



JX1932
.L19
1913-1916

REPORT

OF THE

TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL

LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE

ON

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

MAY 17th, 18th AND 19th

1916

PUBLISHED BY THE

LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

MOHONK LAKE, N. Y.

1916



OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

THE PERMANENT CONFERENCE OFFICE

DANIEL SMILEY

H. C. PHILLIPS, *Secretary*
Mohonk Lake, N. Y.

THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

May 17-19, 1916

President

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, New Haven, Conn.

Secretary

H. C. PHILLIPS, Mohonk Lake, N. Y.

Treasurer

CHESTER DEWITT PUGSLEY, 25 Broad St., New York, N. Y.

Executive Committee

JOHN C. ROSE, Baltimore, *Chairman*

ALBERT K. SMILEY, Mohonk Lake, N. Y., *Secretary*

ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, Argentine Re-
public

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, Worcester,
Mass.

ELMER ELLSWORTH BROWN, New
York

IGNACIO CALDERON, Washington

FRENCH E. CHADWICK, Newport,
R. I.

JOHN B. CLARK, New York

A. B. HUMPHREY, New York

GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, New York

HENRI LA FONTAINE, Brussels, Bel-
gium

FREDERICK LYNCH, New York

JOSEPH B. MOORE, Lansing, Mich.

H. C. PHILLIPS, Mohonk Lake,
N. Y.

GEORGE E. ROBERTS, New York

JAMES BROWN SCOTT, Washington

L. CLARK SEELYE, Northampton,
Mass.

EDWARD A. STEINER, Grinnell, Iowa

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, New
Haven, Conn.

GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, Cam-
bridge, Mass.

Sub-Committee on Platform

JOHN B. CLARK, New York

A. B. HUMPHREY, New York

JAMES BROWN SCOTT, Washington

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, New
Haven, Conn.

GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, Cam-
bridge, Mass.

Finance Committee

THE TREASURER, *ex-officio*, *Chairman*

FREDERICK E. FARNSWORTH, New
York

A. B. FARQUHAR, York, Pa.

ROBERT A. FRANKS, New York

HOWARD B. FRENCH, Philadelphia

ELBERT P. MARSHALL, Cincinnati, O.

J. H. MOORES, Lansing, Mich.

C. A. PUGSLEY, Peekskill, N. Y.

ALEXANDER C. WOOD, Camden, N. J.

Press Committee

ALLAN P. AMES, *The Associated Press*, New York, *Chairman*

GEORGE LOUIS BEER, *The New Republic*, New York

ALBERT E. DUNNING, Boston, Mass.

W. P. HAMILTON, *The Wall Street Journal*, New York

HAROLD J. HOWLAND, *The Independent*, New York

ALBERT E. HOYT, Albany, N. Y.

ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON, New York

N. H. VAN ARSDALE, *The Christian Intelligencer*, New York

FRANCIS G. WICKWARE, *The American Year Book*, New York

STANDING COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

(Appointed in 1902 to enlist the cooperation of leading Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade, etc., in the United States and Canada.)

Chairman, WILLIAM McCARROLL, New York

Secretary, (The Secretary of the Conference acts)

GEORGE FOSTER PEABODY, New York

ELWIN G. PRESTON, Boston

CHARLES RICHARDSON, Philadelphia

ALEXANDER C. WOOD, Camden, N. J.

JAMES WOOD, Mt. Kisco, N. Y.

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF, Philadelphia

PREFACE

The Lake Mohonk Conferences on International Arbitration were founded by Mr. Albert K. Smiley in 1895 for the purpose of creating and directing public sentiment in favor of international arbitration and an international judicial system. To this end they work through annual and representative assemblies, the members of each being entertained by Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Smiley at their summer home at Mohonk Lake, about one hundred miles from New York City. Mr. Smiley maintains a permanent office, in charge of the secretary, through which the annual conferences are arranged and a continuous correspondence conducted.

The Conferences are greatly aided, not only by those who attend them, but also by the official cooperation of nearly two hundred leading chambers of commerce and like bodies throughout the United States, Canada, and other nations, and of a large and widely scattered body of "Correspondents."

The Twenty-second Annual Conference was held in the parlor of the Lake Mohonk Mountain House, May 17, 18 and 19, 1916, with two hundred and thirty-five members in attendance. Six sessions were held, the proceedings of which are given, nearly in full, in this report. The attitude of the Conference on various questions discussed is shown by the Platform (p. 8.)*

The management of the Conference, while providing opportunity for free discussion of matters not foreign to the purpose of the meeting, assumes no responsibility for individual opinions printed herein.

One copy of this report is sent to each member or official correspondent of the Conference, and several thousand copies are mailed to individuals in public and private life, to libraries and to other institutions. Distribution of current reports is free to the limit of the edition, and libraries and public institutions may obtain back numbers without charge except for transportation. Applications for reports, and other correspondence, should be addressed to the Secretary of the Conference.

* The Platform, as the official utterance of each Conference, gains force from a standing rule requiring its adoption only by a substantially unanimous vote.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE.....	229
OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE CONFERENCE.....	2
PREFACE.	4
PLATFORM OF THE CONFERENCE.....	8

First Session

MR. DANIEL SMILEY: <i>Remarks of Welcome</i>	9
HON. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, LL.D., Secretary Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Presiding Officer pro tem: <i>The Form of Agreement and the Cooperation Necessary for the Creation of an International Court of Justice for the Decision of International Disputes</i>	10
HON. JOHN C. ROSE, Judge of the United States District Court of Maryland: <i>Difficulties in the Way of Applying Rules of Individual Morality to the Relations of Independent States</i>	20
REV. LYMAN ABBOTT, D.D., New York: <i>The Pathway to Peace</i> ..	32
MR. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, Law Librarian of Congress: <i>The Adjustment of International Pecuniary Claims: Their Removal From Political to Legal Channels</i>	37
MR. GEORGE R. FAIRLAMB, JR., Winner Pugsley prize in 1915-1916 contest: <i>Essay on International Arbitration</i>	44
<i>Presentation of the Pugsley Prize</i>	50
<i>Discussion</i>	50

Second Session

HON. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, Presiding Officer of the Conference: <i>The Program of the League to Enforce Peace</i>	54
REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, U. S. N., President of the Naval War College, Newport, R. I.: <i>Are Large Armaments Provocative of War?</i>	65
WILLIAM I. HULL, Ph.D., Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College.....	77
REV. CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, D.D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle Church, New York.....	82
JOHN BATES CLARK, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University: <i>Economics and Armaments</i>	86
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, Ph.D., Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University: <i>The Trend of History</i>	89
MR. HAROLD J. HOWLAND, Assistant Editor, <i>The Independent</i> , New York: <i>The Enforcement of Unselfishness: An Analogy</i>	90

Third Session

TOPIC: *The League to Enforce Peace*

MR. HERBERT S. HOUSTON, of New York, Chairman of the Committee on Information of the League to Enforce Peace: <i>Putting Peace on a War Footing</i>	94
---	----

	PAGE
MR. ALPHEUS H. SNOW, of Washington: <i>Cooperation Versus Compulsion in the Organization of the Society of Nations</i>	100
JAMES L. TRYON, Ph.D., Director of the New England Department of the American Peace Society: <i>International Police</i>	108
GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, Litt.D., of New York: <i>International Arbitration and Conciliation</i>	122
GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, LL.D., President of the American Peace Society: <i>The Inconsistency of Trying to Enforce Peace</i>	131
<i>Discussion by:</i>	
MR. W. P. HAMILTON, of the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>	136
MRS. EDWIN D. MEAD, National Secretary of the Woman's Peace Party.	137
HON. THEODORE MARBURG, Ex-Minister to Belgium.....	139

Fourth Session

HON. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: <i>Present Peace Problems and the Preparedness Program</i>	143
EUGENE WAMBAUGH, LL.D., Professor of Law, Harvard University: <i>An International Agreement for Emergencies Arising in War</i>	153
EDWARD B. KREHBIEL, Ph.D., Professor of History, Leland Stanford, Junior, University: <i>Nationalism—An Anachronism?</i>	159
HON. RICHARD BARTHOLDT, formerly Congressman from Missouri: <i>The Elimination of Race Issues by the Substitution of Law for Force</i>	169
MR. EDWARD A. STEINER, Professor of Applied Christianity, Grinnell College: <i>The "Hyphenated American." A Plea for Fair Play</i>	174

Fifth Session

TOPIC: *The Possibility of International Cooperation to Increase Pan-American Influence Against War*

SEÑOR DON IGNACIO CALDERON, Bolivian Minister to the United States: <i>The Pan-American Doctrine</i>	177
HON. WILLIAM P. BORLAND, Member of Congress from Missouri: <i>The Monroe Doctrine as a Factor in International Peace</i>	181
DR. ERNESTO NELSON, formerly Director General of Secondary Technical and Commercial Education of Argentine Republic: <i>Efficient Pan-Americanism</i>	187
MR. WALTER S. PENFIELD, of Washington: <i>Possibilities of Pan-American Cooperation in the Settlement of International Differences</i>	195
<i>Presentation of Conference Platform</i>	203

Sixth Session

HON. GEORGE E. ROBERTS, formerly Director of the United States Mint: <i>The Economic Motive as a Factor in War</i>	207
PHILIP S. MOXOM, D.D., of Springfield, Mass.: <i>Declaration of Business Men Present at the Conference</i>	212
<i>List of Delegates of Business Organizations Present at the Conference</i>	215

CONTENTS

7

	PAGE
MR. CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, Reporter of Decisions, United States Supreme Court: <i>The Limitations of Arbitration Treaties and the "Preparedness" Crisis</i>	216
WILLIAM FREDERICK SLOCUM, LL.D., President of Colorado College: <i>True Preparedness</i>	219
REV. NEHEMIAH BOYNTON, D.D., Pastor of the Clinton Avenue Congregational Church of Brooklyn: <i>The American Spirit in Internationalism</i>	223

APPENDIX A: SPECIAL MEETINGS HELD IN CONNECTION WITH OR DURING THE TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE	234
APPENDIX B: CHRONICLE OF EVENTS, 1915-16.....	235
APPENDIX C: CORRESPONDENTS OF THE PERMANENT OFFICE OF THE CONFERENCE..	245
APPENDIX D: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATING WITH THE CONFERENCE OFFICE.	246

PLATFORM
OF THE
TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL LAKE MOHONK CON-
FERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
1916

(The platform is the official utterance of the Conference and embodies only those principles on which the members unanimously agreed.—Ed.)

The world conditions of the past two years have confirmed the belief, often expressed in these conferences, that arbitral and judicial methods should and must increasingly prevail in settling international disputes.

During the twentieth century the Permanent Court at The Hague has acted upon cases involving questions relating to Europe, Asia, Africa, the Islands of the Pacific, and the three Americas. These questions involved financial and territorial claims, and such fundamental matters as the right to fly the national flag and to exercise jurisdiction over national military forces. These facts are clear testimony to the development of arbitration.

The tendency of this court at The Hague to become in reality permanent is evident from the fact there are seven judges who have sat in four or more of the fifteen cases and one judge who has sat in seven of the fifteen cases.

The Conference desires again to affirm its belief in the desirability of such legislation by Congress as will confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction over all cases arising under treaty provisions or affecting the rights of aliens.

Note: For an important resolution adopted by the official delegates of business organizations, see proceedings of the session.—Ed.

THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

First Session

Wednesday, May 17, 1916, 9:45 A. M.

The Twenty-second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration met in the parlor of the Lake Mohonk Mountain House, Mohonk Lake, N. Y., on the 17th of May, 1916, at 9:45 A. M. About two hundred and forty members were present as the personal guests of Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Smiley. In welcoming them, Mr. Smiley said:

REMARKS BY MR. DANIEL SMILEY

The hour has arrived for the assembling of our conference, and I would say only a few words of welcome and not take up much of your time.

Because of your unselfish and patriotic interest in making the recurrence of armed strife between the nations less frequent, and also because of personal love and affection, you have most hearty welcome from Mrs. Smiley and myself to the Twenty-second Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. With the welcome also, is the expression of grateful thanks to the members of the two conferences who last summer made it possible for us to enjoy such melody, as the choralcelo, your gift, has given us.

That half the world is upside down and our own southern border guarded by numbers rather large to pass for a police force, should not stand in the way of our deliberation. The name by which this conference is designated, presupposes a state of war or at least the serious disagreement which often leads to it. If, in time of peace, we should prepare for war, it ought to be equally true that in time of war we should prepare for peace. (Applause.) For such preparation there was never more urgent need and probably at no time has it ever been more universally or more ardently desired by a world weary of strife. There is need of work to be done, and I am sure that this conference, with its long experience, is well equipped to do its part and will not fail at this time to give a good account of itself.

I am happy to be able to present, as the presiding officer for this morning, HONORABLE JAMES BROWN SCOTT, of Washington, Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Applause.)

THE FORM OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE COOPERATION NECESSARY FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE FOR THE DECISION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

ADDRESS BY HON. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, LL. D.

I do not need to welcome you on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Smiley, to the Twenty-second Annual Conference on International Arbitration, as Mr. Smiley has in gracious and felicitous terms already welcomed you. But, on behalf of the guests whom they have been good enough to invite, I beg to tender Mr. and Mrs. Smiley our sincere thanks for the very great pleasure which their invitation has already given us, and to voice in advance our appreciation of the pleasure which the conference has in store for us. (Applause.)

I shall venture to make some observations upon the general question before attempting to speak, perhaps too briefly indeed, on the topic assigned to me. I would like to show, or at least endeavor to show, that, whatever progress we may be making or whatever lack of progress may be noted, it is inevitable that we shall accomplish what we are trying to do, and, whether it takes a long time or a short time, the goal which we have before us we must eventually reach. In order to make this appear a little clearer, I beg to submit some observations on three points. I would like to call your attention to the fact, which we well know, that society exists, meaning by that international society, that the very existence of society implies law, to regulate the rights and duties of the members of this society, and that, finally, in order to ascertain this law, in order to interpret this law, and, in order to apply it to the concrete case as it arises, it is necessary that there be an authoritative agency to ascertain this law, and to apply it not merely to the members who happen to be in conflict, or whose rights happen to be doubtful and the subject of litigation, but also to all members of the society of nations, because the agency created for the ascertainment and administration of law is the agency, not only of the two nations or persons in litigation, but also of the society as a whole.

Without going into details, let me ask your attention to two or three very important observations of clear-minded, clear-

sighted thinkers, whose views have stood not only the test of time but the shock and the fall of empires and are to-day as unquestioned as when they were first promulgated. Aristotle, writing some twenty-two centuries ago, says that man is driven to society or to form society by what he calls the social instinct or the impulse to society. He says, furthermore, that man is a political animal. It follows necessarily, in his conception, and it has been so in all the ages of which we have knowledge, that man not only forms society, but that he forms political society, and that this society, organized for a political purpose, forms what we call roughly and loosely, without stopping to define it, the state. Now, the state, no matter how high sounding the title may be which it bears or whatever the form of government which may control the rights and duties of its members, is nothing more nor less than the people composing this state. Whatever the idea in the past may have been, it is abundantly clear in the present and in this western world of ours that the state is created and exists for the benefit of the people, not the people for the benefit of the state; that the form of government is created for the benefit of the people, and that when a particular form of government created for a particular end has failed it is according to a famous Declaration whose day is not yet run, the right and the duty of the people to discard that form of government, to choose or to devise another better calculated to effect the aims and purposes for which society was formed, and also for which this particular form of society, this particular government was formed. The Declaration, which I have ventured to paraphrase rather than to quote, for I do not have its text before me, goes on to say that there are certain inalienable rights for whose preservation government is formed, that among these are the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that, when this form of government has failed, as I have said, to protect the rights of the people, it is the right, it is the duty of the people to change it, and, in the light of their experience, to establish a new form of government better calculated to accomplish the purpose which the framers of that government had in mind.

Now these are very simple and commonplace truths, with which we in this country have been familiar from our earliest childhood, but they are essential to the well-being of society and to the well-being of mankind, because, if properly understood and interpreted, the result is that states, however high and mighty they may be in their own conceit, are the creatures of the people and of their successors who made them, that the various forms of government are created to give effect to the rights of the people and to control the governors by prescribing for them duties. In other words, in this simple conception with

which we are so familiar the state is the creature of law and is subordinated to law. Its rights and duties are tested by law, because the rights and the duties of the state have been created by law, and I beg to inform you, and I ask you to believe, that if this very simple doctrine I have laid before you and which is, as you know, based upon the Declaration of Independence of the United States, should make its way not merely into the western part of the world, but into the world at large, there would be a revolution in thought and in practice such as the world has rarely seen, and it would be a revolution in thought and practice which would make for the happiness of mankind.

The second point that I wish to lay before you is that if society is organized because of the social instinct and because of the fact that man is a political animal, it is necessary that there be law in order that the members of the society may be kept together, their rights conserved and their duties performed. Aristotle expresses this in the simple phrase that justice is the bond of men in states and Cicero very briefly but happily says "*ubi societas, ibi jus,*" that is to say, where there is society, there is law, or, as the French put it, "who says society, says law." In other words, society in the sense in which the term has always been used and defined by political thinkers from the days of Aristotle to the present time, is synonymous with law, is unthinkable without law. We say very frequently that justice is the great essential, and properly, because law to be permanent and to serve its great purpose must be based upon justice. But justice is a very treacherous conception. To one man it may mean one thing, to another, quite the reverse, and, if every person is to determine justice, we may have as many conceptions as there are minds or interests of men and of women. Therefore, what we desire and what we must have for society is not merely the individual conception of justice but what we may call the collective sense of justice; that is, we must have the sense of the community concerning justice. In other words, we must have what we may call community justice. How are we to obtain this? The great Selden says, speaking of equity, in terms which may be applied to justice, that it is a roguish thing, whereas for law we have a measure and know what to expect; that equity varies as the chancellor's conscience or as the chancellor's foot; that one chancellor has a large foot; another has a small foot, and still another an indifferent foot. As with equity, so with the conscience and so with justice, the conception may vary. Therefore, it is in the interest of the community that we have a community standard which may perhaps not be so high as the standard of the individual, certainly not so high as the standard of the advanced individual or as the standard of the select few, but nevertheless something which

represents the conscience of the community, something which is definite, something which is authoritative because prescribed by the community and to which we can refer as the measure and standard of right and wrong. Therefore, in any society, in order that justice may be a reality, instead of a hope or a dream, we must transmute the conceptions of the individual or the conceptions of the individuals into the conceptions of the community, and we must ordain that which, when ordained, shall stand as the law, whether it be the written law or whether it be the unwritten law of that community. In order that it may, when perfected, bring forth its full fruit, it must be a law which has reference to morality, which has reference to what we are pleased to call justice without defining it, and which shall change and take on a higher and nobler form with the advance of the community as a whole.

How is this law to be brought into being? We have states formed of persons drawn together by the social instinct. We have the same people composing these different states drawn together, because of the social instinct and the political impulse, into a society of states. There has thus grown up international as distinct from national society; there has grown up what we roughly and loosely call a society of nations composed necessarily of these same men and women who, taken in smaller artificial groups within the state, form these states. Now, if we examine the fundamental laws or the fundamental conceptions of each of the states of the society of nations we find that they are similar, if not wholly identical, because every state that makes a pretense to civilization, no matter what its geographical location or its form of government may be, recognizes and assures to its inhabitants some four or five fundamental concepts. They are properly termed fundamental, because all other provisions of their laws can be based upon and derived from them, even although these conceptions, which I have ventured to call fundamental, may be considered the culmination of a development extending from primitive man to the present day. These fundamental conceptions are the right to life, the right to liberty, in the language of the Declaration of Independence, the right to the pursuit of happiness, the right to equality before the law, the right to property and the right to the enjoyment of these rights. If the right to their enjoyment be not secured, they are but worthless things. They are at best but aspirations; they are not realities. Now, if Aristotle is correct, that justice is the bond of men in states, and if Cicero's statement is correct that where there is society, there is law, and if the French expression of it be accepted, "who says society, says law," it must necessarily follow that if the individual state has law, the society of nations, however loose it may be, must likewise

have law. The one is the law of the state and is known as national law; the law of the society of nations will be the law of the nations imposing it, which we may therefore call the law of nations or international law. But, inasmuch as the society of nations is composed of the same men and women making up the states, we are justified in assuming, in believing and in expecting that these fundamental concepts familiar to every man and woman and, I may say, child in the states, will one day be pushed across the national boundary or the frontier of the state into the international area. In other words, these fundamental conceptions of every state and familiar to every man, woman and child in the state will, little by little, be forced or force their way across national boundaries into the society of nations and be accepted as the fundamental conceptions of the society of nations, because they are the fundamental conceptions of the men and women forming each state which is in turn a member of the society of nations.

It is dangerous to indulge in prophecy, particularly in political prophecy—Mr. Lowell advises us in his Bigelow Papers not to prophesy unless we know—but I may at least be permitted to express the hope, which is in the nature of a belief, that in no distant date these four or five fundamental principles which I have ventured to lay down as the fundamental conception of the law of each state, proclaiming or pretending to be civilized will become the fundamental conception between and among the states because they have been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States and declared to be fundamental rights and duties of the United States towards the sovereign independent and equal nations forming the society of nations. In support of this prediction, which perhaps it would be more modest to call a hope, I beg leave to read you a rather summary formulation of these rights and duties of nations, which are the fundamental conceptions of the municipal law of each state or nation translated into terms of international law by the Supreme Court of the United States, and which are to be found in the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall, his illustrious associates and successors.

(1) “Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence, but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.” This fundamental principle is laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Chinese Exclusion case, decided in 1888.*

(2) “Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to

* 130 U. S. Reports, pp. 581, 588.

develop itself without interference or control from other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states."

(3) "Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim, and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them." Numbers 2 and 3 are based upon the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of the *Antelope*, decided in 1825.*

(4) "Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all persons, whether native or foreign, found therein;" a principle based upon the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the famous case of the Schooner *Exchange*, decided in 1812.†

(5) "Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all to observe." This broad principle was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of the *United States v. Arjona*,‡ by Chief Justice Waite, speaking for a unanimous court, and, as this principle is so fundamental and all embracing, I feel that I would be justified in reading—indeed, I would not be justified did I fail to read you the passage from the judgment, because the presence of one word in the above paragraph might perhaps suggest that it was interpolated by the speaker if I did not quote the material portion of the opinion. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the court, said:

But if the United States can require this of another, that other may require it of them, because international obligations are of necessity reciprocal in their nature. The right, if it exists at all, is given by the law of nations, and what is law for one is, under the same circumstances, law for the other. A right secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its people, is one the United States as the representatives of this nation are bound to protect.

(6) "International law is at one and the same time both national and international: national in the sense that it is the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles." The far-reaching principle

* 10. Wheaton's Reports, pp. 66, 122.

† 7 Cranch's Reports, pp. 116, 136-7.

‡ 120 U. S. Reports, pp. 479, 487.

which I have last read is to be found in the case of the *Paquete Habana*,* decided in the year 1899 by the Supreme Court.

Instead of asking you whether or not you accept these principles as universal and fundamental I am in the very fortunate position of asking if you accept the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States; for, if you accept the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, you have the fundamental conceptions upon which the law of nations is and must be based and which are seen to be the fundamental conceptions of the individual state, translated into terms of international law by the Supreme Court and laid down by it as fundamental provisions.

Accepting these, as we must, as a basis for the structure upon which the temple of international justice is to be reared, I ask you to follow me while I endeavor very briefly to show how these principles may be embodied into the law of nations, if they are not already regarded as forming an integral part thereof, and how rules of conduct formed upon these principles and designed to give them effect can be adopted by the society of nations.

To make law, there must or should be according to modern practice a law-making body. Is there one for the society of nations? There is at least in embryo in the Hague Conference, first called in 1899 and next assembled in 1907. This body is not a legislature in the national sense of the word, because it is the organ of the society of nations, composed of states not having or not recognizing a superior. The Conferences are formed of representatives of nations willing to take part in them, and they have drafted and laid before the participating nations a series of recommendations which have been given the form and effect of law by the appropriate national body in each of the states, and ratifications thereof have been deposited at The Hague. By this process, differing in form but hardly in result from the action of a parliament, the principles contained in the drafts, recommended by a conference, not imposed by a parliament, have become the recognized conventional or statutory law of nations. Now, if a rudimentary society exists, and I shall ask you to believe that it does, this society must of necessity have a law, and I have tried to show you, with what success you must yourselves judge, that there is at least in being the foundations of the law for the society. If there must be some formal body in order to develop and to perfect the law, in order that it may be adequate to the needs of the nations, there is, I beg to assure you, one in being, which, if not perfect or

* 175 U. S. Reports, pp. 677, 700.

adequate, can be perfected: The Hague Conferences, with recommendatory, not legislating powers. (Applause.)

Admitting the existence of the society, the law of the society, and a rudimentary law-making body, there must be some organ of the society to find, to interpret and to apply the law of the society in disputes between and among its members, and this organ, acting in the name of the society, must authoritatively find, interpret and apply the law, so as to bind, not merely the members in controversy, but all members of the society and indeed the society itself. This organ, everywhere existing within national lines, is, need I say it, a court of justice, and one of the great projects of the Mohonk Conference is and must be, as it is the hope of mankind, to endow the society of nations with an international court of justice, authoritatively to find, to interpret, to apply principles of international justice to international disputes.

Much progress has already been made towards the creation of an international court for the society of nations. Arbitration, introduced into the modern practice of nations by the Jay Treaty of 1794, has borne good fruit, such good fruit indeed that it is seen to be possible for nations to submit their controversies to other nations having little or no interest in the settlement of the dispute, but having a deep and enlightened interest that the dispute between nations be settled peaceably. At the First Hague Conference in 1899, arbitration was, so to speak, internationalized, a method of appointing arbiters proposed, a list of arbiters furnished from which or from whom a temporary tribunal of arbitration might be created and a code of procedure drafted to be applied by the nations in dispute should they not adopt or choose to adopt some other form of procedure. In 1907 a proposal was made by the American delegation to the Second Hague Conference to create as the organ of the society of nations and as its conscious organ a permanent international court of justice, called the Court of Arbitral Justice, to be composed of permanent judges acting under a sense of judicial responsibility, to ascertain the law of nations, to interpret the law of nations and to apply the law of nations to the concrete case as it arises; to be in existence before the outbreak of the dispute, not to need to be created after the outbreak of the dispute, when it is difficult, if not impossible, adequately to create such a court. An agreement was reached at that Conference upon thirty-five articles outlining the organization, the jurisdiction and the procedure of such a tribunal, but, by reason of the shortness of the time, the difficulty and the alleged novelty of the subject, the representatives of the forty-four nations taking part in the Conference were unable to hit upon a method of appointing the judges acceptable to all the powers; but the project itself was

adopted and the Conference recommended that the nations through diplomatic channels hit upon a method of appointing the judges and thereupon constitute the court at The Hague for such nations as might care to do so.

Let me suggest in closing the form of an agreement by which I believe it is feasible to constitute this great and beneficent institution. I think we approach it with bated breath; we look upon it as too high, too dignified, too far removed from us; we feel awed by its difficulties instead of dwelling upon the progress already made and seeing how simple the problem really is if the nations only wish to meet and to solve it. By way of illustration, let me lay before you some details of the Universal Postal Union, which was created many years ago and the last convention of which was revised in 1906 at Rome. The nations and their self-governing colonies have formed a postal union, thereby showing that sovereignty was not involved in such a union, for if it were, self-governing colonies, which are not sovereign, would not have been admitted. By Article 19 of the Postal Convention, the contracting parties, in this case the nations of the world, declare that any dispute between the postal administrations created by the treaty or any dispute concerning the meaning or application of the convention is to be settled by a board of arbitration composed of three members. They define the method of selecting its members, providing that one arbiter is to be appointed by each of the disputants and the third by the two arbiters conjointly. Therefore, my recommendation is that, instead of attempting to federate the world, we form a judicial union similar to the postal union, investing it with the jurisdiction of justiciable disputes between states as such disputes may be defined and decided by a court of justice and have been repeatedly defined and decided by the Supreme Court of the United States; that the judicial union have as its organ the court; that its judgment bind all members of the union, whether they are parties to the particular dispute or not; that the court be composed of judges instead of arbiters acting under a sense of judicial responsibility; and that the judges, in the exercise of their functions, interpret or pass upon international law which the parties may, if they choose, prescribe for the particular case, as was done by Great Britain and the United States in the Alabama dispute, or which may be developed and perfected by the Hague Conferences meeting periodically. Finally, I would venture to suggest that, in the clause of the agreement constituting the court it be provided that a nation, which we may call the plaintiff in the case, believing it has a justiciable dispute, should be permitted to lay this dispute before the court, that the court, as courts do and must, should take cognizance of it and decide whether, in its opinion, it is or is not a jus-

ticable dispute. If it decided that the dispute is justiciable, that the court thereupon invite, not summon, the other party or nation, to appear and litigate the case; that this other party, called the defendant, be permitted to appear or to refuse to appear as in its wisdom or in its unwisdom it may determine; that, if it appears, the case proceeds to judgment; if it does not appear, the case likewise proceeds to judgment if the plaintiff so desires in the absence of the defendant, and that the execution of the judgment, whether it be reached in the presence or absence of the defendant, properly invited, be left to the good faith of the nation under the persuasive pressure of public opinion. This procedure is based upon the experience of the United States and follows the practice of its Supreme Court. There is no clause in the Constitution nor in the Federal Statutes which permits a state of the American Union to hale another state of the American Union and to compel by force its appearance before the Supreme Court, although the court may take jurisdiction of disputes between the states of the American Union and, in the absence of the defendant state, properly summoned, may render judgment; and there is no clause in the Constitution nor provision in a Federal Statute permitting a state or the Supreme Court or the United States to enforce a decision of the court against a state in favor of another state. Indeed, there is a decision of the Supreme Court to the contrary, still unquestioned, much less overruled. I refer to the case of *Kentucky vs. Dennison*, decided in 1860, and to be found in the 24th volume of Howard's Reports, which holds that there is no power in the United States or in any department thereof to coerce a state of the Union to execute a judgment against such state rendered or delivered by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Therefore I suggest that in providing judicial machinery for this very loose union of states which we call the society of nations, we do not lay upon it a greater burden or require of it greater perfection than has been found necessary to enable the Supreme Court of the United States to fulfill its beneficent mission, that we go from the known to the unknown for the procedure and practice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the results of such procedure and practice are known, whereas the procedure, practice of an international court and results thereof are unknown, that we begin very modestly and trust to experience, in the confident belief that if experience shows force to be necessary to the success of an international judiciary the nations will in their wisdom and as the result of their experience hit upon the kind of force and the method of employing it best suited to the society of nations, so that in the long run due process of law may obtain between states as between

man and man, and that the disputes of nations shall be settled by principles of justice, as disputes between man and man within nations are settled by the application of principles of justice. (Applause.)

The next thing on the program is the report of the Treasurer of the Conference, MR. CHESTER DEWITT PUGSLEY.

REPORT BY MR. CHESTER DEWITT PUGSLEY, TREASURER

After presenting a detailed report, showing receipts during the year of \$2,207.45 and disbursements of \$2,123.56, with a balance of \$83.89, MR. PUGSLEY said:

I might say, for the information of those who have not been here before, that since the foundation of the conferences, the members have assumed the publication of the proceedings. About 10,000 to 12,000 copies are printed each year and widely distributed throughout the country. Mr. Smiley defrays the expense of a permanent office, but the expense of publishing these proceedings he permits the members to defray.

MR. DANIEL SMILEY announced the officers of the Conference, a list of whom will be found on page 2 of this report.

The CHAIRMAN: HON. JOHN C. ROSE, Judge of the United States District Court of Maryland, will speak to you this morning upon the Difficulties in the Way of Applying Rules to Individual Morality to the Relations of Independent States. Applause.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF APPLYING RULES OF INDIVIDUAL MORALITY TO THE RELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT STATES

ADDRESS BY HON. JOHN C. ROSE

After listening to the eloquent eulogium on law so satisfactory to one whose daily business is to deal with law, one cannot forget Hooker's summary of the whole subject, "Law has her seat in the bosom of God, her voice in the harmony of the world." But so as not to have the harmony too oppressive and not to discredit the preceding speaker as a prophet too soon, I should call attention to the fact that if the Supreme Court has had less trouble than the new court will have, the former for 127 years has enjoyed a privilege which I do not understand the new court ever will have, that is, it may make its executions effective, if not upon the state, upon the individuals who compose states.

That certainly simplifies the work of the Supreme Court considerably. (Laughter.)

The moral law governing the conduct of individuals is summed up in the Golden Rule and the second of the great commandments; they are simple enough, very easy to understand, very hard to obey. They tell us how we should treat John Smith, but then John Smith is one man. Would they make our course plain toward a stranger from Mars who combined in one body two or more separate brains, souls and appetites, which at the moment we were called upon to act were in violent controversy with one another?

Was France justified in aiding us to break loose from England? Were we right in helping the Cubans to freedom? France had many times recognized the British title to the thirteen colonies. We had oft admitted Spain's sovereignty over what she once called "The Ever Faithful Isle." There are shelves of books which try to tell us when international law justifies one state in aiding rebels against another. Neither their practical wisdom nor their ethical soundness is now to be questioned. It is enough for the purpose in hand that they recognize that a nation cannot always be treated as if it were an individual.

Almost everything connected with the Panama episode of 1903 is disputed. Nevertheless, I shall assume the people who then lived in that part of the Republic of Colombia wanted the canal. Those of them who were of enlightened patriotism and broad vision, saw their land, long so poor, so backward, so isolated and so pestilence ridden, made rich, brought into living touch with the centers of the world's thought and the world's endeavor. To them it would seem that great would be the educational advantage of front seats along the highway through which, in a never ceasing procession the world's commerce moves from ocean to ocean. Some of them may have realized even then that there would be done all that medical science and skill could do to make healthy that which had been deadly. Grant that, in Panama as everywhere, such souls were few. Human nature is pretty much the same under every parallel of latitude and every color of skin. The canal would cost at least a quarter of a billion. Panama had then about the same population as one of our Congressional Districts has now. Imagine, if you can, how any such district would long for the opening in its midst, not of a single pork barrel, but of a whole collection of hogsheads of that nourishing dainty. Pride of Colombian nationality had never been very strong among them. Panama had formerly been an independent republic. It had tried at intervals to become one again. The Colombia Congress had rejected the treaty which would have made the canal at Panama a certainty. Many influential Americans favored the selection of the Nicaraguan

route. If something was not done at once, the hogsheads in question might be carried North, never to return. Then Panama's opportunity to become the gateway for the shipping of the world would be gone forever. The reasons why Colombia refused to ratify the treaty were purely financial. In the judgment of the Colombians the price offered by the United States was too small. If the people of Panama had acted according to our custom, they would have called a meeting of protest in the Faneuil or Carnegie Hall of Colon or Panama, or would have gotten up a procession which would take eleven hours to pass the reviewing stand. But fashions between the Rio Grande and the Orinoco are not the same as in colder climes. The citizens of Panama started a revolution. What does the Golden Rule tell us we should have done? We might have helped the Colombian Government. We might have aided the insurgents, or we might have kept hands off and let them fight it out. Many feel that various moral considerations should have had more weight in determining what we did than they actually had. That is apart from the matter in hand. For the present purpose it is sufficient that if we had wished to act according to the principles of New Testament morality, we should have had to make up our mind who were the individuals we were bound to do unto as we would that they should do unto us, and who were the neighbors we were to love as ourselves. Was that love to be bestowed on the Colombian Government, on the people of Panama or upon the world at large to whom the canal would be so useful?

Since the fall of 1910 a number of different personages have held the City of Mexico for intervals of time, longer or shorter, mostly the latter. Not more than one of them came into such power as he exercised in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of his country. During the whole period large portions of the land were devastated by war. Civil war is bad enough. Guerilla war is worse, but a civil war carried on by guerillas is the most destructive of all wars, as it is the most demoralizing. The Golden Rule does not tell us what we should have done or should do about it, or whether we should have done or should do anything. It forbids our acting, or for that matter our refraining from acting from any selfish motive of our own. We might believe that we would serve the Mexican people by intervening with force enough to restore order. In that we might be mistaken. If we act upon that belief, we may cause more misery than we will cure. But if the motive named was in fact the only one we had, intervention would contravene no recognized rule of individual morality.

To spend time in pointing out that a nation is not one man, but many, is to labor the obvious. But plain as it is, does it not lie at the root of many difficulties in the way of conducting

international relations in accordance with the highest ethical standards of individual conduct? Why is it that in all ages and in all lands, many men, very possibly the great majority of all men, have been willing to do for their country, their race, their tribe, their faith, their party or their faction, and in our day, for their labor union or even for their corporation, things they would shrink from doing for themselves? We feel sure that in most cases we are right in condemning this attitude of mind. We are inclined to believe that it is never really defensible. Nevertheless, it is and always will be so general and instinctive that any plan for reducing or abolishing wars and the causes of wars must take it into account. It is true, when things are done for some group of which the doer is a member, self-gratification in some form usually plays its part. Any altruistic purpose may be pretence none the less that it deceives the man who makes it. Corporations do crooked things for the good of the widows and orphans who hold their stock. A foreigner might think that widows and orphans were the only American capitalists. The dirty work of politics is done to keep dangerous men out of office. The surest way to keep them out is to keep yourselves in.

In most political assassinations vanity and a craving for notoriety play a greater part than love of kin and country. The statesman who plunges his people into war may not be unmindful of the added fame and power he will get from its successful outcome. It is not easy to think of Henry the VIII or Louis the XIV as champions of pure religion and undefiled, or indeed of purity of any sort. When the many wived Defender of the Faith sent heretics to the fires of Smithfield, and the most Catholic but much distressed Louis the Great let loose his Dragoons on those of the Religion, each believed he was atoning for some of those sins of the flesh which did so easily beset him. Nevertheless, the Bosnian boy whose pistol shots at Sarajevo were the cause, the occasion or the pretext of the present worldwide slaughter, felt he was serving his race and through it, mankind, precisely as did the mighty Apostle of Blood and Iron, who to force a war in which he knew thousands of lives would be lost, garbled his Sovereign's harmless telegram until it rang out like a challenge.

Henry of England and Louis of France thought that in persecuting those whose opinions differed from their own they were doing the Almighty an acceptable service. They so believed because far better and abler men than either of them had long preached that even worse horrors might be to the greater glory of God.

One who would read exceptions into the moral law must be very sure of the soundness of his judgment. Yet, there remains the question, why there is so general a tendency to distinguish in

practice between individual and group morality. Some of the reasons are plain enough. An ill man asks you how he is. If you say nothing, much more, if you tell the truth, it will take away the slight chance that he had. A falsehood may save his life. The more people for whom one is acting, the more frequent and serious are the problems presented by the conflict of moralities.

The English seizure of the Danish Fleet of 1807 was a mistake, as well as a crime. Suppose, however, that the facts had really been as the English Ministry at the time represented them to be and probably thought they were. As they pictured the conditions, Denmark had a fine fleet. If Napoleon added it to his own, England's command of the seas would be imperilled. In a few weeks or months he would take it, no matter what Denmark did or tried to do. Under such circumstances would England have been justified in compelling Denmark to put its fleet into English keeping?

Frederick the Great found out that France, Austria, Russia and Saxony were about to crush him. If he waited until they were ready to strike, his ruin was sure. He solved the problem in David Harum's way. He rushed upon Saxony first. Settle for yourselves whether he was right or wrong. The ordinary rules governing the conduct of the individual members of civilized communities will not help you much in reaching your conclusion. If you or I had reason to believe that somebody had planned to break into our house and steal the spoons, we would tell the police. A nation which fears another, and perhaps a stronger, is about to invade it, has no police to tell.

With the possible exceptions of Italy and Bulgaria, every one of the powers engaged in the present war says it is fighting to ward off an assault which was about to be made on it or its friends. All or nearly all of their people are sure that they are slaying and being slain in a defensive war. Such a belief is possible because attack may be the only effective defense. In consequence of these mutual fears and suspicions, eleven out of every eighteen inhabitants of the globe are now at war. One-half of those who are not are Chinamen or Mexicans, neither of whose countries has recently been enjoying unbroken peace. Has the future the promise of better things?

Belgium charged that it is the victim of a crime against international law and Christian ethics. Germany replied that whether its invasion of Belgium was or was not a technical violation of a formal right, nevertheless it was the most effective, if not the only way in which it could defend itself against an unjust and dangerous attack aimed at its very existence as a nation. We, speaking through our President, said that we have no right even to form an opinion upon the issues thus made. It follows that

every state, no matter how peaceable and well governed it may be, must depend for its protection upon its own strength and upon that alone. It may not hope for even so much as moral support from any terrestrial power, unless it can convince some other nation that the latter's own selfish interests are in peril. Can we imagine a group of men and women with such a conception of individual rights and duties? They would not be pleasant people to live with. Was it upon moral grounds that the United States took the stand it did? Some of the President's language may be understood as answering this question in the affirmative. If so, have we not said that in some respects the moral code of individuals is not applicable to the relations of states? In all organized societies, one individual is entitled to the help of others in defending his life and property against unjust attack.

Still another question: in the world of to-day, how can the rules of individual morality be applied to relations between well governed and powerful nations, and backward, decadent or disorderly peoples? You may think that no nation has a right to make itself guardian of another, or you may believe that in a sense and to a degree, every state is its brother's keeper. In either case, puzzling problems arise. It is often said that a weak nation should be treated as if it were a strong one. That depends on what we mean by "weak." If strength and weakness have reference to comparative power in things material, the statement is true. Belgium, civilized, intelligent, orderly, well governed and with a contented and patriotic population, was entitled to have its rights respected as fully and as scrupulously as if it had been as powerful as either Germany or France. If, on the other hand, the weakness is in the moral and intellectual qualities of the state, the truth of the instant proposition is by no means obvious. There have been countries, the government of which for long periods of time has been wretched. Neither life nor property has been safe. The larger part of their citizens or subjects were miserable and were miserably treated. In private life we distinguish between the two sorts of weakness. A cripple or an invalid has his rights as fully respected as are those of Mr. Jess Willard or Mr. Frank Moran, but if anybody, from lack of moral or mental self-control makes himself a nuisance to others, a limit is put upon his powers of annoyance. Everybody feels it right to lock him up. Why is it that when some disorderly and badly governed state is dealt with in a somewhat similar fashion many, if not most of us, feel that complete moral justification is lacking? The state which acts is seldom under any clear duty to do so. The action taken is nearly always troublesome and expensive. Sometimes it is dangerous as well. No state is prone to undertake the task unless it has some

special purpose of its own to serve. If successful, that purpose is usually attained. All that was done then seems to lack moral sanction. The high pretences under which the mission was entered upon appear to have been mere hypocrisy. We feel that there is justice in the query of the weaker to the stronger state, "Who made thee a judge over me?"

Moreover, in modern life as in feudal days, there is likely to be a contest over the profits of wardship. Powerful nations have often been on the verge of war over such disputes. Not infrequently neither of them wanted anything of the disorderly state. The one which moved first did so because it thought the other was about to. A high court of chancery of the world might do for incompetent and troublesome nations what among us chancellors have always done for lunatics, idiots, and drunkards, though even then, I suppose, there might be some rivalry as to who should be appointed committee, receiver or trustee. The Monroe Doctrine is not much to the liking of some who have at past conferences here spoken. It has at least kept this hemisphere free from the dangerous competition for the rewards of guardianship.

The lack of any law enforceable upon sovereign states raises problems unlike in kind, as well as in degree to those which have to be dealt with in the relations of citizens of the same state. An individual may own property which may be needed for a public use. He may not have the slightest interest in the proposed improvement, or may for some reason be violently opposed to it. He may be warmly attached to the property required, and very unwilling to exchange it for any amount of money. Nevertheless, we feel that in a court of conscience, as well as in one of law, he must yield. If he be paid a fair market value for what is taken from him, justice has been done to him as well as to the community. If Colombia had been an individual, every one would have felt that it was right to compel her to permit the digging of the canal. Was it wrong, because she was a sovereign state? There was certainly no tribunal anywhere which had the recognized right to say that the land was needed for a public use, and if it was, what was its reasonable worth. It was not the first nor the millionth time in which the lack of legal machinery adequate to do complete justice has led to trouble, nor will it by a like margin be the last. Such a lack leads to a confusion as to what is or what is not morally justifiable. Because no effective legal machinery has ever been constructed to compel any independent state to give to the wants and wishes of another any consideration other than it is willing to concede, there are many who suppose it is under no moral obligation so to do. If so, the rules of private morality do not apply to states.

Since slavery has gone out of fashion, we all agree that an

individual cannot by any agreement be made to surrender his title to the equal protection of the laws. He cannot by contract deprive himself of the fundamental rights possessed by all others. One state may be forced to agree to something which restricts it from doing that which other states may freely do. By the Treaty of Paris of 1856, Russia promised not to keep war vessels in the Black Sea. She took advantage of the Franco-Prussian War to announce that she would no longer regard the limitation as binding upon her. To look upon solemn treaties as scraps of paper was then, as now, both immoral and dangerous. Yet, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, there should be some way of ending an agreement which in course of time has become unjust or oppressive. He suggested that it should be made a principle of international law that no state could by treaty deprive itself of the right to do anything that was lawful to other states. American constitutional law recognizes an almost identical principle. Congress may refuse to admit a territory into the Union as a state, but if the territory is let in at all, it must come in on equal terms with the other states. Congress cannot by an agreement with New Mexico or Idaho, prevent them from exercising every right possessed by Massachusetts and Virginia.

The municipal law of every progressive state is always changing. It must, if it is to serve the public weal. It is often necessary to alter some legal rule because it unduly favors special classes or individuals. Unanimous consent to the amendment cannot be hoped for. Nobody feels it is morally required. In this respect is the moral code of individuals inapplicable to states? There is today no recognized means, other than war, for making any independent state do anything it does not want to. The same rule prevailed in the Polish Diet, and Poland ceased to be. Is there any way out so long as each state retains its absolute and unqualified sovereignty?

An individual is not bound either legally or morally by a promise extorted by force or threats. Is a state? It does not feel that it is, yet many of the most important treaties were forced by the victor upon the vanquished. An individual may get the courts to set aside a bargain made under duress. A state may not. An individual may be forced to do justice. Except by war, a state cannot be.

Should Alsace-Lorraine be French or German? The larger part, if not all, the territory included in these Provinces was once German. The greater part of their people are of German blood and speech. France gained title to large portions of them in all sorts of irregular and unjust ways. But their people, prior to 1870, had become French in feeling. There was no tribunal which could say to which country they rightfully belonged. Germany took them by force in 1871, and France has ever since

longed for the day in which she could take them back. If there had been some impartial or disinterested tribunal, with the recognized right to pass on this dispute, the world might today be at peace. Certainly the line-up of the antagonists would not have been the same. Germany and France each think that their right to the disputed lands is morally perfect. Neither has any way, other than war, to secure what it believes to be justice, and men have died off every shore, from the Cocos Islands to the Falklands, and in every land, from China to Ireland.

Some parts of Alsace-Lorraine had been French for more than two centuries. None of them had been German at any time within seventy-five years. There are no parliaments to enact international statutes of limitations; no courts to frown upon stale claims. The rights asserted by some of the Balkan States to sections of that troubled Peninsula have not been exercised since the fall of Constantinople, more than four hundred and sixty years ago, or the fatal Field of the Black Birds sixty-four years earlier. We do not think well of one who pleads limitations to his grocer's or tailor's bills, but for all that, such statutes make greatly for the peace of society.

In countless other ways the lack of any organized government of states makes their moral problems more complex and difficult than those that individuals have to solve. Doubtless every one of the governments now at war would like to come out of it with some gains to compensate at least in part for the sacrifices made. Yet, it is highly probable that all of them would gladly obey a command to lay down their arms at once, and replace every boundary stone where it stood on the 23rd of July, 1914, provided the order came from some source both able and willing to guarantee that those boundaries will not thereafter be changed without their consent, and that each of them will be safe from attack from any of the others. The fundamental difficulty in the way of peace is, that each of the strong belligerents fears a new attack at some time when it may be even less able to defend itself than it now is.

Can any nation feel sure it will never be at war? It is no answer to say, as some here may be ready to say, that war, offensive, defensive, or any other sort, is always wrong. Every statesman must keep in mind that only a small minority of his people are prepared to say that they are for peace at any price. He may suspect that not all of those would act in accordance with the principle they profess, if some cause in which their feelings were warmly enlisted could not be saved otherwise than by battle. Any war is itself so far a negation of every fundamental ethical conception, that it is impossible to find a logical basis to sustain on moral grounds any limitations on what may be done in its prosecution. Many atrocities generally perpetrated on the

vanquished have gone out of fashion. Yet, have not many things been done since August 1st, 1914, which can be justified, if at all, only on the assumption that every belligerent is entitled to do anything, the doing of which it thinks would make its victory surer or speedier?

Was it not De Quincy who said if a man allowed himself to commit murder he might some day come down to lying? Soldiers might agree with him. Many who would kill an enemy without hesitation and risk their own lives without a tremor, shrink from becoming spies. They do not like the falsehood and deception which are an inevitable part of a spy's work. It is true John André and Nathan Hale were spies. Both of them were caught. Men of their sort are likely to be caught. Is it worth while to use such tools for such work? Is it not a job for another sort of man, say one whose daily walk and conversation has made him a master of the fine art of lying? There is only one drawback: the general who employs such an adept may have doubts as to the side for which he is spying.

War does not fit in well with the ethics of peace. There is a legal maxim that one who does a thing through the agency of another does it himself. Sir George Warrington was no mean judge of what a gentleman should be. His respect for Sir Henry Clinton as a gentleman was as great as his appreciation of his generalship was small. It was Sir Henry Clinton who sent André on his fatal mission. Harry Warrington's General was a far greater man. It was at Washington's request that Hale went in disguise into the British lines. Is it surprising that to prevent war, or to insure victory in a war which seems probable, statesmen feel justified in doing in time of peace immoral things?

We assume that absolute independence and unlimited sovereignty are normal attributes of every fully recognized member of the families of nations. That conception now seems fundamental. In our day, every people which feels itself a nation insists upon maintaining such independence and sovereignty, if it has them, or seeks to get them if it has not. Only a few years ago Norway broke the loose and slender ties which since 1815 had bound it to Sweden. There never has been an organized independent Irish State. Within these last few weeks we have seen that there are many Irishmen who repudiate any measure of home rule which stops short of absolute independence. No statesman can close his eyes to facts like these. Yet a mere propounder of questions may ask whether a nation may not be happy, although it has surrendered the right to do in all things that which at the moment pleases it best.

Tribal and racial prejudices are as old as man. The idea that every nation should be sovereign and independent is comparatively new. In the fifteen centuries between Augustus and

Luther, men did not have it. Until about the time of the Reformation, they felt that all civilized and Christian folk were, in temporal as well as in spiritual things, members of one body. There was an Emperor as well as a Pope. It is true that the Pope could never get the allegiance of the Eastern Church, or at all events, never could keep it. Charlemagne was the only Teutonic Emperor who was in any sense whatever the real head of all Western Christendom. It is idle to speculate whether the magnificent imperial conception could ever have had any chance of realization. For the purpose in hand, it is sufficient to remember that for centuries the world felt that it wanted an emperor, although it never was willing to submit to the emperor there was. Is it certain that our present feeling that every nation must be absolutely independent is one of those deep-seated instincts of human nature, against which it is both idle and dangerous to struggle? Does not the medieval conception of Christendom suggest something higher and finer than we now have?

Even this war-torn, blood-soaked world of ours is more attractive than it would be if it were subject to the absolutism of a Tiberius or Diocletian, or even to the benevolent despotism of a Trajan or a Marcus Aurelius. Freedom is worth all it costs to win and to keep. A world in which all races and all people were poured into one common mould would not be an attractive world to most of us. But is there no way of bringing all civilized states into a union which shall be close enough and strong enough to enact and enforce justice among them, give to every one of them some measure of the protection which every individual citizen or subject of each of them now usually has, and at the same time preserve the right of local self-government? I am asking questions, not answering them, but I may hazard a guess that until something of this kind shall come about, perhaps centuries, maybe millenniums hence, the difficulty of applying the moral rules which should govern the conduct of individuals to the relations of states, will to many statesmen, seem insuperable. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: It is always a great temptation on the part of the speaker who has the opportunity to defend himself against what may be considered a successful attack. This I shall not do on this occasion, but I do feel that the prestige and dignity and authority of the Supreme Court, entrusted for a brief moment to my hands, should be maintained against the assault of the previous speaker (laughter), and fearing that somebody, not liking the fact that the Supreme Court hasn't a club and that the government of the United States cannot coerce or use force in the interest of peace, I have brought along with me the judgment of the Supreme Court on this point, and I should

like to call to Judge Rose's respectful attention, the language of his superior who likewise (laughter) was a Maryland jurist, one Chief Justice Taney by name, who lightly bore the mantle of Chief Justice Marshall. In speaking of the duty of the Governor of Ohio to give effect to a request for extradition on the part of the Governor of Kentucky, a duty imposed by the Constitution and defined in 1793 by an Act of Congress, in which Congress framers of the Constitution of the United States took part and legislated, Chief Justice Taney said, speaking for a unanimous Court, "It (The Act of 1793) does not purport to give authority to the State Executive to arrest and deliver the fugitive, but requires it to be done, and the language of the law implies an absolute obligation which the State authority is bound to perform. And when it speaks of the duty of the Governor, it evidently points to the duty imposed by the Constitution in the clause we are now considering. The performance of this duty, however, is left to depend upon the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact entered into with each of the other states when it adopted the Constitution of the United States, and became a member of the Union. It was so left by the Constitution, and necessarily so left by the Act of 1793.

"And it would seem that when the Constitution was framed, and when this law was passed, it was confidently believed that a sense of justice and of mutual interest would insure a faithful execution of this constitutional provision by the Executive of every state, for every state had an equal interest in the execution of a compact absolutely essential to their peace and well being in their internal concerns, as well as the members of the Union. Hence, the use of the words ordinarily employed when an undoubted obligation is required to be performed, 'It shall be his duty.'

"But if the Governor of Ohio refuses to discharge this duty, there is no power delegated to the general Government, either through the Judicial Department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him."

So much for the power of the United States to pierce through the envelope that separates it from the citizen and coerce the individual in a case in which the rights and duties of members of the American Union are concerned.

JUDGE ROSE: *Ex-parte Young* has been decided since.

The CHAIRMAN: It has. I now have the very great pleasure of introducing to you, although he needs no introduction to a Mohonk audience or indeed to an American audience, DR. LYMAN ABBOTT who has so often delighted and instructed us at Mohonk. (Applause.)

THE PATHWAY TO PEACE

ADDRESS BY DR. LYMAN ABBOTT

It is sometimes asked: "Who shall decide when doctors disagree?" The answer to that question America has long since settled; the editor decides. (Laughter and applause.) Were it not for that, I should hesitate to remind the learned gentlemen to whom we are all indebted for instruction, of my own impression, that when General Lee surrendered to General Grant at Appomatox Court House, it was decided for all time that the Federal Government has power to coerce a state. (Applause.)

That is my introduction. Any other that would be proper as a graceful introduction on this occasion and any peroration that would be proper to conclude what I have to say, I will leave you to provide for yourselves. Count Tolstoy came across the New Testament when he had reached manhood, and the result of that was a very significant and suggestive book entitled: "My Religion," to which I think the Christian church is not a little indebted for its present faith that Christianity is social, not merely individual. It is not surprising that, having come to the New Testament without previous familiarity, he should give some interpretations to it which the world has not followed. He found there, for example: "Swear not at all," and he concluded therefore, that oaths should be abolished from courts of justice. He either forgot or he did not know that an oath was submitted to Jesus Christ on the trial for his life and accepted without hesitation by Christ. He found there: "Judge not," and he decided that all courts of justice should be abolished. He either forgot or he did not know that Christ had specifically provided for a kind of court of justice—I shall refer to it presently more at length—in the instructions which he gave to his own church. He found there the direction: "Take no thought for the morrow," and concluded therefore that no man ought to make any provision for his old age or for future time. He forgot or he did not know that when Jesus Christ fed the five thousand, he had the basket of fragments gathered up that nothing might be lost,—certainly provision for the future. He found there: "Resist not evil;" and therefore, he concluded not only that all armies but all policemen should be abolished. He either forgot or he did not know that twice in his life Jesus Christ used physical force, once in the beginning and once in the end; that he began his life by going to the Temple which a corrupt league of priests and politicians had turned, as he said, into a den of thieves, and drove the marauders out with a whip; whether he used a whip as a symbol or an instrument is immaterial, his teaching was the same, and certainly it required some measure of violence to overthrow the tables and

let loose the doves. At the end of his life, when the police came to arrest him, and his recreant Disciples were asleep, he went and put himself between the arresting party and the Disciples, and when he did so, the soldiers, it is said, fell back to the ground. Was it natural or supernatural? I do not care to ask. I, as a follower of Christ, have a right to use my natural powers as Jesus Christ used his supernatural powers when the soldiers fell back to the ground. By so doing he gave his Disciples an opportunity to escape and they fled away—he literally saved the lives of those who had failed in their promise to him. Jesus does not teach us what instruments we may use, he teaches us in what spirit we may use them. A girl's tongue may inflict a greater injury than a boy's fist. The pen of an editor may soil, if it does not destroy the reputation of a woman, and the pistol of a policeman may save a defenseless woman from the white slaver. Our condemnation is against the spirit and not against the instrument. This is the simple truth I want to put before you here to-day, that the object of Christ and the object of civilization is not to change the instrument but to transform the spirit (applause), and that the teaching of Christ and the teaching of civilization is this; for defense of one's self we are to substitute the defense of our neighbor, we are to take the instruments of warfare, whether pen or voice, or billy, or pistol, out of the hands of self interest and put them into the hands of the impartial and disinterested guardian. That is the teaching of Jesus; that is the teaching of civilization. I have not time, nor is it necessary this morning to show how a state of nature is a state of universal war. We have gone far on our way out of war into peace. If we want to know how we are to go the rest of the way out of war into peace, we must look back into the history of the past and out of that experience of the past learn the future, and that experience of the past tells us that the way out of universal war is to substitute the defense of others for self defense. Robert Louis Stevenson has put it tersely and well—I cannot quote his words, I have no verbal memory but substantially he said this: "If one smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. Yes, if he smites thee, but if he smites someone else, it may be your duty to come to his defense." This is what civilization, Christian civilization, has done. This is the way which Christian civilization has thus far pursued to get to peace. Even to-day we have some remnants of the private war that is based on the idea that every man's duty is to defend himself and his own family. The vendetta which our Italian fellow citizens have brought with them, some of them, to this country, the duel which only in the past generation has been abolished from this country, are both results of the notion that every man's duty is to defend himself

and every man's duty is to defend his family. And we have gotten rid of them because we have shown how the man can better defend his family by putting that defense upon others and how the man can better defend himself by putting that defense on others. Thus the individuals have combined together to transfer that duty of defense from themselves to the state. The state is primarily—it is more than that, but it is primarily a mutual insurance company. We unite and we agree that we will, by our combined efforts, defend each peaceable and law abiding citizen and therefore, having the state to defend us peaceable and law abiding citizens, we no longer carry the sword at our side nor the pistol in our hip pocket. We have gone further; the states in this country have acted upon precisely the same principle; they have formed a Union, and in that union they have put upon the nation the responsibility of the defense of each state. The states have voluntarily, by their Constitution, surrendered their sovereign right to make war; that is abandoned, and the nation has, on the other hand, assumed the responsibility by the very phraseology of the Constitution, to protect each individual state, and because the nation has assumed the responsibility of defending the state, the state has not to arm to defend itself, it has only to arm sufficiently to defend its citizens, and it is under duty to arm to defend its citizens because it has assumed that responsibility, and it is the duty of the nation to defend the states because it has assumed that responsibility. It ought to be a simple proposition, and yet, in a good deal of the discussion I hear, it is ignored. We may surrender our rights but no man and no state and no nation has ever a right to surrender its duty (applause), and now the proposition is made to secure international peace by following along in this same roadway to peace. We have practically abolished the vendetta; we have practically abolished the duel, with one exception of which I shall speak in a moment. We have practically abolished private war, however, by taking the arms from the individual, saying to him: "You shall not decide for yourself what your rights are, you shall not arm yourself to protect those rights, the state will decide what your rights are and the state will protect your rights;" and we have prevented wars between the states—and there have been many occasions in which there would have been wars between the various States of this Union if it had not been for our Constitution—by saying to the States: "You shall not make war, you shall leave the question of your rights to the nation and the nation will defend them." Now the next step is for the nations to unite in a league of nations in which they will say: "We will no longer depend upon our own arms to defend ourselves, we will no longer depend upon our own judgment to determine what are our rights

and what are our duties; we will leave it to a disinterested tribunal to decide what are our rights, we will leave it to a disinterested tribunal to decide what are our duties, and leave it to this legislature which unites all the nations in one common enterprise to maintain those rights and to fulfill those duties." It is simply one step further in the historic progress from universal war to world peace. (Applause.)

I said a moment ago that Jesus Christ prescribed a court. The passage is this: "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his faults between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee two or more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." The Jews had no intercourse with the heathen and the publicans. Translate that into international language and what does it mean? If you have a quarrel with another nation, try peaceful negotiations—diplomacy—and if you cannot settle it by diplomacy call in some impartial nations and by their council, endeavor to settle it by arbitration. If you cannot settle it by arbitration, bring it before a congregation of the nations. If the other nation will not hear the congregation of the nations, then what? War? No, non-intercourse. (Applause.) It has been said that non-intercourse will be an inadequate remedy, and non-intercourse would be an inadequate remedy unless there was power to protect the right to inflict that remedy; but if you think, as I do, that Germany is getting near the end of her resources, it is not because she has been beaten on the battlefield, it is because she is hedged around so that no longer supplies of other nations can reach her, and no nation is sufficient for itself alone. If the nations of the earth had adopted this wise counsel of Jesus Christ, there would be a universal boycott on Germany, she would stand absolutely alone, and she could not stand alone three months with the whole civilized world shutting their doors on her. I am not now discussing whether Germany is right or wrong—I have some opinions on that subject—(laughter) I am simply pointing out that a universal policy adopted by the civilized nations of the world of non-intercourse, with simply a sufficient armament to enable them to maintain that policy of non-intercourse against the arms of any one nation that attempted to rise against it, would compel obedience by any nation on the face of the globe. Now in view of this statement, what is the duty of America? Certainly disarmament will not bring peace, and I say that it will not bring peace because it has been tried and has not brought peace. The Armenians were disarmed; it did not prevent their wholesale mas-

sacre; the Jews in Russia were disarmed—it did not prevent their wholesale massacre; American citizens in Mexico were disarmed—it did not prevent the killing of men and the violating of women in Mexico. Merchant ships crossing the Atlantic ocean were disarmed—it did not prevent the torpedoing of them. Disarmament never has produced peace. To-day, if we were to sweep the navy from the ocean, as some would have us do, we would bring back the pirates. I say that with a good degree of assurance, because here in the East, where we have a fairly closely settled population and a good and effective means of protection, train robberies are very rare—we are armed; and in the West, where the population is scattered and there are no adequate means for the protection of the railroad trains, train robberies are frequent. Take away the protection from our merchant vessels and the pirates will come back again. Disarmament never has brought peace. It is not the abandonment of power, it is the transference of power from self-interest to impartial and disinterested hands that brings peace. (Applause.) What, then, is the duty of the United States? First, to equip itself so that it can fulfill its sacred obligations, to so equip itself intellectually, morally and physically, to be so equipped with courage and with a clear vision of its duties that it will be able to do what, in its Constitution, it has sworn to do, furnish defense against foreign aggression. It should be strong enough to defend American citizens at home and abroad; at land and on sea, not because that is the right of the nation, but because that is the sacred duty of the nation, and only that way, lies peace. Secondly, it should so equip itself with courage, with patriotism—but with international patriotism—with human recognition of the rights of man everywhere over this world, that it can do its fair share with the other nations of the world in maintaining a world peace; for the pathway to peace is this, take the instruments by which justice is enforced and righteousness is determined out of the hands of selfishness or even self-interest and put them into the hands of disinterested and impartial arbitrators. If the state does that, the peaceful citizens are at peace; if the nation does that, the peaceful states are at peace; if the world does that, the peaceful nations are at peace. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Let me paraphrase what General Grant said at the end of his career and let me submit that as General Grant's path to peace. He said that he had been in more battles perhaps than any man in his time, certainly in as many as most people could have been, and he never saw a time when the soldiers knew what they were fighting for, and he never saw a cause of dispute between nations which could not have been settled by a resort to peaceable means. He said—and it is almost, though

not quite, a quotation—"I look forward to a time when the dispute between nations shall be settled by arbitration or by the decision of an international court of justice." (Applause.)

The next and concluding speaker of the morning is Mr. Edwin M. Borchard, law-librarian of Congress, sometime Assistant-Solicitor of the Department of State, a member of the American Delegation before the Tribunal of Arbitration of 1910 that settled the Fisheries dispute between Great Britain and the United States, and the author of an authoritative work upon international claims, who will speak to you this morning upon the Adjustment of International Pecuniary Claims, Their Removal from Political into Legal Channels. I am very happy indeed to present MR. EDWIN M. BORCHARD. (Applause.)

THE ADJUSTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PECUNIARY CLAIMS: THEIR REMOVAL FROM POLITICAL TO LEGAL CHANNELS

ADDRESS BY MR. EDWIN M. BORCHARD

Dr. Scott laid down certain philosophic theorems of international relations with which I think it is well to open conferences that shall deal with international affairs. It is also well that the ministers have gone on to point out to us the ideals at which we shall aim; it is for the lawyers to attempt to work out the details by which the object is to be achieved and to bring their rules into conformity with the philosophic principles underlying the field. I shall address myself to a very practical problem that, to my mind, lies at the foundation of modern international relations; namely, the economic. The majority of the conflicts in the controversies between states arise out of complaints due to injury alleged to have been inflicted upon the citizens of one country by the government of the other country.

These controversies are increasing in number, not merely because of injuries suffered in time of war, but principally because of claims for pecuniary redress of injuries arising in time of peace. This is due to the circumstance that as the means of communication grow greater the countries of the world are becoming physically more closely bound together and coincidentally capital and individuals in greater number are seeking investment and fields of activity in foreign countries. The resulting growth in intercourse and in exchange of commodities and money, while establishing bonds of dependency between the exploiting and the exploited country, also involves a growing amount of friction and conflict.

The legal position of the foreigner has progressed in the

course of time from one of complete exclusion and the status of an enemy to one of practically full civil and commercial equality, with minor exceptions unnecessary to recount. Only political rights are still denied. Hence we now witness thousands of foreigners doing business and millions of foreign capital invested in the exploited countries of the world, a condition which will prevail in still greater degree as time goes on.

The complaints of individuals against foreign governments arise because of some alleged violation of their legal rights which either can not be or have not been redressed by the municipal courts of the foreign country. In final analysis, the individual's complaint, before it may properly be heard by his government, must be based upon some alleged denial of justice, as that term is understood in international law, by the administrative or judicial authorities of the country complained against.

The common practice of nations has established a certain standard of conduct—incapable, however, of exact definition—by which a nation must be guided in its treatment of aliens and below which it can not fall without incurring international responsibility. But as there is no central authority among states capable of enforcing this standard, international law, as at present constituted, has granted the state of which the individual is a citizen the right to enforce his demand and secure redress for his injuries by diplomacy or other methods—even reprisals and war—sanctioned by international practice. In this fact that plaintiff nations judge for themselves whether a legal wrong has been committed and determine for themselves the extent to which they may go in the enforcement of what they conceive to be the rights of their injured citizens lies much of the weakness of the present international organization and in this weakness may be found a practical field for progress in international cooperation and the adjustment of conflicts. It is to this problem that I shall address myself.

We are all familiar with the well-known division of controversies between states into legal and political and the conclusion that the former may and the latter may not be submitted to judicial determination. It has been said on numerous occasions that the range of justiciability of international disputes is limited by the paucity of legal principles which are common to all states in their international relations. International conflicts have not uniformly lent themselves to judicial solution because so few of them may be referred to standards or rules or even principles, although when an international demand or position is based on national policy regardless of law, its non-justiciability is due usually to an unwillingness rather than inability to submit it to arbitration. The enlargement of the area of legal differences and a reduction of the area of political differences

lies to a considerable degree in securing recognition for an increasing number of rules in the development of international relations. When, therefore, it is found that that important phenomenon, the foreigner residing in the state or entering into relations with it, has already been brought within the cognizance of legal standards and rules, it seems deplorable that so many political controversies should arise because of disputes as to the legal rights of the foreigner and of claims for pecuniary redress of injuries. The reason why pecuniary claims have so often resulted in international conflict is because nations have too frequently insisted upon transforming a pecuniary claim, which had its basis in the dispute of a legal right, into a political question.

Perhaps the most important factor in this weakness lies in the fact that the present machinery for the adjustment of claims is calculated to impress upon them a political character. Inasmuch as practically all of them, whether arising from personal injury or from breach of contract, are in their origin of a legal nature, machinery should and can be devised by which their legal character may be preserved and a status or condition created by which it shall be rendered at least difficult to bring them into the field of political controversy.

It is not generally realized by the public that thousands of pecuniary claims, involving enormous sums, on the part of individual citizens and corporations against foreign governments rest in the archives of the State Department or Foreign Office as grievances to be redressed by foreign governments complained against. Their owners exert a steady pressure to obtain governmental aid for their payment. Nations differ in the extent to which they undertake to espouse the claims of their injured citizens, depending upon the nature of the claim, upon the policy and physical strength of the claimant country, and upon political considerations of a lengthy variety. It must also be acknowledged that on numerous occasions, particularly where large groups of claims are involved, states have voluntarily submitted them to arbitration, to which practice our own government has made commendable contributions. It may here be said that it has become customary to submit to arbitration at least one class of controversies; namely, boundary disputes; and I believe that in the matter of disputed pecuniary claims, we may justifiably expect and strive for recourse to judicial settlement, a reform to which at least the states of America, in the Pan-American Congresses of 1902, 1906 and 1910, have in principle committed themselves.

Since each country is permitted to judge for itself of the injury it has sustained in the person of its citizen it is to be commended that in some matters certain countries have in the

interests of international justice placed upon themselves voluntary restraints in the enforcement of certain classes of claims. The United States, for example, has declined officially to intervene for the enforcement of a contract voluntarily entered into between its citizen and a foreign government in the absence of a denial of justice in the foreign courts. The stability of international relations, like the success of democracy, lies in the observance of self-imposed restraints. These voluntary restraints in the prosecution of claims should be increased and will be increased, I believe, in so far as machinery is devised to enforce just claims by other methods than those now pursued. This machinery obviously is an international court for the adjudication of pecuniary claims. Without making any unwarranted demand or imposing a sacrifice upon any state of the exploiting or exploited category, the world, and particularly its business men, may and should properly demand that private pecuniary claims of a contractual or noncontractual nature be submitted for determination to an international tribunal, a procedure which will result not only in a greater degree of general justice, but specifically will give more exact justice to each of the parties involved in the adjustment of an international claim; namely, the claimant himself, his own government, and the defendant government, not to speak of the vital interest of the world in having peace prevail among all governments.

An outline of the present methods of adjusting international claims will serve to make clear the defects of the prevailing system and its many opportunities for injustice and the disturbance of friendly relations among states. The claimant under present conditions presents his claim to the Foreign Office or State Department of his own government and requests diplomatic interposition. It may be assumed that he has exhausted his local remedies abroad. If the claim is one arising out of contract, the espousal of his claim depends largely upon the policy of his government in supporting contractual claims. Some governments do not officially support these claims whereas others appear to impose upon themselves no such restraint, so that in effect the claimant's remedy in these cases depends primarily upon his nationality, an unjust distinction and discrimination in a case purely legal. Again, the Foreign Office may grant or refuse diplomatic action as in its discretion it deems advisable and it has been judicially determined in the United States, Great Britain, and France—and the rule is probably the same in other countries—that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or Secretary of State, can not be compelled to institute or prosecute a diplomatic claim. The claimant's remedy, therefore, depends entirely upon the willingness of his government, in its unimpeachable discretion, to espouse his claim. Again, the Foreign Office

may approve his claim and yet the interests of the nation or its relations with the defendant government may be such that for political reasons it is deemed inexpedient to press the claim. For example, it is practically impossible to prosecute and secure settlement of an American claim against Spain because the United States Senate has steadily refused to arbitrate the so-called East Florida claims for unpaid interest due to Spanish subjects, purely a legal matter. The archives of Foreign Offices are filled with claims which have accumulated for years, awaiting some happy event which may open the diplomatic channels for their admission to arbitral or other adjustment. The unfortunate and uncertain position of claimants under present conditions is readily apparent.

Let us now turn to the government complained against. The defendant government, now often too weak to resist the demands of a strong claimant power supporting a claim intrinsically unjust, a situation by no means infrequent, would profit greatly by the establishment of an international forum for the adjudication of pecuniary claims. While the Porter proposition adopted at The Hague in the matter of contractual claims is intended to postpone the use of armed force until an offer of arbitration has been refused, there are many and oppressive measures of diplomatic coercion not so violent but nevertheless as burdensome and annoying and in result as effective as armed force. Although defendant governments usually insist upon the finality of the decisions of their municipal courts, a demand which in practice has not been unqualifiedly recognized by foreign governments, they would find their condition vastly improved by the submission of claims to the jurisdiction of an international court.

The claimant government and its Foreign Office would also be helped and relieved by the institution of a permanent court for the adjudication of pecuniary claims. These claims are now first passed upon by the law officers of the Foreign Office who must act on *ex parte* evidence and who have not at their disposal the judicial machinery necessary to sift uncertain facts and doubtful evidence. Their determination as to the espousal or rejection of a claim is not based upon satisfactory data and their responsibility in setting the diplomatic machinery in operation is not inconsiderable. To make international action, often of vast financial, and at times political, importance, depend upon an administrative decision based largely upon *ex parte* evidence alone invites injustice to one or other of the interested parties. The fact that rejected claimants often renew their demands upon each incoming administration in the hope of a reversal of the decision of the State Department or Foreign Office, bringing to bear political pressure of various kinds, is the source of considerable administrative annoyance and occasionally of domestic political trouble.

Again, the fact that nations may employ such coercion as they may deem appropriate has often resulted in an unusual degree of pressure by strong nations to the disadvantage of equally meritorious claimants, the citizens of weak nations, which can not resort to forceful measures to secure redress of alleged wrongs.

Finally, the fact that the prosecution of pecuniary claims depends so largely upon political considerations and the fact that the accumulation of unsatisfied claims always embodies the germ of international misunderstanding and controversy present unassailable grounds, in the interests of world peace, for compelling the just, speedy and peaceful solution of the rights of the parties. Reprisals have on numerous occasions been employed as a mode of redress for a violation of the rights of citizens, and in several cases war—in its physical manifestations merely general reprisals—has been based upon unpaid claims for alleged wrongs inflicted by one country upon the citizens of the other, notably Italy's war against Turkey in 1912 and our own war against Mexico in 1846.

The advantages to be derived by all the interested parties by the removal of pecuniary claims from the arena of political controversy to the channels of judicial adjustment must be apparent. Such a development of international relations would assure the claimant of a fair judicial hearing (which is not now the case), and the determination of his rights and his remedy would not depend upon his nationality or upon the strength, policy or willingness of his government to entertain the claim, but upon the merits of his case. The defendant government would be relieved from the diplomatic pressure of unjust claims which by its very weakness it now feels itself often unable to resist. The Foreign Office of the claimant government would be immeasurably relieved by not having to present claims on *ex parte* evidence and enter into diplomatic correspondence and controversy which frequently disturbs friendly relations. The peace of the world would be advanced by removing from the field of conflict what is now always a germ of international difficulty.

Although there has been an international court at The Hague which has adjudicated numerous international differences, the agitation for a permanent so-called judicial court has been renewed on many occasions. Up to the present time one of the important reasons for its non-existence has been the inability to agree upon methods for its creation and organization. Less attention has been given to defining the jurisdiction of the proposed court. An agreement to submit pecuniary claims to an international forum will in itself, I believe, largely solve the difficulties hitherto encountered in the creation of the court. By proving its immediate necessity, in the fact that hundreds of

international claims involving purely legal questions now await settlement, the greatest stimulus to its early institution will be afforded. By demonstrating that a vast amount of business requires the court's attention, the minor obstacles which have hitherto prevented it from being brought into existence will, I believe, quickly disappear.

The question of procedure is a detail which will be readily settled, but the important right of the individual citizen to sue a foreign government in the international forum should be preserved. In the Central American Court of Justice we have a procedure by which an individual can bring a claim against a foreign government before the court as he would against a municipal corporation, and one such case has already been decided. In the unratified Prize Court convention of 1907 an individual was given the right to institute suit before the international Court of Prize on his own initiative. The idea, therefore, of permitting an individual to bring suit against a foreign government before an international court is not entirely novel and its application may well be extended. The privilege might be tempered by preserving the present necessity of securing the preliminary approval of the citizen's home government or else the individual plaintiff against the foreign government might be compelled to deposit a sufficiently heavy security for costs and good faith as to subject himself to a heavy pecuniary penalty if his claim is considered grossly exorbitant or founded in bad faith. Resort to this jurisdiction might also, if deemed essential, be made conditional upon a diplomatic exchange and refusal of the defendant government to pay the claim. But however the right may be limited, it should be possible for a just claimant to summon a foreign government before the international forum and take a purely legal matter out of the channels of political controversy.

But little time need be spent upon devising machinery for the enforcement of the court's decisions. Among the hundreds of arbitral awards which have been rendered, less than half a dozen have been refused enforcement by the losing government, and these cases were practically all subsequently settled. Efforts should rather be concentrated upon persuading nations of the reasonableness and justice of submitting pecuniary claims to a court, as has been done by various business organizations in Europe, and if necessary, devising means to compel recalcitrant nations to submit their claims to such adjudication. The cultivation of the habit of submitting legal disputes to a court will also exercise a potent influence in securing a more frequent resort to arbitral adjustment for purely political differences. Permanent peace will come only gradually, if at all, but anything that can be done to narrow the arena of political conflict and

widen the field for the judicial solution of disputes will hasten its approach and the submission to a court of pecuniary claims arising out of injuries to citizens will at once remove a large proportion of the causes for present international conflict.

The divorce of pecuniary claims from political considerations, a union which now not only results in inexact justice but often gross injustice, and the submission of such claims to the determination of an independent international tribunal constitutes a practical step in advance towards peace and must make a universal appeal to man's passion for justice. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: It is frequently said by people who should know, the officers of the Navy themselves, that the Navy stands for peace and is the greatest school for peace. Now, admitting that that is so, because they say so, think what the future of the Navy must be when the second class men in the Naval Academy spend their time, not in dreaming of prizes upon the high seas but in writing peace essays for the Pugsley* prize. I have very great pleasure in introducing to you MR. GEORGE R. FAIRLAMB, JR., a Sophomore, in terms of ordinary parlance, in the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, who has performed this great feat of winning a prize on land. (Applause.)

MR. FAIRLAMB: Just as a word in explanation, before reading my essay as I have been requested to do, when I speak of pacifists, I refer to the people who are non-resisters—those people who want peace at any price. The subject of the essay is International Arbitration: An Estimate of the Situation Showing the Necessity for the Revision of Pacifist Methods.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: AN ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION SHOWING THE NECESSITY FOR A REVISION OF PACIFIST METHODS

In making an estimate of the peace situation we are called upon at once to investigate two opposing theories. The militarist theory is that armaments secure peace. The pacifist theory on the contrary is that armaments lead to war. The militarist takes things as they are. The pacifist at least looks forward to and works for a brighter future. Both parties are sincere and work for the same object through different means, and

* The Pugsley prize of \$100 for the best essay on International Arbitration by a man undergraduate student of any college in the United States and Canada was offered in 1915-6, for the eighth time under the auspices of the conference. The judges were Hon. John Bassett Moore, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University; Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, United States Navy, retired; William I. Hull, Ph. D., Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College. The winning essay, by Mr. Fairlamb, follows. Forty-three essays were submitted.—ED.

thus it is unfortunate that bitterness has marked the discussion on both sides as each side is in reality necessary to the other for very existence—just as centrifugal and centripetal force is necessary for the preservation of the solar system. The national idea still exists. We are most interested in our own country. We want to know what is best for the United States. In the present state of world politics it is felt that it would be folly for the United States to consider restricting its armaments. It is a period of general suspicion and distrust which in due course of time we hope will pass away to give place to a brotherhood of nations. There must of necessity precede this a higher conception of the brotherhood of man. More real progress can be made if each side grants the other a sincerity of purpose and realizes its own defects and weaknesses. More lasting good will be effected if the pacifist movement changes its method of guiding the effect of the causes of war to a method of actually determining and evaluating the causes themselves, with the end in view of eliminating them.

It will be of interest and of value to examine briefly the two contentions referred to above and to see what relation if any they have to obtaining international peace. The militarist, first, claims that we must be *prepared*; that we can avert war and secure peace by having an efficient army and navy ready to act at a moment's notice. Is this true? Undoubtedly, yes, when viewed from the standpoint of the weaker nation. No nation would precipitate a conflict with a neighbor stronger than itself. Looking at it from this viewpoint we can say that peace is secured by the readiness of a rival nation. On the other hand, the stronger nation by virtue of its strength can choose either war or peace and presumably chooses that course most advantageous to itself—which might or might not be peace, according to whether or not there is some definite political or economic advantage which it feels reasonably sure of securing. Thus far we have been considering only two countries in their relations to each other. One is likely to forget the fact that owing to the inequality of armaments, nations no longer act independently, but the weaker in concert with a stronger ally. In short, there is a balance of power against power, and though no one denies this to be latent war, yet it is undoubtedly true that the peace of Europe has been secured for thirty years by just this means, viz., balancing of armaments against armaments.

This is the weak point of the militarist doctrine, then. Balancing of power does very well for a time, but eventually there must come a preponderance on one side since each strives to be stronger than the other. Then, with important issues fancied or real at stake, the clash comes. Armaments undoubtedly secure peace up to a certain point, but it is a rather uncertain protection ultimately, since we cannot forbid our neighbors to have armaments. This is surely a practical method—to be equipped to do your enemy up as badly as possible—but it is very superficial as it does not once consider cause and effect. We can dispose of this argument as having no bearing on the attainment of lasting international peace.

The claim of the pacifist that armaments lead to war is even more absurd in its contention than the militarist claim that they secure peace. It is true that armaments do constitute so much explosive material and that in times of suspicion and tension, carelessness on the part of a military or naval officer might ignite the spark. But we cannot say because of this that there would have been no war had there not been armaments to start it; as so many people do claim. Given a nation with a grievance, fancied or real, and a grievance which it feels cannot be settled satisfactorily to itself in a court, or a grievance that could not admit of arbitration, and if it have no armaments it will proceed to make them. We must go deeper into the causes of war than this. We have not gone

beyond the surface of the matter when we say that a war is the direct result of armaments. How often have we heard this said of the present European war. And what an insult it is to the intelligence of a thinking person. Admiral Mahan has said quite truthfully, that given a number of people started with the same capital and equal opportunities, there will soon arise inequalities due to the inequality in their natural and inherent capacities; and that these inequalities will give rise to friction and strife. This strife goes on both internally among the classes of a nation and externally with the classes of a foreign nation, and it can be safely said that as a cause for war, armaments are nil, but inequality of economic and political advantages is everything.

The question that confronts future generations is to hit upon some solution of the causes of war, and not until we direct our efforts at the root of the matter instead of trying to control the effects by armaments, by arbitration, and by leagues of peace, can we hope for universal peace. The present treatment is similar to the local treatment that we apply to poison oak in order to scare it away and give relief for a season—it is sure to reappear the next summer if we are not very careful. Is this too complex a matter to admit of solution? Is the idea of exterminating the causes of war an ideal one? It is a complex question, so complex in fact that many people are fooled by it and think they have the solution right at hand, while others are discouraged beyond hope. And the solution of the causes may be an ideal one, but ideals have been attained before. And certainly it is rather premature and dogmatic to say that this one cannot be reached. There was a time not so long ago when Catholic and Protestant of Europe were engaged in a terrible struggle because of a difference of religious opinion. The tangle seemed hopeless and yet it was finally unraveled; and following out the school of thought of Mr. Norman Angell, who can say the causes of war will not eventually be hunted down and exterminated. As a matter of fact Mr. Angell regards most causes as chimerical and only apparent—not real.

The cause of most modern wars is summed very neatly in the phrase “national honor and vital interests,” and this seems real enough. Now, interests may be material and they may be ideal. At any rate “national honor” is so bound up with a nation’s interest that the two are inseparable. And although national honor is a relative term, since we cannot insult millions of people individually, it is nevertheless a very real and existent thing for it is possible to insult millions of people *collectively* by insulting the government whose function it is to represent them. It is not within the scope of this essay to argue on the merits of material and ideal interests as causes for war. Every one agrees that material interests, inequality of economic advantages, leads to war, or what is the same thing in effect, the idea that by successful war a nation can increase the economic advantages of its citizens or a class of its citizens. But some are not so certain about the more purely ideal interests, such as the desire for peace and justice in Cuba on the part of the United States in 1898. They feel that there are ulterior motives behind these, and whereas such may exist in the breasts of a few calculating individuals, action (war) must be secured by arousing in the people of a country a sense of indignation at perverted justice or atrocious wrongs. We can see the relation of national honor to vital interests of a non-material nature by considering the recent demands of our government on Germany. We have demanded of Germany that she obey the rules of international law. Germany in a life and death struggle has refused, naturally. Therefore our national honor may prompt us to declare war. Has there been in reality an insult to honor? We have merely taken a stand of our own free will—a precarious stand but a righteous one as according to our views we are upholding international law and the rights

of non-combatants and neutrals—and if our will in the matter be thwarted it is the man's part to use his fists. Here, "national honor" would call for action, but if it were not due to our vital interests that we took the stand on neutral rights, national honor would never have figured in the situation at all as it does to-day. If, as a matter of fact, it is not to the vital interests of every American to see that international law is upheld and increased in scope, then our stand in the matter is wrong. We commonly believe that material interests, national aspirations, is the true cause of the European war, but we also see that there may be a higher motive than material interests. However, the sub causes that lead to the broad and sweeping term "vital interests" is what is really desired to be cleared up. They are complex and they nearly always arise from within a nation; it would be an excellent thing if the pacifists should direct their efforts along these lines and if possible get at the root of the matter as Mr. Norman Angell has tried to do.

Until we can eliminate the causes what is best to be done? The best alternative is to get what relief is possible through arbitration and leagues of peace. Does this mean that we can trust to this means so completely that we are to neglect defense measures? In spite of the fact that for long years the United States remained in a state even more defenseless than it is to-day—and the pacifists point to this as indicating the feasibility of disarmament—it would be folly to pursue such a policy. Why? Well, was it not due to luck and circumstances that we got by safely? We may not in the future be so fortunate—our present policy of playing the rôle of a world power is much more likely to embroil us than when we stayed at home and kept free from entangling alliances. True, we arbitrated some questions during this period, but they were "justiciable" questions. If we had encountered a first-class power in the Philippines and Cuba instead of Spain, would we have come out of that scrape so easily? Certainly not. Well, could not we have arbitrated? Yes, but as we had no legal right to interfere, Spain or whatever country we assume to have been there, would be there to-day and the improved conditions that have resulted from our action would at least be doubtful. For the reason that there arise at times questions which cannot be settled by judicial courts, it is wrong not to be reasonably prepared, absurd to disarm. Charity begins at home—let the American pacifists put forth every effort to secure peace, but let them cease opposing defense measures that are reasonable.

Here it will be of profit to examine arbitration a little more closely. What has it done in the past, and what hope does it hold for the future? Quoting reliable statistics, we have six cases submitted to arbitration in the 18th century, 471 in the 19th, and to date 150 in the 20th century. We can see from this that interest in securing better international relations is not a new thing. In fact the beginning was made at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and has steadily grown since. There were called several international conferences in the last century for the sole purpose of considering methods for the restriction of armaments, etc. They were notably those held at Geneva, Petrograd, Brussels, and principally at The Hague in 1898. This last conference established a permanent Court of Arbitration to be convened at the desire of nations wishing to use this method of settling disputes. There have been tried before this court already sixteen cases. Prior to the establishment of this court, arbitration was usually effected directly between the countries concerned with a friendly nation acting as umpire or mediator. The Second Hague Conference of 1907 established the first truly international body, viz., the International Prize Court whose name is self-explanatory, and the same conference proposed a Court of Arbitral Justice which should always be open at The Hague with judges to give it their whole time. This latter court has not yet been established, due to the difficulty of arranging a

satisfactory method of representation. But it is easy to see from the brief review of the history of arbitration that interest has steadily been growing in this method of settling international disputes. We may hope that with the growth of empirical knowledge in this field the scheme may be improved and made more satisfactory in its application.

At present the weaknesses of the Court of Arbitration are quite apparent. They are: (1) no way of forcing a nation to arbitrate, and (2) no way of enforcing the award. Thus, if we examine the sixteen cases tried before the court since its establishment we find that ten are claims for debts under various circumstances and that the remaining questions were equally justiciable. The reason that the awards were accepted was because they *were* justiciable. It is recognized that a nation will not arbitrate a question of policy, and until something happens to cause disputes of a non-justiciable, non-arbitrable character to be arbitrated, and the decision reached to be abided by, there will be war. In short, international arbitration at the present time is limited in its application, and the hope that it holds for the future is measured by the possibilities of bringing non-justiciable issues within its scope and jurisdiction.

Let us theorize for a moment on the possibilities of arbitration for the future. We might conceive of a case arising between two nations who had agreed to arbitrate everything—as for instance France and Great Britain suggested to the United States a few years ago. Further that national honor, contrary to causing war, would tend to cause the nation which lost the decision to accept the award and abide by it. This would be analogous to the terms of a business contract between two individuals, in which each is honorably bound. This is evidently the ultimate aim and hope of arbitration—here we see that national honor would be directly opposed to the interests of the nation that loses the decision. The question is, can arbitration really reach this state of perfection? If it can, wars will cease in spite of causes. The law of cause and effect will be so greatly modified by an artificial arrangement (arbitration) that we shall no longer recognize the effect as war—but there must be effects inevitably. It is quite impossible to say with certainty whether or not this condition can be reached by arbitration, and applied to all nations. We are sure, for instance, that between Great Britain and the United States these conditions could be obtained at least for a long time, for there are more common interests to bind these two countries in peace than there is to oppose them in war. We are doubtful, on the contrary, by similar reasoning, that these conditions can be arrived at between Great Britain and Germany for many years subsequent to the end of the present war. Says Admiral Mahan: “Artificial arrangements are effective only in so far as they take into account contemporary human nature.” We know that human nature has changed since our forefathers dwelt in caves and jungles, and it is possible to modify it in the future. So that if we are educated to think differently, to change our natural desires and way of doing things until our natures accord with the spirit of arbitration the results should prove gratifying. It was by education that ideas of religious intolerance and witchcraft were destroyed. This is the hope for the future of the pacifist movement and for arbitration.

There are other plans besides arbitration for securing peace—disarmament by all nations being one of them. Some see a League of Peace, others a World State. The former is but in reality a mere extension of what we have to-day, viz., balance of power. Instead of Great Britain, Russia, and France forming the Triple Entente, we extend this and ask into the Entente a few more first-class powers whose “national aspirations” are either null or at least not antagonistic to any nation in the league. If this could be put into practical operation, which is not wholly an unfeasible assumption, there would very likely be an attempt to

balance up this preponderance of power by the nations not in the league; which puts us just where we were before. The latter plan is not seriously expected to come anywhere near realization during the lifetime of anyone now living, its weakness being the same as that of the League of Peace—viz., widely divergent ideals and economic interests of the nations—but considering how man has advanced from savagery to the present state it is not too much to expect and to work for. It has been suggested also that economic pressure be brought to bear upon nations contemplating war or at war, in the form of non-intercourse. This plan has never been tried, possibly because nations have not as yet reached the point of making the necessary self-sacrifice. That such a procedure would have a profound effect on the issues of war is evident to the most casual observer. It would certainly cause a government to weigh matters carefully before making a rash step. The proposed League of Peace which also embodies the plan of non-intercourse is an attempt to solve the question along lines directly opposed to arbitration, i. e., force, which is just what we have to-day. However, the idea is that with the growth of arbitration and the general feeling of repugnance for war, the armed forces of the League can be cut down gradually until they assume the function of an international police.

What is of most interest to the United States just now is the degree of moderation that should temper the more radical of the pacifist ideas. What safe middle course to pursue, which, while working unceasingly for peace, will still keep the nation in readiness to defend itself. No one who has thought and read of America's interest in international conditions will deny that we may become embroiled in war at any time. What is the estimate of the situation?

The estimate of the situation, then, in brief, is this. There are opposed in the field of international relations in the various countries two factions: one, militaristic, that pins its faith in the present system of balancing power against power to secure peace; the other, pacifist, that advocates a change to a system of judicial procedure. The militarists put their faith in guns, in men, in preparedness to meet the probable enemy. The pacifists oppose this to the utmost and put their faith in courts and arbitration treaties. We have seen the weakness of the militarist system—it secures peace up to a certain point; then the storm breaks with greater fury than before. In fact, militarists go on the assumption that wars at the present stage of civilization are always possible and ought to be provided against; which assumption is undoubtedly true. And the weakness of many pacifist plans is that they propose to diminish or abolish armaments and give no better security than good will. Their argument that armaments actually leads to wars is quite beside the point. Their splendid work in creating the Arbitration Court has been productive of much good, and has furnished an improved means of settling minor disputes. Arbitration cannot, however, be relied upon to avert war between nations for the reasons noted above. Other pacifist proposals, such as the League of Peace and Non-Intercourse, are as yet in the purely theoretical stage. Unlike arbitration, the League of Peace is not artificial in its dealings, for its weapon is force, and the world has not yet come to the point where the use of force is unnatural. The time has come for the pacifist to realize the futility and the error of trying to persuade nations to disarm, and instead, to devote his time principally to investigating the complex causes from which wars derive.

What tack should be taken by the workers for peace? What is the "minimum of safety" for the United States? Efforts along present lines, save one, namely, the plea for disarmament, should continue until the artificial arrangements for securing peace are fully developed; but in the meantime steps should be taken to ferret out the fundamental causes that

lead to war. If the causes of war exist only in the imagination, as Mr. Angell believes, by a system of publicity and education if we can make people see this we have gone a long way to securing peace. And if it be found that causes do actually exist, as seems most probable, efforts should be made to eradicate them. This will take a long time—we can hardly hope to solve one of the most perplexing problems of mankind in a single generation. If our nation be strong her influence for righteousness in world politics will be strong. If weak, her activity will be hampered. If the pacifists would rely upon arbitration for strength, let them first develop arbitration to a point where it can successfully cope with the complex problems of modern international life. Until that time we must follow the only remaining course. The "minimum of safety" is a large army and a strong navy. Pacifist methods need revision. (Applause.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"The Great Illusion"—Norman Angell. "Arms and Industry"—Norman Angell. "The United States and Peace"—Taft. "America's Interest in International Conditions"—Mahan. "Armaments and Arbitration"—Admiral Mahan. Report of the Lake Mohonk Conference, 1915. Pamphlets of The World Peace Foundation, including Record of The Hague, Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6. Pamphlet series of the American Association for International Conciliation, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 97. "The Two Hague Conferences"—Wm. I. Hull.

Rear-Admiral FRENCH E. CHADWICK, U. S. N., as one of the judges and on behalf of the donor, Mr. Chester DeWitt Pugsley, presented the Pugsley prize to the winner, MR. FAIRLAMB, who gracefully accepted the prize, with a word of thanks to Mr. Pugsley, and expressed his belief that the interest created among young men through the contests was decidedly worth the investment.

The CHAIRMAN: Time has been left for discussion under the five-minute rule, and it would be a pleasure to recognize anyone who should care to avail himself of the opportunity.

MR. JOSEPH ELKINGTON, of Moylan, Pa.: On every occasion Jesus Christ declared that He came to save and not destroy, and the whole spirit of the New Testament utterly puts the ban forever on preparation to fight. We know the disposition in the hearts of the American people today is not for relying upon a foolish preparation by way of force, when we all know the power that has lifted our nation to its present situation, has given it a place in the world, has been based upon international justice, the disposition which goes not only to arbitration but to reciprocal advantage. I want to stand firmly for the conviction and the assertion that nothing but universal good-will, nothing but the eternal love of Jesus Christ is the foundation upon which we can remedy the evils in this world, upon which and to which we must refer as individuals, and just as we do refer to them, we find that the spirit of Jesus Christ goes out from us and

extends our hands to every nation whatever may be their inclination. (Applause.)

GENERAL HORATIO C. KING, of Brooklyn: I am reminded of a story that I heard the other day about a Hoosier schoolmaster. They had tried for seven weeks to get a competent teacher for a set of hoodlums who had turned the school upside down and turned the teacher out. Then a rather sickly looking fellow went up to the President of the Board and said, "I'd like very much to teach that school myself." "Well," says the man, "you don't seem strong enough; I think you must have the consumption or something of that kind." "Well, sir, I want to teach the school." They were pretty hard up for a teacher and accepted him. Next Monday morning he went into the school-house and took up a small spot, drew a little round hole in the middle of it, walked to the other end of the school and nailed it up against the door; then he went back to his table and whipping a revolver out of his pocket, a fine six-shooter, levelled it deliberately, aimed it at the door and put six bullet holes right in the center of the target. Then he came back and drew a bowie knife from the other pocket and passing his finger very gently over the edge to indicate that it was in a proper condition, he laid that down also on the table. Then he looked up to the scholars and said, "Now young men, we will open these proceedings with prayer." (Laughter and applause.) This little bit of preparedness which our pacifist friends do not believe in, made that school a strong candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. (Laughter.) I cannot understand how anyone who is thoughtful, studying the history of the country and of all countries, if you please, can say that preparedness is not absolutely necessary. I believe that it is not only necessary, I believe it is Christian—that we should take proper care of our country under all circumstances. I speak from the experience of an old soldier for I know that had this government had a dozen good naval vessels in 1861 and sent them to each of the forts on the Atlantic Coast, the rebellion might not have been commenced, and if commenced would have been speedily subdued, because the South would have been starved out, but on the other hand if we had had twenty-five thousand available effective soldiers at the first battle of Bull Run, they would have wiped out the Southern Confederacy. That is what Preparedness means; it does not mean war nor anything of the kind. There are no more peaceful citizens on the face of the earth than the soldiers and sailors of the United States. (Applause.)

PROFESSOR WILLIAM I. HULL, of Swarthmore, Pa.: I wish very much that General King might give us the sequel to his

first story. I would like to know, for example, just what influence prayer, under the circumstances he has pictured, had upon the school over which he presided; also, what type of American manhood would grow out of such a system of "education."

Our discussion this morning has touched both ideals and fundamentals, and I feel it my duty to say just one word in regard to one great ideal which has been discussed. Dr. Abbott has summed up in one of his characteristically epigrammatic sentences what he believes to be the teaching of Christianity; namely, that Jesus Christ did not teach the weapon which was to be used, but that he did teach the spirit in which it was to be used. May I venture to suggest that there are a great many earnest students of Christianity who believe that the spirit which he taught was not the spirit of *defense*, of one's self, or even of others, but that it was the spirit of *sacrifice*. If Christ's ideal is to be realized by our nation as well as by us individually, it is not so much a question of defending this nation, as it is of doing the utmost, even to the extent of sacrifice, for the welfare of the rest of the world.

To come to the fundamentals to which our Chairman has called our attention, it has seemed to me that he has most helpfully reminded us that back of the family of nations, or the states, are the peoples. Now, if we fully appreciate this fundamental fact, together with the other fundamental fact that there are in this twentieth century a number of great forces, other than military force, which spring immediately from the peoples themselves, I believe that we can have great encouragement in the task of this conference, the task, namely, of providing *before* the millennium, for the judicial settlement of disputes between nations. I cannot analyze the various forces of this twentieth century, but will merely call your attention to them. These are the great forces of international diplomacy, of international commerce and international finance, and of a national and international public opinion. We have had scores of arbitrations, successful arbitrations. Why have they been successful? It is because they have been sanctioned by one or more of these great twentieth century forces. Hence, as I see it, the first task before us is the organization of these great twentieth century forces, and their adequate utilization. We must have, also, perhaps, as the ultimate sanction, a genuine international police power; but this is fundamentally different from an alliance of national armaments.

The twentieth century forces to which I have referred have not only caused the peaceable acceptance of scores of arbitral decisions, but they have also compelled the submission to arbitral tribunals of questions of vital importance and of national honor. In the case of the Alabama claims, for example, states-

men of Great Britain insisted that they would not arbitrate that dispute with America because it involved national honor. In the case of the Venezuela boundary dispute, which involved what we consider a vital interest—the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine—not only did we insist that that vital interest should be arbitrated, but we were ready to fight Great Britain unless it would consent to arbitrate it. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: There being no further discussion, the Conference is adjourned until 8 P. M.

Second Session

Wednesday, May 17, 1916, 8 P. M.

MR. DANIEL SMILEY: I wish to express to Dr. James Brown Scott our appreciation and our thanks for the skill and tact with which he conducted our deliberations this morning. (Applause.) I also have the honor to introduce as the permanent presiding officer of this Conference, HON. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT. (Applause.)

THE PROGRAM OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

OPENING ADDRESS BY HON. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

It is a great pleasure to be one of this Conference. I thank Mr. Smiley for giving me the opportunity to come here and I admit with humiliation that this is the first time that I have ever had the delight to look upon this beautiful spot. The conferences are of world-wide reputation and have been full of usefulness. I want to speak to you of something that has come from them and other institutions devised with the hope that they contain something constructive in their features, not new, perhaps, but formulated in such a way in their platforms as to approve themselves to a great many who have been aroused by the present war to the necessity of providing some means that shall be affirmative to make less likely a recurrence of the dreadful cataclysm that we are witnessing in Europe.

The League to Enforce Peace is an association organized through the activities of three or four gentlemen who were first dazed with the defeat of their hopes by the outbreak of war and who, after they recovered themselves, thought it was wise to bring together as many interested in the subject as they could within the cosy limits of the Century Club at dinner. There is something about a dinner that always helps to promote agreement. It creates a desire to be unanimous. So much to the surprise of the twenty gentlemen who were there, we did agree and then, gathering at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, we agreed upon the platform with very few changes. I only recite in general what the platform is, not because I think that most who are here do not know it, but merely for the purpose of refreshing their recollection and making it the basis of my re-

marks, which are directed toward some controverted features in the practical working of the plan. The plan contemplates an international agreement signed by as many powers as can be induced to sign it. The first provision is for a permanent international Court of Justice, with jurisdiction to consider and decide all controversies of a justiciable character arising between two or more members of the League, the power of the Court to be extended to passing upon questions finally and in a binding way upon whether the issue presented is a justiciable one and therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court. The second provision is that all questions not of a justiciable character, leading to differences between two or more members of the League, are to be presented to a Commission before which evidence is to be introduced, arguments are to be made and then the Commission is to recommend something in the nature of a compromise. The third provision is that if any one member of the League violating its plighted faith, shall begin hostilities against any other member of the League before the questions creating the trouble have been submitted either for decision by the Court or for recommendation by the Commission, then all the other members of the League agree to defend the member prematurely attacked against the one who begins the hostilities; and to use, first, economic means, and then military force for that purpose. The fourth plank provides that International Congresses shall be convened with representatives from all members of the League, who shall consider the subject of international law, shall extend it in a legislative way and submit the changes thus agreed upon to the nations constituting the League. If there is no objection within a year then the rules changing existing or extending international law shall be considered as rules for the decision of the permanent court.

Now one of the things that has been very gratifying to those who have been connected with the League has been the eagerness with which, in very many quarters, the propositions have been accepted and approved. Of course there have been criticisms the character of which can be noted when I tell you that in England the objection to the title was that we have "Peace" in it at all. They wished us to strike that out and just call it a League of Nations, whereas from Oregon we got the proposition that we should strike out the word "Enforce." If we struck out "Peace" and struck out "Enforce," it would be what Gov. Allen used to call "a damn barren ideality." (Laughter.) But we thought if we left out Peace, we would be leaving Hamlet out of the play so we concluded that in England they might call it a League of Nations if they retained its real features, and that that gentleman who declined to come in because

we had force in it—we would have to consent to let him stay out. (Laughter.) It would seem that many had been waiting for the formulation of some such proposals, and if I may judge from the comments on them, what attracts is its affirmative and constructive quality, in the proposition that physical force be added to the weight of moral force in order to prevent a general war, with the hope that the threat will be enough without actual resort to military or economic means. Now I want to emphasize in this plan a number of its features with a view of taking up some of the objections. First, I would like to emphasize the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable. That has led to the division into a court and a commission, the court to consider justiciable questions, the commission to consider non-justiciable questions. Non-justiciable questions are those which cannot be settled according to the principles of law or equity. The justiciable ones are those that can be so settled. There are a great many non-justiciable questions that can arise between nations that may well lead to war, and in that respect it is not so different in our domestic life. Take the case of Mrs. A., who has a lawn upon which she allows the children of Mrs. B. to play, Mrs. B. being a neighbor. Mrs. C. is the neighbor on the other side and Mrs. A. does not let Mrs. C.'s children play on that lawn because she has had some previous experience with Mrs. C.'s children and she finds that they are young mustangs and dig up the lawn and tear the flowers and everything of that sort. Now she has a perfect right to say who shall come on that lawn and who shall not, but there well may be an issue between Mrs. C. and Mrs. A. growing out of that discrimination; it is non-justiciable; you cannot settle it in court, unless perhaps Mr. C. comes home and Mrs. C. tells Mr. C. about it and asks him to go over and see Mr. A. about it; then you may have a justiciable question. But the issue then is not whether Mrs. A. was right in her judgment of Mrs. C.'s children and her discrimination against them in favor of Mrs. B.'s; the justiciable issue usually settles down to the ultimate fact whether Mr. A. or Mr. C. hit first. This is a domestic illustration, but we are having just such a situation with respect to Japan and China. We have a right to exclude the Japanese if we please; we have a right to exclude the Chinese. We are a bit inconsistent; we wish the Chinese trade but we do not care for the Chinese. We have a color scheme in our immigration and naturalization laws; it is limited to black and white and we are very fastidious about the browns and yellows. (Laughter.) Such a question may very well lead to friction and something worse. I only give that as an illustration of a non-justiciable question which in some way or other must be provided for. You can arbitrate a non-justi-

cial question if both parties are willing; you can leave any question of any sort to a board of arbitration or a single arbitrator if you are willing to do it and abide the decision, but you cannot submit such a question to a court, because a court has to proceed according to rules of law and there are many questions that you cannot dispose of according to rules of law. You can see that in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. It has under the Constitution, the power to sit as in a national tribunal and the duty to sit, because its judicial power extends to controversies between two or more states. Now the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Bradley and other of the Justices have said a number of times that there are controversies between states that the court can not consider because they are non-justiciable, they cannot be settled on principles of law or equity. In such a case, of course if a state may not have a remedy through the court, it cannot have any remedy at all, because if it attempted to use force to establish what it believed its rights or interest to be then Uncle Sam would step in to restrain that state by force. This is the difference between the Supreme Court as an instance of an international tribunal, and a commission of arbitration between independent states. Objection has been made to giving to the permanent court the power to decide for the parties whether the question before it is justiciable or not; in other words, the power to decide upon its own jurisdiction. This is not giving it any excessive power. Every superior domestic court has it. The question whether an issue is one of law or equity is a question that such a court is entirely competent to decide. If such a question arises, the person against whom the complaint is filed or the nation against which the complaint is filed ought not, it seems to me, to be given the opportunity to say "I decline to submit to this jurisdiction because in my judgment this question is non-justiciable and cannot be settled on the basis of law or equity." I think if we are establishing a permanent court, we ought to establish it so that a party may be brought in against his will. That is the case with us in a domestic court. The court issues its summons and brings in a party whether he thinks the court has jurisdiction or not. If the party chooses to raise the question, the court passes on it, and that settles it. Now I think therefore, with respect to that kind of a question, it ought not to be voluntary with the parties. Nations are much more willing to make agreements in the future to submit abstract questions than they are to submit a burning issue in respect to which they may feel that the law is against them. We should take advantage of this willingness and bind them by agreements as to general jurisdiction interpreted to be applied by the court itself. Objection is made to this

on the ground that it surrenders too much of a nation's sovereignty. I do not think so. It may encounter opposition when it is brought up in a world's conference but I think we here ought to stand for it and press it as far as we can in order that the agreement which shall be made shall be as effective as possible. The reason why we have not one body to dispose of both legal and non-legal questions—we might have a commission of arbitration that could dispose of legal questions and also non-legal questions, but the reason why we make a division is important. We wish to settle legal questions by a court that proceeds on principles of law and equity, and decides without regard to the good will of the parties. A commission of arbitration is a continuance of the diplomatic function of negotiation. The commission of arbitration usually has a representative of each party on it, and such representatives are not regarded as judges, but as advocates of the parties who go into the conference room with the other members of the board of arbitration and there continue the arguments. The result in an arbitration is generally what a negotiation is for; namely, a compromise, and the board of arbitration seeks to please, as near as it can, both parties. Well that does not lead to exact justice, so that a nation which has a real claim against another may feel loath to go into such an arbitration, when law and equity justify a full allowance of its claim.

Another feature that I wish to emphasize is that while the establishment of the permanent court would doubtless create an obligation on the part of those who entered into litigation to abide that judgment, the third clause for enforcing the agreement only goes to the extent of enforcing the agreement by using economic and military means to compel the submission, and the delay of any action until there has been a decision by the Court or by the commission. In other words, A and B are brought into court; A is the complainant, B the defendant; the court decides against B and renders a judgment. Now, being parties to the League, B is bound by that judgment to A, but when D and E and F are called upon to comply with their limited obligation under the League, they may say B submitted the case, he waited until the judgment, he did not institute hostilities until after judgment was rendered, and we, under this agreement, are under no obligation to enforce the judgment by using our military forces to bring it about. Now that has been the subject of criticism. It has been suggested that we ought to have the military forces of all those connected with the League, not only to prevent a hasty beginning of war before submission, but that we ought to have all bound to use their economic and military forces to enforce the judgment rendered. Well, that was

made the subject of very considerable thought, but it was finally concluded that we ought not to be over-ambitious. It was thought that if we could stop hostilities until there had been a full hearing of a dispute, the introduction of evidence and the argument and delay incident to all that, that we might reasonably count on some settlement between the parties after they had had the time to think which was necessarily given by the discussion, the hearing and the delay. Sometime we hope that it may come to the use of the sheriff to enforce the judgment as well as to keep peace until the judgment is rendered, but up to this time we have not been ambitious to that extent. So much for the judgment. What about the compromise? Ought we to enforce the compromise? Can we do more with respect to the compromise than merely to have the hearing, recommendation and delay? The allies might enforce a judgment because that follows according to the rules of law and equity, but could we enforce a compromise? Would not that be going too far and compelling parties to abide the exercise of discretion in matters that are difficult to decide because there are no rules for decision? That is the question that troubled us. It is easy to hold them off until the compromise has been recommended; that makes a definite day, but when it comes to enforcing the compromise recommended in a matter that cannot be decided on legal principles, it seems to us that it is a little too ambitious to undertake it. Now it is said that this leaves something too open and that war may creep in. I agree, it does, and anybody that says that he has got a machine that will work every time to keep away war, says something that I cannot credit. I believe he is sincere if he says it, but I think his conclusion impeaches his judgment some. (Laughter.) I feel that we cannot make progress if we are going to attempt the impossible, because I think the whole plan will break down and the breaking down would be worse than if we attempted less and succeeded in it. Now the opportuneness of these proposals is growing more and more apparent to those who are charged with the duty of carrying on the work of the League to Enforce Peace. I do not know how near the end of the war we are, but we are certainly very much nearer the end than we were in 1914. And there are indications that people are getting tired on the other side and there are suggestions that point to a possible collapse, certainly to a trend toward peace. Under those conditions the opportuneness of the proposal seems to press itself on the men most concerned with the struggle. A gentleman came to see me the other day who had had conferences with Sir Edward Grey, with Monsieur Briand and with Herr von Jagow in which he discussed the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. He re-

ported to me that Messrs. Grey and Briand did not see how a satisfactory peace could be established unless it was on condition of some such international agreement as this of the League to Enforce Peace. Mr. Jagow thought the plan was a good one but he doubted whether it could be adopted. Of course this is a working hypothesis. In detail it may be changed, but the general proposal that, by the united force of all the powers of Europe, the hot-heads in two nations shall be restrained from involving the whole of the world in another such disaster is too good to give up. That idea ought to be cultivated, and European nations look to the United States to lead in the matter of its suggestion and of its being brought to the attention of a world conference and urged. (Applause.) I think the views of these European statesmen very significant, and they grow more significant the more you think about it. They are discussing the question of what the end of the war shall be; they are discussing how the object of all to prevent future war shall be attained. Is not this an opportunity and a great one? If that be true, then isn't it our duty to stir up our people on the subject, to iterate and reiterate the wisdom of the proposals? I was not so much impressed when I was earlier in politics as I am now with the necessity of repetition and repetition and repetition and again repetition, in order to spread an idea among the people, all the people. When you read the New York papers for a week and hear the same thing repeated in one form and another, you conclude that everybody of the hundred millions knows all about it and agrees with it. Well, it isn't true. The circle of those who know that such an issue is being mooted is small, and the task of bringing the question home to the whole American people is a vast work. Prof. Lounsbury of Yale was in the habit of saying that one of the remarkable things he had discovered in his career of teaching was the wonderful capacity of the undergraduate mind to resist the acquisition of knowledge. (Laughter.) If we have something that we think is good and that we think the American people ought to approve, and to give a mandate to their representatives in a world conference to stand for, then we ought to agitate and agitate and agitate. That is the reason why we have an organization; that is the reason why some of us seize every occasion to talk about it, in season and out of season; that is the reason why you have this infliction tonight. (Laughter.) Now I want to consider, as I said in the opening, some of the objections that have been made. The first objection is that membership in the League is impracticable for us because it would require a great standing army for us to perform our part of the obligation in the third clause. Well, I do not think that is a considerable objection. We are now engaged in a cam-

paign for reasonable preparedness, and the limits of what that preparedness should be are gradually being hammered out. Certainly if that which seems to be regarded as a reasonable military army force and naval force is to be maintained, then it will furnish all that we need to contribute to any joint force to carry out our part of the obligation. It must be borne in mind that we shall only be one of a number of contributors if the plan can be carried out. Now there are many who say that they are not in favor of this plan but they are in favor of an international police force. Well, what is the difference? We do not claim any patent on this plan and we are quite willing to call it an international police force. But it must be constituted in a practical way. When the joint forces are united and are doing the police duty of the world, it is true to say that they are not carrying on war, but enforcing justice. In the second place, there is a constitutional objection. That does not strike me as very formidable. Perhaps it is because I know something about the Constitution, at least I am trying to teach it, and if there is anything that makes you know something about a subject, it is trying to teach it. (Laughter.) It is said in the first place that the provision for a permanent court is unconstitutional in that it delegates the power to a tribunal to decide questions concerning the foreign relations of this country which must be decided by the President or by the President and the Senate or by the President and Congress. Well, if that be true, then we cannot have an arbitration of any sort and agree to abide by it. That same delegation is involved in every arbitration that we have had. We have agreed when we have gone into an arbitration that what the tribunal decides is to bind us. To that extent we yield our discretion and liberty to control our own action by the judgment of another. Now, in Jay's Treaty we had a provision for an arbitration in 1794, and Professor Scott, who is always accurate, says that we have had forty such arbitrations since. If arbitration involves delegation of delegated constitutional power, then we have violated the Constitution so many times that it must be a very sorry thing. (Laughter.) Some distinction is sought to be made between agreeing to arbitrate an issue in the future when it shall arise, and arbitrating an issue that has already arisen. What distinction is there? What can there be? In either case we agree to arbitrate a difference, the difference to occur in the future or the difference which has already occurred. The truth is it is not a delegation of power to agree to create a court and to abide its judgment. The nation as a sovereign agrees to consent to the creation of a court and its judgment just as a person may consent to an arbitration. The sovereign has as much power in that regard as a person. Now the second constitutional objection is that in the third clause, where it is agreed that the

nations of the League not engaged in the controversy shall unite their forces economic and military to enforce submission, we bind ourselves to make war, and that as Congress alone has the power to declare war, we take away from Congress this power and agree to change the structure of our Government. Well, the slightest analysis will show the utter lack of foundation for any such objection. The treaty making power of the government is in the President and two-thirds of the Senate. When a treaty is made, it binds the whole government, it binds the House of Representatives, it binds the Senate, it binds the President, it binds the people of the nation in whose behalf and name it is made. When the obligations of that treaty are to be performed, then that part of the machinery of government that discharges such a function as is involved in the performance, is, under the Constitution, to act. This part of the machinery is bound in the sense that its honor ought to compel it to do the thing that the treaty-making power agreed for the government should be done, but the government does not and can not do the thing until that part of the machinery acts. Congress is to declare war; therefore when the treaty-making power has made a treaty involving the United States in the obligation to declare war, it is for Congress to declare war and exercise the constitutional function that it has to declare war. It may, if it chooses, it has the constitutional power, to break the obligation of the Government and not do that which the Government is in honor bound to do. It is like fore-ordination and free will (laughter); it has the power and may exercise it constitutionally to say we will make no war although that part of the Government that had the power to agree that we should, did so agree. Now how does that interfere with the normal operation of the machinery as provided by the Constitution? Well, if it does, we have been violating the Constitution right along. When we entered into that arrangement with Panama in respect to the zone and acquired dominion over that zone for the purpose of building the canal, what did we agree? We guaranteed the integrity of Panama. What does that mean? It means that we bound ourselves by that treaty that if any nation attempted to take away any territory from Panama or to subvert her government, we would fight. Now who would arrange the fighting? Wouldn't it be Congress? Doesn't that bind Congress to make war? She has the right to violate the obligation if she chooses. Does that make the treaty unconstitutional? We have guaranteed the integrity of Cuba, which means that no foreign nation can come in there and take any of her territory or subvert her government. Is that constitutional? It binds Congress to make war just as this does, and it does not do any more, and Congress may violate the plighted faith of the nation if it chooses, but it does not change

the constitutional obligation and power on the part of Congress to make war.

Then of course, there is that objection to force. I am not going to argue, I am not going into that question of pacifism. I am certainly not disposed to call those who are pacifists names, because I want to convince them of their error, and my observation is that it never helps you to convince a man when your major premise is that in his then state of mind he is a fool. Ordinarily with that major premise, he is inclined to stick to his denial of the correctness of the conclusion. (Laughter.) The Society of Friends have always advocated non-resistance. They have not always been consistent in it, as the Connecticut people, who took Connecticut grants over into Pennsylvania and tried to live on the lands under those grants, found out; they found that non-resistance did not work there. Nevertheless the Society of Friends has usually been consistent and I always differ with them with the utmost reluctance, because you can look back three hundred years and find many things they advocated then which seemed far away from anything that was reasonable in the views of the ordinary common-sense individual in those days and see now how they have come to be regarded as axiomatic, I feel like opposing that particular denomination therefore with very considerable reluctance and great respect for their views; but nevertheless, I do not think that we have reached the time when force as an aid to moral impulse, can be dispensed with. The modern anarchist, if I understand it—I do not mean the gentleman who begins his argument with you by blowing you up—I do not mean him, but I mean him who theoretically sustains the doctrine that if we could get rid of government entirely and all restraint and bring up children with the understanding that each was to act on his own responsibility, his or her own responsibility, and was to have no restraint of any kind, that then when they became adults they would know just exactly what they ought to do first and then they would do it—I sometimes think we have begun this practice with our children (laughter), still I do not think that human nature is so constituted that the theory will work. We still need a police force at home in society to enforce laws, and it seems to me that a police force, if we can arrange it with respect to nations, may be made most useful and that its existence and the threat of using it may make the use of force by one nation in controversies between nations much less frequent.

Then there is the objection to the entangling alliances, against the injunction of Washington which we have heretofore observed; I agree this is a serious objection, and one to be carefully considered. Of course when Washington talked, he had in mind that very annoying treaty he had made with France

during the Revolutionary War, which of course helped us in our Revolution but subsequently involved us in some very uncomfortable obligations to France in her war with Great Britain. He had in mind an alliance with one nation against another, perhaps. This of course is different from that, in that it is hoped that it will embrace all the nations of the world, at least all the great powers of the world. Nevertheless I agree that it is a departure from the principle as he stated it, and we can only justify it on the ground that our situation is very different from what it was when Washington spoke. He was then five times as far from Europe as we are today, if you can judge by the speed of transportation and twenty-five times in matter of communication. He was twenty-five times as far from Asia, if you can consider that Asia was any considerable quantity at all in our foreign relations at that time, as it is now. Now we are a hundred million people and reach from ocean to ocean; we have Alaska, a dominion in itself, purchased by Seward in 1867, a place where a base of operations could easily be made for an attack on the Pacific Coast. We have the Hawaiian Islands and we have the Philippines—that is, we have them up to date. (Laughter.) I am not going to dwell on the Philippines; I cannot in this presence. I think it is in *Our Mutual Friend*—my memory is sometimes defective—but my recollection is that there was a gentleman named Silas Wegg, who was reading the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* to the golden dust man and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Boffin, and he occasionally made a mistake in his reading and called it “*The Decline and Fall off the Russian Empire*,” and Mr. Boffin, with the intention of clearing up his ignorance, inquired what the distinction was between the Roman Empire and the Russian Empire, and Mr. Wegg was a bit stumped until some kind providence helped him and his eye hit on Mrs. Boffin and he said, “Mr. Boffin, I cannot explain that distinction in the presence of Mrs. Boffin.” (Laughter.) I cannot tell you what I think about the present Philippine policy in the presence of the ladies. (Laughter and applause.) But we are there now; it makes us an Asiatic power. The Philippines are under the eaves of Asia, and if we stay as long as we ought to stay to carry out the pledge we in effect made when we went in there, we shall continue to be an Asiatic power until a good many of us here are gone. Then we have the friction with Japan and China. We wish to keep the open door and it is closing a bit. Then we have the Panama Canal, an investment of four hundred millions to unite the eastern and the western seaboard, to double the force of our navy, it may be; that makes us almost a South American power. Then we own Porto Rico, fifteen hundred miles out at sea from Florida. Then we do not own, but we have a relation to Cuba that is even more likely to

involve us in trouble than if we did own it. We have guaranteed her integrity and we have reserved to ourselves the right to go in and suppress insurrection and have had to do it once. Then we have Mexico; that is an international nuisance that is likely to entail, I am sorry to say, greater burdens on us than we would like. And then we have our relations to Europe. When Europe went into the war, we settled back, shocked of course, but with a kind of feeling that at any rate we were so separated from the war that we could not be involved, but I think we have gotten over that feeling now in view of our recent experiences in ultimatums (laughter); which show our proximity to war and the warlike things in Europe. Now the question which I want to put to you is whether, in view of the strained relations that we have had with Germany, for instance, in view of the questions that have arisen between us and England, in pursuing the indifferent course of a neutral, as I believe we have done, and yet coming so close to war as we have, we can say that we are any more likely to be kept out of war by remaining a neutral and avoiding such an alliance as this we here propose than if we went in and availed ourselves and made ourselves part of the great power of allies in such an agreement to stop war and to prevent its involving such a disaster to human progress. (Applause.)

The topic for further discussion tonight is, Are Large Armaments as Such Either Provocatives of War or Deterrents of Arbitral and Judicial Settlement of International Differences? The first speaker is REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, of the United States Navy, President of the Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island.

ARE LARGE ARMAMENTS PROVOCATIVE OF WAR?

ADDRESS BY REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, U. S. N.

I contend that armaments are distinctly not provocative of war, if considered in themselves and without reference to the spirit of the nations maintaining them. I contend, further, that in many, perhaps in most, cases, they are distinct deterrents from war, and this especially when they belong to nations like our own, whose spirit is essentially un-aggressive and unmilitary. For in the consideration of this matter we must recognize two types of nations,—one aggressive, the other non-aggressive. I shall have more to say about this before I have finished.

In a large proportion of the wars of which we know the causes,—if we except civil wars and wars of religion—we find these two types opposed, the aggressive nation forcing war, in

one way or another, upon the one which is non-aggressive. This may not be by a direct invasion of territory. It may be by an invasion of rights or a violation of ideals quite as compelling in effect as would be a violation of territory. As between two nations representing these contrasted types, if disputes arise, the only way for the nation which is peacefully inclined to insure consideration for its rights is to be ready to defend these rights. The surest way to maintain peace, is to make it manifest to the nation which thinks to profit by war that there is no hope of profit in it.

Aggressive power, faced by power held in reserve, quietly, unobtrusively, unthreateningly, but resolutely, will hesitate long to take the step from which there can be no retreat.

I do not claim that in any case or with any nation armament is a certain guarantee against war. There is no such guarantee and there can be none. But I claim that the effect of armament is, in the main, favorable to peace, and that the lack of armament tends, in the main to invite war by offering to a world in which nations, even more than individuals, are subject to the temptations of selfishness and greed, the spectacle of great and alluring possessions, lying, undefended, at the mercy of any nation which at a given time chances to combine the three characteristics of power, aggressiveness, and covetousness.

No one can say how many times nations have been saved from attack by being ready for defence. It is never easy to prove what might have happened if conditions had been different from what they were.

But history is filled with examples of nations being attacked because they were manifestly too feeble to resist.

A weak and un-aggressive nation has wealth or territory that an aggressive neighbor covets, and determines to secure. Here is a cause making for war. If the aggressive nation proceeds to prepare for taking what it wants, it is illogical to say that the preparedness is the cause of the war. If a burglar, proposing to break into a safe, provides himself with the tools of his profession, we do not say that he robbed the safe because he had the tools.

It cannot be denied that a nation may be prevented from going to war because it is unarmed. But this fact cuts both ways.

Our burglar may be prevented from opening the safe because he cannot secure the necessary tools. On the other hand if he has the tools and proceeds with his enterprise, the owner of the safe may be prevented from interfering, by the fact that he is a small man and has no revolver. In one case the lack of means to accomplish the desired end is a blessing. In the other case it is a misfortune. If a nation wishes to attack another, it is fortunate for the world if she lacks the means of doing it. If she

has the means and uses them, it is then a misfortune for the other nation to be without means of defense.

I believe that there are few if any cases in history where preparedness can be shown to have been, in any sense except that to which I have just alluded, a real cause of war.

The ambition of Bonaparte did not grow out of his preparedness for war. His preparedness grew out of his ambition. He prepared to fight because he was determined to fight.

Germany and France did not go to war in 1870 because of their armaments. They went to war because each had, or thought it had, something to gain by war. Louis Napoleon needed to strengthen his hold upon the throne he occupied and Bismarck wanted Alsace and Lorraine. And because they were determined to fight, they prepared to fight. One prepared completely and efficiently, the other incompletely and blunderingly, and we all know the result. Today Germany and France are again at war, but this time France is, measureably, prepared, and the contrast between this war and the previous one is full of instruction for the United States.

The preparedness of Germany and France and England and Russia did not prevent the present war. But neither did it provoke the war.

It held war at arm's length through many years, every one of which was filled with menace from industrial and commercial and racial rivalries. It was from these rivalries that the war came; not from the armament of any one or all of the nations involved.

It is a favorite contention of the pacifists that the war grew out of the armament of Germany. Nothing could be further from the truth. The armament of Germany grew out of the certainty that war was coming sooner or later.

The interests of Germany and England in industry and commerce have long been diametrically opposed. After centuries of practical control of the markets and the carrying trade of the world, England has, during the last quarter century, seen her control threatened by Germany,—not by the Army and Navy of Germany, but by German manufacturers and steamship companies. It is the commercial, not the naval, fleet of Germany that England has feared. It is the commercial, not the naval supremacy of England which Germany has challenged. Nor is this the only field in which the interests of the two nations have clashed and in which rivalries and jealousies and animosities have been developing.

The rapid increases in the population of Germany and in her industrial output have created need for room in which to expand; and finding all other desirable regions of the world closed to her either by the actual occupancy of England and France or

by the Monroe Doctrine, she has turned her eyes to the South-east, toward Asia Minor and Persia. But in that quarter she threatened the frontier of England in India and Egypt; and her Bagdad railroad, as a commercial enterprise, promised to become a by-pass to the Suez Canal. Here was a widespread and growing conflict of *material* interests out of which war was bound to come, sooner or later, whether the nations concerned were prepared or not; and these are the real causes of the war, so far as Germany and England are concerned. Armament was the result of their quarrel, not the cause of it.

As regards Germany and France, it has been inevitable since 1870 that the struggle between these two should be renewed. The causes lie deep in the hearts and memories of the French people. It is unnecessary to state them here. They have existed for many years and they would have continued to exist and ultimately to result in war whether the nations were armed or not.

The racial animosities between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other, connected largely with Poland and Servia, have existed for centuries and have no connection with preparedness for war except as making preparedness necessary because they rendered war inevitable.

The age-long desire of Russia for an outlet to the sea through the Dardanelles, with the ownership of Constantinople which alone could make that outlet secure, is another of the causes of the war and is, like most of the other sources of friction which have been mentioned, commercial in origin and manifestation.

To sum up,—the real causes of the present war are not in any primary sense military. They are primarily and almost exclusively, industrial, commercial and racial. Preparation for war has grown out of the danger of war, not the reverse.

It is unnecessary to call attention to the swift and terrible disaster which would have overtaken any of the nations involved if the war had found them unprepared. England was prepared at sea, but unprepared on land, and in the first few months of the war she lost practically the whole of the small trained army that she had, because she was obliged to throw it into the field against overwhelming odds. And her losses since then have been enormously out of proportion to any results obtained, because her second line troops were brave, and as ignorant as they were brave; and what was worse, they were led by officers as brave and as ignorant as themselves! When the full story is told, if it ever is told, of certain battles in that mysterious zone which the censor designates as "somewhere in France," the world will have an appalling lesson of the criminal folly of a nation in throwing raw recruits, without training and without trained leadership, against troops equally brave, with every advantage

that grows out of thorough and scientific preparation of both officers and men. The awful massacres at St. Eloi and Gallipoli contain a lesson to which the pacifists who for years have stood in the way of preparedness in England cannot forever shut their eyes. Nor can they, one would suppose, shut their eyes to the fact that the responsibility for these horrors rests with them.

I hope that before our Conference is ended some of our own extreme pacifists will tell us what they think their responsibility will be, if, in spite of all their well-meant efforts to maintain peace by preventing preparation for defence, war actually comes to our country as it has come to so many countries where we were told by pacifists that it could never come, and if, coming, it finds us unprepared. I assume that no one after the experience of the last two years, will claim that this is altogether impossible. To me and to many others who are studying world conditions and their relation to the United States, it seems not only possible but even probable that our country will before many years—I will not say before many months,—find itself involved in difficulties which will tax the utmost resources of diplomacy to meet. And if diplomacy fails and all our well-meant efforts in the cause of peace, all our longings and prayers and beautiful dreams, prove impotent, and war does come, bringing to us what it has lately brought to the whole of Europe, what then?

What will the pacifists think of themselves if, *as a direct result of their efforts*, our fleet is destroyed by an enemy fleet of twice its size—and I tell you now that if the fleet is defeated it will be destroyed—and if after our little Army has been offered up as a further sacrifice upon the altar of unpreparedness, some hundreds of thousands of our so-called citizen-soldiery are in their turn offered up on the same altar,—and all to no effect.

There appeared in the *New Republic* of April 15, 1916, one of the sanest articles that I have ever read on the pacifist side of the question of preparedness. I quote the following paragraph:

“When they speak about the defense of America, they mean the defense of American rights at sea, of American interests in China, of American policies about Latin America. They do not imagine that we are to be invaded in order to take away our gold, or put a ransom on our cities. They know that if we are committed to a first-class war it will be because we have quarreled with some great Power about some American right or ambition in some territory not within the boundaries of the United States.”

It is certainly true that the principal danger of war for any nation, lies in the policies for which that nation stands.

These are the true provocatives of war, as has been pointed out in what I have already said; and the preparation which I am advocating is a preparation, primarily, for the defense of such of these policies as our people may think worthy of defense.

The zone within which these policies manifest themselves may lie in the Atlantic or the Pacific, in Central or South America, in China or in Australasia. Wherever they manifest themselves, they carry a significance proportioned to the force which other nations recognize as standing behind them. A national policy is an expression of the ambitions and the ideals of the nation. If a nation has neither ideals nor ambitions for the betterment of its people or the advancement of civilization, it will sooner or later submit to the domination of some nation which has such ideals and ambitions and holds them sacred enough to be worth fighting for.

But though I agree with the *New Republic* in its estimate of the causes which may lead to war, I cannot accept the view that even in the event of war there exists no possibility of the actual violation of our territory. The statement is often made that at the worst the country is in no danger of *invasion*,—that three thousand miles of water constitutes a barrier that no enemy can cross. I read an editorial some weeks ago in which the statement was made that England had always been protected from invasion by a strip of water thirty miles wide. This shows an amazing ignorance of history or a singular indifference to facts. For many centuries the strip of water in question and the much broader strip of the North Sea, formed a route so admirably adapted for invasion that the enemies of Britain and of England crossed it at their pleasure.

In 55 and 54 B. C. Caesar invaded Britain without difficulty and penetrated the country as far as he wished. A century later the Roman legions crossed the channel and within a few years completed the conquest of the island.

In 449 the Germanic tribes under Hengist and Horsa crossed the channel in their turn, and for the second time the island was conquered by invaders from the mainland of Europe.

During the 9th and 10th centuries, the Norsemen from Norway and Denmark crossed the North Sea whenever it suited their humor to do so, harrying the coasts, penetrating to the interior, and ending by making themselves masters of the whole of England, and seating their leader on the throne of Alfred the Great.

In 1066 the Norman French crossed the channel, landed on English soil, defeated the Army hurriedly assembled to oppose them and placed a Norman Duke upon the throne as King of England.

During the hundred years' war and later during the wars of the Roses, expeditions from England to France and from France to England crossed and recrossed the channel at will, neither France or England having such control of the sea as enabled them to make effective opposition to such crossings.

In 1667 the Dutch Admiral DeRuyter sailed up the Thames and for several days held London under the guns of his fleet. Had he brought with him only a small army London must have fallen practically without resistance.

In 1688 William of Orange landed at Torbay and the fifth conquest of England was promptly completed;—this time, it is true, with the connivance of a large proportion of the English people. The next year an expedition in support of James II landed in Ireland and entered Dublin in triumph. This expedition failed to accomplish its object, but its defeat came on land and not on the sea.

During the 18th century, England developed a Navy distinctly more powerful than any other in the world, and for many years now she has maintained a Navy superior to that of any other two powers. For that reason and for no other—for the reason that she has held, unquestioned, the command of the sea—the little strip of water that separates her from the continent has not been violated in recent years. But her security has rested and still rests, not in the water itself, but in the Fleet which commands the water.

What such command of the water may mean is so strikingly illustrated in the present situation abroad that it would seem as if no one could be so blind as not to see its full significance. While the British Army is holding a short hundred miles of trenches at tremendous cost in precious lives and with its hold uncertain in spite of all the sacrifices it is making, the British Battleship Fleet rides secure at anchor in sheltered harbors and *by merely existing*, without the necessity of firing a gun, makes England absolutely safe from danger of invasion. Criticism is sometimes made of the inactivity of the Fleet, by those who do not realize that this very inactivity is the evidence of its efficiency. It is the evidence also of the claim on which this paper is largely based,—the claim that preparedness for defense may do away with the necessity for defence;—in other words, that large armaments, so far from being provocative of war are in a very practical sense deterrents from war.

The Atlantic Ocean is in no sense a serious obstacle to invasion in these days of large fast steam vessels,—unless the waters bordering our coasts are held by a fleet strong enough to command them absolutely. Eliminate the fleet, or make it so inferior to an opposing fleet that it can not block the approaches to Boston and New York, to Narragansett and Chesapeake Bays, and the ocean is a highway, broad, spacious and convenient beyond any military road that the Romans ever built.

Please note however, that there is a difference between saying that our country may be invaded, and saying that a hostile army would or could march from coast to coast. There is little danger

that an army would attempt anything at once so rash and so unnecessary.

The great middle west is probably as safe as it apparently feels itself to be, from danger of actual contact with an enemy. But that our coast cities could be seized and held is something that does not admit of question, and it is interesting to speculate as to the effect upon Chicago and St. Louis of the control by an enemy of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, especially if the enemy in question were strong in military power, but financially bankrupt.

But those of us who wish to see the United States powerful, think of power not alone as a matter of offence and defence, not alone as a matter connected with wars, actual or threatened, but as a matter of influence and of helpfulness. We urge that the United States be made great in physical power in order that its moral power may be made effective beyond its borders; that its ideals of freedom and justice and righteousness may be felt in the councils of the world. And we deny that the possession of power is in itself an incentive to use that power for evil. Here, I believe, we touch the very core of the whole controversy between those who wish to see our country strong and those who seek to keep it helpless.

On one side are arrayed those who believe that our people are instinctively just and even generous; that, given power, they would use it, on the whole, sanely and magnanimously, for advancing the interests of civilization and humanity. On the other side are arrayed those who lack this confidence; who feel that our people cannot be trusted not to play the bully. On this side, too, are those who see in peace the first of blessings and in war the worst of evils; who would have our country sit idly by, powerless to interfere and disinclined to interfere, no matter what wrongs may be committed at our doors, and who, going further, would have no resistance made against wrongs aimed at our national honor, our national safety, or even our national life.

For myself, I stand with the first. I believe that power in the nation as in the individual is the necessary basis of usefulness. Without power, it is possible perhaps to be happy in a narrow and altogether selfish way. It is assuredly not possible to be helpful. A strong man may abuse his strength. But we do not for that reason teach people to cultivate weakness. A great intellect, misguided, may do almost incalculable harm, but we do not for that reason preach the doctrine of imbecility. A great army and navy may be used to provoke war and to oppress nations who have no power to resist, but the remedy is not to eliminate armies and navies,—it is to insist, by word and deed, that armies and navies are instruments of justice in a world

where justice can be commanded only through the possession, and, whenever necessary, the exercise, of power; and to strive to do away as rapidly as may be with those diseases of humanity which make armies and navies necessary instruments of progress and enlightenment and civilization. So long as nations whose aims are selfish, whose methods are based upon ruthless disregard for the rights of others,—so long as these nations continue to maintain great armaments, the obligation is imperative that nations which stand for justice and righteousness maintain an attitude which shall make their influence effective in combating and counteracting the influence of those who stand for principles the opposite of these.

The United States has been a great nation for a hundred years. But never until the ending of the war with Spain in 1898 did it take its place as a world power. There are doubtless those who think that it was better off in its earlier position of "splendid isolation," but such a view is narrow and selfish. So long as it was isolated it was powerless to contribute anything worth while to the progress of the world. Conditions changed suddenly and completely with the victories of our Navy at Manila and Santiago, and in one short summer, the country passed from a provincial power to a world power. Recognition of our right to play a part in world affairs came without demand from us. Within a very few years it fell to our lot to make two important contributions to the peace of the world in connection with matters from which before the war we would have been contemptuously ruled out if we had attempted to interfere. I refer of course, to the Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan and to the settlement of the Moroccan question at Algeciras. The first of these is too well known to need description here. It was epoch-making not only in the history of the United States but in that of the world. Ten years earlier, the nations involved and the world in general, would have smiled at the thought that a President of the United States could interpose with any effect in such a war as was then at its height. Yet at the time it was accepted in all quarters as entirely natural that he should be the one to take the lead in a movement for peace.

The United States had little interest in the Moroccan question which became acute in 1905. Yet when an International Conference assembled at Algeciras to consider the question, our representative was welcomed, and it was very largely through the part which he played that an agreement was reached which preserved the peace of Europe.

A report of the Conference reads:

"What also seems certain, and what is particularly gratifying, is that Ambassador White has taken a leading part in bringing about the happy result. From the first this country has been looked to for the exercise

of conciliatory influences, and from time to time there have been reports that it was smoothing the way to a settlement of all issues involved. Now it is explicitly stated that the disposition of the police question, the crucial question of the whole controversy, was suggested by the American Ambassador, and that its acceptance by the French and German Governments was due to his tactful efforts."

The United States Navy at this time was far from being a great Navy, but it had established a claim to the admiration of the world, and had won for the country which it represented the respect of the world. And the power to help in making and maintaining world peace followed as a direct result.

Here, for the first time, the United States had *power* in the eyes of the world. And here was illustrated what power meant to us and how our government and our people viewed the responsibilities connected with it.

A great peace conference lies ahead of the world, in which the United States will desire to have a part. And beyond that lie other conferences which will make new rules of international law covering the developments of the recent past and attempting, at least, to provide saner methods for the future, with guarantees, if such can be secured, for the observance of these methods. Still other conferences, and more significant ones, will deal with a multitude of plans for securing permanent peace between nations.

Where is the United States to stand in all these gatherings? For peace, of course. But in the first rank of those who are studying this subject, or somewhere far back to the rear? It all depends upon the prestige with which our delegates enter the conferences.

If they go as the representatives of a great power, as the world counts great powers, they may have almost a controlling voice. If on the question of disarmament, they speak as the representatives of a nation armed and ready to disarm if others will do the same, they will be heard. If they speak as the representatives of a nation already disarmed and therefore helpless, their motives will be questioned and their arguments discounted. Little importance will be attached to the fact that a nation, itself unarmed, urges its possible enemies to disarm.

It may be regrettable, but it is true, that other nations will judge us by the standards which they know to be applicable to themselves; their delegates will be eminently practical men, as it is desirable that they should be, and the fundamental instincts of human nature will play a large part in the deliberations of the conference and in the conclusions reached. And no argument will count for much in favor of disarmament which comes from a nation which has everything to gain from world disarmament and nothing to lose.

We must be prepared to put something of magnanimity into

our plea if we wish to make it effective ; and magnanimity is the privilege of the strong.

There is much anxiety felt by pacifists lest the upbuilding of our Army and Navy should result in *militarism*. This anxiety appears to me to ignore entirely the spirit of our people. And yet the spirit of any people is the touchstone by which to test the question whether or not they may be safely trusted with powers which admit of being used unwisely. *Militarism*, as I see it, is a state of mind. And it is my conviction that this particular state of mind is so absolutely foreign to the people of the United States that there is absolutely no possibility of it being developed among them. From 1861 to '65 the country passed through a period of intensive military experience during which our whole national life was turned into channels tending toward and determined by a condition of war. And at the end of the period, the whole organization fell apart as if it had never been, and the country lapsed into a condition of abject helplessness, except that it had within its now entirely peaceful population, some hundreds of thousands of men who, after having been dragged through the appalling blunders of four blundering years, with losses many times what the conditions justified, had been forced, almost in spite of themselves, into a degree of efficiency approximating that with which they should have entered upon the war. No one who reads the real facts of our wars of 1776, 1812, 1846, 1861 and 1898, is likely to be disturbed by the spectre of militarism so far as this country is concerned. All the Von Moltkes that Germany has produced or ever will produce could not make America a military nation. The panic into which some of our friends are periodically thrown over the thought of school boys and their wooden guns is really quite unnecessary.

Only one stage beyond that of the wooden gun is the military school for youths, and beyond this still we find the college whose curriculum includes military training. I wonder if anyone in this audience has ever found that graduates of these schools and colleges are more blood-thirsty or more quarrelsome than those from other schools and colleges, or if, indeed, they have been able to distinguish them by anything except, perhaps, their better carriage, their more alert and forceful manner, their greater readiness to submit to discipline, their prompt obedience to authority, and their power in leading men. These are a few of the characteristics that military training tends to develop, and it seems to me that they are rather fine, and that they are especially desirable in this country, where young men are apt to be a little over-independent, a little too resentful of discipline. One could wish that the military training which can be given might go even deeper than these superficial traits and instil something

of what is finest in military *character*;—for strange as it may seem to some of you who hear me, military character rests upon three elements to which you cannot refuse your admiration;—loyalty, obedience and devotion. In the Army and Navy we sum these up under the name of *service*, and so thoroughly do we identify the thought of this with our profession, that we habitually speak of the Army and Navy as “the services.” No young man will be harmed by military training if only it is directed toward this, which is the true military ideal as known to the Army and Navy of the United States if not to those of other countries.

Please observe that the military character as I have outlined it has absolutely nothing in common with *militarism*, which, as I have said, is a state of mind and a state of mind pervading a whole people.

In conclusion, let us consider for a moment what we mean after all when we speak of power and preparedness. Preparedness for what? To say preparedness for war, is not to tell the whole story. There are wars and wars,—good wars and bad wars; wars of offence and wars of defence. When I think of the United States as engaged in war I think of a war in defense of some splendid cause, some lofty ideal, some issue involving freedom and justice and enlightenment. I see our country standing before the world as the champion of such things only as are fine and forward-looking in the progress and the uplift of the race. I think of any war in which she may engage as a war that is only a step to a righteous peace. If she is fighting to maintain her independence I think of her as desiring that independence in order that she may be free to follow ideals which in their essence are altruistic; and I think of her as deserving victory because her victory will be the victory of civilization. If I am right in my conception of our country, how far-reaching the disaster if she is found unequal to the task imposed upon her because she lacks the *power* to meet her privileges and her responsibilities?

Some one has said that the advocates of preparedness lack the larger vision of the pacifists. I deny that this is so. I claim that ours is the larger vision because it takes in, not alone a land at peace, but a land at peace with all its ideals preserved, its people protected, its possibilities of helpfulness expanded and expanding;—a land not stripped of power through cowardly fear of using power unjustly, but rich in power and richer still in the determination that this power shall be used alone as a means to the attainment of great and noble ends. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion will be continued by DR. WILLIAM I. HULL, Professor of History and International Relations at Swarthmore College. (Applause.)

ADDRESS BY WILLIAM I. HULL, PH. D.

Are armaments as such provocatives of war? It has seemed to me that the Admiral, in his very thoughtful and interesting paper, has nevertheless confused quarrels with fights. As I see it, a war has both elements. There is first a quarrel and then there is a fight. Armaments are for the purpose of settling disputes by means of fights. Now I fancy that no one expects that, this side of the millennium, human beings or nations of human beings will cease to have disputes with each other. The great question of our time is, How shall disputes between nations be settled? Shall they be settled as are disputes between individuals, and as are disputes between the commonwealths of this Republic; namely, by judicial process, or shall they be settled by means of armaments?

From the point of view of pure reason it would seem that if we are in possession of armaments, we will be very strongly inclined to settle our disputes by means of them. In the first place we have the spectacle of the great war in Europe, the greatest in the world's history; this war was followed hard upon the unprecedented building up of great armaments. On the other hand, America furnishes some experience of a different kind. A hundred years ago at the close of the Napoleonic wars, we had as our American representative at the Court of St. James, that shrewd, level-headed Yankee diplomatist, John Quincy Adams. Adams heard that the British Government was about to build upon the Great Lakes some warships. He was authorized by our government to take the matter up with the British Government; he did so, and I wish I might read to you the letters which Adams wrote to Lord Castlereagh, in which he pointed out that if the British Government built these warships on the Great Lakes, inevitably the United States Government would follow suit; that there would ensue an endless and expensive competition in the building up of a war fleet upon the Great Lakes; but worse than that, he insisted that at every time of quarrel or dispute between the two countries, the inevitable tendency would be to settle those disputes by means of the warships. Let us, then, he said, limit the armed forces on the lakes to a minimum, and the smaller the minimum the better satisfied will be the United States. As a result of that correspondence, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 was entered upon; and as a result of that agreement there has been practical disarmament upon the Great Lakes, and not only there but throughout the entire boundary between our own Republic and the British Empire: for beyond that line there is not only Canada but Great Britain, the mistress of the seas. Yet, with that mighty empire we have celebrated a century of peace. Whatever else is proved

by this twofold experience, surely this must be admitted, that the old theory that the best and only way of preserving the peace is by the possession of adequate armaments has been exploded forever.

Secondly, I would like to consider for a few moments what is meant by "adequate armaments." I fancy that if we go into the military program, we should go into it whole-heartedly; we should no longer fool with it as we have evidently been doing during the last generation. Within the last seventeen years we have *increased* our military and naval expenditures by three thousand million dollars; and yet our military and naval experts have testified before Congress that we are *absolutely unprepared!* How much preparedness, then, is "adequate" for the preservation of the peace or for the protection of this country? Consider the army as one element or item in the program. We are talking now of increasing our regular army from 90,000 to 207,000 men. Are 207,000 men adequate for twentieth century warfare in defense of such a program as has been spoken of here this evening? The defense not only of our own continental territory, but the defense of our possessions in the islands of the Atlantic, and in Central America, and in the Pacific? A program of defense of neutral rights, of the lives of Americans, whether they are travelers or missionaries or merchants; the defense of the Monroe Doctrine, of the territorial and political rights of the two Americas? Such a program as this might lead us into a defensive war on any one of the continents or on any part of the seven seas. If we are to defend such a program by means of armaments, we have no business with "moderation" or "modesty" in the light of what the twentieth century warfare has revealed to us. Two hundred and seven thousand men? Why, they *capture* that many men in the course of a summer's campaign. When the Japanese Prime Minister heard that Germany had 3,000,000 captives upon its soil, he said: "This is not capture, this is immigration;" and he was right. Take the item of *killed* or *permanently disabled*. We are told that it amounts to 5,000,000 men on either side. The bare item of *missing* amounts to 2,000,000 men. In the warfare of our time, evidently, we must think in terms, not of tens or even hundreds of thousands, but of *millions* of men. Of course we could "Belgiumize" this country by half-way preparedness; but that is a program which does not appeal, I fancy, to most Americans.

Take the program upon the seas; what is adequate armament for the defense of the peace or of our country? Well, it is difficult to find out. Some think that two warships a year are enough; others that four warships a year are enough. There are others who insist that we must have incomparably the greatest navy on earth. Perhaps the naval warfare of the future will

be fought out *beneath* the seas instead of on them. I cannot, however, go into other items of this military program, but will stop merely to express my conviction that Americans, in their thoughts about preparedness, have been thinking in terms of absolute inadequacy. During the months of this preparedness furore to which we have been witnesses, I have sometimes wondered what has become of the American sense of humor, that there should be made to us, by serious men, and that there should be seriously considered, such propositions for adequate preparedness as the military training of school-boys, or the training of officers in summer camps, or by winter correspondence courses, or by the week-end training of Bible classes, such as they undertake down near where I live, or by "Women's Plattsburgs." Of course, I realize that these are fine things to do,—for the individuals who participate in them, and I frankly admire the public spirit which leads some, at least, of those people into that sort of thing; but from the point of view of military adequacy, it seems even to a layman who knows anything about German military training and German military preparedness, absolutely and laughably inadequate.

But, as I said at the beginning, the very worst thing about the armaments program is not that it is fooling with the military situation or that it is enormously expensive, but that it constitutes, in my firm belief, the chief obstacle to what I like to call the American program for the preservation of the peace. (Applause.) Now what is this American program? A Princeton professor came to Philadelphia the other day and informed us that it was "sitting down idly and folding your hands and doing nothing." *Is* it a program of "longings and prayers and beautiful dreams?" To ask that question of a Lake Mohonk Conference on arbitration is certainly superfluous, to say the least. But let me at least mention some of the planks in this American program for the preservation of the peace, and allude to the relation of big armaments to each of those planks.

In the first place, it means the limitation of armaments. The whole world of civilization I fancy, inside and outside of the warring nations, is determined that at the end of this war there shall be a stop put forever to that incessant competition in the building up of armaments which has disgraced the civilization and Christianity of the last half century. Consider the position of an American delegation in a conference called for the purpose of limiting armaments, if the military program is put through in the United States in earnest. Would not the delegates from the other countries say: "You Americans, while we were engaged in destroying each other's armaments, seized the opportunity of building up your own. Go to; we will now go and do likewise." So far from having any influence in such a confer-

ence, we would give an impulse to the international competition in the building up of armaments such as this world has never seen before. On the other hand, it is *not true* that the possession of great armaments is the *sine qua non* of exerting influence in the congress of the nations. This is abundantly proved by the experience of the two Hague Conferences; it was the representatives of *big ideas*, even though they came from the little countries, who had supreme influence in those conferences in getting things done. (Applause.) Let me recall some of those magnificent men, such as Drago of Argentina, Ruy Barbosa of Brazil, Soveral of Portugal, Beernaert and Descamps of Belgium, Asser and Poortugael of Holland, Hagerup of Norway, and Eyschen of tiny Luxemburg.

Mediation also is an American plank. We have tried it again and again, both to prevent and to put an end to wars between American republics. It was pressed at the beginning of this war; our President's offer was rejected. Why? The whole world is now waiting for the time when that offer can again be made. What is it waiting for? You know, as well as I do, that we are waiting until the big armaments, on one side or the other, have been smashed into smithereens; for then and then only may there be hope of the utilization of mediation.

Consider another plank in this program; namely, commissions of inquiry. They, too, have been tried and found successful, as has every single one of the planks in this American program. It is not pure theory; it is practical experience, which is back of this program. Commissions of inquiry have been successfully tested. A commission of inquiry prevented a probable war between Russia and Great Britain over the question of the Dogger Bank; another settled a controversy between Italy and France. Consider the immediate cause of this war: the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, and Austria's charge that the Serbian Government was responsible for it. Here was a question of *fact*, which an impartial, international commission of inquiry could have investigated and published to the public opinion of the world. Why was not a commission of inquiry resorted to? Because of big armaments. Austria knew that back of her was the unrivaled army of Germany. Serbia knew that back of her were the armies of France and of Russia, and probably the navy of Great Britain.

Consider next arbitration. One of the proudest pages in our country's history is the page which records those fourscore disputes with other nations which have been settled by means of arbitration. What is the relation of great armaments to that plank in the program? Well, at the first Hague Conference, when it was proposed to establish a court of arbitration, the German military delegate said: "Germany will have none of

arbitration; Germany has an army which is ready to fight at the drop of the hat; arbitration is merely a device to let the unprepared fellow get ready." Great Britain's naval delegate said practically the same thing: "Great Britain is mistress of the seas; by means of its navy, it will enforce international justice." Fortunately the naval and the military experts of Europe were brushed aside in this matter at the Hague Conference and the court was agreed upon. It went into operation four years later, on the initiative of the government of these United States. Since then a dozen years have passed, a tiny span in human history, and yet that court has settled fifteen disputes between the nations, and has settled them so thoroughly, as is the characteristic of judicial settlement, that you and I have almost forgotten what they were about. Nor were they all trifling disputes, by any means. Two or three of them were grave, or of long standing; while before that tribunal have stood, not only the little fellows in the family of nations, like Venezuela and Belgium, but every one of the eight great powers with the exception of Austria-Hungary; our own Republic repeatedly, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Italy, Germany and France. A dispute between Germany and France, the bitter rivals of a half-century, was settled by it.

But you say, "What has become of this Hague program which is really the American program? Those conventions are scraps of paper now." Yes, and what *made* them scraps of paper? Big armaments (applause), and reliance upon big armaments. This experiment which we are now trying to put over upon the rest of the world is nothing new in our Republic. It was tried in 1787 and 1789. There were men who proposed a scrap of paper, the Constitution, for the settlement of disputes, for the judicial settlement of disputes between the thirteen independent states; and there were men in Virginia and New York and Massachusetts who said: "We will not trust to a scrap of paper; we will go home and prepare to defend our states in the good old way of building up our little navy and our little army, and, as our President has remarked, Pennsylvania and Connecticut came to the verge of war on exactly that basis. Fortunately the Hamiltons and the Madisons and the Washingtons won out in that great struggle. The Constitution was tried; it has worked. Would it have worked in the presence of state armaments? Both reason and experience afford abundant and convincing proof to the contrary. Here then, as I see it, is the great crisis which confronts our Republic today. Two paths have opened before us; one path is that old-world, medieval, barbarous, fallacious pathway of so-called military "preparedness." The other pathway is the twentieth century, the judicial, the civilized, the adequate, the American pathway. Which are we going to choose? (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is REV. CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, D. D.,* Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle Church, of New York.

ADDRESS BY REV. CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, D. D.

Are large armaments as such either provocatives of war or deterrents of arbitral and judicial settlement of international differences? My answer is they are, and these are my reasons: First, because of their nature. They are in reality enormous masses of explosives. The explosives are of two kinds, chemical and human. Their presence deranges the normal beating of the world's heart. We can never have national health on this planet, until swollen armies and navies are abolished. They create a state of mind out of which war, soon or late, must inevitably come. They are fomenters and feeders of fear. For forty years Europe has tossed and moaned in a hideous nightmare. War itself came at last as a relief. Fear begets suspicion. Out of suspicion springs dislike, dislike deepens into hate, hate rushes on to bloodshed. Fear, suspicion, dislike, hate, slaughter, these are steps in the stairway down which nations pass to hell—shoved down by their armaments.

But armaments are more than metal and chemicals. Armaments are made largely of flesh and blood. Armies are men, so also are navies. Large armies and navies mean tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions of men. Along then with your tons of chemical explosives, you have explosive material done up in the bodies of a vast multitude of men. These men must have officers—thirty-five thousand to every million men—and out of every hundred of them you can expect one or more Bernhardis—men who believe that war is a biological necessity, that it is the mother of all the virtues, and that every nation must perform those deeds of blood and valor which above everything else bring national renown. Bernhardi is not simply a Prussian; he is a Russian, a Frenchman, an Englishman, an American. He is in every army. He is a product of the barracks. You cannot eliminate him. You must always reckon with him. He will talk. He will write. He will organize a war party. It is cruel injustice to say that all military and naval officers want war. Many of them abhor war with an abhorrence deep and true. But you cannot have an army in which there will not be at least one Bernhardi, and in every army in every country today there are many Bernhardis. Now Bernhardi is a provocative of war. He always has his eye on the next war. It is inevitable, imminent. He dreams of power—of conquest.

* Although Dr. Jefferson's address was of necessity delivered during the Fifth Session, it is printed here to preserve relevance of thought.—ED.

He moves heaven and earth to plant his ideas in the public mind. By his propaganda he makes his nation feared. He kindles at last a fire which may burn up the world.

Huge armies give birth to Bernhardi, also to a twin brother, Krupp. Without Krupp the army can do nothing. He manufactures the guns and the ships, and all the explosives. The bigger the military and naval budgets, the happier is Krupp, and the mightier. He employs more and more men, adds more acres to his plant, amasses more capital, and extends his influence until he looms the chief man in the nation. He becomes at last almost a demigod, able even to control the national weather. He launches international storms. He sends the lightning, and while the lightning is playing he tightens his clutches on the national treasury. He starves every department of national activity in order to convert national treasure into guns. He has costly machinery. It must be kept running. He has thousands of workmen. They cannot be allowed to be idle. Hence improved guns must be introduced every few years, and battleships must go to the junk heap before they have seen service.

Krupp works through the journalist. Without the printing press, he is undone. Newspapers when owned by men of low type, are the most dangerous of all the poisoners of the wells of international good will. Their capacity for mischief cannot be measured. In all countries, the big newspapers—with few exceptions—are for big armaments. Krupp and the millionaire journalist usually join hands. They are both men of power. It would be unfair to say that the munition maker bribes or hires the editor. He simply uses him. The editor is indispensable when it comes to creating war panics, and stampeding the nation into wilder schemes of preparedness. He crowds his columns with insolent gossip and lying rumors, and fills his readers' hearts with dark imaginations and terrifying fears. He excites hatred toward every nation against which he sets his heart. Lord Northcliffe, for instance, owns the *Daily Mail*, the *Daily Mirror*, the *Daily Graphic*, the *Daily Express*, the *Evening News*, the *Daily Times*, and the *Weekly Dispatch*. This is what Lord Northcliffe said several years ago in an interview in the *Paris Matin*: "We detest the Germans cordially. I will never allow the least thing to be printed in my journal which might wound France, but I would not let anything be printed which might be agreeable to Germany." There you see the journalist at his worst. Northcliffe is found in every one of the world's capitals. You cannot get rid of him. You must reckon with him. He has matches and you jeopardize civilization when you pile up the gunpowder around him. Are large armaments

provocative of war? Yes, for the reason that they are explosives, and are within reach of Bernhardt and Krupp and Northcliffe.

There is a second reason why huge armaments provoke war. They are confessions of distrust, and therefore strain and finally break down international friendship. Without confidence nothing goes on well in this world. Armaments smash confidence to splinters. Nations all arm now in defense. They themselves seek only justice and the things which are right, but their neighbors alas! are unprincipled rascals, against which they must be on their guard. To arm in defense is therefore an insult to the nation you arm against. A nation multiplying its guns, and all the time protesting it arms solely in defense, is slandering its neighbors. It is saying: "My neighbors are cutthroats and bandits and I must be ready to beat them off with a club." That is what we say to Japan when we strengthen our Pacific defenses, and that is what we say to Germany when we talk about five hundred millions in five years for new ships to be ready for her when she comes. When once bad feeling is engendered, it is easier to fight.

Armed peace is a form of war. Armament is in reality an attack on some other nation. That nation meets it with a counter attack. You cannot arm for defense without compelling others to arm in defense, and when the defenses have reached a certain point of perfection there will be war. Just now many Americans are trying to draw a line between armament for defense and armament for aggression. There is no such line possible. What is defensive, for you, will be offensive for your neighbor. It makes no difference at all whether you arm for offense or defense—*for* war or *against* war. The effect is precisely the same, and the budgets are the same. Great Britain armed for defense only. A navy was necessary, she said, to protect her commerce. Germany built up a vast commerce, and acting on the British philosophy, she said she had to protect it with a fleet. Every German, from Von Bulow down declared it was only for defense, but no Englishman believed it. Every Englishman declared that the British navy was solely for defense, but no German believed it. What is the use of fooling ourselves with words. It is not what we say but what we do that shapes the character and destiny of the world. England and Germany did not want to fight. Every Englishman of note has said that within the last ten years. Every German in official position has said that Germany desired only the friendship of England. The Kaiser said it, and Marschall von Bieberstein and Prince Lichnowsky and Herr von Jagow, and all the rest of them. I believe they were all honest men, and spoke the truth. Those two great empires were driven to war by their guns.

The expanding squadrons of battleships on the North Sea simply drove them irresistibly apart, snapping the ties made sacred by the memories of a thousand years.

In the third place large armaments precipitate war because in times of national excitement, the control of affairs passes inevitably into the hands of the most aggressive and best organized body of men in the nation. As a recent writer in the *Berliner Tageblatt* says: "Even the most gifted and most industrious monarch disappears behind the machine." Now the army and navy are machines. They are organized for swift and vigorous action. The English papers have prided themselves for years on the fact that in case of war, the British navy would get its blow in first, before the other nation had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared. At the first Hague Conference, the head of the German Delegation, Count Munster, disparaged arbitration, saying: "It would be injurious to Germany. Germany is prepared for war. She can mobilize her army in ten days. Arbitration simply gives rival powers time to put themselves in readiness." At the same Conference, Sir John Fisher spoke for England. His argument was this: "The British navy is prepared. A vast deal depends on prompt action by the navy. The truce afforded by arbitration proceedings, will give other powers time to put themselves into complete readiness." It is fundamental in military tactics that the blow shall be swift. No time must be wasted on reflection or on discussion. It is disheartening therefore to hear just now so many Americans crying for guns and saying: "We do not want war, we do not intend war," just as though nations get what they want or intend. They get what they prepare for. (Applause.) In a crisis, our big army and navy, if created, will fall into the hands of the then dominant political party, into the hands of the ruling faction of that party, into the hands of the most energetic group in that faction, into the hands of the most vigorous and ambitious individual in that group. The people will have nothing to say when the crucial hour arrives. Even the alleged rulers will have exceedingly little to say. It is the men who have been trained for war, who when the clock strikes, leap into the saddle, and drag the nation after them. That is what happened in Berlin in the feverish August of 1914. William II is a man of unusual strength, but when the army chiefs all told him there must be no delay, the fateful ultimatum was sent, and the war was on!

Great armies and navies are of necessity the implacable foes of arbitral and judicial methods of settling international disputes. Militarists have scant patience with diplomatists who want to investigate and consider, and reason. They do not care to untie knots, they prefer to cut them. In 1908 when Bosnia

and Herzegovina were taken by Austria, there was no conference for discussion. Germany appeared in shining armor and the case was settled, not by reason but by the army. Later on at Agadir, Great Britain appeared by the side of France in shining armor. The case was settled not by reason but by the navy. It was those two settlements which unsettled the world. Big armaments shove reason aside and throw the purple over the shoulders of Force. If you point a gun at me I cannot reason. I fall back on my primitive instincts. If I am strong, the tiger in me comes to the front, and I try to knock you over or tear you to pieces. If I am weak, the fox in me becomes dominant and I trick you if I can. Guns cut the nerves of arbitration. Diplomatic pressure (which means the pressure of 16-inch guns) is a kind of pressure that squeezes out the life of justice, and of liberty, and leaves nations irritated and revengeful.

International diplomacy cannot be sound, so long as these great armies and great navies exist. World finances cannot be normal until this incubus is thrown off. Our Christian ideals cannot be realized so long as Caesar sits on the throne of the world. The mailed fist is an enemy of Christ. Hague Conferences will make tardy progress until we escape the domination of the military-naval experts. Great armaments must be gotten rid of. They will be, when the people decree it. It is for all who love mankind to proceed to organize the world. Our fathers organized thirteen commonwealths into a Republic. The principle was sound, and the thirteen have increased to forty-eight. We must now help to organize the nations into a family to be governed by justice and liberty and good will. It is for us to bend all our energies at this crisis in history to the working out of a plan whereby the world's armaments shall be melted, and the streams of gold and brain energy now devoted to the multiplication of the instruments of blood, shall be consecrated to the creation of those constructive and beneficent agencies and institutions, which shall heal the running sores of the world, provide for its multitudinous and clamorous needs, and open the beautiful gates of a thousand years of peace. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion upon this theme under the five-minute rule will be opened by JOHN BATES CLARK, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University, New York. (Applause.)

ECONOMICS AND ARMAMENTS

REMARKS BY DR. JOHN B. CLARK

I have been very much interested in trying to gather from the arguments offered on the two sides, a certain number of axio-

matic truths on which doubtless both sides would agree. One of them is that when a highly aggressive nation has a very good army, that is a source of danger to other people. The other is that when a highly peaceful nation hasn't any army, particularly if it is rich, that is a source of danger to itself. There are two conditions which are perilous, therefore, to society as a whole. There is one imaginable condition that would be relatively safe, that is, a condition in which nobody should have any army at all. Next to that the safest plan would be for everybody to have a proportionate army and not be over-inclined to make haste to use it, because of wholesome respect for the armaments of the other fellows. If you imagine a group of people only one of whom has a gun and knows how to use it, the lack of a gun is a source of danger to each of the others, and it is a measure of peace for them to get guns. Until a better state arrives and you get a court of justice and a lot of policemen arms in the hands of orderly citizens tend to diminish crime. That is true of nations, until the courts of justice and the policemen of nations arrive.

The great army of Germany was a source of danger to Belgium. If the Allies had been able to put into Belgium an army of about the size of the Swiss Army or a little larger, and do it promptly, that would have been a source of safety to Belgium. It would then have been, for the Germans, a better bargain to enter France by some other route; and I have observed that through that little peaceful and altogether admirable country, Switzerland, the German armies have not chosen to go. (Applause.)

I suppose the real and abiding cause of disagreement is the question whether America ought to have about as small an army as Congress has now provided for. Wild horses shall not make me express an opinion on that subject, but I am reminded of some facts on which an opinion might, with due reflection, be based. One is that, during all its earlier history, America was relatively safer as against attack by foreign countries, in case they chose to make it, than we should be now. With our once large fleet of merchant vessels, we could then have extemporized a navy that would have made a respectable showing, comparatively speaking, on the sea. The English used to say that America was relatively safe on the sea by virtue of the large mercantile marine she had afloat; but you cannot make dreadnoughts out of modern merchant vessels, and if you could, we haven't the merchant vessels. On the sea we were relatively safer then. On the land also we were relatively safer. We could not make very much of a showing, indeed, but could have made a far better one than we could now, because of the simple way in which battles were then fought, the much more elaborate way

in which war is now made and the greater elaboration of the needed instrumentalities, which we altogether lack.

I have been asked to say something about the economic phase of the question. The question is whether the incidents connected with a great armament themselves have a pacific or a militant effect. As a matter of fact, the enormous expense attendant on a vast armament shows itself mainly in the internal condition of the country rather than in the external relations of it. The army itself has to do mainly with external relations, but the cost of it has more to do—very much more to do—with the internal relations; and the chief result of it is to put a damper on extensive and costly projects of reform and of human uplifting which otherwise, by the absence of the vast military expenditure, would be made possible. At the end of the war we shall see that effect at its absolute and almost inconceivably bad extreme.

As far as the effect of the cost of great armies on the relations between different countries is concerned and its effect on the possibilities of war, I am moved to refer simply to an impression which I have reason to know prevailed in Germany, in rather high circles, at the outbreak of the present war. It was then said that, inasmuch as the French had recently adopted a three-year period of service and so greatly increased the size and cost of their army that they could not possibly maintain it on that basis for any considerable term of years, it must necessarily be that France was contemplating an early attack upon Germany. I had just come from France and I knew very thoroughly how mistaken that impression was. The effort was to keep measurably even with Germany; but that impression existed. If a nation, however, is struggling under such a terrific burden of expense as the present war, for instance, is entailing on all the countries, what it does it will have to do quickly if at all. What the nations now at war will be able to do they will have to do rather quickly, since they cannot continue the struggle indefinitely. Even the burden of an army at peace may at some time lead to aggression. The mere costliness of the army may conceivably lead a nation to precipitate a war if they think it is sure to come in any case; but how much of an argument is that in comparison with the fact that the army, big as it is in time of peace, costs relatively nothing in comparison with what it would cost in time of war? The expense argument is in favor of peace and overwhelmingly so. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Further discussion from the floor under the five-minute rule is now in order.

THE TREND OF HISTORY

REMARKS BY GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, PH. D.

Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University

The addresses on large armaments, to which we have just listened with such pleasure, leave us with the impression that the fundamental issue between peace people and militarists is that of immediate reasonable preparedness. I wish to suggest that this issue is not and cannot well be a fundamental one between us. The true aim of peace advocates is so to regulate the intercourse of states as to avoid the necessity of recurring war. This aim is not necessarily opposed to reasonable preparedness.

Those of us who were here this morning remember Dr. Abbott's statement that if we wish to deal with the war problem, we must first understand the trend of history, and also Judge Rose's remark that the fundamental difficulty at the present time in world organization is to be found in the absolute unlimited sovereignty of the various states. I should like to point out that the trend of history from the beginning to the present moment has been a process of limiting or abolishing this absolute unlimited sovereignty. This has been done by continually creating ever larger political or national units. At the dawn of history, the political unit was the family; then the family was absorbed by the tribe; and the tribe by the city state. Later the unit was the feudal castle on the hill; then the feudal county and duchy; then the kingdom and the absolutistic state; and finally the nation of to-day. Adams, in his *History of Civilization*, written before the war, says, "If we could venture to put any trust in the apparently regular and natural character of this progress, the next step logically would seem to be some kind of an international federation or possibly world state."

Notice the way this development has actually been working out in the recent past. Not a long time ago, as we count time in history, England and Scotland were bitter enemies; England, Anglo-Saxon and Episcopal; Scotland, Celtic and Presbyterian. For centuries their unending border warfare lasted on. But finally, without conquest, these two old enemies were united. Germany was divided, not a century ago, by a deep and long-standing hostility between the Protestant states of the North and the Catholic states of the South; but they finally formed a union which they later cemented, by mutual consent, into the present German Empire. A similar evolution took place in Italy. What was fiercer than the patriotism of the Italian city states? Nothing except their hatred of each other. But they all united, for the most part by voluntary action, and the little patriotisms of Venice, Milan, Genoa and Florence took on the larger patriot-

ism of Italy. Finally there were our own thirteen states. We almost forget the vitally critical period when it was yet an open question whether they would form one or thirteen nations. There arose the same kind of disputes and the same spirit of mutual suspicion which we know too well in Europe. Fortunately they created a Federal Union which has gradually developed into our United States of to-day.

It is especially instructive to notice the process by which this development has been brought about. In each of these recent and notable cases of political consolidation, mutually suspicious and often mutually hostile states have first of all created the form of a greater state. This new union has been a common guarantee to each of the small political units against attack from any other member of the new federation. It has also done away, at once, with the chief causes of war, such as rivalry for colonies and for preferential privileges in foreign markets. Only after this, have the old local patriotisms gradually adjusted themselves to the new larger government.

Already the next logical step in world federation is taking place before our very eyes. Excluding China, about nine-tenths of the world's territory, the world's population, and the world's wealth is now grouped into only three great new units, the Entente, the Central Powers, and the Pan-American Union.

In the study, then, of the problem of developing some agency other than war for regulating the intercourse of states, the teaching of historical evolution points to a limiting of present-day national sovereignty by some form of international federation. The creation, therefore, of a proper and suitable international federation should be the aim of those working for permanent peace. Whatever is attempted must be in accord with the progress of world evolution or else it will be merely a futile effort.

The League to Enforce Peace, described by our Chairman this evening, has its greatest strength from the fact that it is in line with the centuries-long trend of history. It seems to be the next logical step in the evolution of the world's organization and government and therefore gives the best promise of real and lasting success. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Will anyone else continue the discussion?

THE ENFORCEMENT OF UNSELFISHNESS: AN ANALOGY

REMARKS BY MR. HAROLD J. HOWLAND, ASSISTANT EDITOR,
The Independent, NEW YORK

I should like to present the idea of the League to Enforce Peace from a slightly different point of view. If I may say so,

the reason which entitles me in some degree to speak of this is because I took a small part, as probably the youngest of the group that gathered around the dinner table which President Taft has described, where the idea was first worked out.

The problem which is before us is to see how we can get along without war. The first thing we ought to try to find out in approaching that problem is what causes war? Now of course there are many wars which have many causes, but is there anything, any fundamental thing at the root of all those causes which is common to all? It seems to me that there is,—that the cause of any war is a conflict of desires on the part of two groups of people, otherwise nations, one of which desires at least must be selfish. Both may be selfish, but one of them must be selfish. Obviously if all the nations in the world, taken two at a time, treated each other in a purely unselfish manner no two of them could ever fight. I think if you take any war you like, you will find this rather truistic cause at the base of it: a conflict of two desires, one of which at least is selfish.

How are you going to get over that cause and the things that arise from it? How are you going to remove that cause? I would like to take an analogy from the lives of individuals in a community, and it seems to me that it is a fair analogy because in the world we are a community of states, of groups of people.

What is it that makes people fight among themselves? What makes them disagree and quarrel? Conflict of desires, one of which at least is selfish, both of which may be. And what is it that keeps us on the whole in civilized communities living at peace with one another? I take it that there are just two things, which go along parallel and both contribute to keep us living at peace in spite of the fact that from time to time two or more of us as individuals have a conflict of desires with the selfish element in it. One of these is the growth by slow degrees through the ages of the spirit of unselfishness in individuals. As men develop spiritually and morally and grow more and more unselfish, they naturally tend to stop quarrelling with one another. If we were all unselfish we could not fight, for the life of us. As that development goes on, the individual communities of the civilized world become more peaceful and better places to live in. But that is a slow process. It has been going on for a good many centuries and some of us even now sometimes act in an unselfish way and quarrel with our neighbors as a result of it. When the time comes that the development is complete, there will be no quarrels among individuals. But it is a slow process and it is as yet by no means complete.

So there is another process, going on alongside of this process of spiritual and moral development, which avails to keep us living in peace and harmony. That is the interference of the state.

This government is merely an organization of all of us, which imposes upon us as individuals the task, the duty, the requirement that we shall act in our relations to each other as though we were unselfish, even when we are selfish and desire to act in a selfish manner. The government, which represents all of us, imposes upon us by force, either actual or potential, the requirement that we shall behave toward each other as though we were unselfish.

Now those two things are going along side by side. When the first process is complete, the second process, in so far as its purpose is to keep the peace between individuals will, I take it, have become outworn and unnecessary.

Let us apply the same analogy to the community of states. There we need two processes to keep the states of the world living in harmony and peace with each other. One is the development in each individual state of a community desire to treat other states in an unselfish manner. If each group of people in the world had the desire with regard to every other group of people in the world to behave in an unselfish manner toward it, there would be no fights between states. That process of development is going on. The world, in so far as that relationship between states is concerned, is better off than it once was, in spite of what is going on in Europe at the present time. But that process is bound to be much slower among states than among individuals, because the state is a much more complex organism than the individual.

In the meantime, what do we need? We need that other process to go alongside of this one of spiritual and moral development on the part of the nation. We need some organization to impose by force, either actual or potential, upon the individual groups, that is the nation, the requirement that it shall behave toward the other groups in the world as though it were unselfish; to enforce the condition that all the states in the world shall behave toward each other as though they were unselfish. The ideal obviously, carrying out this analogy, is a world government which should, by being built up as an organization of all the individual states, impose the collective force upon each individual state and make it act as though it were unselfish. But that is rather far in the future; it is rather difficult to think of a world state at any time within our immediate view.

Therefore those of us who are proposing to organize a league of nations to enforce peace offer this as the first tentative, partial step in that direction. It is a device by which a group of states that want to keep the peace, shall organize its force to compel each one of its members, in case of any possible dispute with another, to act toward that other member of the group as though it were unselfish.

I believe that this analogy drawn from the life of individuals in communities and the two forces which are combining and cooperating to keep them living in peace and harmony with one another, presents a fundamental and a sound argument for the trial of this scheme of a League to Enforce Peace as the best tentative step that we have in sight for solving the problem of keeping the individual members of the world community living at peace with one another.

The Conference then adjourned until the following morning.

Third Session

Thursday, May 18, 1916, 9:45 A. M.

The CHAIRMAN: The topic of the morning is The Possibilities of International Cooperation in Determining the Necessity, if any, for, and Regulating the Use of, Military Force, Economic Pressure or Other Sanctions, and the first speaker is MR. HERBERT S. HOUSTON, of New York, Vice-President of Doubleday, Page & Company, and the Chairman of the Committee on Information of the League to Enforce Peace. (Applause.)

PUTTING PEACE ON A WAR FOOTING

ADDRESS BY MR. HERBERT S. HOUSTON

For many years these interesting conferences at Lake Mohonk have been discussing peace. And yet on this very day the calm in these mountains is disturbed by the roar and the dread of war. Last Saturday over one hundred thousand men marched up Fifth avenue in New York to put in moving panorama their burning conviction that the United States should have adequate defense. During these May days 30,000 engineers, without cost to the Government, are making a card-index survey of industry so that it may become the basic line of defense, if need comes. And for a year the President has been standing with quiet, and, it seems to me, unflinching courage for the rights of neutrals, although the country be brought to the very brink of war.

Now what is the meaning of all this to the cause of peace. Isn't it clearly this—that peace must be put on a war footing. It must have for a symbol the strong, far-seeing eagle rather than the tame and ineffective dove. And its advocates must quit the forum for the field, if need be to fight, not to urge war but to establish peace. But isn't this stark militarism, in the mask of pacifism? Not at all. Instead it is pacifism, militant if you please—but still pacifism, radiant in strength and glowing with the irresistible purpose to make its dream come true.

Next week there will gather in Washington nearly a thousand men and women at the great Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace. They believe in peace, not only as a dream but as a program. They are convinced that the warrant from all history, as declared in Independence Hall last June when the League was formed is this:

“Throughout five thousand years of recorded history peace, here and there established, has been kept, and its area has been widened, in one way only. Individuals have combined their efforts to suppress violence in the local community. Communities have co-operated to maintain the authoritative state and to preserve peace within its borders. States have formed leagues or confederations or have otherwise co-operated to establish peace among themselves. Always peace has been made and kept, when made and kept at all, by the superior power of superior numbers acting in unity for the common good.

“Mindful of this teaching of experience, we believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and to create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace among themselves and to guarantee it by all known and available sanctions at their command, to the end that civilization may be conserved and the progress of mankind in comfort, enlightenment and happiness may continue.”

Believing that peace *between* nations, just as does peace *within* nations, must rest on force, the League has flung a mighty challenge in the face of a warring world—a challenge to establish peace, when the war ends, on a basis of justice and to maintain it through courts, upheld by international agreements and made effective by international forces. And these proposals have received broad support both at home and abroad. Sir Edward Grey told Mr. Theodore Marburg at the Foreign Office in London a few weeks ago that he was prepared to go the whole length of the program of the League to Enforce Peace and expressed the opinion that if some such plan had been in operation when the present war was threatened the war would not have occurred. Surely this is strong support from a high quarter. And as the attitude of England will be influential if not decisive with the Allies, this view is bound to have great weight in determining the basis for a durable peace. When the wisest foreign minister in Europe, a man who bore a leading part in all the negotiations that led up to the war, will go so far as to say that even this mighty war could have been prevented by a plan similar to that proposed by the League—surely no one can claim that this program is impossible of achievement.

The President of the United States in speaking to representatives of the American Union against militarism in Washington a few days ago took practically the same stand as that outlined by the British Foreign Minister. He expressed the belief that peace could be maintained only if it were enforced, and that this country, in order to bear its part with other nations, would require adequate military force. So here are responsible statesmen in places of leadership in the great English-speaking democracies standing for world peace through international forces. And the business men of America, through the Chamber of Commerce of the United States have spoken to the same effect. Last fall a Committee of the Chamber was appointed to study the economic results of the war and to consider plans for a lasting peace. After

a careful survey of all the plans for peace this committee submitted the proposals of the League as constituting the wisest and most practicable that had been formulated, and the hundreds of constituent commercial bodies in the National Chamber, with several hundred thousand members, voted in favor of them by a great majority; in fact all but one of the four proposals received a majority in excess of two-thirds. Last October the International Peace Congress, in session in San Francisco, embodied these proposals in its platform; and peace societies in Massachusetts, in New York, in Pennsylvania and throughout the country have taken similar action. Many church associations have given their support, as have the economic societies in various cities. Recently in New York the Executive Committee of the League met in conference with the leaders of the Security League, the Navy League and of other preparedness organizations and it was discovered that they were practically of one mind in favoring national defense for America and international peace for the world, resting on law and on courts. Right now the Associated Advertising Clubs are carrying forward a nation-wide publicity campaign under that shibboleth, "National Defense and International Peace," in support of the 30,000 engineers, who during this month of May are making a card-index survey of industry so that it may be mobilized for defense, if need comes. In the coming national political conventions the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace will be presented for adoption in party platforms. All this is a record of things done, or now in hand to do, in furtherance of a plan to secure world peace that has been formulated since the last meeting of this Conference. I submit that it is a cheerful record, in a time of war and rumors of war, and that it gives some ground for the hope that wars may be reduced in number in the future, if not wholly done away with.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States strongly favors the use of economic pressure as a force to further world peace. By an overwhelming majority, in the referendum of which I have made mention, they favored the use of a "System of commercial and financial non-intercourse" against nations which, after joining with other nations in setting up courts, persisted in going to war before taking their international differences to these courts for decision.

Let us briefly examine commerce as economic pressure. Of what does it consist and how could it be applied? The most effective factors in world-wide economic pressure, such as would be required to compel nations to take justiciable issues to a world court for decision are a group of international forces. To-day money is international because in all civilized countries it has gold as the common basis. Credit based on gold is international. Commerce based on money and on credit is international. Then

the amazing network of agencies by which money and credit and commerce are employed in the world are also international. Take the stock exchanges, the cables, the wireless, the international postal service and the wonderful modern facilities for communication and intercommunication—all these are international forces. They are common to all nations. In the truest sense they are independent of race, of language, of religion, of culture, of government, and of every other human limitation. That is one of their chief merits in making them the most effective possible power used in the form of economic pressure to put behind a world court.

Business to-day is really the great organized life of the world. The agencies through which it is carried forward have created such a maze of interrelations that each nation must depend on all the others. A great Chicago banker, John J. Arnold, Vice-President of the First National Bank of that city, said to me a few weeks ago that so closely drawn and interwoven had become the economic net in which the world was enmeshed that if the great war could have been postponed four or five years it would never have swept down upon men like a thunderbolt of destruction. As an additional strand of great strength in the warp and woof of modern progress, Mr. Arnold believes that an international clearing house will come—in fact that it is an inevitable development in international finance, for settling balances between nations, just as our modern clearing houses now settle balances between banks in cities in which they are located. Beyond question such an international clearing house, when established, would quickly become an invaluable auxiliary to a world court, helping to give it stability and serving, when occasion arose, as a mighty agency through which economic pressure could be applied.

And I believe Mr. Arnold is right in his view that an international clearing house is bound to come. Business, finance, and commerce are now so truly international that there is a manifest need of it. As a strong proof of this let me remind you that when this war broke, forty per cent of the securities of the world were held internationally.

Economic pressure is not a new thing in the world. It has been used before by one nation against another and usually with tremendous effectiveness. When Philip was organizing the great armada the merchants of London persuaded the merchants of Genoa to withhold credit and moneys from the Spanish King. The result was that the armada was delayed for over a year, and then the English were prepared to meet the shock. What could be done three centuries ago for a year to delay a power so great as Spain then was could be done in this century far more effectively. And it has been employed in this century. When the German Emperor dispatched the gunboat to Agadir

bringing on the acute crisis with France, I happened to be in Paris. On the fourth day of the crisis I was having luncheon at the Grand Hotel with a young French banker of the Credit Lyonnaise. I remarked on the fact that the crisis was becoming less acute and inquired the reason. "We are withdrawing our French investments from Germany" was the rejoinder "and that economic pressure is relieving the situation." As we all know, it not only relieved the situation but it served as a definite means to prevent a war that seemed imminent. Now I submit that a force which England could use against Spain in the sixteenth century and that France could use against Germany in the twentieth century—in each case let me remind you a single nation was applying force against another single nation and that nation its enemy—I submit that that force can be applied by all nations collectively against another nation that refuses to take a justiciable issue to a world court for a decision.

A nation that should decline to take justiciable questions to the world court, after having agreed with other nations to do so, would manifestly become an outlaw. Why shouldn't other nations immediately declare an embargo of non-intercourse with an outlaw nation, refusing to buy from that nation or to sell to that nation or have any intercourse whatsoever with that nation.

One of the great advantages of economic pressure is that it can be applied from within, rather than from without. Economic pressure touches the war chest of every country. Instead of fighting with bullets we can fight also with the money and credit that must be behind bullets. And the world can fight in that way to protect the civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through the centuries if it will use the force of commerce that stands ready to its hand. Nations can declare an economic embargo against an offending nation. Or, it is more accurate to say the offending nation raises an economic embargo itself by its own act in breaking its pledge to other nations and placing itself outside the pale of civilization by becoming an outlaw.

Of course, the one apparently strong and valid argument to be brought against economic pressure is that it would bring great loss to the commerce of the nations applying it. But that loss would be far less than the loss brought by war. And there would be no loss whatever if war were avoided.

If a balance could be rightly struck in this country is there any one who believes that our interests would be best served by war in some other country? This is quite apart from any question of humanity or civilization. Let it be a trial balance of commerce alone and it will show a heavy debit against war. And an accounting will show the same result in all other countries. If this be true, with only current commerce entering the equation, how staggeringly true it becomes when the piled up debts caused by

war are considered. Economists who have examined the matter state that this war has already cost over sixty billions of dollars. And the end is not yet.

So why shouldn't business, which has been binding the world more closely together for centuries, be employed to protect the world against the waste and loss of war? The loss in trade would be small or great in proportion to the amount and duration of the pressure; but it would be at most only an infinitesimal fraction of the loss caused by war. The League to Enforce Peace stands for the use of both economic and military power against a nation that goes to war before submitting any question arising to the international court. If the question is submitted and decision rendered the nation can go to war if it is so disposed, but the League believes that it will not be so disposed. Instead, in the time required for submitting the question to the court and getting a decision a nation will, as a rule, have its war fever cooled and its calmness restored, with the result that the court's decree will be accepted. There is not a case on record of a nation refusing to abide by an arbitration decision, in all the arbitrations that have been held in the last century. So if nations can be brought before an international tribunal the record shows that decrees will be obeyed and wars avoided.

As an American business man I take pride in knowing that business men have so strongly endorsed these sane and practicable proposals. The Committee of the National Chamber, of which Mr. Filene of Boston was the Chairman and of which I had the honor to be a member, closed its report, accompanying the peace referendum, with these ringing words, which I hope and believe represent the view of the great body of my countrymen:

"The time must inevitably come when the world will provide some better method than war for dealing with the questions that arise between nations. Your committee believe that it is practically possible that the time has arrived, if the United States will but do its share of the work. There is little real hope for success if the United States is not a part of it. For it is being demonstrated by this war that success in modern war depends largely on adequate supplies of ammunition and other war materials. Of these, the United States is capable of the largest and least interrupted production. If, at the close of the war, there exists the legalized purpose of the United States to join in the work needed to enforce peace, there will be a most practical reason to expect success for this so necessary step forward. In fact, the beginning of the necessary organization may be in existence at that time by reason of agreements between the United States and some of the neutral nations of South America and Europe. It is a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest that has ever come to any nation. It is a great adventure, practically within our power to promote,—an enterprise that appeals to all that is best in us,—an opportunity we will not miss." (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion will be continued by MR. ALPHEUS H. SNOW, of Washington. (Applause.)

COOPERATION VERSUS COMPULSION IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS

ADDRESS BY MR. ALPHEUS H. SNOW

During the past two years, perhaps as a result of the war, a plan has been seriously advanced and widely supported, for organizing a league of nations on a compulsive basis; and within the same period, a plan of wider scope has been brought forward with equal seriousness and with a considerable following, for organizing the whole society of nations on a compulsive basis.

The first plan is that of the League to Enforce Peace, which was fully explained and strongly advocated at the session last evening by our presiding officer, who is the President of the American committee to promote the League, and who brings to its support the influence of his high position as a former President of the United States.

The other plan is that of the Fabian Society of London. This is a proposal for organizing all the nations compulsively under what is called a "supernational authority." This "supernational authority" is to have conciliative, judicial, legislative and executive functions and organs, and is to enforce its decisions by means of an international police and by economic force. The plan recognizes and provides for large district unions of nations after the manner of the Pan-American Union—each district union cooperating with the others to uphold the society of nations and the supernational authority. The eight great powers are to occupy a special position in the whole organization, evidently as an Inner League to Enforce Peace.

Such movements, so elaborated and so supported, challenge our attention and consideration. It is our duty to examine them and either to support them or to state our reasons for opposing them when suitable opportunity is given. Mr. Smiley, following the wise traditions and policy of this Conference, that all sides of pending questions shall be heard, has asked some of us who are of that goodly number opposed to the League to Enforce Peace, to present our views to the Conference. Doubtless the objections will be based by the various persons on various grounds. For myself, I wish to say that my objections are not based on any notion or belief that the use of force is not justifiable in any case. The experience of mankind has, I believe, abundantly proved that in some kinds of organization, the use of force is necessary and therefore justifiable. Whether force ought to be used in a particular political organization depends upon whether it is possible to use it in that political society so as to

effect the object of that society. In the society of nations, or in any league of nations, it seems to me that the use of force is impracticable and therefore unjustifiable. I shall therefore attempt to base my objections on accepted principles of political science and on considerations of practical politics.

The plan of constitution of the proposed League consists of a contracting clause and four articles. By the contracting clause the United States and some other nations—evidently less than all—are to constitute themselves into a political union, described as a "League," the members binding themselves to the observance of the four articles. No object is stated, no fundamental principles of individual and national right and duty are declared, no constitutional prohibitions designed to safeguard these fundamental principles are to be accepted by the signatory nations, no legal limitations of any kind upon the processes and organs provided for in the four articles are established.

The first article obligates the signatories to use the process of judicial settlement as respects all "justiciable" questions, subject only to the limitations of treaties,—that is to say, in conformity with particular or general agreements,—and provides for the institution of an organ or organs of adjudication called "a judicial tribunal."

The second article obligates the signatories to use the process of conciliation as respects all other questions arising between them not settled by negotiation, and provides for the institution of an organ or organs of conciliation called "a council of conciliation."

The third article obligates the signatories jointly to use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing two articles, but fails to institute any organ to determine, direct and apply the force.

The fourth article provides for the process of formulation and codification of rules of international law, which formulations and codifications, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern the decisions of the organ or organs described in the first article as "a judicial tribunal." The fourth article also obligates the signatories to institute an organ or organs of formulation and codification of the rules of international law, described as "conferences."

Such being the provisions of the proposed constitution of the League of Nations to Enforce Peace, let us consider them briefly.

In the first place, let it be understood that no criticism is made or intended of the first, second and fourth articles of the

constitution taken by themselves. These articles provide for a general treaty binding the signatory nations to use processes and establish organs of adjudication, conciliation and law-formulation. These processes and these organs are, as pointed out by Dr. John Bassett Moore, in his learned and inspiring address as the presiding officer of the last Mohonk Conference, the normal processes and organs of the cooperative and non-compulsive form of organization. The Conference of last year incorporated in its platform resolutions advocating the general application of these processes and the general establishment of these organs between nations. The League to Enforce Peace proposes to take the processes and organs which are peculiar to voluntary and cooperative organization, and make them compulsive. The normal processes and organs of the compulsive form of organization are, of course, the legislative, the judicial and the executive. The plan of the League to Enforce Peace therefore is an attempt to confuse two antithetical forms of organization.

The plan assumes that a league of nations could compel any member nation to submission in a manner comparable with that by which a nation compels its citizens and societies to submission. A war waged by a coalition of nations having five hundred millions of population against a nation having a hundred millions would doubtless not be able to effect the submission of the nation. It would, however, mean practically universal war, followed by universal bankruptcy and famine. In proposing a compulsion of nations, therefore, the plan seems to propose an impossibility in fact.

The constitution of the proposed League may be construed as providing that the League shall compel its members to submit to having their disputes with the members submitted to adjudication or conciliation, or as providing that the League shall punish or abolish any nation refusing to submit to adjudication or conciliation. If it is to be construed as proposing to compel submission to conciliation, it proposes an impossibility in the nature of things. Such use of force is negated by the definition of conciliation. The word "conciliation," is the one selected by the English-speaking part of the world to express a wholly voluntary and persuasive process by which a person brings the influence of religious belief, of experience and of reason to bear upon the minds and consciences of other persons who are involved in a disagreement which is becoming or has become a dispute, and which may lead to violence. The sole purpose and end of conciliation is to induce the disagreeing or disputing parties voluntarily to agree. That force may be used in aid of conciliation is doubtless true, but the plan does not so limit the use of force. It provides for conquering a nation and forcing

it to submit to the League's will when it has refused to submit to adjudication or conciliation. This is a compulsion placing a nation at the mercy of the other members of the League whenever they, after condemning it as a violator of the League's constitution, succeed in conquering it. Such provisions for conquering and punishing, or perhaps dividing and abolishing nations, are abhorrent to modern ideas.

The plan contains no provision for an executive to yield the force of the union, nor for a permanent legislature to determine how the force is to be used. The force used is to be joint force—that is, joint and several force,—not united force. The experience of mankind, in the use of the compulsive form of organization, warns us of the dangers of the use of any force in any organized society or union of organized societies, except the united force of the society in aid of the powers which are conferred on it by the members and which are constitutionally and legally limited by a fundamental constitution. When the law and will of the society is constitutionally formulated, declared and applied by its legislative, judicial and executive organs, the executive, when necessary, wields the force of the society so as to make its law effective in determining the actions and relationships of the members in their own and the common interest. An organized society or union wielding force without a definite legislative and executive organ to direct the force in execution of the legally limited judgment and will of the society, is a political anomaly of the kind aptly described by Jefferson as an “entangling alliance.” It is an alliance, because it is an imperfect and defective union; it is entangling because it involves the members of the imperfect and defective union in a tangled mass of relationships and activities, for the disentanglement of which force is used without adequate determination, direction and limitation, and without those arrangements for solving disagreements before they reach the acute stage of dispute, which is essential to the orderly, economical and efficient use of force.

As illustrating the possibilities of entanglement, it is only necessary to consider some of the questions which each of the signatory nations in the proposed League would have to decide for itself in order that their economic and military forces might be used jointly. What “question” in a given case, is to be “submitted,” of all the various questions which are possible to be regarded as the questions in dispute when great nations or great groups of nations stand threatening each other and on the verge of war? What is a “submission” of a dispute to adjudication, or to conciliation? What is an act of hostility? What is economic force? How shall it be used in a given case? What shall happen if both or all the nations between whom questions arise insist that they will not submit their dispute to adjudication

or conciliation, and proceed to fight regardless of the rest? Is it to be permitted, when both parties to the dispute violate their obligations as members of the League and engage in war, that the others may be neutral, or must the non-disputants fight both the disputants? Would any member of the League which felt that both belligerents had violated its provisions be able to claim any rights or perform any duties as a neutral, if other nations of the League held that only one of the belligerents had violated the constitution of the League?

The proposal that the members of the League shall use joint economic and military force recognizes and legalizes the use of military force to bring into operation the destructive economic forces of cold and hunger. Economic force used to compel submission, if morally justifiable at all, can only be justified when used as humanely as possible by a skillful legislature and executive of a responsible organized society. In time of peace economic force may be so directed as to affect classes of people, to the benefit of all. In times of war, however, it can only be used to compel submission, and inevitably injures both combatants and non-combatants. Economic force used in war, or as a substitute for military force in compelling submission destroys alike infants, children, women, the sick, the aged, as well as the men of fighting age and ability. The horrors of its use far surpass the horrors of war between armed men. The use of economic force to compel submission—whether by encirclement and siege on land, by blockade of commercial ports, by destroying unarmed ships of commerce, by general embargo, by general prohibitive tariff, or by prohibitive regulations designed to effect a boycott—recoils upon those who use it. Not only does such use of economic force generally involve the nation using it in economic loss, but, since it involves the destruction of the weak, the innocent and the helpless, it decivilizes the people of the nation using it and sets back civilization generally.

The League, therefore, in order not to be an entangling alliance, and in order not to extend the inhumane and decivilizing use of economic force, must have a permanent legislature and an executive. But if these are added, the plan becomes one for establishing a federal state out of widely separated nations. The failure of the Imperial Federation movement in the British Empire shows that a federal state composed of non-contiguous states or nations is an impossibility.

The proposed constitution of the League makes no reference to the greater part of the internal relationships of the League and none at all to its external relationships. That such a League would arouse suspicion and jealousy on the part of the omitted nations goes without saying. The League, in order to have an opportunity to be internally peaceful, would have to be so com-

pletely dominant over all nations outside it that those nations, either separately or in alliance, would never dare to attack it or any member of it. A dominant League would soon bring under its control all the weak and backward nations outside it, and the world would find itself in the hands of an oligarchy of widely separated nations; an oligarchy which would itself ultimately be ruled by the nation or nations controlling the sea.

The proposed constitution of the League, whether it provides for a weak League, a strong League, or a dominating League, is inconsistent with the whole conception of the society of nations and of the laws of nations recognized, formulated and applied by that society, which has been slowly built up by the thought and effort of the world. A League of separated nations differs in nature from a league of contiguous nations. A League of separated nations must, in order to live, be dominant at sea, and probably also on the land and in the air. A League of contiguous nations forms a district in the whole organization of the earth's surface, and its local self-government is consistent with the local self-government of other district Leagues. If the world were divided among several great district leagues or unions, they would tend to establish a supernational authority over all. A League of separated nations on the other hand would tend to be the supernational authority. If there were several such Leagues, they would tend to fight until one of them became the supernational authority.

Finally, the plan exposes all nations to new and real dangers. It is said by the promoters of the plan that the League is not dangerous to its members, or to the nations outside of it, because the members will never be called upon to perform their obligation to go to war, since the mere existence of the League, and the fear of joint action, will keep the peace. The hard experience of many men and women who have entered into dangerous obligations on representations made to them by persons they have trusted, that they would never be required to fulfill their obligations, proves the fallaciousness of this plea.

We conclude, therefore, that the proposed constitution of the League to Enforce Peace is objectionable:

Because it seeks to use the processes and organs which are suitable only for the voluntary and cooperative form of organization and to make them compulsive;

Because it proposes compulsion of great nations by a number of great nations, which is either an impossibility or a plan for universalizing war;

Because it either proposes to submit to possible destruction nations adjudged by the League to have violated its constitution and thereby ultimately to establish a world-monopoly; or to com-

pel submission to conciliation, which is impossible in the nature of things ;

Because it lacks a permanent legislature and an executive, and thereby provides for an entangling alliance and an indefinite and disorderly extension of economic force, which, however, applied, is essentially inhuman, since it operates upon non-combatants as well as combatants ;

Because, if a permanent legislature and an executive be added, the plan becomes one for the establishment of a federal state composed of widely separated nations, which experience shows to be impossible ;

Because the League must either be weak and subject to external attack, or dominant over all outside nations ;

Because the League, being composed of scattered nations, whether it be weak and precarious, or strong and dominant, is inconsistent with the whole conception of the society of nations and the law of nations, and tends to the destruction of international order and law ;

Because the League is not, as its advocates would have us believe, a means of producing universal peace without danger to its members, but, if carried into effect, would be a political union of an imperfect and defective kind, involving its members in complicated and highly onerous relationships, and imposing upon each obligations, which it must fulfill at the risk of its destruction by the others.

Are we then driven to the conclusion that there is no hope for a more economical, efficient and therefore peaceful organization of the society of nations except by organizing that society into a federal state, which is clearly beyond the range of practical politics? I believe not. The possibilities of voluntary and cooperative organization have not yet been exhausted. In the industrial world as at present organized, enormous groups and societies and corporations carry on their operations and settle their disputes and strikes by wholly voluntary and conciliative methods. The success attained in this field should stimulate those who are interested in political organization on a vast scale to explore the possibilities of this new science of cooperative organization. The great industrial groups and societies of the modern industrial world resemble nations in that no compulsion of them by the state is possible, because their power rivals that of the state itself. But experience seems to have shown that not only is compulsion of those vast societies impossible, but that it is also unnecessary, since the increasing reasonableness of democratically organized societies, under modern conditions of universal education, makes conciliation increasingly possible. It may well be that the voluntary processes and organs which have been found suitable for holding in cooperative union the great indus-

trial groups and societies may prove to be more effective for holding the nations together in peace than the compulsive processes and organs which we use in our federal states.

Moreover the nations of the world are now actually organized as a voluntary and cooperative union under the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. That Convention, as adopted by the First Hague Conference, was accepted by all the nations of the world except three small nations—Costa Rica, Honduras and Korea, the last named of which has since lost its independence. It was thus, to all intents and purposes, a unanimous and universal compact of all nations. It formed the signatory nations into a union by establishing certain processes for determining their relationships as members of the union, and by instituting certain organs of the union to carry on these processes. It was thus a constitution. By its universal acceptance, the union of all nations became a matter of political fact and practical politics. The union thus constituted was an organized political society with processes and organs of conciliation, arbitration and law-formulation. The Convention, as originally adopted, still holds, although the revisions and amendments made at the Second Conference in 1907 have not yet received unanimous adoption.

The Union of Nations, thus constituted, was, however, a very imperfect union. The processes were unscientific, and the organs were inadequate. These processes may be made more scientific, and these organs may be made more adequate. To do this would be doing, in a new way and on a broader scale, what our American statesmen did in 1787—it would be the formation of “a more perfect union.”

The perfecting of the cooperative union of the nations will require, not only the scientific development and the local extension of the processes of conciliation, adjudication and law-formulation throughout the union, but also the removal of the obstacles to the cooperative life and action of the nations. The principal obstacles, at the present time, are the external monopolies of nations, and secret agreements. These external monopolies may be abolished by means of universal agreements for the common and equal use by nations of the sea and the air, which are by nature the common property of all nations; by the extension of the areas of federal or cooperative union on the land; and by recognizing the “open door” in colonies, dependencies and spheres of influence. Secret agreements can, it would seem, only be abolished by the gradual establishment of the principle that all secret agreements are void for all purposes, as contrary to public policy.

It may thus be possible to make the existing union of nations so effective that economic or military force will not be required.

If, however, such force should be found necessary, a basis will have been laid for the establishment of a suitable and legally limited supernational authority to wield the force of the union with skill and efficiency, and such a supernational authority will no doubt in due time be evolved.

The practical course therefore is, it would seem, to take as our basis of thought and action the present written constitution of the cooperative union of nations—the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes as originally adopted, the one unanimous act which has ever happened among men, so far as appears, since the dawn of history. On that foundation, it may be possible, by taking thought and proceeding with careful steps, gradually to evolve a more and more perfect cooperative union of the nations, which shall secure to them order and law, and permit them to live in peace. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion will be continued by DR. JAMES L. TRYON, Director of the New England Department of the American Peace Society, whose subject is International Police. (Applause.)

INTERNATIONAL POLICE

ADDRESS BY JAMES L. TRYON, PH. D.

Whether or not it is advisable to put a policeman behind the law of nations at the present time is one of the most debatable questions of the movement for world peace.

For at least three hundred years or since the proposal of the Great Design of Henry IV of France, the idea has found a place in some peace projects. On the initiative of Czar Alexander First, the proposition was in part realized by the Holy Alliance countries, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in the suppression of democratic uprisings after the Napoleonic Era and might have been tried in the subjugation of the Spanish revolutionists in Latin America had it not been for the possibility of interference by the British fleet with transportation of international troops and the effect of the publication of the Monroe Doctrine which warned Europe against intervention in American affairs. As exemplified in the Holy Alliance the use of force was discredited among the liberal statesmen of the nineteenth century and has remained under suspicion ever since.

Although international police has been advocated by some eminent publicists in our own time, the weight of opinion in the organized world peace movement as a whole has been against coercive sanctions. William Ladd's "Essay on a Congress of Nations," which is the foundation document of the American

Peace Society, and of the American peace movement itself, provided for an international congress to codify law and a court to interpret it, but no method for the use of coercion was attached to his proposals. The Interparliamentary Union, the most influential peace organization in the world, has never as a body approved coercive sanctions. We do not find them in the Hague conventions, either for the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or the proposed International Prize Court, nor are they in the draft for the Court of Arbitral Justice. Whenever the application of force is contemplated in the Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, and in the Porter-Drago convention, where its permissive use is hinted at in case of failure to abide by an award or proceed with the arbitration of a question relating to contractual debts, only the aggrieved state itself is expected to act.

Public opinion, good faith and enlightened self-interest have hitherto been deemed sufficient sanctions for the acceptance of the decisions of arbitration courts. In no instance has it been necessary ever to use force to sustain them. If a decision has proved to be unacceptable, questions left at issue have been re-submitted to arbitration, or an adjustment of them has been made by diplomacy. But not all cases that might have been arbitrated have been brought to court, some of them, like the difficulty between the United States and Spain, in 1898, having been referred to war; and here has been a limitation to the development of arbitration.

On the other hand, while there are publicists who oppose the use of force on moral grounds, or grounds of expediency, the fact remains that the adoption of international coercion means the surrender of the individual sovereignty of the nations. To this the nations will not yet agree. They prefer to remain on their present basis of organization, or rather lack of organization; they want to continue to be free and independent states, subject to no international overlord. They maintain the right to redress their own wrongs or even intervene in the affairs of other nations as necessity may dictate; and there is as yet no general desire among them to fix permanently the map of the world. Before the war, no conference of responsible statesmen could have agreed upon a *status quo*. The Interparliamentary Union, at Geneva in 1912, would not seriously consider a resolution, proposed by a United States delegate, looking to a fixed *status quo* as a starting point for the organization of a permanently peaceful world order. The members were not ready for the recognition of such a principle, as it was feared it would work injustice to some races, or defeat the cherished plans of others, or consecrate the colonial gains of predatory states. Only an

occasion has been needed to throw a dissatisfied and agitated world into a state of war; and the war has come.

Under such conditions, the true import of which it is easier to see now than it was before the war, it was unreasonable to expect the nations to put themselves into a position to be coerced by international police; and, therefore, it was felt by some leaders of the peace movement that the proposition to institute it was untimely. They feared its advocacy would hinder the moderate but steady progress that the cause of peace was making under the Hague system.

But this lack of force behind international law has appeared to certain other publicists so great a defect as in their opinion to reduce the law to no law at all and some modern writers have favored a world state or a United States of the World with an international police, whether as a federalized body or as a combination of national contingents of armies and navies of the nations, for the enforcement of law. This idea which has long been familiar to us has been emphasized since the war. Other writers have preferred to put force, either economic or military, directly behind the Hague court, or some international court, both to compel nations to come before it and to accept its decisions. This latter method of compulsion is advised by a committee of the Fabian Research Department as well as several eminent publicists. But the two most notable of recent plans for international coercion have been those of Professor C. Van Vollenhoven of Holland and of the American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace. A brief examination of the proposals of Professor Van Vollenhoven and of the League to Enforce Peace with some consideration of the proposal for a United States of the World will enable us to see some of the problems underlying the practicability or desirability of putting force behind the law of nations and of committing the United States now to a permanent agreement for collective enforcement of international law.

Professor Van Vollenhoven proposed an arrangement for international police consisting at first of national contingents of armies and navies, but later of a federalized force, to be placed under the direction of a board of admirals at The Hague, who should be empowered to act on their own authority in an emergency, or, in cases of a doubtful character, upon the orders of the Hague Court or projected courts or a delegation of one of them. The international troops were to be summoned without regard to the dictates of any foreign office. Strong enough to cope with England or Germany, they were to enforce Hague conventions at first, for example, the Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War; but ultimately, they might be used to guarantee treaties or support the

decisions of an international court. The plan, however, was not to go farther than the formation of an association of the nations which should make its own laws and allow the withdrawal of members if after a certain number of years they were dissatisfied with the terms of union, but it was to be understood that the organization of a world state or a United States of the World, which the Professor considered a Utopian idea, should not be attempted.

Professor Van Vollenhoven believed that, if established under proper safeguards, which he did not attempt to name, the police executives would not usurp their power. He held that the organization of international police would be better than the use of force by individual nations and gave examples of the application of his principle; for instance, the European intervention in Mexico in 1862, the suppression of the Boxer rebellion by international troops in 1900, and the blockade of Venezuela by Great Britain, Germany and Italy in 1902. He maintained that by his plan of collective action war would be prevented, security given to the nations and disarmament encouraged. He proposed that the subject be referred to the Preparatory Committee for the third Hague Conference for report. The Peace Congress, after a careful hearing to his plan, voted to give it further study.

Working to some extent along parallel lines with a British committee, which has had Lord Bryce as one of its advisers, the League to Enforce Peace of which our most distinguished American champion of arbitration treaties, Hon. William H. Taft, is president, proposes the formation of a league of nations of which the United States shall be a part. The nations of the league are to be obligated, subject to the limitation of treaties, to refer all justiciable questions not settled by negotiation to a court of international justice for hearing and judgment and all other questions not settled by negotiation to a council of conciliation for hearing and recommendation. There are to be international conferences to codify law which the court shall apply to cases unless the dissent of one of the signatory powers is made known within a stated period. In harmony with the conclusions of some of the exponents of the views of the British Committee, the League to Enforce Peace adds compulsive sanctions to its proposed system. It provides that the signatory powers shall jointly use "forthwith" their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising is submitted to the court or council. The association of states intended by these new proposals is that of a confederation or organization of governments, not of peoples with a common citizenship. A distinguished initiator of the League to Enforce Peace proposes that the association of nations comprise

at first only the eight great powers including the United States, the secondary powers of Europe and Argentine, Brazil, and Chile. The League to Enforce Peace does not provide for an executive or a treasury, but probably we should be expected to consider them both implied in order to carry out the functions of a league of nations. It does not put a ban on secret treaties. It does not prohibit alliances or limit armaments. Its plan contains no declaration of the rights of nations or persons. It does not fix a time for the duration of the league, or expressly permit withdrawals from membership.

As to the features of the program of the League to Enforce Peace apart from coercion, that is, the conference, court and council of conciliation, though there may be differences of opinion as to detail, these proposals are likely on the whole to meet with approval. They are in harmony with the evolution of the movement for world peace which has already to a large degree realized its objects in the Hague system and accords with international treaties already adopted, as for example, the Bryan peace treaties, and the international convention between the United States and Canada, appointing a joint international commission to deal with various questions. We have a court at The Hague. The principle of arbitration is established together with mediation and the procedure of the international commissions of inquiry. It is intended by us all to make these institutions more efficient and truly permanent, when the time comes to get together again after the war.

It is to be noted that the League to Enforce Peace contemplates the use of coercion in two forms, economic pressure and military force. Economic pressure is a subject that should be treated fully by itself. It has able exponents, Edward A. Filene, Herbert S. Houston and others, who have already secured endorsement for it from business organizations in the United States. At this time I desire to deal with the problem of coercion only from the point of view of military force.

Though we may accept the principle that there should be force behind international law and agree that collective coercion would be an improvement upon national self-help, whether in the assertion of rights or the prevention of aggression, questions arise as to what kind of organization of the nations should precede the authorization of the use of force and how it should be applied.

Critics of the League to Enforce Peace may fairly say that it ought to develop a plan for an executive and not leave it merely to be assumed. How and under what officers are the military forces to be organized or economic pressure concerted? And what will happen if any of the members refuse to respond to the call of the League, or actually join the belligerent state? If the league is a confederation, how will troops and money be obtained

from its members to prosecute a war? Must each member contribute its quota or give what it chooses to give, or pay according to its means? Must the league beg, or requisition its money for expenses, if it has any, in time of peace? Can these be legally or successfully exacted by compulsion from sovereign states as entities, there being no apparent intention to tax individual citizens? These questions became vital to Washington and the leaders of the American revolution while our first thirteen states were conducting war with Great Britain under the Articles of Confederation and no satisfactory solution was reached until our country was organized as a consolidated state under the Constitution. We gave up the requisition system and applied taxation to individuals, whether directly or in form of duties on imports, which could of course be collected by government officials with the assistance if need be of the military arm as in the case of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 when resistance was offered to the collection of revenue.

Likewise, critics of the Van Vollenhoven plan may also fairly say that the idea of making a board of admirals the executive, even in conjunction with a court, would be objectionable. Should not the admirals be placed under a supreme civil executive power and the court be expected to apply to it for help? Should not this executive power, acting under legal limitations, have discretion to act or not on the report of the court?

The scope of these two coercive plans differs. The proposal of Professor Van Vollenhoven is progressive. By force it supports codified law first, and then in the far future other matters, which, under due limitations, would seem to be a logical conception of the use of coercion as it would provide a sanction for the substantive law of the international government. The League to Enforce Peace is limited in its scope and is related to the enforcement of legal procedure rather than of substantive law, but causes the eventual application of law, an idea which is also intelligible. Touching directly a defect of the arbitration system, the League confines itself to inducing an aggrieved state to bring its case before the court or council, penalizing the state if it first resorts to war; but the question might fairly arise whether it is enough simply to discipline a state for committing an act of hostility before submitting to an investigation and what the moral effect on enlistments would be when it was known that the decision of the court or council, should it be rendered, would not be enforced. Would it be right for the law of the league to permit a dissatisfied litigant state to attack another state that had joined in submitting its case to a court or a council and secured judgment? Would not the league of governments thus consecrate in international law the discarded common law principle of trial by battle? In case of an infraction of the obligation previously

to submit a case to investigation, how are we in these days of masterful diplomacy to be certain which side begins hostilities that shall warrant the application of coercion "forthwith?"

Judged by American experience, would it not be safe, within the bounds of present day statesmanship, and also in accord with the evolution of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which now permits notification by a state to the bureau of the Hague Court of willingness to arbitrate a question, to arrange for a judgment by default or *ex parte* hearing after summons or invitation and not attempt to go farther? In a controversy between two states of the American Union, if there were a refusal to come to court on the part of one of them, it would be given time to get into a right frame of mind and no hostile action by or against the absentee would be likely to follow.

Thus far there has been no occasion to enforce arbitral decisions, and, therefore, it may not be necessary now to create machinery for their enforcement. In any event, before it is decided to authorize the Hague Court itself to use force, which is a favorite plan of some publicists as well as a suggestion of Professor Van Vollenhoven, we should do well to be cautious. The possible political consequences of a decision rendered by an international court should be taken into account. The Dred Scott decision on slavery in the United States, which is considered a forerunner of the Civil War, in which the national government finally fought against the political doctrines and implications of the decision, which was at first applied to an individual, is a warning as to what, under an extraordinary temptation, an international court might try to do in deciding a controversy vitally related to the future policy of the society of nations, say in a question between the European polity and that of the United States. To give such a court power over armies and navies might enable it to impose an undesirable political system on our people or the peoples of this hemisphere and imperil the political foundations of the international order as well as our own country. The best sanction of a court is not the fear that it inspires, but the justice that it declares. This will be realized all the better when a regular judicial court is established which has as its guide not the many and sometimes confusing sources of law, the decisions, text-writers, treaties, and customs of today; but an explicit code of laws consented to by the nations. And then behind this the best reliance may be an educated international public, which, as in the United States, is accustomed to respect a federal supreme court. Here decisions of controversies between states or between the states and the Federal Government do not have to be enforced either by the military arm or by the boycott, but are solved by the mental forcefulness of the judi-

ciary, whose reasoned opinions have helped to establish the federal system in the confidence of the people. Again, in any international system of justice based upon the experience of the United States, which advocates of coercion ought carefully to examine, not only must the elements of time and of patience be counted upon as factors in the solution of questions between the federal court or the executive and a state, but the provision for constitutional amendment must be relied upon for the purpose of qualifying or abridging rights like the right of a citizen to sue a state as in the case of *Chisolm v. Georgia* when Georgia, sued for debt by a citizen of South Carolina defied the United States Supreme Court, which, in saying that the Constitution permitted the suit of a state by a private citizen, had decided against her; or there should be resort to legislative compromise as in the dispute between the United States and South Carolina over the right of nullification of a federal law, by a state, when the action of Congress in meeting the difficulty was probably more effectual than the threat of executive coercion, and for the time served the purpose both of doing justice and keeping the peace.

The question is brought up by both the European and the American plans, whether it is best to organize at first a league of some nations, or to begin with a plan that includes the membership of all of them, say the forty-six that were invited to The Hague in 1907. Would not either plan, in this respect, be retrogressive compared with the inclusiveness of the Hague plan? If by any plan adopted the United States should become a party to an association of nations that repudiated the doctrine of the equality of nations, objection might come from our Latin American neighbors. It will be remembered that they so steadfastly maintained the doctrine of the equality of nations at The Hague, in 1907, that it was impossible to agree upon a method of appointing a board of judges for the Court of Arbitral Justice without giving small states equal recognition with the large states. If a league, of which the United States were a part, were formed and only Argentina, Brazil, and Chile of the Latin American States were considered sufficiently civilized to belong to it, might not the question arise as to what would be the effect of this exclusive action on public opinion in other states of Latin America toward the United States as well as the league? What would be the fate of those countries left outside the league? Would they not fear that they were to be exploited? Would they not ask if they were now to become colonies or imperial territory, after already being recognized as states under the protection for nearly a century of the Monroe Doctrine? Might they not be anxious lest they should become objects of intervention by the league, according to the plan of the Holy Alliance? And what

would become of the Monroe Doctrine if Europe were permitted, practically, though indirectly, to compel the arbitration or mediation of American questions? The movement might be declared inconsistent with the present agitation in the United States to form a more real Pan-American Union than we now have concentrated in the bureau at Washington. Or again it might be said that if the government of the United States joined a league of European nations in the present chaotic state of boundaries and the conflict of imperial ambitions, it would commit itself to the principle of the balance of power, from which we have always held aloof, and that, instead of helping to preserve peace or to enjoy it ourselves we should get into war sooner than if we remained in isolation. And it is pointed out that this might have been the case had the United States been in a league whose principles would have called for collective military action in consequence of the hostilities that followed after refusal to arbitrate the issue between Austria and Serbia in 1914.

In determining upon a policy for the United States for the present day, would not the wisest plan be to cooperate, if need be, with other nations in the use of force for the preservation of public safety, in a specific emergency, like the Boxer rebellion, as it arises; but be in a position to withdraw when we consider the purpose sufficiently fulfilled, without taking the obligations of an alliance with all its possible entanglements? But if in far distant days, as common conceptions of government and habits of thought are developed, we should enter into a permanent arrangement, would it not probably be better to make coercion only an adjunct to a completely organized international government, under a written constitution, with legislative, judicial and executive departments, placed under legal limitations, with checks and balances on the departments and especially upon the orders of the elected civil authorities who by means of a representative system should be ultimately responsible to the people? This form of organization would help to ensure democratic control and tend to avoid imperial despotism. This of course would mean a world state or a United States of the World, with humanity at its base. It would indeed spell Utopia, but it would point the way to justice, security and peace.

But how could an international government built after the model of the United States adjust and operate the sanction of international police? What might happen to this country, what should we have to give up, if we tried to extend our own principles of organization to the world order? What would be the advantages and disadvantages? As a practical matter, it may seem idle to ask such questions at this time, but an answer cannot help being suggestive to those who propose federation.

In a federation, not necessarily in exact limitation of, but

somewhat like, that of the United States under the Constitution, the very fact of union would be strong sanction in itself. An association of friendly states which, in effect, voluntarily restrict their sovereignty and renounce war between themselves or with the federal government, though not the use of force for local or federal protection, would be a good and probably an essential foundation for peace. With this there would naturally go a limitation upon national standing armies or navies in times of peace. But even more important for justice as well as peace than too much or too little reliance upon force would be pacific machinery for settling controversies, a congress to deal with political questions and a court, with subordinate or special jurisdictions, to attend to judicial questions, and an executive acting under legal limitations, to carry out the international objects of the federation.

But, in a federation, there would have to be a fixed *status quo*. Agreement as to border lines or changes in them would have to be made. There could be no more territorial ambitions on the part of states, but some retrocessions or readjustments of territory would have to be made by judicial determination or consent. There might be an international domain or federal zones in backward countries administered by an international government, capable, if possible, of development into states as civilization advances. There would have to be an abandonment of alliances. There could be no such thing as a shifting balance of power—the bane of the present world system, the continuance of which means periodic wars, with horrible slaughter, taxation, load of debt, and injury of commerce. There would doubtless have to be a bill of rights for nations as well as men—signs of which have, however, begun to appear in the declarations of publicists, like the declaration of the American Institute of International Law, and in the preamble of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. There would have to be a guarantee of the integrity and internal autonomy of states, with a check on domestic revolutions except by legal means, a beginning of which is being made in the relations of the United States with Latin American countries, while the problem of securing the rights of peoples as well as of the governments of states, or their rulers, would have to be met reciprocally as it was not met by the one-sided and repressive measures of the Holy Alliance.

The theory of the use of coercion in a union like that of the United States raises another question of procedure when we compare it with the theory of the Van Vollenhoven and the League plans. These plans, contemplating an association only of governments, but not of peoples, depart widely from the conception of the use of force in this country. They apply it to organized

states and not to citizens. Our government is a government that deals, within its sphere, directly with the individual. It does not primarily conceive of the use of force against states in their sovereign capacity with all their powers of organized resistance. And it might be difficult if not impossible without a great war, which we desire to avoid, for a league of nations to use its military and naval forces for federal execution against strong powers like Great Britain and Germany, and perhaps their allies, especially without a previous limitation of armaments, upon which neither the Van Vollenhoven plan nor the plan of the League to Enforce Peace insists, though it is encouraged by the former. Such a theory might, however, be applied under the German Constitution which is more confederate in its character than ours, and, in this respect, might have to be taken as a model for a confederation of the governments of nations, though whether federal execution would work successfully in the German Empire against military Prussia if she became recalcitrant is a question as yet undecided. Our federal force, when used, is or may be directed against individuals who violate the laws of the union, or rebel against the government of the United States, or take possession of its property, interfere with interstate commerce or the mails, or do various unlawful acts that are specified in statutes, relating to public lands, the Indians, neutrality, etc. The thought behind our government, having as its crowning feature a Supreme Court and a system of subordinate tribunals empowered to interpret and enforce the Constitution and the laws upon individuals, is that it is a government of law and not of men, a coercion of law and not of arms, which, shall we not say, is different from the traditional European and Asiatic idea? Within our confines military force is used with reference to the support of public peace when the police or marshals of courts fail in the execution of the laws. Under our system, the innocent are not to be confused and punished with the guilty; we do not act at the start against whole populations, but select the real offenders against the law.

But, in an emergency, for purposes of suppressing rebellion, our system is elastic, and, in this respect, our experience is a valuable study for the nations as well as a caution to ourselves in considering whether and how we want to obligate our country now to a system of international police. Under our system, if a rebellion becomes strong enough the government may operate as if at war with foreign enemies and consider its opponents, even its own citizens, all the people within the borders of insurrectionary districts, as territorial or practically foreign enemies. If our system were applied to the nations, their rulers if loyal, in time of war would be agents of the federal government, but the international authorities could, if necessary, pass over the

heads of nations and lay hands on the national forces (cf. the Van Vollenhoven plan) and utilize both the federal and national forces in defense of the federation, or of one of its constituent nations in case of invasion or insurrection. If, following out another conception of ours, that the law of the Union can be enforced on every foot of American soil, if there could be an international federation with an international citizenship, this doctrine might be applied not only in the protection of property, the mails, or interstate commerce, but by extension, either by interpretation or statute, in defense of the rights of a human being of whatever race, or condition anywhere in the world, and this might become a universal benefit.

Under such system of ours, if it were applied to the family of nations, there could probably be no exclusive control by any nation of a waterway like the Panama Canal, or the Dardanelles. Commerce would have to become internationalized and placed under international control. Tariff barriers, exclusive national spheres of influence, and concessions, which are recognized causes of friction and wars, notably of this European War, would have to be given up.

While the use of all seas, bays, rivers and harbors would be free in time of peace, an international fleet would, if it could, stop all commerce with the enemy in time of war. There could be no neutrality among the nations. A nation or people would have to be for or against the international authority in time of war. If by violence the people of a nation opposed the federal authority the penalty might be war, non-intercourse, blockade, confiscations, the deprivation of important civil rights that are protected in time of peace, and punishments involving death or imprisonment of leading rebels. After a war, according to our practice, nations might be considered conquered provinces and occupied and administered under military governments until restored to their relations in the union—a form of intervention, however, that was hateful to the Southern States after our Civil War and would probably also be to the rest of the United States or any other country that had to endure it.

A mere glance at these propositions with which we in this country have become familiar by experience is enough to show, in view of present world conditions, how far the nations, either ours or those of Europe, Latin America or Asia, with their variety of governments, different degree of civilization, and cross purposes are ready for complete federation. Would they agree to it or accept now the real or fancied risks therein involved? Would Great Britain give up her control of the seas and expose herself and her colonies to peril? Would Germany, except under pressure of defeat, give up the right to have as efficient an army as she wants or to have colonies for her surplus

people and products? Would Russia give up her imperial ambitions to extend her sway? Would France and Italy curtail their plans for expansion? Would the old countries strictly recognize the open door and surrender their trade privileges in Africa or Asia? Would Japan agree to confine herself to her present limits? Would the United States give up her Monroe Doctrine? Would we remove our tariff barriers? Would we admit all races to our territory in any number? Would we—ought we—without constitutional guarantees of the strongest kind to throw into the scale of international politics our conception of sovereignty in the people for sovereignty in kings or parliaments against which our whole system from the Revolution down is a protest? Would not there be an inevitable clash if democracies, monarchies and empires should try to live under the coercion of police, manipulated politically by the strongest, possibly at first, by the reactionary powers? Until changes come over the imperial dreams of other nations that are not democracies, or, shall we venture to say, until we of the United States are ready to make what are now impossible sacrifices, or better still, until the world has by disgust of war, waste and commercial competition, worked out for itself a better system than that of unregulated nationalism; until, as in the case of the United States in 1787, economic and political necessities compel the acceptance of what are now ideals—we shall have to wait for a United States of the World, an international arrangement like that proposed by Professor Van Vollenhoven, or possibly also, for a league of nations pledged to enforce peace.

In a word, an arrangement for international police or any kind of plan for an international force other than for temporary purposes presents very great difficulties—and in one sense a dilemma. Without world federation it looks impractical, and world federation at the present time is impossible. International police must be further studied before it can be adopted. Without American help, the European War will undoubtedly facilitate somewhat the solution of the problem by preparing Continental Europe, though possibly only Central Europe at first, according to the results achieved by the Teutonic powers for federalism, with perhaps coercion in some form under Germanic control. A copartnership of European states with collective enforcement was suggested in a speech by Premier Asquith of Great Britain in September, 1914, if the Entente Allies should win; but it was only prophetic as he said he did not expect to see his idea become a reality in his lifetime.

But as to the probable policy of Great Britain, from the point of view of British interests, we had a suggestive precedent a century ago. And it may be that the line of action then taken by her indicates the probable attitude of the Senate of the United

States should its views on international police suddenly be put to the test in a request for its consent to the ratification of a treaty. We would of course make an alliance or alliances to save our country if we had to; but we should not be likely to do so for the general proposition of enforcing the peace of the world especially in the present disorganized condition of the nations. While the result of the Napoleonic wars was still in doubt, the British government, then, as now, in need of allies, was willing to accede to a proposal to organize collective force, but only under the specific treaty of alliance for definite purposes, like keeping France in order. It was unwilling to join in a standing arrangement for the use of international coercion for the vaguely defined or general objects of a confederation. It would not join the Holy Alliance because the method of the alliance was intervention in the internal affairs of nations and its object the suppression of democracy, which might mean legalized interference with British institutions. But rulers and statesmen of Europe will see the light, or, if they do not, the people of Europe will and a better organization of the European nations on a non-compulsory basis, or in any case constructive measures for their good, from which the whole world will also profit, will in time be adopted. A more cooperative spirit, a deeper respect for legal methods of settling disputes will prevail.

After the war, the nations may go back for a time to the balance of power, but we should expect that after some interval the Hague conferences would be resumed. By many students of international relations these are now considered the historic basis of the future world order. The Hague Conferences represent not a group of powers, either European, Asiatic or Pan-American, but the whole family of nations; and therefore stand for a universal idea. The present Court of Arbitration is likely to develop in time into a tribunal or several kinds of tribunals, one or more of them, with a permanent personnel; for example, the Court of Arbitral Justice, possibly representing a judicial union at first of some, but finally of all of the nations; and the function of conciliation by means of commissions of inquiry may be enlarged and become judicative in the sense that decisions of such a body may become advisory. The diplomatic conference at The Hague may in time become a political world congress. This conference may be expected to leave, when they are completed, codes for the prevention of war, mediation, commissions of inquiry, arbitration, the regulation of war, and the rights and duties of neutrals, subjects hitherto chiefly considered, and then advance to the consideration of a limited class of measures for the common social welfare. When this transformation comes legislation may be made by delegates who are instructed not merely by governments, but to a large extent by the peoples as

to their fundamental political needs. As the Hague system is adjusted so as to respond to the needs of the peoples, as by its constitution it manifestly promotes commerce, gives security to property, improves the condition of labor and defends individual rights as well as the rights of nations and races, it will grow in public confidence, and once established in that confidence, it will be invested with inexorable sanctions. (Applause.),

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion will be continued by DR. GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, of New York. (Applause.)

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION

ADDRESS BY GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, LITT. D.

The legal and constitutional phases of the methods for the settlement of international disputes have been very fully considered by the speakers who have preceded me, several of whom have authority as jurists. As a layman, I may not venture to take up again matters that these speakers have practically disposed of. I will undertake only to present certain suggestions, from the viewpoint of a layman, as to the principles that should be borne in mind in any scheme for world-wide arbitration.

The states of the world constitute what may be called a family of nations. We may admit that at this time the family circle is in a very quarrelsome condition. The issues that are being fought out in this abominable and destructive war are issues that could arise only between peoples who have more or less similar desires, aims, and ambitions, and who have convinced themselves, whether rightly or wrongly, that their aims cannot be fulfilled except with the undermining of the strength and the partial destruction of the resources of competing nations that stand in their way.

The United States is a member, and a very important member, of the family of nations. At the close of the present war, it will undoubtedly possess larger resources than will be within the control of any other state in the world. Our Republic could not if it would, and it would not if it could, escape its responsibility as a member of this world family. Many of us take the ground that during the eighteen months of war, it has failed to realize its responsibilities in a satisfactory measure, or to fulfill its obligations as the greatest of the neutral states; that is to say, of the states not taking direct part in the war. We hold that at the outbreak of this war, the United States ought to have placed itself at the head of a league of neutral nations, with the avowed purpose of doing what might be practicable to maintain

the principles and the precedents of neutrals, and to prevent these from being undermined through the pressure of the requirements, real or assumed, of the combatants. Such a league should have done whatever might be in its power to protect the lives of non-combatants, and to prevent the war, with its new mechanisms and methods of killing, from being utilized to make new precedents in favor of military effectiveness and contrary to the principles and the ideals of civilization. Much could, we believe, have been done, and much may yet be done, to prevent the destruction, through the bitterness of the conflict, of things that have been gained in the civilized relations of peoples. *Inter arma silent leges*. The pressure of conflict puts to one side not only the authority of an action of law, but all possible plans for the adjustment, by arbitration or conciliation, of the issues arising between states. During the continuance of war, it is possible only to study out the basis for such claims and to arrive at some consensus of opinion in regard to methods of organization of a world's federation.

It is my own belief that international arbitration can be made effective only when the states of the world have been brought together into something in the form of a federation. That it is possible to bring into federated relations with one another states which possess varying characters of interests and ambitions, and which will be left to retain their full independence of action, is shown by the organization of the Pan-American Union. The council that sits in that beautiful palace in Washington, charged with the duty of bringing to peaceful adjustment issues arising between the forty-one members of the federation, issues that in earlier times developed promptly into friction and war, constitutes an advance suggestion or outline model of a council that will yet be created to comprise the states of the civilized world. (Applause.)

I do not see how it is going to be possible to include in a world's federation states whose conduct has given evidence that they do not accept the principles and precedents of civilization. It would hardly have been possible to conceive of a federated Europe in 1806 which would have included France under the leadership of Napoleon. The aim and methods of Napoleon had put him out of relations with the civilized states of his time. France could be brought into decent relations with its fellow states only when Napoleon had been safely placed in St. Helena. I hold that Germany, whose membership in a world's federation is, of course, essential can be brought into relations with such federation only when it has gotten rid of the Hohenzollerns. Germany has, for the time being, under the obsession of the Hohenzollern dream of world's domination, gone mad. We have other instances in history. Prussia went mad under Frederick

the Great and broke all kinds of international relations and obligations; and if Europe had then been strong enough Prussia ought to have been repressed and brought into a decency of behavior before consideration was given to any of the claims which Prussia presented. William of Berlin has followed the example of Frederick the Great in beginning this war with an act of infamy,—the invasion of Belgium,—and in continuing the war with methods and proceedings contrary to previously accepted precedents and standards of civilization. Of the methods and proceedings, we have the evidences in the reports from Belgium and from France, reports printed with the German documents and facsimiles; in the Bryce report on Belgium; in the report from Armenia of the massacre of thousands by Turkey, massacres for which Berlin can fairly be held responsible. We know that Turkey has done nothing within the past eighteen months excepting with the approval, and usually under the orders, of Berlin.

You would not undertake to arbitrate between a crazy man and a civilian whom he had assaulted. It would be necessary first to take charge of the mad man and to repress him.

Even the Teutonic powers, which began the war by tearing up treaties and by trampling upon the rights of a peaceable and neutral state, have shown themselves anxious to defend their action and to head off the disapproval of the civilized world. The war has been in appearance a step backward, but it gives evidence of a development of a consciousness of world-wide responsibility, and has given the opportunity for a restatement of the principles upon which must be brought together a world's federation of states so organized that future wars of aggression shall be made impossible.

Under the plan of the organization of the Pan-American Union, the decisions of the council have back of them for enforcement the whole power of the states constituting the union. Our own Federal Union, constituted under the wise action of the forefathers who framed the Constitution, and the genius of John Marshall who did so much for the development of the constitutional powers of the government, controls the peace between forty-eight independent states. Issues arising in these states, which in the old days of the Thirteen Colonies would have developed into friction and war, are now adjusted by the decisions of the Supreme Court, but the decisions carry authority and the adjustment remains permanent only because back of the Court stands the whole organized power of the nation.

The International Tribunal (the plan for which was outlined at the conference of forty-four states held at the Hague in 1907) had the weakness of presenting no provision for the enforcement of the decisions of the Tribunal. In every civilized state of the world, decisions are now arrived at in a court, and issues be-

tween individuals which at one stage in the world's history were fought out with rapiers, pistols, or fists, are now decided by law. These court decisions would have little value, however, in maintaining peace in the communities unless back of the authority of the court stood an organized force,—the force of the state. The plans outlined by the League to Enforce Peace make provision for carrying into effect the decisions of an international court, or council, and, so to speak, for enforcing conciliation by means of pressure, first, economic, and then, if necessary, military, brought to bear upon any state or states, which having accepted membership in the federation, should refuse to abide by its decisions. This pressure is to take the form of a commercial and financial boycott of any nation that undertakes to go to war without first submitting its dispute to judgment or inquiry; and if the commercial and financial pressure prove to be insufficient to bring such recalcitrant state into submission, there is then to be applied the pressure of military or naval force. This force, constituting what might be called a world's police, is, under the scheme of the League, to be contributed by the various states making up the federation in proportion to their relative resources in men, in wealth, and in material.

It is the expectation that the instances in which such force would be called into action would be very rare. The mere fact that authority has been organized for carrying out economic or military pressure, and the further fact that this authority represents no selfish interest on the part of any one state, or group of states, but the interests of the whole federation, which are the interests of civilization, will, it is hoped, constitute a sufficient influence to render improbable, almost impossible, the risk of disobedience to the authority of the world's supreme court. Righteous purpose must have behind it organized force, otherwise righteousness cannot be made to count. It has no effectiveness.

If we accept the views of our pacifist friends, all the organized power in the world would be left in the hands of the states which are prepared to act the part of the bully. The United States, with other neutral states having no aggressive purposes, refusing, under the pacifist theory to organize their resources, would be unable to withstand the aggression and the domination of the bully. If the organized power of the world is to be left in the hands of the aggressive states, and if the states which have no desire for aggression, which maintain ideals such as those of our own Republic, are to decide not to organize their forces, to do nothing for their own defense, or for the fulfillment of their obligations to other peoples, this world would, in my judgment, become a very unsatisfactory world to live in. It would be a pandemonium.

I knew something about Andersonville Prison. I was myself a prisoner during the Civil War, but at the time I was an officer, and my sojourns were in Libby and in Danville. In the officers' prison, we had an organization, always giving obedience to the senior officer. The senior commander had his own staff complete in every post excepting that of commissary. For that post, there was usually no appointment, for there was nothing for the commissary to give out. In Andersonville there were only enlisted men. The great stockade contained at different periods from ten thousand to thirty thousand prisoners. In such a number of men you get all kinds. Our American soldiers were a good lot, but the best men under such pressure as that of famine, the heat of the sun, fever from heat and the rain, the poison of gangrene from dying men and from the poisoned ground, go mad. The demon, the animal, comes to the top, and there is no longer an acceptance of the ordinary rules of humanity. These mad men have to be repressed. In Andersonville at the time of which I am speaking, a council or vigilance committee was organized made up of one or two of the sergeants and others who had not been in the stockade too long to have lost their strength. This committee secured an interview with Captain Wirtz, the commander of the prison,—the only man we hanged after the war; four or five ought to have been hanged, but we did not get the others. They told Wirtz that they wanted to stop the anarchy in the prison,—the strong men were abusing the others. The food of the weak was taken, which meant death for the weak. There had finally come not only the stealing of food, but actual murder. It did not take much to murder a poor fellow in his last gasp, and then his ration was available for the murderer. They said that these things were a disgrace to the Confederacy, and that they wanted to hang the murderer. Wirtz was not troubled much concerning the reputation of the Confederacy, but he said promptly that he had no objection to the plan for hanging, "The more Yankees they hanged the better." He would loan them a rope and some beams. They put up in the stockade a beautiful gallows where it could be seen from all corners. Under the gallows sat the Court Martial which promptly condemned to death a dozen or more of the culprits, the evidence being conclusive. They hanged three or four of the condemned and they held the others under suspended sentence. The next murder or another assault was going to bring the hanging without question. When throughout the stockade it was understood that there was organization with a righteous purpose, and with force behind the purpose, the anarchy was brought to an end. Now, anarchy among nations is a much more serious matter than among individuals, simply because the misery produced is greater. I hold that unless those nations which have no aggres-

sive purposes, which have the desire and the will power to protect their fellows and to maintain justice, will organize their resources not merely for self-defense, for a selfish neutrality, for the maintenance of their own shores and the protection of their own business (and their liberties and their business would not be maintained but for the fulfilment of obligations outside their own borders) and for the performance of their duty to civilization, I contend that unless the nations in this frame of mind and with this standard of action are prepared to act with full sense of manliness, the world will become an anarchy of nations.

I have from the outset been a supporter of the purposes and the policies of the League to Enforce Peace. The scheme of having a world's court to determine issues between the nations, and having back of that court an organized force prepared to carry out the decisions, seems to me to be the scheme that is most likely to maintain a world's peace. I should connect in any case with such scheme a policy of freedom of trade between nations. I am confident that the breaking down of tariff barriers and the larger and more civilized intercourse that would be brought about between the peoples of the world under freedom of trade will together constitute the most important factor in maintaining peace in the world's federation of states.

Some years will, I believe, be required before such organization can be brought into shape, and the United States has something to do in advance of its part in the work of the League. I have held from the beginning that at the outbreak of the war the United States ought to have placed itself at the head of a League of Neutral States. The smaller states would have been very ready to have come in under our leadership. The work of such League should have been to make protest against each invasion of the rights of neutrals to do what might be practicable for the protection of non-combatants. The institution of such a League by the United States would have been an acceptance of the contention that our Republic has a responsibility beyond that of keeping peace within our own territory. We have something to say and something to do for the precedents of civilization, for the maintenance of neutral rights, for the protection of the lives not only of American citizens, but of all non-combatants.

The United States, with its forty-eight communities, differing widely from one another in characteristics, in interests, natural, commercial and industrial, in race, heritage and local history, presents the widest example that the world has ever known of the advantage to all concerned of free trade between communities. This is an important precedent for the economic development of the future federation of the world. The history of the

United States makes clear how the removal of trade barriers minimizes the risk of inter-state jealousies and friction. When the artificial barriers which have stood between peoples are destroyed, these peoples realize the advantage that is to be gained for all. They realize that it is more profitable to sell to a neighbor than to appropriate his property, undermine his capacity for production, or destroy his life. Commercial jealousies have in time past been a frequent cause, and during the past century by far the most frequent cause, of wars; and a policy of free trade will, in my judgment, constitute the most important factor in maintaining peace in the world's federation of states.

In like manner, the history of the United States in maintaining among independent and widely differing communities peace with justice, must serve as a valuable example of the possibility of maintaining peace and of influencing justice in a world's federation of states. There need be no difficulty in reserving for each state its full independence of action in all matters not affecting the rights or the interests of its neighbors. Each state will maintain, as each state in our Republic maintains, its own system of law, its own forms of belief and of economic organization, its own social and industrial conditions, and each state will put to one side, as the states of the American Federation have put to one side, only the right to individual action in foreign affairs. The habit on the part of individuals of working together brings about, of necessity, a development of confidence in each. The majority of men want to do the right thing, and unless for some individual conscience the pressure or temptation becomes too great, they will continue to do the right thing. When the word of a fellow trader, usually, of course, a competing trader, can be taken, as it is taken in the New York Stock Exchange, in transactions involving many millions of dollars, on the strength of the raising of a finger, or the nod of a head, without the formality of an oath, or even of a document, not only is the transaction of business facilitated, but the human relation is developed. Man comes to trust his fellow men, and with the rarest of exceptions, he finds that such trust is justified. The larger this measure of confidence on the part of individuals in a community, the larger the possibility of joint action for the benefit of all. That trust is, however, a development of civilization, a result of the experience of generations in the conduct of complex business relations.

We may fairly look forward to the time when, in like manner, nations, after having worked together with a peace enforced by a central authority, will have come, as generations have grown up under such conditions of enforced peace, to accept peaceable relations as the normal and ordinary condition of national life and of international life, just as today we accept peaceable rela-

tions as the ordinary condition of life within the community of a city, or a state, or a nation. Such condition of peace and justice will be maintained by a central authority represented by the world's supreme court, which will be charged with the control of all matters that if left to individual states would involve the risk of friction and dissension. Such acceptance of peaceable international relations as the normal condition for states as for individuals, will make available for peaceful development, for the comfort and happiness of mankind, a vast amount of human energy, of vitality, and of resources that have been accumulated by human industry, energies and resources, which, under existing conditions, have been so frightfully dissipated in war and in preparation for war. Under a world's federation, these resources and energies can be utilized for the minimizing of evils which now beset society, and for the development of the productive possibilities of the earth's surface, in such manner that there should come to be if not wealth, at least comfort for all. It should prove possible, when human thought is free to be concentrated upon the things of humanity, to stamp out disease, and through such control of physical conditions, to bring to an end, or at least materially to lessen, those phases of wickedness which result from disease. Pauperism will be controlled, so that only those who are lazy without remedy need be at risk of not securing the things of life. I should agree with Plato that the man who will not do his share of work in the community should, by some comfortable process, be spared from the fatigues of life.

I myself hold that the time has come for the United States to take a direct part with England and France and their Allies. This will be going to war not for the sake of war, but for the sake of peace. These powers are acting as a police force doing what may be in their power to repress a vicious and well organized aggressor whose aggressions on the peace and the justice of the world have been the more serious because the organized strength and preparedness were on the side of the bully. Great Britain and France are fighting not only for their own existence and for the fulfilment of their obligations, but for the defense of the liberties of the United States and for the maintenance of civilization. The action of the United States might easily be the determining factor in the war. It would influence certain neutral states whose policy is now in the balance. The method in which our cooperation should be given would be a matter for adjustment afterwards with the Allies. The main thing is a clear expression on the part of the nation that in this great fight of democracy and representative government against military imperialism, the United States belongs on the side of democracy.

The peace of this hemisphere has throughout the past century been maintained by the Monroe Doctrine, and that doctrine would long ago have disappeared into space if it had not been for the support of the British fleet. Irrespective of the present war conditions, the three powers, England, France and the United States acting in concert can maintain the peace of the world. In advance of the organization of the world's federation, the United States ought to come into such cooperation with the other two great states which stand for representative government. England wants nothing for itself. England's history has its fair share of blunders and of misdeeds, but the British Empire has, nevertheless, been the most beneficent empire that the world has known; beneficent in the sense that it has done more for the welfare of the peoples under its control than has ever been done by any Empire in the world's history. Our policy and that of Great Britain are practically identical. We are ready together to do our part in the securing and the maintenance of representative government, in the protection of the smaller states, in opposing military imperialism and the theory of the so-called "divine state."

I never have been able to get any one of my pacifist friends to say what the United States ought to do about its national obligations. If we are not prepared to organize our resources, the only loyal and manly course is to cancel our obligations. We will put a "To Let" sign on that beautiful palace in Washington in which sits the council of the Pan-American States. This League of the Western Hemisphere constitutes a good advance model of the world's federation that is to come. A state that will not carry out its obligations does not deserve to live and will not live very long. I have based criticisms upon the late Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, because he has repeatedly expressed his readiness to meet the obligations of the United States on the rate of fifty cents on the dollar, or less. I do not admit that such a citation from the public utterance of a public man constitutes a personality. The utterances of a man who has been a political leader are public property and are properly subject to criticism from his fellow citizens. I contend that the presence in the Cabinet of a citizen who hold Mr. Bryan's views, the utterance by the President of those careless words, heedlessly used and so sadly misinterpreted throughout Europe, "We are too proud to fight," the impression given to this country and to Europe by the interview of our Secretary of State with the Ambassador from Vienna, to the effect that the United States would take no action and that the President's eloquent address was given only for home consumption,—these things have been responsible for a serious lessening of respect for the United States on the part of the whole world. They have also, I be-

lieve, been responsible for the deaths since the sinking of the *Lusitania* of hundreds of non-combatants, including many American citizens. The feeling in Europe is that the United States will do nothing, that it can be trusted to remain selfish, sitting back and taking care of its own interests.

Our friends, as well as those who are not our friends in Europe, must be made to understand that the United States will act in the cause of the world's justice, and that the utterances of our Administration are not empty words. We look forward to the great federated state of the future with a central court of justice and with the necessary organization back of that court, for the enforcement of righteousness against wilfulness and aggression. In this way will the relations of mankind be brought into accord with faith, hope and charity. The United States must do its part towards the relations of the ideals of the founders of the Republic and of the successors of those founders who have helped to maintain the Republic towards the maintenance of the rights of men and of peace with justice to the end that throughout this world government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion will continue through an address by DR. GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, New York, President of the American Peace Society. (Applause.)

THE INCONSISTENCY OF TRYING TO ENFORCE PEACE

ADDRESS BY GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, LL. D.

I got the text for my few remarks last evening when I was so fortunate as to meet a very intelligent naval man. It is true he insisted overmuch that he was no pacifist, after giving vent to the most pacific ideas I have ever heard, and yet I cannot believe that his insistence on the fact that he was not a pacifist was due to the fact that he has allowed his conceptions of what constitutes a pacifist to be colored somewhat by more or less political utterances on the subject that have appeared during the last few months from the platform and in the press. He seemed to think that a pacifist was a person who preferred an osseous condition of peace to any other condition that could exist, who was willing to sacrifice justice and mercy alike on the altar of peace.

It was you, Mr. President, who have posed as the ultra-pacifist in certain public enunciations of yours, or been posed because of the fact that you tried to put over on Europe as well as on the American people a series of all-inclusive arbitration treaties while you were President of the United States. (Applause.)

Well, we are all of us, including my naval friend, pacifists. We all believe that peace is the ideal of humanity. All of us here, I venture to say, believe that it is, perhaps not in our time, but in God's good time, a realizable ideal. We do not believe that the military virtues are to be preferred to the virtues developed in time of peace; we do not believe that the military arts are to be developed at the expense of the arts of peace. We are pacifists; some of us believe in preparedness and a few, a very few of us, do not believe in preparedness. But we are all of us believers in the reign of peace. The text which was suggested to me by my militant pacifist friend, the naval officer, was from the fact that peace, as he expressed it, is a state of mind and not the mere absence of war. I wish that might sink into the hearts of all of us here, and especially into the consciousness of my Utopian friends who are seeking to bring about peace by the use of force. (Applause.) Now I, too, have passed through that Utopian phase but I graduated from it. Fortunately I had the attack early during the summer when the war broke out. During my brief vacation at the end of the summer, I cogitated over the matter and returned to New York with a carefully drawn constitution for the United States of Europe. Well, it reposes in obscurity and I trust it may continue to repose there until Europe is ripe for its United States. The difficulty with so many of us is that we cannot wait; we are so shocked by the horror of this European War, by the atrocities that it has brought in its wake, that we feel that war must be put an end to at once, and so we invent ingenious devices for that purpose. We started with plans for the federation of the world at some of those famous conferences in New York City, and then finally we tapered down to the League to Enforce Peace as a sort of irreducible minimum. We are going to have peace anyway at the close of the present war even if we have to arm the whole universe to get it and keep it armed for the purpose of preserving it. Mr. President, I am the man from Oregon of whom you spoke last night. It was after you, with your innocence of politics (laughter), arranged things so that you could safely leave that conference at Philadelphia and had gone out and left it to run itself, that I rose and made a motion, which should have immortalized me more than it has done, that the title of the League be changed from "League to Enforce Peace" to "A League to Establish and Maintain Peace." Then I moved that the third paragraph of the program—that relating to the use of economic and military pressure on a recalcitrant member of the League—be eliminated. There were two votes cast for my motion; one, by myself, and the other by your friend Victor Berger, the Socialist Congressman. (Laughter.) I do not know what Mr. Berger's motives were; mine were not based upon any

theory of non-resistance. On the contrary, I believe in a reasonable measure of fighting. I believe not only that a defensive war may well be and usually is a righteous war—always if it is really a defensive war—but I believe that the nations may well, individually or collectively, from time to time group themselves to abolish international nuisances. We undertook to do that at the time of the Spanish War and it was a righteous thing to do. Long ago the rest of Europe ought to have combined to suppress Turkish atrocities in Armenia which have recently reached their culmination. Then if I do not believe in this League to Enforce Peace with the word “enforce” written in red blood or red ink, as the case may be, it must be not because I am opposed to force under any and all circumstances, but because I cannot persuade myself that the way of violence is the way to peace. (Applause.) You have noticed of course that Europe today is divided between two leagues to enforce peace. Is there any doubt that the Entente Alliance was organized mainly for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo* and of preserving the peace of Europe and of the Orient? I am of those who believe, too, that the League of the Central Powers was primarily a league to maintain the peace, and both of them enjoy the same advantage that is proposed now to be conferred upon the United States of America as a result of the Philadelphia Conference, that they are leagues to enforce peace by arms. Let us look at the situation. This is what the whole problem resolves itself into; shall the United States of America side with one or another of these two leagues to enforce peace, and if so, with which one? Well, Mr. Putnam has frankly given his answer and I rather like his answer; if there is to be a league to enforce peace in which we are to be participants, I think now is the time to join that league. I have never believed that it was better to wait until the fire had burned itself out before calling out the fire-extinguishing apparatus, and I believe that if we are to take an active part in maintaining the peace of Europe and of the world by force of arms, now is the accepted time and not at the close of the war. Is that our rôle? Shall we undertake it? If so, shall we let it depend upon the result of the present war? If the Central Powers are victorious, shall we ally ourselves with Germany and Austria and Turkey and whatever other allies there may be there to maintain the peace of Europe? It will be safer than to join the other leagues of peace if the German powers are victorious. Isn't this proposal that we join into a league of peace, that we become members of such a league, really a wager on the success of the Allies, and doesn't it mean that if the Allies are successful, that then and only then we are to become members of the League of Peace which will then, for a time at least, dominate the international relations of Europe? And

if it means that, doesn't it mean, also, that we are invoked to cast our weight into the scales of the balance of power in Europe? I cannot see it in any other light. Perhaps that would be a good thing for us to do; I think that is a debatable question, but let us not delude ourselves with the belief that the device is a device to secure peace. It is a device to maintain a precarious peace by the old European method of the balance of power. Well, how can we weigh that balance of power so that our adherence to the League shall be effective? Does it mean anything else but that we shall become as great a military power and at the same time as great a naval power as exists in the world at a given time today or in the future? If I were a French statesman and had to choose between an alliance with America for the preservation of peace or an alliance under existing conditions with Roumania for the maintenance of peace, I would choose Roumania rather than America unless America becomes what Germany is today plus what Britain is today, a power great enough to really dominate the world. In other words, my first objection to the League to Enforce Peace as a part of our American international policy is that it would immediately, in my opinion, involve the conversion of the United States into a great, dominant military power. You know what that would mean. It would mean the stimulation and not the reduction of the competition in armaments. It would not mean less dreadnoughts and submarines and less siege guns and less armies; it would mean more and more and more the world over. And then in the second place can we trust ourselves in that tangled web of European worldwide international rivalries and ambitions? What is the difference between the pacific nation and the aggressive nation? We are today a pacific nation, are we not? And Germany is pointed to and Russia is pointed to and Japan, perhaps, as types of aggressive nations. What makes a nation pacific and what makes it aggressive? Is it that we are made of different clay from that of which our European brothers and sisters are compounded? Is it a fact that we are insensible to the influences, to the emotions which convert a pacific people into a militant, aggressive people? Great Britain has been cited to us all frequently of late as the great type of a non-aggressive nation. I think that is a sound description of Great Britain today; she is non-aggressive, just as the anaconda is non-aggressive before he has digested his meal. (Laughter.) Germany is aggressive as Greece is aggressive, partly because they have the vision of empire, which we also have had and which we may have again, particularly because there are legitimate national aspirations which both countries desire to satisfy and which they have been prevented from satisfying by ordinary diplomatic means. Frankly, I am afraid to trust our American statesmanship; I

am afraid to trust our American people even, in that maelstrom of European passions, rivalries and ambitions. If we once become involved, why should we not seek to control the destinies of portions of Africa, of portions of the Orient, having once had a taste of imperialism ourselves? For these reasons, which seem to me overwhelming—first, I believe that a League to Enforce Peace will not have the effect of bringing about peace but only of weighting the balance of power on the one side or the other; second, I am fearful of the enormous stimulation that we will give to the militaristic idea throughout the world by ourselves becoming a great military and naval power, and third, I would, like Washington, preserve our country from entangling alliances abroad for fear of the danger that it will bring upon us and the world—I cannot see my way clear even yet to support the project of a League to Enforce Peace by military power. What is the solution, my friends? There isn't any solution in our time, if by solution is meant some happy expedient for putting an end to wars at the close of the present war. It is not in that way that God works. What we may look forward to is the growth of civilization which will operate more and more to define and limit the aspirations of nations, which will reduce the asperities that result from race conflicts and the contact of incompatible races and of incompatible ideals, and which will result after a long time in the ideals which some of you will recall as having been put before us so eloquently by my colleague, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, on the occasion of his presiding for the first time over a Mohonk Conference, the growth of the international mind. But that, as he pointed out, is a slow growth and is to be obtained only in a long time through the process of civilization. How can we hasten it? Only in the good old-fashioned way, I believe, of adhering to and pushing to fruition as rapidly as may be, the rest of the program of the League to Enforce Peace. We should indeed have that court for which our statesmen in and out of office have so long and almost victoriously labored, that high court of international justice, and we must have a council or commission of conciliation which will adjust disputes which are not properly justiciable, and we must develop out of our Hague Conferences or otherwise, and we shall, an international legislative organ which will formulate, codify, our rules of international law, and will provide little by little a broader legal basis for the adjustment of international differences. (Applause.) Those things we may confidently and hopefully and without discouragement work forward to in season and out of season. We talk a good deal about the interests of neutrals and of humanity, but we do nothing but talk about them. When the integrity of Belgium was threatened, our Government should at once have notified the governments that were arraying themselves as bel-

ligerents at that time, that the United States would not regard with favor the violation of that resolution of the Hague Conference to which we were signatories, that the territory of neutral powers should be and remain inviolate. (Applause.) We, the protagonists of neutral rights and the rights of humanity, should have boldly assumed that position. The man who preserves his authority and his influence is not the man who goes into hiding in a time of danger. It is the man who stands out boldly and declares his convictions, and there we failed, and I believe, however lamely we must do it today, that we are called upon by the highest duty that can rest upon a nation in a time like this, to still perform that great duty to civilization and to humanity. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The subject of the morning is now open for discussion.

MR. W. P. HAMILTON, of the *Wall Street Journal*, New York: On the question of economic pressure, I am something of a compulsory economist myself. I have to write about it every day, and it occurs to me that sufficient attention has not been given to the practical questions that would come up. Suppose, for instance, that such a country as Brazil, with a decision of the Hague Court against her, should decline to comply with the terms of that decision. Economic pressure on Brazil would mean that her exports of coffee would be interrupted. Now you are the largest consumers in the world of coffee, you take the largest portion of Brazil's product, and practically there is no Mocha coffee now-a-days and very little Java coffee except for blending. So it is just a question whether we should not be inflicting upon the United States considerable punishment as well as on Brazil. Of course if you are all prepared to accept these substitutes of the dregs of molasses and burnt bran,—post-mortem coffee, so to speak,—that's well and good, but I want you to consider that economic pressure upon one country means economic pressure upon all the other countries, and you have to exercise that amount of self-denial. I don't want to give you a great many instances, but I could name twenty at least which the British Empire controls that are desirable or imperative raw materials used in manufacturing by other countries. You have an instance in German dyestuffs, and Germany very largely controls the output of tungsten and a number of other things. We are feeling that pressure today and are exercising compulsory self-denial. The question is whether you are willing to make voluntary self-denial. I am not saying that there is not a great deal to be said for this thing, but I think it needs to be worked out in a little more practical detail.

This discussion, for the most part, today went back to the original purpose of these conferences. Many of you remember their founder; and he differed from other philanthropists, or some other philanthropists, in one very important particular—he mingled with his philanthropy a great amount of common sense. (Laughter and applause.) He saw that peace was largely an abstraction, that peace was not the alternative to war, that to come out and say that you believed in “peace” would not get you anywhere, because everybody admits that peace is a good thing just as absence of pain is a good thing. But he saw that the alternative of war is arbitration, something worth fighting for, and he, being a Quaker, was very willing to fight for the principle. (Applause.) I have heard one or two phrases today which I can paraphrase. One speaker says, “Are we not, as a nation, opposed to war?” And I suppose he thought he had said something. Of course we are. All nations are opposed to war. The belligerents are particularly opposed to war. I should imagine the only question that arises—everybody admitting that war is a bad thing—is not whether it is a bad thing, but whether on some occasions it may not be the lesser of two evils; as, for instance, war was a less evil than slavery or the disruption of the Union. Then again, somebody says he “loves peace,” and he thought he had said something. It is a pure abstraction. The only question that arises is whether there cannot be an occasion when peace costs too much? I think there can. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is MRS. EDWIN D. MEAD, of Boston.

REMARKS BY MRS. EDWIN D. MEAD

The League to Enforce Peace quite properly began its work last year by presenting a few simple fundamental ideas, leaving all details for the future. But a question has arisen here in regard to its implications which seems to me is not a question of detail but a very important question of national policy. I understood last night the implication was given that if we are to take our part and give our quota of armament in case of necessity to the League to Enforce Peace, it will be necessary for us to be further armed. I am an ardent believer in the League to Enforce Peace and have been from the first, and with both my pen and my voice I have tried to do my little part to help it on. But if I am right in my understanding that this is the attitude of the leaders who are guiding this movement, I am concerned and think it is very important that it should be at once known. I was told that one of the leaders when asked the question “Does this mean increased armament?” replied “You bet it does.” I am not going to enter into a discussion as to whether increased

armament is reasonable or unreasonable at the present time; the only question is whether we are to be free to settle our own national policy or whether we are to be dictated to by a body of nations who are to decide for us what shall be the size of our army and navy. When the federation of nations comes and rival armies are abolished and we have genuine international police under central control, we shall submit, of course, to paying our little quota, which will be very small, to keep up a mere police. But until then our army might be called on to engage with those nations outside of the League to Enforce Peace. We do not expect that all the nations will come into the League for some time; at first there will be only a group united, and there will be other nations outside the League against whom we might think that we ought to prepare. If so, that must be our national policy. If we are to submit to the dictation of a League to Enforce Peace, it would mean practically this; they will say, "We perceive you have an army and navy which you consider sufficient to meet outside dangers for yourselves; we do not consider it sufficient for your proper part in the League to Enforce Peace; therefore we desire that you undertake to increase your army and navy and keep them paid and trained and standing ready for that remote contingency when it will be necessary to cooperate with other members of the League to coerce some recalcitrant nation." I do not believe that the American people will ever submit to such dictation until we have a real federation of nations and are no longer preparing to meet nations outside the League. Of course it would be a preposterous proposition, and yet is not that logically involved in the hint that we shall need increased armament if we are to give our proper quota? I should think our quota would become smaller as the numbers in the group increased; naturally, the larger the group the smaller would be the amount required from each nation.

Let me turn to another point. It seems to me that one practical difficulty in enforcing military compulsion will be in getting nations at a great distance from the trouble to send their troops beyond the seas to punish a recalcitrant nation. For instance, if we have at first twenty nations in the League to Enforce Peace, including some South American nations, China, Japan, etc., and if a quarrel breaks out in South America and Brazil attacks Argentina, why should Japan and Russia, which are very remote and are least concerned in the whole matter, have, at great expense, to mobilize their forces and by cumbersome methods send them oversea when the trouble might be all over before they get there? Might it not be well to consider carefully the question whether there ought not to be a division of military obligation on the basis of the oceans and no nation compelled to send its troops beyond them? Mr. Norman Angell once said that if the

United States should ever enter into a league with the nations of Europe, its contribution to the united force should be purely economic; it seems to me that the force of any European nation applied in this hemisphere should be merely economic and that our contribution to settle a quarrel in Europe should also be merely economic force and that no nation should be required to send its troop ships beyond the ocean.

A Nobel peace-prize winner has given what seems to me by far the best definition of peace, far better than the one given this morning; he said "Peace, according to pacifism, means a condition of organized living together among nations." It is not merely a state of mind, but something that requires statesmanlike action, scientific organization. Is not the goal of the League to Enforce Peace as well as that of the Hague Court conventions, to bring about an organized living together among nations as we have already brought about an organized living together among states and provinces and small entities?

Just one final word—I would like to suggest to my friend, Mr. Houston, that there is something better than the eagle, whether the Prussian eagle, the American eagle, or any other bird of prey, as a symbol for a League to Enforce Peace, and that is the scales of justice. (Applause.)

HON. THEODORE MARBURG, of Baltimore: The atmosphere of peace of this session would not be perfect unless the critic were criticised. We have had most formidable attacks this morning upon the program of the League to Enforce Peace. I won't charge collusion, but it was certainly a concerted attack all along the line. All these critics of the League I know to be sincere friends of a better international organization. Mr. Snow has been working with us most zealously and effectively in connection with the Judicial Settlement Society. Dr. Kirchwey is a well known friend of the movement and is now President of the American Peace Society. Dr. Tryon has devoted years to the promotion of this cause, and he professes himself on the whole as satisfied with our program, though he raises certain very important questions. We are charged on the one hand with having very loose and indefinite aims, and on the other with aiming at a world confederacy. Our program was purposely kept very simple. It consists of the four elements you have heard discussed.

The plan contemplates "not a league of some states against others but a union of as many as possible in the common interest." What Dr. Kirchwey charges; namely, an intention to set up two hostile groups such as have faced each other in Europe for the past decade, is the very thing we are aiming to avoid.

The plan was kept simple so that the majority, if not all, of

the great Powers could be induced to accept it. We feel that when its principles have been agreed to, the envoys who meet to frame a plan will be equal to all questions of detail, of program or policy.

We stand dominantly for one great thing, and that is the demand that there shall be a hearing before a nation is allowed to go to war. Mr. Snow fears an oligarchy as an outcome of this League. An oligarchy to do what? To inflict this awful penalty of a hearing, a public hearing of a dispute! Now, if we were proceeding to enforce the verdict, I grant you there would be danger of oppression, and that in that event we would want in the League not only the eight great Powers or the great majority of them, we would want all of the progressive nations of the world so that out of their united action justice might emerge. But I ask you what injustice can result from demanding a public hearing of a dispute?

Mr. Snow, pointing out that conciliation is a voluntary process, asserts that to force conciliation is a contradiction in terms. He sets up his own straw man and then proceeds to knock him down. The League does not force conciliation. It simply forces a hearing, leaving the parties free to accept or reject the award. Under the League nations are prevented from going to war to get what they suppose to be their rights until, by means of a hearing, not only the outside world but—that which is of high importance—their own people have the facts of the dispute spread before them. They are not prevented from indulging in that costly pastime if, after hearing, they still hold to the opinion that they are being wronged.

Mr. Snow has further said that we go contrary to the practice within the state in the labor world when we compel a hearing. Now, one of the things which has encouraged us to put forth this plan, and which I know must have encouraged Mr. Bryan to make his great pronouncement in London some years ago, which led him later to negotiate the most promising series of treaties for obligatory investigation, was this very experience in connection with labor disputes. I am sure he had in mind the successful practice of that principle for a full generation in the State of Massachusetts. There we find a Board empowered to summon witnesses, to demand a hearing of a dispute between the laborer and his employer in quasi-public services before a strike is inaugurated and we find that that law has worked admirably. As I understand it, they do not even proceed to a judgment. The facts are laid before the world, each side gets a better understanding of its opponent's viewpoint, and the sense of justice in the disputants and the force of public opinion are generally sufficient to bring a settlement. We turn to Canada and find the Dominion Law providing for compulsory investi-

gation before a strike is permitted in these same services, but including the coal mining industry which intimately touches the public interest.

The judicial tribunal which the League aims to create will be a true world court with permanent judges, and the assembly an embryo world parliament to meet periodically. The court, while set up by the League, will be open to any nation electing to use it. And there is no reason why the parliament, though convened and prorogued by the League, may not be composed of representatives of all nations, a true development of the Hague Conferences and the Interparliamentary Union. If now the League should fail of its main object and melt away, these institutions should remain, a valuable legacy to the world. Far from running counter to the promising current of arbitration the project therefore is moving with it. It is not blocking it. We have had put to us the question whether the United States could afford to enter into an agreement which, under certain conditions, would justify a league of nations making war upon it. Such a situation would arise if the United States should proceed to make war on a fellow signatory without a previous hearing of the dispute. But the United States is already bound by these same Bryan treaties entered into with a large number of nations, to submit all questions for a hearing before going to war over them. And if it does not violate the letter and spirit of these existing treaties, that is to say, does not go to war without a previous hearing of the dispute, the League would never make war upon it.

Pending an investigation of a dispute involving a vital interest such as the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would be safer under the League than under the Bryan treaties because it would be protected from injury to its interests by an injunction issued by the League forbidding the continuance of the objectionable acts under penalty of war. This is so reasonable and necessary a provision that it would certainly be included when the League was actually constituted.

We have been charged this morning by Dr. Kirchwey with attempting the impossible by trying to establish universal and perpetual peace. Now, what we think will happen under the League is this: nations bent on aggression will conform to the demand of the League by going through the form of a hearing and will proceed with their warlike designs afterwards, which they may do without suffering any penalties at the hands of the League. Therefore we do not hope to avert all wars.

We admit that that is a defect of our plan, but we feel that in its present attitude of mind and under present conditions the great nations of the world at least are not ready to say that they will enter a League which obliges them to go into an arbitration

and which obliges them at the same time to respect the award of the tribunal. America might have the Monroe Doctrine brought up or the question of Oriental immigration; England the question of Gibraltar or Egypt or spheres of influence. When nations today enter an arbitration, they do so voluntarily; the terms of the arbitration are agreed upon and self-respecting nations go in with a determination to abide by the award. To be compelled to accept arbitration—which shall be binding—of every dispute that may arise with a large group of nations is a very different matter.

Mr. Snow has furthermore intimated that while here in America we were successful in uniting our colonies into one great state, and that it was because they were territorially contiguous, he used the term "District League." I would call your attention to one thing in rebuttal of that: the existence of the great peace loving League of the British Empire with its self-governing colonies; one government scattered over the face of the world, one of the most just of governments. (Applause.) They talk about the imperfections of our League; they complain about our not going into details and providing a special organization of the legislature, of the court, and executive. Do they forget that our own great government began in this same way? Before this more perfect union was formed, we had a confederation, a loose grouping which proved inadequate but which convinced the American people that progress was in that direction, that their safety was in that direction, that in that direction was light for the world, so that out of this imperfect union grew the United States of America. (Applause.)

There being no further discussion, the session then adjourned.

Fourth Session

Thursday, May 18, 1916, 8 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN: We will have the pleasure to-night of listening to the HON. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, former Secretary of State. I have great pleasure in presenting Mr. Bryan to the audience. (Applause.)

PRESENT PEACE PROBLEMS AND THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

ADDRESS BY HON. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

The delightful memory of a visit to Mohonk six years ago has led me to look forward each year to the time of your meeting, with the hope that I might indulge myself again and enjoy the pleasure of association with you; but this is the first year since then when I have felt that I could work this into my plans. I am enjoying this session to the full.

Before taking up the subject which I desire to present, I am sure you will pardon me if I make reference to something that was said this morning before I arrived. I shall not deal with the personal criticism, for I discovered about twenty-five years ago that it was impossible for a Democrat to deal with all the personal criticisms that he received. (Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bryan, I'd like to include Republicans in that. (Laughter and applause.)

Mr. BRYAN: I welcome the distinguished ex-President to a companionship in this respect which we shall both enjoy. (Applause.)

Mr. Putnam is reported to have said: "The presence in the Cabinet of a man like W. J. Bryan, who shamefully misrepresented our country in his interviews with Dumba and in other ways." Let me say in advance that I am not surprised that people should be misled. Those who have nothing but the Eastern metropolitan press to rely upon are fortunate if they get any truth whatever; they are the more easily excused if they do not get all the truth. Mr. Putnam, while his tone did not indicate that conscientious search for truth which is sometime rewarded by success, was probably, honestly misled by reports which I have tried to correct, but I have found that corrections of misrepresentation do not travel as rapidly as the

misrepresentations themselves, and they are not always found upon the same page or under the same attractive headlines.

Ambassador Dumba called at the State Department and it happened to be at a time when the President was in New York. Immediately after the interview I wrote out a report and sent it to the President, and received his approval of what I had said. When, a few days afterwards, I heard that my conversation with the Ambassador had been misrepresented, I immediately called him to the State Department, read over to him the report of the interview which I had made to the President, received from him a written statement certifying to the correctness of the report, and that was sent to Austria, his government, and to Berlin and to the President. It was after that that I resigned and if you will read the letter which the President wrote at the time of my resignation you will either have to doubt his good faith in what he said or you will have to cease criticizing me for the Dumba incident, for he knew all about it and, neither at that time nor since, complained of anything said.

The thing—if I may be pardoned for speaking of the subject of the conversation—the thing that was misrepresented or misinterpreted was this: I said to the Ambassador that the fact that lives were lost in the sinking of the ship made the controversy with Germany different from the controversy with Great Britain, which only affected loss of trade; that the people could not consider a loss of life in the same light or treat it in the same way that they did an injury to trade. That was the distinction I made; it was a misinterpretation placed upon it that I had occasion to correct. The statement that I made and the distinction that I drew is one that I suppose has been drawn, and I think very properly, by every one who has discussed this subject.

I am very glad to present the facts in this case. I believe that a man in public life should be held responsible for everything that he does, but it is only fair that the facts should be known and that he should be judged upon facts and not upon misrepresentations of the facts. (Applause.)

Before taking up the particular subject which I desire to discuss, I shall dwell for a moment upon the plans of the League to Enforce Peace, and I will say to you that, in dissenting from those who support those plans, I give myself more embarrassment than I give those who represent them. I know the distinguished gentleman who is at the head of this League too well to doubt for a moment that he desires to have every possible criticism candidly stated, for I know he desires the triumph of that which is right much more earnestly than the triumph of any particular thing in which he may believe. (Applause.)

The names of those who stand sponsor for this League to

Enforce Peace create a very strong presumption in its favor, but it seems to me, as I view it, that there are four objections to the plan and that these objections are of such great weight and importance that they deserve to be considered by those who have this plan in contemplation or who are inclined to support it.

The first is that it involves us in entangling alliances with Europe, and that we, therefore, cannot adopt it without abandoning the advice of Washington which has been followed thus far and will, I believe, continue to be followed by the American people. I have not the slightest thought that any argument that can be presented in behalf of any plan that connects us with the quarrels of Europe will ever bring to the support of that plan anything like a majority of the American people.

Now, as I understand this plan, we are to agree with other nations of the world, to enforce peace and to enforce it by compelling all of the contracting parties to submit all of their controversies for investigation before going to war. I need not tell you that the plan of investigating *all* questions is one that I heartily approve. It is now more than ten years since I began to urge in this country and in other countries, a plan, which has finally been embodied in thirty treaties, which submits every question of dispute of every kind and character to investigation and gives a period of a year for that investigation during which time the contracting parties agree that there shall be no resort to force; I am committed to the plan of investigation. The point I make is this, that, when we join with other nations to enforce that plan, we join with them in attempting to settle the disputes of the old world. While the chances of a resort to force may be very remote, I am not willing to speculate on a proposition about which we can know absolutely nothing; I am not willing that this nation shall put its army and navy at the command of a council which we cannot control and thus agree to let foreign nations decide when we shall go to war. Now, if I understand this plan, you cannot agree with other nations to enforce peace by compelling the submission of all questions to investigation before war, without lodging with some power somewhere the right to decide when that force shall be called out. We cannot hope to have a controlling influence in that body; I assume that it would be impossible to secure any kind of an agreement which would leave us to decide when these nations would enforce a proposition. My first objection therefore, is that it necessarily entangles us in the quarrels of Europe and that we would go blindfolded into an agreement, the extent and effect of which no human mind can know.

The second is that if we join with Europe in the enforcement of peace over there, we can hardly refuse to allow Europe to join in the enforcing of peace in the Western hemisphere. If

I understand the sentiment of the American people, there is not the slightest thought in the American mind of surrendering the Monroe Doctrine or of inviting any foreign nation to assist us in maintaining peace in the Western hemisphere. (Applause.)

The third objection is that our Constitution vests in Congress the right to declare war and that we cannot vest the power to declare war in a council controlled by European nations without changing our Constitution. The suggestion that we so amend our Constitution as to vest in a body, whose control is across the sea, the right to declare war would not be popular in the United States. If we are to change the Constitution from what it is now I am in favor of putting the declaring of war in the hands of the people, to be decided by a referendum vote of the American people. (Applause.) This is quite different from surrendering, into the hands of a foreign body, the right to determine when this nation shall take up arms.

The fourth objection that I see to this plan is fundamental and cannot be changed by a suggestion that I shall make in a moment. The fourth objection is that when we turn from moral suasion to force, we step down and not up. I prefer to have this nation a moral power in the world rather than a policeman. (Applause.) Therefore, while I have no doubt whatever of the high motives and of the laudable purpose of those who stand for the doctrines of the League, I cannot bring myself to believe that it is a step in advance.

Three of the objections mentioned might be obviated if we divided the world into groups, the American group being entrusted with the maintenance of peace in the Western hemisphere. I would be much more willing to join with the Republics of Central and South America in any plan that would compel the submission of all disputes in this hemisphere to investigation before war than to favor a plan that binds us to enforce decisions made by nations across the ocean.

And in addition to all the other objections—and there are so many that I shall not take time to give them all—when this League embraces European nations and puts them in a position where they can decide questions of war for us, there is this consideration that I think will not be treated lightly by the American people. If we are in a group of American Republics, we are associated with people having our form of government, but the moment we cross the ocean, we tie ourselves to a theory of government from which our people dissented a century and a third ago, and, if I understand the heart of the American people, they still believe that there is an essential difference between a monarchy and a republic. So long as the European monarchies vest in their executives the right to declare war, it seems to me that the American people can well refuse to tie

themselves to these countries and become thus "unequally yoked together."

Now I have presented, as briefly as I could, the objections that I see to this plan to enforce peace and I shall be very glad if it can be so modified as to make it consistent and harmonious with the ideas of the American people and the institutions of the United States, for these gentlemen do not surpass me in the desire to do whatever can be done to make war impossible. (Applause.)

I ask you to bear with me for a moment while I speak of the nation's attitude on two or three phases of the subject now under consideration. First, as to whether we shall go into this war: there are very few people who say that we ought. I believe they had a meeting in New York not long ago, and one in Boston, at which the speakers said that it was our duty to go into this war. The virus has not yet been carried across the Alleghany Mountains; we have had no such meetings in the west. My fear is not that we shall deliberately decide to go into this war; my fear is that, following the diplomacy of the old world, we may do the things that will bring us into this war, even though we do not desire to enter it. You will remember that all the rulers who entered this war entered it *protesting that they wanted peace*, but they followed the precedents that lead to war. My contention is that the precedents of the past have broken down, that they have involved the world in a war without a parallel; and that they ought not to be followed in this country if they will tend to bring us into the war. And so, where I have had a chance to speak to the people—and I have been improving every opportunity for some ten months—I have presented the alternatives which I think we can choose instead of going to war.

In the first place, if diplomacy fails, we have a peace plan. It was offered to all the world. It has been embodied in thirty treaties with one billion three hundred million of the human race. We now have three-quarters of the globe connected with us by these treaties, and three nations that have not signed the treaties have endorsed the principle. We have almost the entire civilized world bound to us either by treaties, actually made or by agreement upon the principle which the treaty embodies, providing that *every dispute of every kind* shall, before hostilities begin, be submitted to an international tribunal for investigation and report. Four of the belligerent nations have signed these treaties with us—Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. Great Britain and France signed on the 15th of September, 1914, a month and a half after the war began, and Russia signed on the first of October, two months after the war began. Italy signed before the war commenced. Three belligerent

nations—Germany, Austria and Belgium—have endorsed the principle but have not yet formed treaties. Germany was the sixteenth nation to formally endorse the principle embodied in these treaties. My contention is this, that if this plan was good enough to offer to all the world—and we have never withdrawn the offer—if it was good enough to be embodied in the treaties we have made, and to be endorsed in principle by the other nations that have not yet signed treaties, it is good enough to use with any nation before we go to war with that nation. (Applause.)

If we use the treaty plan and it fails to bring a peaceful settlement, or if we fail to use the treaty plan and reach a time when we must decide either to go into this war or to postpone final settlement of the dispute until the war is over; if we are compelled to choose between these two alternatives, I believe it will be the part of wisdom to postpone final settlement of the dispute until after this war is over. In suggesting this I am simply applying to international affairs the principle that is applied in our courts every day. Our courts postpone hearings in the interest of justice, and if, by postponing the final settlement of a dispute until this war is over, we can secure a settlement without war, I think it is worth postponing. The only difficulty we have had in regard to any dispute with either side has been the fear of the *effect of the settlement on this war*. When this war is over, that difficulty will be removed and I think the chances are many to one that we can reach a settlement without a resort to arms.

But there is another contingency which should be considered. Suppose it were impossible or were believed to be impossible to secure a settlement after the war without a war; suppose the question were simply this, that we must have a war to settle the dispute and that the only thing we had to decide was whether we would have it now, while this war is on, or after this war is over. If we were compelled to choose between those two alternatives, I believe it would be the part of wisdom to have our war after this war is over. Why? In the first place, we would still have on our side possibility of a peaceful settlement after the war was over. Second, we would be free to act as mediator and help to bring this war to a close before we entered our war; and, third, if we have to have a war, it will be our war with the single nation with which we have the dispute and we can have something to say about when to go into it and when to come out and the terms of the settlement; but if we go into this war, it is not our war, it is everybody's war; if we go into it, we cannot come out till the others do and while there we must fight for the things they fight for, and God forbid that

this nation shall ever entangle itself in the quarrels of the old world or put an American army and an American navy at the command of a European monarch to be used in settling his quarrels with other European monarchs. The first point, therefore, that I ask you to consider is this, that we shall not go into this war. I shall not attempt to present all the reasons, I shall simply present three and those very briefly.

The first is that we cannot go into this war without imposing enormous burdens upon many generations yet unborn. If we go into this war, we cannot go in in a stingy way or as a miserly nation. If it is manly to go in, it will be manly to play a man's part and be prodigal with men and with money. If we judge the possibilities in regard to our expenses by what has already occurred in Europe, we must know that we can not possibly take part in this war without contracting an enormous war debt. In less than two years the countries now at war have added to the war debts of the world a sum about equal to all the war debts that have come down from all the wars of history until this time.

In the second place no man can tell how many men it would cost us. If we go into it, what will be our quota? One hundred thousand men? It would be more likely to be half a million or a million. If I know the sentiment of the American people, they are not willing to make this sacrifice in either blood or money for any cause that has arisen in our disputes, with either side thus far.

The third objection is, that we would forfeit an opportunity that never came to any other nation before, since time began. We are the greatest of the neutral nations; we are the nation to which the world is looking to act as mediator when the time for mediation comes. If we go into this war, no matter what the cause, no matter what the excuse, no matter what the pretext, we step down from that high position and turn over to some other nation this unprecedented opportunity.

And more than that, we are next-of-kin to all the nations that are at war. They are blood of our blood; they are bone of our bone; not a soldier boy falls on any battlefield over yonder but what the wail of sorrow in his home finds an echo at some American fireside, and these people have a right to expect that we will remain the friend of all, and in God's good time play the part of friend.

Some nation must lift the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when peace can be made enduring by being built on love and brotherhood, and I crave that honor for our nation; more glorious than any page of history that has

yet been written will be that page that will record our claim to the promise made to the peacemakers.

This is the day for which the ages have been waiting. For 1900 years the gospel of the Prince of Peace has been making its majestic march around the world and the philosophy of the Sermon on the Mount has become more and more the rule of daily life. All that remains is that this moral code shall be lifted from the level of the individual and made real in the law of nations; and this, I believe, is the task that God in His providence has reserved for the American people. And now—how much time have I left?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I have followed you and not the time. (Applause.)

Mr. BRYAN: Thank you—a very gracious rejoinder.

Let me say just a word about the false philosophy, as I regard it, that some ask this country to adopt. We have in this country a propaganda for what they call preparedness. It ought not to be called preparedness; it is unfortunate that a word with such a distinguished lineage and such high character should be dragged down to so base a use. It does not accurately describe it, because there are two kinds of preparedness, and those who ask you to adopt *one* kind have no right to insist upon monopolizing the meaning of that word. The question is how best to prepare against war. My objection to the plan which is suggested and described by that word preparedness, as it is used by the friends of large appropriations, is that it will not prevent war but will provoke war, and in proof of this, I appeal to the fact that the war in Europe was preceded by a period of preparation such as the world never knew before. If preparedness would prevent war, there would be no war in Europe, for they had spent money lavishly preparing. One side prepared on land and the other side on sea. Why did the side that prepared on land not prepare on sea? Because it thought preparation on land was more effective. And why did the side that prepared on sea not prepare on land? Because it thought preparation on sea was more effective. Each thought it was prepared, and when the war began, those best prepared went in first; after them others followed as they could prepare, and if we had been as well prepared as some now ask us to be, we would, I believe, be in the war to-day, shouting for blood as lustily as any of them. (Applause.)

This false philosophy that has brought Europe into this war will, in my judgment, bring into war any nation that adopts it. Europe has built its hope of peace upon a false foundation, upon the foundation of force and fear and terrorism; the only

hope of peace that these European nations have had rested in the belief that each could terrorize the other into peace.

It is a false philosophy; if you want to see how false it is, try it on a neighborhood. The big questions between nations are settled by the very same rules that we apply to neighborhoods. I will show you what this philosophy is, and then you can judge whether it can be expected to bring anything else except war.

Suppose nearby you have two farmers living side by side, good farmers, well-meaning farmers who wanted to be friends; and suppose they tried to maintain peace on the European plan, how would they go at it? One would go into the nearest town and buy the best gun he could find, and then he would put a notice in the paper saying that he loved his neighbor and that he had no thought of trespassing upon his neighbor's rights; but that he was determined to defend his own rights and protect his honor at any cost, that he had secured the best gun in the market and that if his neighbor interfered with him, he would shoot him. Then suppose the neighbor went to town the next day and got him a better gun and, with the same frankness, consulted the newspaper and put in a similar notice explaining that he loved peace as well as his neighbor did but that he was just as determined to defend his own rights and protect his honor and that he had a better gun than his neighbor and that, if his neighbor crossed his line, he would kill him. And suppose then the first man, when he read that notice, went to town and got two guns and advertised that fact in the paper, and the second man, when he read it, went to town and got three guns, and so on, each alternately buying guns. What would be the result? Every undertaker in that vicinity would go out and become personally acquainted with the two men, because he would know there would be at least one funeral in that neighborhood. That is the European plan. One country gets a battleship and announces that it can blow any other battleship out of the water; then a rival nation gets a dreadnought that can sink the battleship; then the first nation gets a super-dreadnought; then they go to the dictionary and look for prefixes for the names of their battleships as they build them larger and larger; and they make guns larger and larger and they equip armies larger and larger, all the time talking about how much they love peace and all the while boasting that they are ready for a fight.

Go back to the time when they commenced to pass laws against the carrying of concealed weapons and you can get all the material you want for a speech on preparedness, because the arguments made in favor of carrying revolvers can be put into the

speeches made to-day in favor of preparedness, without changing a word. Did you ever hear of a man who wanted to carry a revolver to be aggressive? No, it was just to protect his rights and defend his honor, especially his honor, but they found by experience that the man who carried a revolver generally carried with it a disposition to use it on slight provocation and a disposition to provoke its use by others. For the promotion of peace, every state in this Union has abolished preparedness on the part of individuals because it did not preserve peace. It provoked trouble, and unless we can convince ourselves that there is a moral philosophy applicable to nations that is just the opposite of the moral philosophy applied to individuals, we must conclude that, as the pistol-toting man is a menace to the peace of a community, so the pistol-toting nation is a menace to the peace of the world.

That is my view of this philosophy and I remind you that the concessions that the President has made are not to be taken as the measure of this preparedness program, neither are the concessions made by Congress. When you discuss preparedness as a program, you must take the program that is presented by the military and naval experts; namely, two billions to get ready with and a billion and more than fifty millions to keep ready with. That is four times what we are now spending.

Our military and naval experts tell us, then, that we must now add to what we are already spending on the army and navy, to get ready for imaginary wars, a sum equal to the entire amount that we spend for the education of all the children of this country.

This is the program and it is only intended to get us ready to compete with the navies and armies of the world *as they now are*. But do we not know that, the moment we start out to thus vastly increase our preparedness, the other nations must enlarge their preparations because we do? And then we must increase ours because they do. If they can scare us when they are not prepared, can we not scare them when we do prepare? And if we can scare them and make them prepare, will not that scare us some more and make us prepare more; and won't we scare them again, and they us again, and we them again, etc? Where is the end except bankruptcy? The plan they now propose is a plan that would enormously add to the taxes of the country and would, in my judgment, make this nation a menace to the peace of the world. The question we have to decide is whether we shall adopt the false philosophy that has led the whole world into war, or whether we shall improve this supreme opportunity to appeal to the world to adopt a different philosophy. Never in 1900 years have the Christian people of the

world such an opportunity as they have to-day. Nineteen hundred years ago Christ and Pilate stood face to face. Pilate represented force; Christ represented love. Force triumphed; they nailed Christ to the tree and those who stood about the cross mocked and jeered, and said: "He is dead." They thought that was the end of the story, but it was the beginning. From that day on the power of Caesar waned and the power of Christ increased; throughout the ages He has grown until He is to-day the commanding figure of the world, aye, the growing figure of all times. This great nation, with an ocean rolling on either side, with a mountain range along either coast that all the armies of all the world could never cross, is in better position than any other nation that ever lived or lives to-day to set the world an example. Nineteen hundred years ago wise men came from the East, following the Star of Bethlehem and seeking Him who was to be born the Prince of Peace. If they could do this, inspired only by prophecy unfulfilled, this great Christian nation, after nineteen centuries of demonstration, should be able to go as a wise nation from the West carrying gifts to relieve the distress on both sides, and appeal to these people to come with us and lift the world out of the bloody mire and up to a plane upon which a permanent peace can be built. Some talk about going into this war, if honor requires. Oh, my countrymen, there is no honor that we can secure or defend by going into this war that is comparable with the honor that we can win if we can persuade the warring to turn, like prodigal sons, from the husks on which they have fed and make the future of the world bright by establishing cooperation instead of combat, and friendship instead of the hatreds out of which these wars have grown. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is DR. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, Professor in the Law School of Harvard University. (Applause.)

AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR EMERGEN- CIES ARISING IN WAR

ADDRESS BY EUGENE WAMBAUGH, LL. D.

This subject has been suggested by problems of the current war. These problems are of several sorts. To begin with, they have to do with legislative matters or with executive matters or with judicial matters.

At the outset of the war, the United States took the position that even in time of war, it is proper to change the rules of international law; for at the outset of the war, the United States requested all the belligerent countries to adopt for this

war the provisions of the unratified Declaration of London. I have not time to detail the answers of the several powers, but the question involved was this: Is it possible for belligerents, in time of war, to change international law even with the consent of a neutral? That problem, if we adopt the classification of the Constitution of the United States, which classification calls powers either legislative, executive, or judicial,—that problem I say is one of a legislative nature; but at present there is not in the world any international body with legislative functions.

To pass to another sort of problem, each belligerent has complained to neutrals that other belligerents have broken established international law in such matters as dumdum bullets and attacks upon hospitals. Now, assuming that it is part of the rights of a neutral to take action in such a case as this, how is the neutral to ascertain the facts? This is a problem of an executive nature; and at present there is not in the world any international executive.

In the next place, to take a different kind of problem, we have found that cargoes have been condemned as contraband of war although not consisting of articles such as have been generally so regarded and although consigned to neutral ports, and we have also found that neutral lives have been destroyed on vessels not normally warlike which have been sunk without warning. The active belligerents have respectively told us that these acts have been in accordance with established international law and that apparent departures have simply been applications of old doctrines to new emergencies. Here you perceive there is a question of a judicial nature; but at present there is not in the world any judicial body which is able to deal promptly with such a question as this.

The three sorts of problems which I have now mentioned have caused and still are causing irritation; and one certain result of the present war is that for many years to come many men will believe that as to the rights of neutrals, at any rate, there are nations which cannot be trusted.

Further, a great difficulty experienced by neutrals during this war has been a lack of understanding of the real basis for the rights and duties of neutrals, and it is important that that basis should be made much firmer and clearer than it now is.

Finally is it impossible, in time of war, for a neutral peaceably to secure its own rights, peaceably to bring to pass that the war shall be conducted according to the rules of the game, peaceably perhaps to bring the war to an end?

These are difficulties raised by this war, questions almost as serious as ever have been raised in the world; and in anticipation of future wars, what can we say? Something must be

done. Something can be done. Something will be done to ameliorate these conditions in the future and to prevent such problems and such bitternesses from mounting up day by day, month by month, year by year, till they become a portentous mass endangering the future peace of the world.

What can be done? Now of course at this time in the world's history, we immediately think of some possible international agreement. By way of experiment, I have framed such an agreement. It was necessary to put it into words in order that the concrete thing might be used as the basis for thought and criticism. I have framed twelve articles which I will read to you, and under each article I will make comments indicating the reasons and the purpose of the article. I entitle the whole agreement International Agreement for Emergencies Arising in War.

Article 1. In time of war the rights and duties of neutral governments and of neutral individuals toward belligerent governments and belligerent individuals shall remain as in time of peace, unless the contrary can be shown clearly by treaties, conventions or otherwise. The reason underlying this article is the fact that the normal and desirable life is being led not by belligerents but by neutrals. In times past there was to some extent a theory that the natural and perhaps the desirable state of man is war and that therefore the belligerent has the right of way; but to-day the trend is toward the opposite theory, and rightly, and it is only accurate that the opposite theory, the one which places upon belligerents the burden of proving that neutrals, in addition to the misfortunes which they suffer by reason of war, incur new duties also. It is only fair and accurate, I say, that the burden should lie upon the belligerents, and that this should be clearly stated in any agreement which means to secure the welfare of the whole world.

Article 2. When the words "neutral" and "belligerent" are used in this convention or in agreements amendatory hereof, the words shall be underscored as including both government and individual, unless this construction shall tend to increase the duties of neutrals or the rights of belligerents, and unless a contrary construction shall be clearly indicated. The reason for this article is the importance of avoiding ambiguity. The word neutral sometimes means a neutral government and sometimes a neutral individual; and similarly the word belligerent sometimes means a belligerent government and sometimes a belligerent individual. The ambiguity is very important, for sometimes an act which would be wholly illegal for a neutral government is absolutely legal for a neutral individual. Let me read to you from a diplomatic document a passage which will show how easy it is

to make a mistake as to this kind of thing. I quote: "For a long time a traffic in munitions of war to the greatest extent has been carried on between the United States of America on the one hand and Great Britain and its allies on the other." The first half of that sentence is speaking of individuals and the second half is speaking of governments. No doubt a skilled person would understand that sentence and similar sentences, but an unskilled person might make a mistake. Now you see why it is important carefully to distinguish in order that we may avoid such ambiguities as this; but when in any sentence the ambiguity exists, then the reason underlying the first article of the suggested agreement requires that the presumption should be in favor of the *prima facie* predominant rights of neutrals.

Article 3. There shall be established three permanent international commissions to care for emergencies arising in course of war; namely, a legislative commission, an executive commission, and a judicial commission. The necessity for this article is obvious. There must be formal machinery to deal promptly and fairly with the kind of problem which I outlined at the beginning.

Article 4. The legislative commission shall consist of two members from each of the signatory powers; and in case of war it may by a majority vote of the commissioners voting establish for the period of the war rules of international law not in conflict with this convention and not in conflict with agreements forbidding change. To-day what happens is that the rules of international law, when changed in time of war, are changed by the only parties in the world who are clearly incapable of passing upon the matter in an unprejudiced way, because they are the only parties in the world who are parties in interest to the quarrel itself, namely the belligerents. It is suggested here that changes in international law should be made by an international commission in which all countries should be represented, all countries large and small, and with an equal representation. Why with an equal representation? Because that is the rule in international law, the theory of international law being the same as the theory of private life, for in private life we recognize that the small man has as many rights as the large man and is just as likely to have sound sense and a properly high moral standard. Why two representatives rather than one? Partly because it is well, in a legislative body, to promote debate, and partly because if there be two representatives from each country those representatives may now and then happily disagree and so remove the impression that representatives simply vote as instructions may come from home.

Article 5. The executive commission shall consist of one

member from each of the signatory powers; and in case of war it may investigate and report upon any apparent infraction of international law, in such investigation receiving the aid of all signatory powers. Obviously it is hardly practicable for any one country to make such an investigation; and even if it were practicable for one country to do it, the doing of it would be a very dangerous thing, for that country would be suspected of being prejudiced and the total result in the long run might well be, for the world, bad rather than good.

Article 6. The judicial commission shall consist of one member from each of the signatory powers; and in case of war it may decide, both during the war and afterwards, unless otherwise hereafter expressly agreed, all disputes raising questions of international law; and its decisions will be recognized and obeyed by all signatory powers. The purpose of this article is not that this commission should take the place of the projected international prize court or of the projected international courts of more general jurisdiction. No, the purpose here is simply to establish a rapid court to take jurisdiction of these serious and pressing matters; and perhaps, by reason of the necessity of having such a commission as this, the various powers can be induced to establish this rather temporary commission before they can be induced to establish the other more important and more permanent courts.

Article 7. Each of the three commissions shall have a president and shall meet at his call; and each of them shall have a standing subcommittee to deal with matters needing instant action or not needing the presence of the entire commission. Clearly the details are left, as I think they should be left, to the commissions.

Article 8. No person shall be a member of more than one commission at any one time. The underlying reason for this is that as far as possible the commissions should be kept separate. It certainly is impossible to separate with exactness legislative and executive and judicial functions; but the attempt must be made and the attempt will be more likely to succeed when the personnel of the three commissions shall be wholly different. Besides, legislative qualities, executive qualities, and judicial qualities are possessed by very different men; and it is desirable that in such commissions as these each country should be represented by persons who have the appropriate quality.

Article 9. A representative of a belligerent power may vote as a member of the legislative commission or of the executive commission, but may not serve as a member of any sub-committee and may not vote as a member of the judicial commission. The reason for this article requires some discussion. Why

should representatives of belligerent powers be able to sit in legislative and executive commissions? In the first place, because it is customary for parties in interest to be represented in such bodies. In the next place, because thus debate is promoted in legislative bodies and criticism is promoted in executive bodies. Because, in the next place, the two sides in a way balance each other. Finally, because, if belligerents were deprived of a voice in such bodies, then a belligerent believing that a certain neutral country was prejudiced, would be tempted to declare war against that neutral country to the end that its representatives might have no voice. On the other hand, when we think of a sub-committee or of the judicial commission, other considerations come into play. It would be unfair that a belligerent power should have the unnatural preponderance of influence, which would come by reason of having membership in a sub-committee. As to a judicial commission, the whole theory of courts forbids that representatives of parties in interest should have a seat. It is true that in some national prize courts, judges have disregarded the apparent interests of their governments; but we must bear in mind the cynicism of mankind and in framing such a scheme as this we must avoid as far as possible even unjust criticism.

Article 10. The appointment of members of the commissions shall not await war but shall take place as soon as this convention has been ratified by three powers. This article depends upon the theory that it is advisable for commissioners to be appointed by reason of their general fitness and not by reason of their supposed usefulness in attaining their country's ends in a specific case. Again, it is much easier to take care of machinery like this in time of peace than in time of war. Finally, I need hardly say that when what one is trying to do is to achieve justice and peace, one cannot move too soon.

Article 11. In case any neutral government shall consider that any belligerent government has disregarded unjustifiably the general rules of international law or the proceedings of the commissions herein provided, the neutral government, whether itself injured or not, may, until the belligerent government shall obtain from the proper commission a finding that the neutral government is in error, take one or all of the following steps regarding the belligerent government; namely, (1) to prohibit belligerent warships, not in distress, to enter its harbors or to approach within a marine league of its shores; (2) to prohibit belligerent merchant vessels, not in distress, to enter its harbors; (3) to prohibit contraband of war to be shipped to the belligerent government or to persons residing in its boundaries; (4) to prohibit commercial intercourse of any sort between residents of

the two countries; (5) to prohibit, within its borders, subscriptions to the loans of the belligerent government; and (6) to prohibit its citizens to serve in the belligerent forces. The purpose of this article is to enable neutral governments peaceably to obtain their own rights and to support the rights of others; but obviously this is a very dangerous article, and any neutral government should usually await an adjudication by the proper international commission.

Article 12. It shall not be considered a breach of neutrality for a neutral government, provided it acts identically toward all parties to the war, to take as to each belligerent government any or all of the steps detailed in the immediately preceding article. For this article there are several reasons. Neutral governments may find it desirable, for their own selfish purposes, to do this kind of thing; for example, to retain munitions for themselves. On the other hand, neutral governments may conceivably be willing to sacrifice their commerce for the benefit of mankind.

All these articles have been framed not so much for the purpose of securing justice in the very case, and not so much for the purpose of bringing to pass peace, as for the specific purpose indicated by the title, the purpose, that is to say, of bringing international law in time of war into a position which really is just and workable, and then enforcing it. Yet there are people who will wish to ask whether it is not a waste of time to frame agreements. Yes, I know that machinery is of no use unless it be accompanied by and founded upon a deep and settled desire to do justice; but machinery is a help, and that is one reason for framing such a scheme as this. Besides, the desire for justice is not dead. Throughout this war each of the belligerent countries has tried to convince itself and to convince us that it is not an anarchist but that it is trying to observe rules. That is the recognition of the power and the desirability of law; and hence a person who believes in the reign of law does not lose hope, but knows that in the midst of war it is wise to frame a plan upon the supposition that law is at the point of beginning a triumphal march. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is DR. EDWARD B. KREHBIEL, Professor of History, Leland Stanford, Junior, University. (Applause.)

NATIONALISM—AN ANACHRONISM?

ADDRESS BY EDWARD B. KREHBIEL, PH. D.

Nationalism is the present political system of a world consisting of nations. The thesis of this paper, put baldly for the sake of challenge, is that this system is out of date, that the nation is no longer the true cohesive unit of society.

Ask the man on your streets and he will glibly reply that his nation is the people to which he belongs; that it is the best people on earth; stands for what is finest in any field, leads in government, prosperity, science, art,—in short, everything; that it has uniformly been victorious in war, partly because its generals are the greatest and its soldiers the bravest; partly, too, because God was on its side, since his nation has always been in the right. And he regards foreigners with contempt or, at best, with pity as an inferior, benighted and perhaps even a hopeless lot.

And the foreigner has the same opinion of his own nation.

Ask the publicist or lawyer what a nation is, and he will guardedly describe it in terms of its external features or manifestations, but will say little of its composition, and less of what distinguishes one nation from another.

A publicist's definition of a nation is that of Lieber: "What is a nation in the modern sense of the word? The word nation, in the fullest adaptation of the term, means, in modern times, a numerous and homogeneous population (having long emerged from the hunters and nomadic state) permanently inhabiting and cultivating a coherent territory, with a well-defined geographic outline, and a name of its own,—the inhabitants speaking their own language, having their own literature and common institutions, which distinguish them clearly from other and similar groups of people, being citizens or subjects of a unitary government, however subdivided it may be and having an organic unity with one another as well as being conscious of a common destiny. Organic, intellectual and political internal unity with proportionate strength and a distinct and obvious emarcation from similar groups, are notable elements of the idea of a modern nation in its fullest sense. A nation is a nation only when there is but one nationality; and the attempt at establishing a nationality within a nationality is more inconsistent and mischievous even than the establishment of 'an empire within an empire.'"

Whatever nationalism is, it has led to an awful catastrophe in Europe; for when all the befogging details and prejudices regarding the cause of the Great War are summed up they leave the blame on the national spirit and the supposition that nations represent different ideals that are bound to get into conflict.

What is the truth about this supposed fundamental difference of nations? A convenient method of attacking this question is to decide what a nation is not.

A nation is not a geographic unit, for rarely are nations bounded by natural features. For a thousand years France and Germany have fought over the question whether the

Rhine River or the Vosges Mountains should be the boundary. There is no natural boundary between Germany and Russia to fight over. Great Britain, with her naval supremacy, does not regard the ocean as a boundary but holds possessions beyond the seas. The boundaries between the United States and Canada illustrate very well how national limits are often determined,—that is, arbitrarily and even accidentally.

A nation is not a closed racial or ethnical unit. That a nation is not identical with a nationality is most conspicuously demonstrated by Austria-Hungary, and in a lesser degree by Germany and the United Kingdom. The United States notoriously consists of an amalgamation of nationalities. If a given nation contains different peoples, the converse that different nations contain identical peoples, is also in some measure true. There are Poles in Russia, Austria and Prussia. The Walloons of Belgium are more like the French than like their countrymen the Flemings. Switzerland consists of Germans, French and Italians, not distinguishable from those just across the border.

A nation is not a linguistic unit, though it should be said at the start that language is a most significant national characteristic. Indeed, if nations consisted of nationalities, language would practically decide national affiliations. However, as things are, this is not the case. Austria-Hungary is a nation, but it contains many languages. There are many mutually unintelligible dialects in Germany, Italy and Russia, to mention but a few instances. If it be true that philologically these dialects belong together, it still remains true that the persons in a nation speaking different dialects do not understand each other, and that for practical purposes they might as well be speaking to genuine foreigners.

Neither is a nation a religious unit, for national boundaries and the areas occupied by religious creeds are not at all identical. Persons holding different faiths are fighting side by side in the trenches in Europe against persons of their own faith in the opposing battle line. Nothing, indeed, is clearer in this war than that religious belief comes after loyalty to nation.

Again, a nation is not a closed economic unit. What could demonstrate more clearly the economic interdependence of nations than the derangement of the trade of neutrals—to say nothing of that of belligerents—by the present war? Everybody knows that the world is a market for any given commodity and that prices are everywhere fixed by world supply and demand. This, of course, means that capital, and therefore labor, are international; it means that all the facilities of transportation and communication are molded to accommodate this

international traffic. And the various interests affected, the railroad men, freight handlers, insurance underwriters, capitalists, labor unions, farmers, news agents and the like, have international organizations or congresses in which they discuss ways and means to expedite their own success.

The nation is likewise not a water-tight cultural unit. Culture means the fine arts, and the intellectual and professional interests of men. The fine arts,—that is, painting, music and literature, since they appeal chiefly to sentiment, may be considered cultural elements of an emotional character. The intellectual and professional elements of culture,—that is, the historic, economic, social and natural sciences, as also theology, law, and the like, appeal chiefly to the intellect and are therefore rational in character.

Premising this distinction the thesis is that a given culture is not national.

It has been contended that all culture depends for its creation upon a national soil, for instance, that music is a peculiar product of the German in Germany, art of the Frenchman in France, and certain kinds of literature, of the Russian living in Russia. In proof of this, it is pointed out that the Germans in Brazil or the United States, the French in Quebec or New Orleans, and the British in Australia or the other dominions, have not been culturally productive after the fashion of their native lands. Lamprecht, indeed, contends that the Germans in the United States have retained only the externals of Germanism and have to a large degree lost the essentials of German culture and in any event have become entirely unproductive of it.

In rebuttal it is asserted that the Jewish people have retained a distinct culture without any national existence whatever, and at first blush it would appear that this is good and sufficient proof that cultures are created without a nation to back them. To this it is, however, rejoined that the Jewish people, though contributing relatively more than their neighbors, have not a Jewish culture, but that their product everywhere appears as an integral part of the culture of the nation in which they are. The question raised by this contention is not easy of decision, and must here go undecided.

But even if in its creation culture is national, it is not national in its consumption, for peoples can appreciate and adopt foreign cultures if they but choose to do so. The clearest illustration of this is the wholesale adoption by Japan of such features of Western civilization as were desired. Sciences are almost necessarily non-national because they rest upon the laws of nature, and these operate the same everywhere. It is so with all rational cultures. Theology and philosophy never were national. The legal and political institutions of Rome influenced all subsequent

peoples, just as those of England and the Code Napoleon have gone far beyond the confines of the land of their origin. The emotional parts of culture have shown less ability to travel abroad, but they have not found it impossible. The music, art and literature of a nation are often enough far more appreciated by "cultured" foreigners, than by "uncultured" natives.

It is the power of appreciation, not the nationality that decides. Given cultured persons of different nations, it would be rash and, just as likely as not, fallacious, to declare that the native possesses a deeper grasp or appreciation of his national culture than the foreigner.

It has been urged that a nation is a political entity and that as such it has a character of its own. It is even contended that the difference in political institutions between monarchies and republics causes war. How then is it that two republics or two monarchies war? It is not the differing institutions which lead to disagreement, it is that two nations, whose institutions may be essentially alike, are under different managements. But this does not warrant the current belief that nations are different, any more than that two engines are different because they have different drivers.

Finally, a nation is not a personality. For convenience we may speak of China, Germany or Mexico; only it cannot be said too often that these are but time-saving expressions which do not represent a real unity. Germany is not a single-minded body-politic, but a community of separate and very diverse interests and purposes. Witness Alsace-Lorraine. Witness also as further instances of the same kind, England and Ireland, Austria and Hungary, Russia and Finland. A nation is not like a person, it is like a bee-hive. It contains many individuals, most of them are at home, but not a few abroad. Not a few of those at home have their major interest abroad; quite enough others privately believe that some foreign nation is superior to their own. A few say so. Such common purpose and action as a nation knows, is governmental. Practical unity in a nation will come only under an absolute government which represses all individualities. One must choose between absolutism and a unified nation or personal freedom and a nation at odds within. Competitive nationalism favors absolutism.

Nations have themselves to thank for not being self-contained. Not content to live or to earn a living within their areas, they have spilled over in a multitude of ways, and have thereby extended their sway far beyond their apparent confines. The simplest form of expansion, the only one known to many of the less informed, is the outright annexation of territory which means the extension of full sovereignty over it. Yet this type

of expansion is far the least significant; is often nothing more than the last step in the process of devouring a victim.

Nations frequently claim and exercise semi-sovereignty over regions outside their own political jurisdictions, by means of protectorates secured through treaties which are in effect unilateral, or by simply designating a given area as a sphere of interest or of paramount influence. The Monroe Doctrine is an instance of the latter. We do not claim political sovereignty in Latin America, but we do assert the supremacy of our interests over those of non-American states. It is a form of political expansion beyond our actual boundaries. Russia has similar spheres in Persia, China and Turkey; Germany, in Asia Minor; Great Britain, in Persia, parts of Turkey, and many places besides; Japan, in Manchuria and other parts of the Far East.

Less understood but immensely more important are the commercial spheres of nations secured by means of preferential tariffs, advantageous concessions, government loans, or private financial investments which mean economic control. Capital, traders and settlers in quantity have poured from one nation into another especially into weaker or "inferior" nations. The world too little understands European control of Turkey, Persia and China by means of loans and irksome commercial treaties, which enslave these states and in no small measure prevent them from meeting the demands of civilization.

Part of the alleged backwardness of these and other peoples is caused by the obstacles to progress placed by the "civilized" exploiting nations of the West. These have, to be sure, insisted upon the "open door" but this merely means that each demands a share in the exploitation and makes the position of the victim the more hopeless. For the latter it means domination through financial and commercial agencies.

Finally, there is the cultural sphere of a nation, that region beyond its physical limits in which its ideals and institutions have found favor, perhaps been to some extent adopted. The cultural sphere of aristocratic France was some centuries ago practically the whole of the western European continent; the United States is today as a whole in the British cultural sphere, as certain parts of the Balkans are in the Russian; Latin America is largely Spanish, Portuguese and French. Missionaries were until the middle of the last century the advance agents of a national culture in a new country; today the precursor of national influences is the representative of trade. Nowadays national expansion is economic first, cultural afterwards.

Summarizing, it appears that nations are in fact not isolated, but that beyond their boundaries they have semi-political, commercial or cultural spheres of dominion; they consist not merely of the actual nation but comprise an ill-defined but very real sur-

rounding nebula. It is in the latter that most modern wars are born, inasmuch as the undefined claims of one nation come into conflict with equally vague claims of another and have the reaction of causing each nation to declare that its vital interests, if not its honor, are at stake and must be protected.

If a nation is not a geographic, racial, linguistic, religious, economic or cultural unit, if it is not a unified personality and is not even *sui generis* a political entity, what then is it? That it is none of these things does not mean that it is nothing. Surely there must be something real represented by the deep-seated feelings we call love of country and patriotism. Strip the nation of all non-essentials, and subject the essentials to rigid and demolishing definition, there still remains a real if not substantial something that the average man calls his country. He may not be able to tell what it is, but he swears that it exists. To him it is the embodiment of what he regards as the peculiar ideals, aspirations, institutions and qualities of the political group to which he belongs.

The nation is a faith, a religion, and may be called the spiritual state, justifying that excellent definition recently used in a London paper: "A nation exists where its component atoms believe it to be a nation."

Let there be no minimizing of the power of this national religion. Men give their treasure, hope, happiness and lives for it; perforce they surrender their own consciences to it and join in the persecution of other nations. They sacrifice everything to their conviction.

Still, in this age of higher criticism, it may be permitted to inquire what basis there is for the faith in this indefinable nationalism. Is it instinctive, is it the result of education, or the epitome of external material conditions?

Nationalism is, no doubt, a manifestation of the group-spirit which makes individuals want to belong to something. In this sense it is instinctive. But this does not explain why the group-spirit today expresses itself nationally, when formerly it was tribal, feudal, ecclesiastical, or what not. Obviously some underlying condition made it national. The condition came first; the corresponding group-spirit epitomizing the condition came afterwards. It is this fundamental condition which concerns us.

Nationalism has a historical basis. Once the nation did represent a relatively complete and self-contained unit, at least one within which relative unity prevailed because a governing class was in a position to impose it. It was the day of rival dynasties, state religions, mercantilist theories and virtual intellectual isolation. In that day the concept of the nation fairly coincided

with the nation of reality. The religion of nationalism had a material basis, the group-spirit attached to the existing unit.

Conceptions once established are perpetuated by tradition, inertia and habit. Nationalism is a habit as well as a religion, the two being very intimate. Education, too, helps to perpetuate nationalism, partly by habit, partly by design. Certain economic forces also favor nationalism and give it real vitality. Among these are those business enterprises which depend for their prosperity upon protective tariffs, foreign spheres of commercial preference, or which supply one nation with the arms to war with another.

These cordially believe in nationalism. So do those which are engaged in what may be called extra-national commercialism, that is, enterprises which lie outside of national bounds. Ventures of this kind find the nation very useful and are, therefore, among the foremost preachers of nationalism.

Along with tradition there are, then, powerful economic forces which give vitality to nationalism. These are the influences behind the national managements already noted. They speak a language the managers understand. The combination controls the national policy, determines what is national interest, decrees what constitutes a righteous national cause, pronounces what shall be the patriotic duty of the citizen, owns and operates the schools which teach the citizen what are called the national ideals.

Germany has just demonstrated how efficiently the schools may be used for national purposes. A century ago Germans were particularists or cosmopolitans, certainly not nationals. In 1914, they responded virtually as one man to the call of the nation. Their patriotism was not something instinctive, it was something acquired through education. What has been done there can be done elsewhere. And if education can be made to serve the cause of national competition it can also be made to serve the cause of national cooperation. What is required for this is the understanding that the nation is not sacrosanct, that nationalism is in no small part a cultivated thing with a material basis, and that, whatever its basis in the past, changes have occurred which are altering the foundations of the whole structure. For the foundations of nationalism are crumbling.

The transformation meant is that accompanying the development of rapid transportation and communication and resulting in the extensive economic and cultural interweaving and interpenetration of nations designated as internationalism.

The first of these transformations is the democratization of governments in the nineteenth century. The equality of man is not a national principle; it is planetary and militates against the artificial groupings of equal men for mutual exploitation.

Furthermore, democracy has given the people a chance to participate in determining what shall constitute the national interest. In this the popular will is as yet too often defeated, but the condition is new and significant.

The second is the altered relation of self-interest and nationalism produced by extra-national commercialism. National business operates within the nation and accepts national jurisdiction and responsibility along with national protection. Extra-national commercialism does not; it profits by using the nation. Capital seeks foreign investments because they yield great profits, not ordinarily because of economic necessity. It finds that it can earn larger percentages abroad where it is free from the legal control and the burdensome labor restrictions, high wages, and taxes of the home-land. Though it escapes the control of the nation, it does not for that reason divest itself of national protection. So long as the enterprise succeeds control by the nation is resisted; when it suffers, the nation is at once called upon for succor. The profits of success go to the enterprise; the costs of making it successful go to the nation—that is, to the tax-payer, or ultimately to the man who by conscription if necessary, gives his life to assure that success.

Will the average citizen long remain devoted to a nationalism which means labor for foreigners, profits for a powerful few at home, and for him, crumbs from the table of Dives,—peradventure, taxes, conscription and holocausts like that in Europe? Hardly! It is largely a question of self-interest; whose interests shall be subserved, those of export capital or those of the citizen?

And just here democracy, a nineteenth century factor, enters; for the common man, being a voter, is in a position to make his point of view honored. Unless, then, the average citizen is a real and welcome participant in the profits which flow from giving the national backing to an enterprise, he will not long tolerate nationalism. He will reject a system which, while exploiting another people, is in reality also exploiting him. Of course, he can be attached to nationalism by letting him share, or making him think he is sharing, sufficiently in the proceeds. But this will continue only as long as he believes that his interest lies there.

Nationalism means competition, perhaps war, with other nations; this means paying the cost of such competition in peace and war. Now it seems that, as far as self-interest is a directing factor in this matter, the system of national competition will meet the approval of citizens only so long as the profits from it to them are believed to be greater than its costs. Individuals increasingly care more about the economic than about the political conditions under which they live, and are learning that the nation as such is not in business and cannot itself profit,

but that gain through national aid is altogether an individual matter. When the burdens of national competition become so heavy and vexatious as to cast doubts on its advantages, we shall have arrived at a turning point. When, if ever, it is the common belief that self-interest is no longer best served by the nation, nationalism will have lost what economic basis it still has and will be altogether an ideal.

What living force is there in such an artificial ideal? Can it long exist as such?

Finally, there is the circumstance that in his economic and cultural or intellectual existence man is largely international and that only in his political being is he national. The result is an insidious conflict within the individual between his national and his non-national life.

To illustrate: Here is an American physician; his early training was in his native medical school with instructors and texts that familiarized him with the best medical experience no matter what its source. He continued his studies abroad, in Vienna, Berlin, Paris or London, to secure the best, not a national, professional education. In his practice he keeps up with knowledge in his spécial field. Now if he is an up-to-date physician—the kind we prefer to summon—his national existence, professionally considered, is immaterial. He belongs to the medical world which knows no boundaries. He has friends and acquaintances among so-called foreigners; he deals with them upon the common ground of mutual interest and understanding, quite unconscious of the accident that they are in other political units; he tests the fitness of their ideas not by their nationality but by their efficacy.

In short, in this medical world there is none of the alleged inability of the individuals of one nation to get on with those of another, none of the inevitable and “irrepressible conflict” between them. And so it is in the artistic world, the literary world, the financial world, the world of labor and the world of sport; in short, in each and every single line of human endeavor the individual understands the alien as well as his countryman and is conscious of no fundamental clash. Truth and falsehood, virtues and vices are human, not national qualities.

But when men are grouped politically there is a different story; there are said to be fundamental differences which inevitably lead to the clash of nations. The dilemma of the individual, though not fully understood, is no less real. He is led by patriotism or compelled by law to rate his allegiance to the political group to which he—often by accident—belongs, above the natural and professional affiliations through which he normally earns his livelihood; he is asked to believe—and apparently does—that, though he and his fellow-citizens and their

professions taken severally are in time of peace in no vital conflict with foreigners, taken jointly there is a fundamental incompatibility between them, one which can be resolved only by the shedding of human blood.

There must be something wrong in the situation. To go directly to the heart of the matter, the concept of the nation as conveyed by tradition and education is no longer in keeping with modern facts. The theory and official aspect of nations is what it was some centuries ago; but underneath the surface there has quietly and persistently occurred a knitting together of the private interests of the several nations.

Thus the nation is the formal but no longer the true cohesive unit of society. Social cohesion of the world today is found in the universal connection, whether friendly or rival, between men of similar pursuits irrespective of geographical habitat. Viewed from without, the earth is an aggregation of separate compartments; viewed from within it is a fabric each thread of which encircles the globe and weaves the several nations into a single humanity. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is HON. RICHARD BARTHOLDT, formerly Congressman from Missouri. (Applause.)

THE ELIMINATION OF RACE ISSUES BY THE SUBSTITUTION OF LAW FOR FORCE

ADDRESS BY HON. RICHARD BARTHOLDT

We are all agreed, I believe, that race prejudice, i. e., the disposition to discriminate against a fellow-man because of his birthplace or his mode of life and ideas is a rather ignoble human instinct. In some races that instinct is more strongly developed than in others, but its existence almost everywhere in the world is an admitted fact. Its eradication in the interest of national and international tranquillity is a consummation devoutly to be wished, in fact we know that the ideal of the brotherhood of man must remain a beautiful dream so long as racial hatreds continue, or in a word, so long as we are unwilling to regard all our fellow-men as brothers. Students of history need not be told how sad a story is presented in those chapters of human history which tell us of the results of racial animosities and hostilities. It is a story written in blood. It is the story of many a war. And we are told even to-day that the greatest obstacles in the way of lasting peace, aside from human nature itself, are the racial differences of the human family. I am speaking now in an international sense. Nationally or domestically such differences are, when once awakened and

emphasized, an even graver menace. In the United States, for instance, where so many different races have found an asylum, we could not enjoy an hour's tranquillity if the race demon was once awakened. It might be said that the easiest solution here would be for the wolf to swallow the lamb; in other words, if the dominant race simply imposed its standards upon all the rest and compelled uniformity of habits, views and ideals by the force of coercive measures. But search as I may, in the lexicon of Americanism, I can find no brief for such a policy. It would be tyranny sure and simple. It would deprive us of the sweets we are destined to gather from all races for a grander and nobler composite civilization of the future. Every such attempt would make the fathers of the Republic turn in their graves. They, the fathers, did not distinguish between races, not even between the color of the skin. They did not qualify their demands of freedom. In the Declaration of Independence they boldly proclaimed: "All men are born free and equal." They did not say: "All men born here" or "all men who came from such and such a country," or even "all white men," no, they used the all-inclusive term "all men" which, as a matter of course, also includes the women. It is this declaration which makes this Republic the greatest country on earth, even if we didn't have a dollar to our credit or a single battleship or soldier to our name. But we need not even go back that far. The constitution guarantees freedom of speech, of thought and of conscience to all who enjoy the proud title of American citizenship, no matter where their cradle stood or of what race or creed they might be. All citizens, irrespective of previous condition and whether native or naturalized, are accorded equal rights, with the sole exception that a naturalized citizen cannot be elected President of the United States (and that proviso has saved me from many a sleepless night). To digress for just a moment permit me to say that the limitation just mentioned, was quite natural and perhaps also necessary at a time when our young Republic had to sit up nights, so to speak, to guard its newly acquired independence against foreign intrigue. And by the way, from what we heard this morning "eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty." To further illustrate the liberality of American laws it should also be mentioned that the gates of the Republic have been left open for all comers (the exception merely proves the rule) from that time to this, and in spite of all that has recently been written and said about so-called hyphenated citizens, in the light of history it can be asserted justly and positively that the liberal spirit displayed toward the immigrants who wished to identify themselves with our institutions, has not proved a mistaken policy. At least we cannot point to

a single instance in our history in which the naturalized citizens failed in allegiance to the flag or proved otherwise a source of trouble. On the contrary, American history is replete with evidences of their sincere devotion, at the most critical times, to American ideals, and of their unwavering loyalty and patriotism. And I will go further and say that if American independence should ever be endangered, as a result of intrigue or war, the hyphenated citizens will rally to the defense of the Republic just as enthusiastically as they rallied to the cause of the colonies and the defense of the Union. Hyphenated citizens! The term means to first give a person a bad name and then to hold him up to the execration of the unthinking mob for having such a name. Isn't it unjust, and isn't it also mentally dishonest to do so when every intelligent man knows that the hyphen merely denotes racial affiliation and in no wise justifies any hysterical fears regarding national or political allegiance?

I hope you will pardon this digression. It was on my mind and had to come off. I also thought that a few words on this much talked-of subject coming from me might not be altogether untimely. Certain it is that the man who raises a racial issue in this country sins against the very genius of our institutions. There cannot be tolerated on American soil any racial distinctions; there must never be recognized any superiority, real or imaginary, of one race over another. We must always be Americans, all devoted to one flag and all equal before the law. The United States is and should remain "the country where," as has been beautifully said, "hatred dies" and whose citizens are ever willing to observe both at home and abroad Abraham Lincoln's immortal injunction: "With malice toward none, with charity to all." (Applause.)

I believe, to-day we can appreciate better than ever before the wisdom of George Washington when during foreign wars he enjoined the strictest and most absolute neutrality upon this country. The population at that time was mainly composed of English, Germans, French and Dutch, and it was undoubtedly with an eye to possible home complications and a determination to prevent them that he made neutrality the axiom of American foreign policy, and, besides, warned posterity against all entangling alliances. What was true then is just as true, if not much more so, to-day. The very corner stone of American foreign policy should forever be honest neutrality, vouchsafing, as it does, the good will and friendship of all other nations, belligerent as well as neutral. Like honesty, it is the best policy, and the easiest, and troubles will come only when it is departed from. In this respect, too, America has a mission to perform; namely, to prove by actual demonstration, how under free insti-

tutions it is possible for many different racial elements to live together in peace and harmony, and, indeed, until the European war broke out, our happy solution of the race problem was an inspiring example to all the world. Let us pray, therefore, that that great lesson, by any unwise steps, may not be lost to us and to mankind.

To return to my subject. I want to show that race hatred will gradually disappear even in the old world so soon as a system of law and order has taken the place of the present anarchy in international relations, or to state it more definitely, as soon as a super-government has been instituted which, while limiting the power of the individual sovereignties in war-like undertakings, grants in its very existence an equivalent for that partial surrender of sovereign power. There can be no doubt that much of the race animosity still existent is due to artificial stimulation. In many cases it suits certain rulers, and in Republics certain cliques, to keep it alive. Since wars of religion and wars of pure conquest can no longer be waged and since enlightened public sentiment has even forced Western governments to conceal commercial wars, such as history will disclose the present one to be, at least as to its real motive, under some kind of a moral cloak, race prejudices come in mighty handy as a means of exciting the passions of the people to a war-like spirit. The immediate cause of the world war was no doubt racial, aside from its hidden motive; that is, racial animosities were used to kindle the conflagration. I do not like to discuss the war here, but perhaps I can illustrate my point by a simile. Supposing a good third of our population were Mexican and the government of Mexico, stimulated by some European power which wanted to destroy our Republic, would stir up, by all means known to the professional agitator, a spirit of disloyalty and rebellion among our citizens of Mexican descent,—that is exactly what Serbia, being completely under Russian influence, did to Austria. Would we do what Austria did? Most likely we would, but that is immaterial here. The point is that the race question was used as a lever for war. The relations between the French and the Germans might also be cited as an example. Now what I wish to make plain is that when the decision of war or peace no longer depends upon the arbitrary will of individual governments, but is safeguarded by a federation of powers such as our honored President favors, a strong motive for keeping race animosities alive, will have disappeared, and as a result these animosities themselves will disappear from lack of fertilization.

Men are naturally disposed to be peaceful and good natured, no matter what race they belong to, and if left alone, they will

readily fraternize with each other and soon forget their racial differences. It is only when attempts are made to discriminate against them or to deal unjustly with them, that their blood is stirred, and such attempts, whether made through the press or through the action of the government, it is our duty as peace men, it seems to me, to discourage and condemn, no matter whether our international or our domestic relations are concerned.

One word more: As Republicans or Democrats we should, of course, steadfastly uphold the theory that all reforms should emanate from the people. They should be handed up, so to speak, by the governed to those who govern. But after considerable thought and long observation I have come to the conclusion that some reforms have to originate above to be handed down to the people. They will never be achieved unless they are. The world organization which we contemplate with its attendant disappearance of race prejudice is one of them. The greatest obstacles to durable peace are known to be human nature itself and the very differences to which I have called attention—that human nature which will cause a man to fight on the least provocation and which will cause even the pacifist to forget his faith and throw his hat in the air when a regiment with martial music passes his door. If we make the peace question the play ball of human passion, I am afraid, we will never succeed, especially because the press—I say this with mingled regret and humiliation—is resolutely and consistently against us. But for the existence of our Supreme Court there would surely have been several wars between individual states of our Union. That they did not come off according to program was because the people knew that all our domestic controversies must be settled by the courts. If governments and people know they cannot fight, then they will not fight, and if the nations of the world will some nice morning find themselves confronted with the accomplished fact of a world court and a world parliament, they will readily adjust themselves to the new order of things and change their habits of thought accordingly.

The disappearance of race hatred will be the greatest achievement of civilization next to the abolishment of war. It is true that it will follow rather than precede that great reform, but I have discussed it, nevertheless, merely to furnish an additional reason why every well-meaning human being should join hands with us to bring about a realization of those beneficent plans to which the Mohonk Conferences are dedicated. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The last speaker is DR. EDWARD A. STEINER, Professor of Applied Christianity, at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa. (Applause.)

THE "HYPHENATED AMERICAN:" A PLEA FOR FAIR PLAY

REMARKS BY PROFESSOR EDWARD A. STEINER

First of all, may I make my credentials clear? I belong to that unhappy group of men, more unhappy than you may think, of which the Congressman who has spoken is one; I belong to those who have been called "hyphenated-Americans." I looked up the word hyphenated in Webster's dictionary, where it has been leading an existence of peaceful obscurity ever since that book became the catechism of the world, and I found that it means "something united by hyphens," and the word hyphen, coming from the Greek, means "something which is united, bound together, held;" so that which has been the symbol of marriage to us, has suddenly got the sinister meaning of divorce and bears the same relation to patriotism that adultery does to married life.

Now I want to plead guilty to being a hyphenated American according to Webster but not according to Roosevelt. (Laughter and applause.) That I was born in a foreign country, subject to a monarch, I could, for certain reasons, not avoid. As soon as I discovered my deplorable mistake, I did the one thing which millions of my people did before me, I emigrated to this country, which has been a beacon to all of us. It admitted me and my kind not only to its struggle, its labor, to the increasement of its wealth, but to its inner spiritual privileges, and no matter what America has done in the past or what she may do in these unhappy days, what she has done for us binds us hyphenates to her for better and for worse. (Applause.) In spite of the fact that I did not have a drop of American blood in my veins when I came here 28 years ago, to-night if you should analyze my blood—and I am willing to give the last drop of it to prove this—you would not find any other blood than American blood there. (Applause.)

But after all that which a nation may bequeath to her children or pass on to other generations does not always travel upon the channels of heredity, and above all, in that thing of being an American, it is not enough to be born, you have to be born again; therefore it is after all a spiritual and not merely a physical heritage. (Applause.) I am making my ground clear because we are living in these unhappy days when what we say reacts upon us with tremendous force.

For the first time in my life in America, this morning I felt that I did not belong here. For the first time I asked myself whether my spiritual experience which made me something which I was not, which made me over into that which I am by the grace of God—whether after all it was not a hallucination and whether I am really an American. Not only were we

within the hearing of words which deeply wounded those of us whose feelings are still over there, knitted to the trenches, to every cottage, to every weeping heart, knitted to them as they must be. For in spite of the fact that I am an American, or because of the fact that I am an American, I am a human being. (Applause.)

It does seem to me, that for an American man, on the strength of a newspaper report, to say that a certain soldier who obeyed the command of his officer to fly and to destroy, came back discouraged because he merely killed one woman and a child—is not fair; it is not American to condemn a nation upon the testimony merely of one side.

May I say this, and freely, frankly and fairly say it, because I feel myself among friends? I hate all war. I know only one great atrocity and that is war itself; (applause) and I hate it as you cannot hate it, not a single one of you. I was carried upon the bosom of a mother unborn for six months, while my father was slain in war. As a boy seven years of age, I followed her to a battlefield in Bosnia where my brave brother had to go, leaving his widowed mother and her little children, and we picked him out of masses of bruised human flesh. I spent my youth near a peasantry living at the edge of war, its feather beds taxed, its huts taxed, its salt for the bread taxed, the meat taxed, the coffee taxed. You don't know what war means, not a single one of you, living in the affluence that you do. I know what it means. I know what it means for millions of people to go to bed and not have satisfied the fundamental cravings of the body because of war.

I am not here to excuse any act of this war, but I am pleading for the recovery of the sense of American fair play. (Applause.) I am one with you in our country for preparedness, and, like Mr. Bryan, I believe in moral and spiritual preparedness first. But, my friends, we cannot afford to break this nation in its center; we cannot afford to compel men like myself and millions of my kind to be alienated by very compulsion.

The other day I was a guest in the home of a Harvard professor, and the hostess said to me that she knew that there was a regiment or an army corps of German soldiers already in Massachusetts, and she looked with suspicion at me, wondering whether I did not wear, under my rather tightly fitting afternoon coat, the German officer's uniform. My host's daughter told me that she knew that all last summer there were German spies in northern Maine, spying all day and writing home to Kaiser William at night. She saw them spying and writing. Evidently they were taking a census of the pine stumps of northern Maine and writing home to Kaiser William so that when he invades North America by way of northern Maine, he shall not stub his toe on them. (Laughter.)

I was in a suburb of Philadelphia, in a Christian community, and coming home from church, the charming daughter of my hostess pointed out a house and said "a German built that." I said "Yes?" "And he put in cement floors." Of course he put in cement floors as a foundation for the 42 centimeter guns of the Kaiser, so that they might be aimed at that great military fort, that strength of our nation, Bryn Mawr College. (Laughter.) I didn't know of anything else in that neighborhood which could be destroyed. I would suggest to my German friends that when they build any houses hereafter, they construct the floors of peanut butter or something of that sort, not to excite suspicion.

I know of a German in Newton, Massachusetts, who was following the harmless and useful occupation of a tailor, engaged in the innocent task of mending and cleaning clothes, and who had lived there twenty-eight years. Suddenly he lost his patronage because he is looked upon as a German spy; and I myself—pardon me if I speak of myself—had certain engagements to lecture, but I have received notice that I am not to speak at those summer assemblies; I suppose they suspected my Americanism. I said that I hated war; I do hate it with a bitter hate, but, my friends, if war should come to this country and a foreign foe should invade it, if government of the people, by the people, for the people should be in danger, I and millions of my kind, and my boy whom I love like myself—will be in the trenches, and I know of no greater joy than to die for my country. Oh, dying is easy and dying in battle is glorious—I'd rather die of a submarine than of typhoid fever; I'd rather die of a bullet than of cancer—but I had hoped that I could live for my country; I had hoped that I could, in my own way, my own feeble way, realize this great dream of making our country one in which German and Frenchman and Pole and Italian and Jew and Gentile could live together and prove to the world that it is possible right here upon this continent.

When I was a boy my unhappy mother wept about the conditions she felt all around her. In the soreness of her own heart she always said this thing to me, "*America du has es besser;*" and thousands and millions of weary eyes look to America, not only because of the freedom she gave us or the wages she gave us for the exertion of our muscle, but because this was after all a continent, a country which did not rest its reliance upon an army or a navy, but upon its moral and spiritual strength. (Applause.) And I am pleading with you as you go out into America to-morrow and the day after, that you restore your sense of confidence in us, and restore your sense of fair play. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: If there is no discussion this session stands adjourned.

Fifth Session

Friday, May 19, 1916, 9:45 A. M.

The CHAIRMAN: The topic this morning is The Possibility of International Cooperation to Increase Pan-American Influence Against War, and we are to have the pleasure of hearing, as the first speaker, HIS EXCELLENCY, SENOR DON IGNACIO CALDERON, Bolivian Minister to the United States. (Applause).

THE PAN-AMERICAN DOCTRINE

ADDRESS BY SENOR DON IGNACIO CALDERON

I want to congratulate the members of this Conference and more especially our good hosts for the abiding faith in the noble ideals of justice and peace in presence of the European conflagration that is trying mankind's soul. One wonders whether those ideals are but dreams and empty words that vanish at the roar of big cannon and the most murderous weapons, scientifically perfected to spread death and misery. We have seen whole nations uprooted from their firesides, and made homeless wanderers on the face of the earth; little children, defenseless women, cold and hungry, vainly looking for shelter and food in the midst of their burned homes; the ocean turned into a grave for innocent travelers; commerce stopped everywhere; merchandise and mails seized and confiscated; all pacific endeavors made subservient to the convenience and the interests of the belligerent nations regardless of the clear and indisputable rights of neutral peoples. Can we think without horror of the millions of the best manhood of Europe mowed down unto death, maimed, blinded, crazed at the sight of the mangled bodies, in the midst of ceaseless thundering of hundreds of cannons; can we grasp the stupendous waste of the accumulated wealth of the world being engulfed by billions and billions into the abyss of this criminal war that all condemn, and for which nobody wishes to be responsible?

It seems incredible that such a conflict could be going on when all civilized nations prided themselves on having attained a high degree of Christian brotherhood; when man's genius has made, as it were, all nations near neighbors and extended the human voice thousands of miles to express friendly greetings and messages of love to dear ones.

If we want to understand the cause of the actual European tragedy it may be possible to find some explanation by looking back into the early political organization and the development of the Old World's nations and take into account the influence of some physiological delusions that at times pervert the national ideas. The numerous hordes of northern barbarians that invaded Europe at the fall of the great Roman Empire, not only destroyed the existing order of things and completely changed the basis of society, but gave origin to the feudal system that during many centuries brought upon Europe the darkest period of its history. The people, tired of the exactions of the feudal lords, sought protection and security siding with the kings and helped them to submit to their authority the plundering knights. But soon the kings claimed the divine right of power, made themselves absolute masters of the nation, and their will became the law. As the greedy monopolists of our day aim to crush and absorb the business of their competitors, the kings always jealous of their rivals made it their business to fight them. Wars were the normal condition of those times and desolation and ruin followed the wars for conquest, religious wars, wars called of succession, waged by rival claimants to a vacant throne. In all of them no account was taken of the rights or the welfare of the people. It was conceived an imaginary entity called the *State* and every act of spoilation, all kinds of taxes and burdens imposed on the people were justified for the good of the State. Nobody could say what or who the State was; but Louis XIV in a feat of vainglory defined it in a single phrase, when he declared: "L'Etat c'est moi," "I am the State." Such is the general outline of the monarchical rule in Europe.

A system of international policy was invented known as the *balance of power*. It meant primarily, on the part of the so-called great powers, the assumption to settle the questions of nationality or independence of weaker countries to suit themselves, as it was the case, amongst other instances at the time of the last Balkan war and the Turko-Russian war. The resolutions taken generally disregarded the interests and the wishes of the people concerned, and left the field ready for future conflicts.

The constant increase of armaments created on the other hand a tense suspicion of impending danger. One of the great countries moulded its whole political structure into a national military camp. The army discipline and subordination permeated even into the habits of family life. Teachers, university professors and writers expounded the theory of the national supremacy and its mission to dominate the world. This belief became a popular conviction and the nation was induced to sup-

port willingly the burden of a large military establishment. Such was the situation of the countries of the Old World when an assassin's bullet started the powder magazine, followed soon after by that most appalling tragedy, whose speedy end is the earnest prayer of the whole world.

When we turn our attention to our America, it is certainly with a feeling of hearty thankfulness we find here the spirit of Pan-Americanism taking every day deeper root in the public opinion of the republics of this hemisphere.

Although President Monroe made his brave declaration excluding forever from America the despotic and monarchical governments of Europe, the door was left open to all good men wishing to come to find a free and happy home. The Monroe declaration will remain in force and will have the support of all the republics, because America has been dedicated to democracy in many bloody battles and is the cherished inheritance left to our care by the heroes that fought and won our liberty and independence.

The English colonies had from the beginning marked advantages over the peoples of the Southern continent. They grew and lived from their inception in the practice of self-government. The colonists that came here were men of high moral and political ideals; they came inspired by the spirit of religious liberty and freedom in the management of their affairs. The New World in all the greatness and fertility of nature, offered them a suitable and inspiring field for the unobstructed development of their energy and labor. The aborigines they found were not numerous nor organized enough to offer a permanent resistance. And when the colonies, grown rich and strong, felt the oppressive hand of an ill-advised King trying to submit them to unjust burdens, they protested and finally won their independence, fully prepared to enter into the exercise of their sovereignty and the obligations of the citizenship in a free country. The growth and progress of the United States was marvelous. The world was given an object lesson of the wonderful, vitalizing influence and force of Republican institutions and a government based on the popular will, freedom and equality.

If we pass now for a moment to the history of the Spanish colonies, how different the picture, how painful the contrast!

The Spanish *conquistadores* did not come seeking for liberty; they thirsted for gold and plunder. Mexico and Peru were then well-organized and populous countries and to subdue them no mercy was shown; and disregarding all humane considerations, brave and daring as the Spaniards were, did not hesitate to butcher the Indians and submit them to the most abject slavery. Nothing was done to educate them; everything to keep

them in submission. Inspired by the writings of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century and the great upheaval of the French revolution, and following the example of the United States, the Spanish colonies undertook to free themselves of their masters. For fifteen years they fought the most bitter and bloody fights, until independence was achieved; but the habits of arbitrary rule remained. They entered in the life of independence unprepared for the difficult duties of freedom and self-government. No child learns to walk without many falls; revolutions and disorders followed and for many years the Latin republics have been the butt of criticisms and scorn because of the revolutions. It was never considered that countries formed under the most adverse elements could not, unless by a miracle, reach the degree of stability that older nations have attained in many centuries.

The period of apprenticeship is passing; and peaceful, orderly governments rule in most of the Latin countries. They have entered a road of genuine progress and self-development.

The Pan-American doctrine is the outcome of that development, and of a better understanding between all the countries of the New World as to their future and welfare.

The Monroe Doctrine expresses the theory of exclusion from this Continent of European intruders; Pan-Americanism means the community of aspirations, of ideals and interests of all the republics of America, without infringing on each other's sovereign rights; the cultivation of one grand, generous sentiment of goodwill, and cooperation in the noble task of working for mankind's welfare, for peace and progress, Pan-Americanism means the strengthening and developing of our commercial relations, under the basis of mutual confidence and advantage, the elimination of international wars through the spirit of righteousness and justice towards each other.

The troubles that have caused friction and endangered the good relations amongst our countries are often the result of acts of ignorant and irresponsible men. To help in the good work of elevating and bringing up to a proper realization of their duties and rights the large mass of illiterate and downtrodden Indian population is to my mind such an important task of Pan-American cooperation that I cannot emphasize enough its urgency and the far-reaching benefits of that work.

If we stop to think that, from Alaska to Cape Horn, notwithstanding the very marked differences of population, education and progress, all the republics of this dear America of ours, live in peace and harmony, linked for a common purpose, working together for the happiness of our people and the rest of mankind; we cannot help to grasp the infinite moral power of such union. (Applause.)

The United States takes the lead in this campaign and is just to acknowledge to its credit that, far from proclaiming the doctrine of the supremacy of might, has thrown all the influence of its great power in favor of peace, of justice and freedom.

The cynics that affect to attribute to might and force the dominion of the world, forget that nothing that is not based on the power of love and right ever remains. History teaches us that the advance of civilization is due always to the inspirations of righteousness, without which the most heroic deeds of unselfish devotion to duty could never have been accomplished. The bravest man is one that never swerves from the path of duty. It takes greater force of character and courage to be ever ready to keep to the straight path than to act the bully. (Applause.)

Pan-Americanism to grow and endure must become a living force and an inspiration in the hearts of every Pan-American to adhere and practice the fundamental principles upon which our democracies are founded. The purely commercial and material interests are never a solid and permanent basis of good understanding. We must let them expand as a result of the indestructible and broad development of our ideals of justice, of peace and liberty, as the guiding lights of Pan-American brotherhood. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker upon this topic is HON. WILLIAM P. BORLAND, Member of Congress from Missouri. (Applause.)

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AS A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE

ADDRESS BY HON. WILLIAM P. BORLAND

I shared with you the delight in hearing that distinguished American diplomat, the Minister from Bolivia, in the very broad, delightful, American view that he has presented, and I was especially pleased to hear his clear-cut declaration in favor of the Monroe Doctrine. (Applause.) His distinguished character, joined happily to a broad mind and a genial personality has given him a commanding place in the diplomatic councils of our country, and I pay my tribute of respect to that great American, that fellow-representative of a republic, Minister Calderon of Bolivia. (Applause.)

It is now nearly a century since the Monroe Doctrine, so called, was announced by an American President in a purely domestic state document, an annual message to Congress.

In the century of its life our conception of this great pronouncement has grown. By "our" I mean to include not only

the citizens of this Republic, but of both Americas and of Europe as well. From an announcement of a policy of our own government it has gradually and inevitably become, if not actually a part of international law, yet a principle to be reckoned with in all of the international politics of the Western Hemisphere. The original meaning of the doctrine, read in the light of the age which gave it birth, is clear and comparatively narrow in its scope. At the time it was announced Europe had passed through two generations of revolutions, the birth pangs of modern liberal thought and popular government. A concerted effort was made by the reactionaries who represented political privilege and the divine right of kings, to reestablish their power by taking advantage of the somewhat unsatisfactory working of popular government in the countries in which it was being tried. One of the purposes in view was to help Spain recover control of her revolting American colonies and reestablish over them a monarchical system. Our interest in the matter arose chiefly from our strong sympathy with representative institutions. Hence President Monroe, or John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State, who is credited with being the real author of the doctrine, announced that having recognized the independence of the American Republics we could not view with indifference an attempt to reestablish over them the political systems of Europe. The pregnant words of the message were:

“We owe it therefore to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.”

Occasionally we hear that the Monroe Doctrine has been outgrown. On the contrary the trend of historic events has given it a deeper significance and a greater importance. Occasionally we are treated to academic discourses on the desirability of abandoning it. Let no theorist put this proposition to the practical test of popular opinion. The query “Shall the political systems of Europe be extended to any portion of this hemisphere?” would receive an overwhelming negative in every country in both Americas. Never was the doctrine more deeply rooted in the affections of the people, and never would it be more unwise to challenge it, than today.

But it is said that some of the South American countries,

which under the fostering care of that doctrine have grown to real national greatness, are able now to maintain their own national integrity. Conceding with pleasure that this is true, it is far from showing that the Monroe Doctrine is obsolete. It shows rather, that there are additional shoulders to be placed under the burden of responsibility in maintaining the right of the countries of the Western Hemisphere to pursue their national destinies. There is nothing to prevent any nation from making the spirit of the doctrine a part of its own domestic policy and maintaining it singly or by convention. The only right which is affected is the right of European countries to acquire, either by conquest or convention, territorial sovereignty here, and such right if it existed could scarcely add to the strength, security or dignity of any American nation.

The initial purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was to secure to the American nations a fair opportunity to work out their national destinies free from the fetters of European feuds and factions. A fresh start was to be made in national life in the New World. Not only was the political creed of Europe to be rejected, but its historic antipathies, its traditional feuds, its tangled skein of alliances and intrigues, the beginning of which is lost in the maze of history. The new countries were to furnish the theater for a newer and better political drama. This initial purpose has been accomplished. Every American nation has had a fair chance to develop its own political ideals. The result has been in its own hands. It has been "the master of its fate, the captain of its soul."

While in form the Monroe Doctrine was a challenge and a defiance addressed to Spain in her attempt to regain her lost colonies, and to all powerful nations of Europe in their efforts toward colonial expansion in the Western Hemisphere and thus might have been easily represented as a standing invitation to war, it has been proved by the unanswerable logic of events the most potent factor in international peace. In the first place it has removed the temptation to, if not the cause for, war between the smaller American states and the nations of Europe. If territorial aggrandisement cannot follow military success nations show a surprising willingness to settle their disputes by other means than an appeal to arms. While there is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine which prevents a European nation from beginning or maintaining a war against an American nation, yet the fact that any attempt at annexation or territorial indemnity as the result of such war, will bring another powerful country into the conflict, seems to have had a decidedly deterrent effect upon such hostilities.

In the second place, while wars have taken place between the American nations themselves growing out of a clash of

interests, which cannot in all cases be avoided, these conflicts have been fought to a conclusion without involving the countries of the Old World. It is but natural that the weaker party to a struggle should seek, if it can, an alliance with some powerful champion, such an alliance dictated by the passion of interest of the moment usually involves a permanent loss of political independence. But for the Monroe Doctrine it is probable that the aid of European countries would have been called into American disputes, complicating the situation and adding to the difficulties of making or maintaining a satisfactory peace. The usual results in such cases are represented by the old couplet about the profits of litigation:

"A shell for thee, and a shell for thee—
But the oyster, that's the lawyer's fee."

Then, again, there are domestic disturbances. Every nation has had its civil war and usually such clashes of domestic interests, if fought out fairly, and with no outside interference, have resulted in a stronger bond of unity and national feeling. But let a foreign power be invited or insinuate itself into the struggle and all hope of a return of peace and mutual confidence is at an end. From the days when Demosthenes thundered against Philip of Macedon for interfering in the local politics of Greece true patriots have recognized the dangers of such interested friendship. And here again we may note how reluctant the European powers have been to proffer their aid and encouragement in the civil wars of the American countries when they could not be rewarded for such friendship by either a concession of territory or a sphere of influence.

If the Monroe Doctrine has kept the nations of Europe from being embroiled in American politics, it has also kept the American nations from being embroiled in the politics of Europe. During the nineteenth century the Continent of Africa and the Continent of Asia were largely divided into colonies or spheres of influence by the European states. The fact that one nation had secured such a colony or sphere of influence seemed to require that to maintain the delicate adjustment of the balance of power other nations be granted concessions of equal importance and strategic value. It cannot be doubted that a like fate would have overtaken the Continent of South America and probably also portions of North America if there had been no restraining influence. While the exploitation of other continents by European powers has gone on rapidly during the past century, the territorial sovereignty and influence of such countries in the Americas has decreased. It was much less at the close of the century than at the beginning. England is now the only great nation of Europe holding important territory in the

western world. This territory is not threatened by her enemies and hence is removed from the zone of hostile influence.

The Monroe Doctrine has fully justified its existence in keeping the Americas out of the present conflict that has engulfed nearly the whole of the civilized world. Without it we would certainly have been involved if the opposing parties each held important territories on this side of the water. It may be judged therefore not only by the success which has attended it in keeping European politics from American shores, but by projecting our fancy into what might and could have happened without it. The eighteenth century saw North America divided into the colonial empires of three great powers, England, France and Spain. War and the entanglement of international politics was the only profit from these colonies to any of these powers until happily the successful revolt of the British-American colonies enabled one local self-governing nation to dominate the strategic position on the continent and make the fragments not worth fighting for. A North America divided into the colonial empires of European states would have been a backward, stagnant and undeveloped continent. A North America dominated by liberal political views and filled with the aspirations of national life has been a factor in the progress of civilization.

Strange to say instead of the Monroe Doctrine proving a source of irritation to the European powers, it has been welcomed by them and tacitly acknowledged and encouraged. England, France and Germany have each had an opportunity in the recent past to test it if they saw fit, but chose rather to avoid the issue. To be sure the balance of power, so long preserved in Europe, has had much to do with the reluctance of those nations to test the American principle. No European nation would now look with indifference upon a violation of that doctrine by another power. The good will of America, the reservoir of raw material for Europe, has been an important factor also in commanding respect. But the positive element after all has been that America had no interest in the quarrels of Europe. Our complete removal from contact with, or influence upon, European politics has been a source of security and satisfaction to all parties. We hold no territory in Europe. We have no ambitions there which may cause alarm. Its nations have nothing to fear from an American country unless the former are the aggressors. But for the frenzy of political excitement in which we committed ourselves to the Philippine folly, we would have no territorial interests in Asia. The politics of the Orient represent the politics of Europe with added complications, and it would be unfortunate indeed if we should become involved in that direction. Whether we can ever honorably withdraw from the Philippines or not our experience in that direction has not

been sufficiently encouraging to warrant the belief in our own minds or the fear in the minds of others, that we will ever willingly repeat our experiment. The blindest partisan has ceased now to talk of making the Philippines a base for the extension of American influence in Asia and the public man who would today urge the acquisition of another foot of Asiatic territory would be politically as "dead as the bulrushes round little Moses on the old banks of the Nile."

While the Monroe Doctrine cannot preserve equality among American nations any more than the Constitution of a Republic can preserve physical or intellectual equality among men, yet it can and does preserve equality of opportunity. It does more—it provides the broad base of common ideals and common interests which cannot but be wholesome in its tendencies. It is the interest of every American country that every other country of the western world should develop its people and its powers to the highest plane socially, industrially and politically. While the doctrine itself is not a guarantee against territorial aggrandizement within our own hemisphere, it contains an automatic check against unwieldy power or any extension of authority over an unwilling people. All of the nations involved are republics and a republic can grow only by incorporating territory upon the basis of equality of right with the original population. To a republic incorporated territory is a source of strength and prosperity, while dependencies, which are held upon a plane of lower political rights than the dominant nation and which can not look forward to an equality of rights, are a source of military weakness, political danger and financial loss.

Out of the common bond of interest in the Monroe Doctrine as it now appeals to all of the Americas, there has grown by action of the present administration a principle of Pan-Americanism which will draw the western nations closer together, inspire them with mutual confidence and respect, and unify their political ideals. The first fruits of this new policy are now seen. Mutual distrust and jealousy born of ignorance of each other's aims and purposes, is disappearing. American nations can now sit in council upon the general peace of America. They can offer without misunderstanding their good offices in cases of friction which may lead to hostilities. They can also assist in a sympathetic and disinterested way in the restoration of stable government in any of the countries. They can observe a true respect for the dignity and integrity of other nations by refusing to permit their soil to be used for hatching plots against the peace and public order of their neighbors. Nations so united and so animated by ideals of peace and progress can in the present unfortunate situation in the world use the independence which they have happily preserved in commanding respect for

the rights of neutrals and non-combatants, for the principles of international law, for the security of commerce, for the humane activities of the Red Cross, and perhaps even for the very existence of civilization itself. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The discussion of the subject in hand will be continued by DR. ERNESTO NELSON, Formerly Director General of Secondary Technical and Commercial Education of Argentine Republic. (Applause.)

EFFICIENT PAN-AMERICANISM

ADDRESS BY DR. ERNESTO NELSON

First of all, I must express briefly my appreciation for the privilege I enjoy, through the gracious hospitality of Mr. and Mrs. Smiley, those jewels of hosts, to witness one of the most magnificent, democratic spectacles that this country offers to the example of the world. To us foreigners, the fact that the former Secretary of War is the presiding officer of a peace conference would speak volumes in behalf of the pacifistic spirit of the nation, unless it is that the organizers of this convention, anticipating a wide divergence in the opinions of its members, thought it would take a war secretary to keep peace in the family. (Laughter and applause.)

One of the obstacles in the way of a more efficient Pan-Americanism, is the fact that the average American does not approach that subject as one of the national public questions of his country, but merely as a subject related to the expansion of American commerce. On this side of the equator, such attitude is part of a larger attitude, if I may say, which is common to most all the inhabitants of the western world; an attitude of isolation. They do not seem to realize that the destinies of their countries are linked together, and that anything that makes for the progress of democracy in any part of the western hemisphere works toward democratic progress in all the western hemisphere.

The sad truth is that there is a lack of vital, sympathetic genuine desire from both sides to know and to understand for friendship's sake. This lack of interest may be ascribed to several causes, such as difference in language, race, religion, temperament, etc. But there is no doubt that ignorance is at the bottom of all; an ignorance which has been the result of a lack of personal contact. Referring to conditions in my own country, Argentina, I would say that our acquaintance with European institutions and events, developed through commerce and other forms of direct contact is far closer than that we have maintained with this country. North America has been absent from

our life since we became independent from Spain, and that is the reason why North American influence is hardly felt in our midst. For over half a century, we have been without American people, almost without American books, and even of American news in our dailies which, however, get every night from four to five thousand words of cable news from Europe. In strong contrast with this, our interest in European thought is so keen that we have adjusted our intelligence machinery so that we can be sure to feel the daily pulsations of European life. So, it has come to pass that the Latin Americans have been kept ignorant of the best there is to be found in American civilization.

In order to really understand this complicated subject of Pan-American relations, let me say to you that the assumption that those countries have many things in common, is a mistaken one. It may be new to you to hear that the terms "Latin America" and "Latin Americans" have no reality back of them, save to the extent of giving a name to a geographical accident. There is not, in effect, a Latin American race since all sorts of ethnological combinations are at work in that wide expanse of the continent; nor is there a Latin American history, a history of course that may make for union by bringing together common traditions of glorious deeds. Moreover, many of those countries have been at war with each other, and many have been brought to the brink of war. It cannot be said that there is a common political tradition among the Latin American countries, nor is it a fact that they entertain the same economic ideals, as these are often conflicting among countries of such a wide range of geographical conditions. I may also point out the difference in the degree in which religious sentiments, so largely dependent on the racial conditions prevailing in those countries, are expressed. In regard to educational methods, the citizens from any two countries of Latin America could not exchange views on that subject without discovering profound differences in their respective systems.

Although admitting that these differences may be at work in Latin America, the average person will contend that at least, there is one thing that makes all Latin America a single geographical unit, and that is language. But the differentiation of life and traditions, of physiographical conditions, ideals and social standards has had its unavoidable influence in the development of the language spoken in those countries. To be sure, the pure castilian can circulate in printed form from one end of that land to the other. But it is the spoken, everyday language, particularly the language of the common people, which is different. A three-foot shelf can be filled with the dictionaries already written containing the vernacular expressions used in

almost each of the twenty republics. No one, therefore, of the characteristics that create a common sentiment and a common consciousness, is to be found in Latin America to the extent of warranting the rolling of such heterogeneous mess into one single entity. Not even in the attitude toward the United States do those countries show any parallelism in their deep current of feelings. While there are some people in certain countries who resent what they call the domination of the "Colossus of the North," others are ready to respond fearlessly and with sincerity to the American overtures of friendship, and there are even some people to whom the sanitation of Panama and the public schools of Porto Rico are eloquent symbols and who would be glad to see a protectorate of United States over a certain part of tropical America.

But after that much has been said about the things in which these American countries may be expected to differ, let us see whether or not they should have something in common whether or not they should work, and work hard, for something it is in the common interest to preserve. Yes, they should develop a concerted action for the safeguard of the democratic institutions under whose auspices they have placed their political existence. Here is where Pan-Americanism deserves to become a national doctrine in any one of the American countries. Unfortunately, in some of the Latin American republics, the duty to perfect or to restore democratic institutions may seem less clear than that of perpetuating present characteristics. There the possibility of a growing movement toward democracy is hampered by circumstances that have been steadily at work in Latin America which are detrimental to the regular evolution of democratic ideals. Being closer spiritually to Europe than to the United States, many of the Latin countries have permitted certain European social institutions to remain or have transplanted new ones from Europe to the western soil. So, despite the spirit of Monroism, monarchial Europe still retains some spiritual possessions in the New World and is still obtaining more every day. Those institutions have to deal with the individual and social attitude that some of the Latin Americans hold toward religion, education and government. Many of such countries are allowing a recognized church to hold a religious monopoly, to the exclusion of all other religious forms which could act as factors of healthy stimulation and mutual check, a state of things obviously contrary to democratic ideals. Still other Latin American countries have neglected to exercise their conscious efforts toward securing to all children the equality of opportunity which is the keynote of democracy. Primary education is in some of those countries paid by the children or

given as an alms to those who confess poverty. Far removed from the spectacle supplied by the United States and too near, on the other hand, to Europe, whose schools, however admirable in certain monarchial countries, are fitted decidedly and avowedly to class distinction, the stimulus for the fulfillment of the ideals of democratic education is wanting or too feeble. In some Latin American countries still, socialism has made its appearance, claiming to be the remedy for social unrest—a socialism founded on the assumption that it behooves the government paternally to provide for the general happiness of the people, a socialism which at its best is a mere compensation for the original deprivation of opportunities, which is the distinctive trait of undemocratic societies. Here again, the overpowering example of Europe is too near at hand and that of the United States too remote to counteract socialism and to suggest that democracy is a preventive in any of the fields where socialism claims to be a cure.

Those Latin American societies could not be blamed for not being altogether faithful to the basic principles of their political constitutions. How could it be otherwise when they are daily fed by European thought, when they are made up with European blood, when they are deprived in more or less degree of the spectacle of a more perfect democracy which might serve them as a model, and last, but not least, when suspicions, distrust, and misconception sometimes lead them to take sides with certain selfish European interest to the extent of ridiculing if not antagonizing American ways? Nor can we expect them to be possessed of democratic instincts strong enough to counteract such external influences when we consider that those peoples, subjected as they were, to Spanish yoke, did not, could not, make a deliberate choosing when they adopted the democratic form of government. Remember that in the years when those countries gained their independence, the spectacle of a France whose republican liberties had been strangled under the iron hand of military power, had been a tragic warning for the Latin world not to fall under the delusion of self-government. In those days, the relative success of the young northern republic was little conspicuous, North America being then still an undiscovered political land, particularly with regard to her southern neighbors. It often has been said that Democracy is on trial, and if that is true, certainly it is on trial below the Rio Grande. We hear a great deal nowadays about the need of studying one another's languages. It may be an unfortunate thing that the language of Emerson is not understood in the Spanish speaking countries of the south; but it will be a still greater calamity if the language of Democracy is also found to be a foreign one

among the southern neighbors. And it is that language Saxon America will always speak, we all hope, in her dealings with her sisters. It was in this language that the Monroe Doctrine was written; it was in this language that the declaration of Cuban freedom was proclaimed; it was in this language that the Americans have just spoken before distrustful mobs across the Mexican border. And yet, this language is not so perfectly intelligible as all friends of democracy should desire. I cannot insist too much on the necessity for the United States of winning the confidence of her neighbors in safeguard of the ends of the Monroe Doctrine. It would be a matter for melancholy reflection if after more than a century of neighborly relations the United States should be confronted with the unexpected danger resulting from an alliance between a Latin American country and an Asiatic or European power, an alliance concerted for the very purpose of opposing the influence of the United States in the very hemisphere which has become the enlarged theatre of the political experiment started in 1776.

The United States needs the whole-souled support of the Monroe Doctrine. But to insure that end she has to prepare her neighbor's soul. If the Monroe Doctrine had had, as a spiritual adjunct, a system of spiritual activities purporting the preservation of democratic institutions throughout the western world, providing for the helping of the struggling republics in their efforts to establish education and order, we would behold to-day quite a different spectacle from that one of indifference, ignorance, mistrust or frank hostility.

What was then left undone it is high time to begin doing to-day. If the safeguard of democracy is the only ground which all American republics may agree is common to all of them, then that ground is the only one Pan-Americanism is justified to take in the eyes of Latin American republics. The present ground of Pan-Americanism, the more visible of its elements at least—the awakening of the American public to the commercial and industrial opportunities offered by Latin America—is far less acceptable and popular there than here.

To my mind, the present campaign for the capture of Latin American markets cannot be successful until it is preceded by a campaign calculated to bring about a better spiritual undertaking. This assertion may appear rather sentimental to hard-headed business men, but I am convinced that the present feelings of distrust to which I have previously referred are considerably in the way of a wide commercial conquest of Latin America.

I could not better illustrate the aims of such a movement as I have in mind than by recalling certain activities that have

already been brought about in this country, activities of a superior order conducive to create among Latin Americans the right attitude and a conviction that the people of this republic take a sympathetic interest in the progress of their institutions. I refer to the work of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace. Among other notorious disinterested tasks that institution has undertaken, I wish to mention the sending to Argentina as a splendid gift, eight thousand volumes carefully selected as representing the best expression of American thought, feelings and actions. I need not dwell on the nature of sentiments such a generous act will surely develop; nor do I need to say that the act in itself may be characterized as a high-minded move toward securing from the Argentine people the right attitude in the judging of American civilization.

But such activities should not, in my opinion, be left to a few institutions. The average citizen of either North or South America should hereafter think in terms Pan-American; that is, he ought to owe his neighbor the benefit of his experience in civilization.

We often witness the inspiring spectacle offered by aggressive social movements which are constantly seeking new adepts beyond the particular location of their origin. Thus, we see the modern library propagandist, the playground missionary or the kindergarten apostle go from one state of the Union to the other on a proselyting campaign. I cannot see why they should stop inside the boundaries of this country, if it is true that the domains of Democracy which those institutions are recognized to serve, do reach as far as the Strait of Magellan.

Many avenues are open for this educational campaign. Latin American newspapers and magazines should be regularly informed about the significant events, social, political, and educational, taking place in this country. The Carnegie Foundation already mentioned, has also undertaken as a part of its program to translate into Spanish some of the publications issued by the United States Bureau of Education. Such work would be done more systematically and in greater proportions, if I may be permitted to suggest, by the Government itself if it chose to act in line with kind of Pan-Americanism we are considering. Certainly hundreds of wonderful publications in every field of governmental activity—agriculture, education, legislation, public health, etc.,—to say nothing of the similar state publications, would be of an immense value to the development of the southern republics if translated into Spanish and widely and systematically distributed. Excerpts from the reports of the state and city boards of education might be made available in the same manner for the benefit of Latin American school authorities. Articles

from American magazines throwing light on American activities could be translated. Many of the American associations founded in this country with the idea to spreading certain social movements might enlarge their scope by becoming Pan-American societies instead of merely American or national organizations. Such associations might organize tours of lectures through Latin America or send to those countries proper informative material, stereopticon slides with the Spanish text attached, etc.

Millions of dollars are placed at the disposal of religious missions to spread the true word among the infidels. Why should not education and democracy seek other fields of activity, precisely the Pan-American field, whose very name is clearly indicating a commonness of something more than geographical territory? . (Applause.)

I would like to mention here a suggestion I have been making these days before educational conventions, and it is to the effect that educational attaches be substituted for military and naval attaches in the Legations and Embassies of all American republics. The function of military and naval attaches is to discover the weak points of foreign nations, that of educational attaches would be to discover the strong points, and it would be in line with constructive Pan-Americanism to discover the progress of education and social activities from whose adoption the cause of democracy may be advanced in this hemisphere.

Turning now to another subject of Pan-Americanism, I must say that one of the results of the lack of common interests among the Latin American countries themselves, is that each of these countries lives in isolation from the others. Latin America is in fact something like a spiritual archipelago. The aggregate commerce of Argentina with all the eighteen Spanish American republics is ten times less than that of Argentina with the little kingdom of Holland. The trade between Peru and Argentina is ten times smaller than that of Peru with Australia, and fifty times smaller than that of Argentina with China. This commercial isolation is an outstanding feature in the case of neighboring countries. Nicaragua's commerce with the other four members of Central America combined, is eight times less than that between Nicaragua and Italy. Personal contact is also wanting among the peoples of Latin America. There are less citizens from the Republic of Colombia in Buenos Aires than of almost any province in Russia. As a natural result of such social and commercial isolation, ignorance is prevalent in every Latin American republic as to conditions in the rest of those countries. I have heard repeatedly that a serious drawback in teaching the history of education or of literature in the schools and colleges of Latin America is the lack of data regarding what the other republics have done or are doing in their

fields of culture. It would be no exaggeration to say that the people of each country know more about the geography of Asia than that of its immediate neighbors. Any Venezuela school child is probably able to recite by heart the list of Swiss cantons but it will be less likely that he will give a correct list of the provinces of Chili. Names as eminent as those of Varona in Cuba and Assis Brasil of Brazil are not nearly so well known in any of the remaining countries as are such lesser lights in the galaxy of European men of science.

The Pan-American centers and activities which may spring up in this country as a result of such attitude would very soon find themselves endowed with a further task—that of being a clearing house for things Latin American; a strange, yet logical result of the conditions described is that there is not what we may call a Latin American center in existence. Buenos Aires might claim to be such a metropolis, but her prominence would be challenged by Santiago or Rio. Up to now, strange to say, such Latin American center has been Paris. For years, Paris has been the great publishing center of Latin American books. The editorial rooms at Garnier's, Hachette's, and later Ollendorff's, have been the meeting place of the Latin American literary men. I do not mean to say that the stream of Latin American men of letters should be diverted from the way to France. But I do firmly believe that the United States is the proper center of information about infinite Latin American questions which are of interest to Pan-Americanism. With the exception of the Pan-American Union, and of what is admirably being done by the Institute of International Law with the assistance of the Carnegie Endowment, to the effect of contributing to the solution of a problem of future readjustment in the relations of the countries of the world, nowhere is a center of expressing the popular sentiments prevailing in the Western Hemisphere with regard to such great questions. Nowhere is a center where recent progress in Latin America, in legislation, education, etc., is organized, digested, surveyed, and compared. Nowhere is a better place than in the United States for a complete library containing the hundred of thousands of books Latin America has produced. Within this field of bibliography, the services of such a center could be made considerably useful to the Latin American countries themselves, as they are curiously ignorant of what the others have produced in science and literature. I know my appeal would find a responsive echo among many libraries in this country which are contending with almost unsurmountable difficulties to obtain reliable bibliographical lists of the books that represent the best literary and scientific thought of the people in those countries. Along a collateral line of work, the United States could become the proper pub-

lishing center of Latin American countries. Every one of those countries produces a great number of books which might find interested readers in the other republics were it not that communication facilities are poor and that the acquaintance with the bookselling business is defective and difficult. Untold literary treasures printed by local concerns during almost a century have not had the opportunity to circulate among the remaining Latin American reading public. A wonderful literary revival could be brought about if those books were reprinted here and distributed through proper channels among the Latin Americans.

These are only a few of the activities I associate with the idea of a more efficient Pan-Americanism. They also define Pan-Americanism as something significant and higher than a mere compact to promote economic possibilities. In the present hours of uncertainty in which all nations seem to have lost the trail, the union of the free republics of the Western Hemisphere is more than ever necessary to suggest a future form of international life, a future form of social adjustment. I may add that not until the Pan-American idea is approached in the spirit which such activities would evince, will the Latin American peoples, judging from their temperament and traditions, be ready to accept what now seems to be the general interpretation of the term. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: We are now to have the pleasure of listening to an address by MR. WALTER S. PENFIELD, of the bar of the District of Columbia.

POSSIBILITIES OF PAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES

ADDRESS BY WALTER S. PENFIELD, ESQ.

As you well know, differences have arisen between the countries of this hemisphere from the time of their beginning as colonies of Europe down to the present day, and they will undoubtedly continue to arise just so long as human nature remains the same. For governments are not inanimate objects. They are composed of a collection of human beings temporarily managing public affairs, and are, therefore, subject to the same whims, prejudices, and biases as exist in any ordinary and normal person.

Knowing that difficulties have existed and are bound to arise, the problem before us is to arrange such conciliatory, arbitral or judicial machinery as would tend effectively to settle such difficulties in an amicable manner, or, at least, to reduce to a

minimum the evil effects of a failure to reach amicable settlements.

We can perhaps best suggest the possibilities of Pan-American cooperation in the creation of such machinery by showing some of the methods the countries of this hemisphere have followed for the settlement of their disputes.

Arbitrations

As early as 1794 the United States, through John Jay, succeeded in having written into the Treaty with Great Britain a clause providing, in effect, for the submission to arbitration of differences between the two nations regarding the boundaries and the pecuniary claims of their nationals. In 1795 and again in 1802 the United States and Spain, by convention agreements, settled by arbitration mutual claims of their nationals. In 1825 Brazil and Portugal likewise agreed to arbitration for the purpose of passing on claims originating during the war. Four years afterwards Brazil thus settled a similar controversy with Great Britain. In 1830 Argentine and England, in 1839 Mexico and France and Mexico and the United States, and in 1840 Argentine and France thus solved differences caused by claims brought on account of the war.

During a period of thirty years, from 1842 to 1871, the year when the Alabama case occurred, we find thirty-five questions submitted to arbitration, as much between American nations as between different European powers and American countries. In this lapse of three decades it is to be noticed that all the American nations, without exception, submitted questions to arbitration.

From 1871 to 1910, or, in the course of forty years, there was submitted to arbitral decision one hundred and twenty-five matters of different kinds, from pecuniary claims, which are the most frequent, to maritime controversies, and from rectification of frontiers to fishing zones and sovereignty over territory, covering a variety of juridical questions, involving both public and private law, the parties including all of the American republics, thirteen of the principal European countries, and various countries of minor importance in Asia.

Besides, from the second third of the nineteenth century, with the exception of the arbitral pacts of 1794, 1814, and 1827, between the United States and Great Britain over Canadian frontier questions, it is to be noted that complicated boundary disputes between the American States, which frequently approached near war, began to be settled by means of arbitral decrees.

International Pacts

From the date of their independence to the present time, the countries of this hemisphere have entered into treaties providing for arbitration. On October third, 1823, shortly after its independence, Mexico celebrated with Colombia a Treaty of Friendship, Union, League, and Confederation, with the intention of creating a general congress of the American states, composed of plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of cementing their relations and of constituting themselves as an arbitral judge and conciliator in their disputes and differences. Three years afterwards, it signed pacts of a similar nature with Central America, Peru, and again with Colombia.

In 1822 Colombia celebrated similar pacts with Peru and Chile and in 1825 with Central America; and it signed arbitration treaties with the United States in 1824 and 1846; with Ecuador in 1832 and 1856; with Peru in 1829, 1858, and 1870; and with Venezuela in 1842.

By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 an end was put to the war which existed between Mexico and the United States. It is truly notable that in the same treaty which terminated the conflict, Mexico accepted the principle of arbitration, the agreement being that both governments would endeavor to settle any differences which might arise, using for this end mutual representations and pacific negotiations. And the treaty further provided that if by these methods they should not succeed in agreeing, there would not be any resort to hostility until the government of that one which believed itself aggrieved might have considered maturely whether it would not be better that the difference be settled by an arbitration or commissioners named by both parties or by a friendly nation.

In the ten years which followed the celebration of the first conference of peace in The Hague, from 1899 to 1909, there were signed forty general treaties of arbitration, in which sixteen republics of the new continent figured as parties. Brazil signed in three years, from 1908 to 1911, twenty-nine treaties, in which this recourse was agreed to. Last year Uruguay signed with Italy the most liberal treaty of this kind that exists between an American republic and a European country. Then during the present administration the United States has signed with the Latin-American countries what are popularly spoken of as the Bryan peace treaties to which the distinguished ex-Secretary referred last night.

The most recent treaty and which was formed on the Bryan plan is the one signed on May twenty-fifth, 1915, by Argentine, Brazil, and Chile, which brings together the union known popularly as the "A, B, C." In the first article it is provided:

“Controversies which, originating from whatever question, between the three contracting parties, or between two of them, and which may not be able to be decided by the diplomatic channel, nor submitted to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties or with those which later on may be made, will be submitted to the investigation or report of a permanent commission constituted in the manner which Article Three provides.” The high contracting parties agree not to practice hostile acts until after the report of the commission, which the treaty provides for, has been produced, or the term of a year, to which Article Five refers, has passed.

American Congresses

It is interesting to examine the records of American Congresses to learn their attitude on the subject under discussion.

As early as the first Panama Congress of 1826 a pact of “Union, Alliance, and Perpetual Confederation” was signed by the states represented, declaring: “The contracting parties solemnly obligate and bind themselves amicably to compromise between themselves all differences now existing or which may arise in the future.” This, however, was not ratified.

In 1831, 1838, and 1840, Mexico unsuccessfully tried to arrange for another congress. Finally one convened at Lima in 1847, at which a treaty was signed, providing, among other things, for a congress of plenipotentiaries, which was to meet periodically, and for settlement of disputes in a friendly manner and by arbitration. It further provided that, if the arbitration should be objected to, then the congress of plenipotentiaries, after examining the grounds upon which each of the republics based its contention, would give such decision as seemed most just.

In 1864 another Congress met at Lima, which adopted a Treaty on the Preservation of Peace, which provided for mediation and arbitration.

In 1880 the representatives of several countries, at a meeting in Bogota, signed a convention for general and absolute arbitration. Provision was made for the designation of an arbitrator in each case by special convention, in default of which the President of the United States would be the arbitrator. It also provided that all other countries should be urged to enter into similar treaties “in order that the solution of every international conflict by means of arbitration may come to be a principle of American public law.”

In the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Bolivar, Venezuela invited the American nations to meet in a congress at Caracas in 1883, and the representatives there as-

sembled formally declared themselves in favor of arbitration as the only solution for all controversies between states.

In 1886 a resolution was moved by William McKinley, in the House of Representatives of the United States, favoring the creation of international courts of arbitration for America. A similar resolution was moved in the Upper House by Senator Logan.

From 1881 until 1888 Mr. Blaine had urged the calling of a general conference of American nations to meet in Washington. By the Act of May twenty-fourth, 1888, the Congress of the United States authorized the President to invite the Governments of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to hold a conference in conjunction with the United States, with the object, among other things, of discussing and recommending to the respective Governments a plan of arbitration for the solution of conflicts that might arise between them.

An invitation was extended, and the conference met during the latter part of 1889 and the beginning of 1890.

This First Pan-American Conference presented a project for a general treaty of arbitration, declaring that the Republics of America adopt arbitration "as a solution of difficulties, disputes, or contests between two or more of them." While this draft of a treaty was not then ratified, it showed the acceptance by America of the principle of possible settlements, which later was adopted in the general arbitration convention in the fourth conference at Buenos Aires in 1910, as the American system of settlement of American international controversies.

The Second Pan-American Conference of 1901, which met in Mexico, included in its program "arbitration," and an "International Court of Claims." The conventions comprised, among other things, the submission to arbitration of all pecuniary claims and obligatory arbitration in all questions not affecting the honor and independence of nations. It was previously stipulated that independence and national honor would not be considered at stake in all controversies relating to diplomatic privileges, boundaries, rights of navigation, and validity, interpretation, and observation of treaties.

At the Third Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1906 it was recommended to the American Governments: "That they give instructions to their delegates to the second conference of The Hague to try in that meeting to celebrate a general Convention of Arbitration, so efficacious and definite as to merit the approval of the civilized world, which may be accepted and put in force by all nations."

At the Fourth Pan-American Conference held in Buenos Aires in 1910 the agreement to submit pecuniary claims to

obligatory arbitration was again renewed, but the question of arbitration was eliminated from the Conference.

American Representation at The Hague Conferences and Arbitration before the Tribunal

At the First Conference held at The Hague, the only American countries represented were Mexico and the United States. As is well known, their representatives joined in signing the "Convention for the Pacific Adjustment of International Differences." This contained provisions providing for the maintenance of general peace, good offices and mediation, and international commissions of inquiry. It also provided for international arbitration, recognizing that in questions of a judicial character, and especially in those regarding the interpretation or application of international treaties or conventions, arbitration is the most efficacious and equitable method of deciding controversies which have not been settled by diplomatic methods.

At the meeting of 1907, there was signed a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which contained provisions similar in nature to those adopted at the first conference in 1899. As signatory parties to this Convention appear the names of all but two of the American countries.

The first countries which availed themselves of the opportunity of using the machinery of The Hague for the settlement of an international controversy were the United States and Mexico.

A year afterwards, in 1903, the offices of The Hague Court were again invoked in the settlement of what is known as the Venezuelan Preferential Treatment Case.

In January twenty-seventh, 1909, a protocol was signed between the United States and Great Britain for submission to The Hague of the case known as the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries. On February thirteenth, 1909, the United States and Venezuela signed a protocol for the arbitration of what is known as the "Orinoco Steamship Company" case. On April twenty-fifth, 1910, a protocol was signed between Italy and Peru for decision at The Hague of the Canevaro claim.

To date fifteen cases have been arbitrated at The Hague. As parties to the protocols appear the names of fifteen different countries. Four of these are American; namely, Peru, Mexico, United States, and Venezuela. Of the fifteen cases arbitrated two of them were between American countries and three between American and European countries. It can thus be seen that the records of The Hague Tribunal show that the attitude of the American states is to settle their differences by means of international arbitration, or other peaceful methods.

The Central American Court of Justice

While the project of establishing a permanent court of arbitral justice at The Hague was not successful, the plan has been realized by the countries of Central America, which signed a convention in Washington in 1907, creating the Central American Court of Justice.

It is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this court is very broad, since, according to Article I of the treaty, it is provided that the high contracting parties are obliged "to submit all controversies or questions which may arise among them, of whatever nature and no matter what their origin may be * * *."

The A. B. C. Mediation

One of the most notable acts, showing the desire of the American countries to settle international disputes by amicable means was the "A. B. C." Mediation during 1914 in the difficulties which had arisen between Mexico and the United States. After a session lasting forty-six days, a protocol was signed by which it was agreed, among other things, that the provisional government to be constituted would be immediately recognized by the Government of the United States, renewing consequently the diplomatic relations between both countries, and that immediately thereafter it would arrange for the establishment of international commissions for the settlement of claims of foreigners, presented on account of damages caused during the period of the civil war as the consequence of military acts of national authorities.

Further Possibilities of Settlement of Differences

Thus we have seen that American Congresses have declared themselves in favor of the amicable settlement of international disputes. The governments have entered into treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of such difficulties as may arise. Arbitration has been had and mediation has taken place. A Central American Court of Justice has been established, and the countries have membership in The Hague Tribunal.

But with all these good results, the goal desired has not yet been attained. The question that remains is whether there are further possibilities of Pan-American cooperation in the settlement of international differences.

Arbitration treaties exist providing for the submission to arbitration of all questions of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties, but they generally contain a proviso clause, stating "Provided, that they do not affect the vital interest, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states, and do not concern the interests of third parties," or

some similar provision. It is this proviso that interferes with the full and absolute settlement of international disputes of every kind. Arbitration treaties entered into between the American countries requiring them to send all disputes of whatever nature to The Hague Tribunal for settlement would, if complied with, be the best kind of Pan-American cooperation for the settlement of international differences. But unfortunately all the nations of this hemisphere have not yet seen fit to enter into such treaties. The only countries which appear to have done so are Argentina, Mexico, and the five states of Central America, all of which are bound by treaties to submit to the Permanent Court of The Hague "all differences of whatever nature which may arise between them and which it is not possible to settle diplomatically."

In regard to legal questions and those pertaining to the interpretation of treaties, I would suggest that there is a possibility of international cooperation by the American republics in the creation of machinery for the settlement of such questions, if they would enter into arbitration treaties agreeing to submit such matters to a Pan-American Court of Arbitration, to be located at the City of Panama, where it would be equally accessible to all the American countries, and where it would sit in an atmosphere in which there is a blending of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon ideals of justice and equity.

In regard to questions affecting "the vital interest, the independence or the honor of the two contracting states," it would appear that there is a possibility of cooperation by the American Republics in the creation of conciliatory machinery for the settlement of such matters. To my mind there should exist in each country of this hemisphere a foreign affairs advisory board, to be composed of ex-secretaries of state and such ex-first assistants as may be necessary to fill the complete board in case there are not sufficient living ex-secretaries. In case of international difficulty involving questions of honor, vital interest and independence, this board could be called in session by the Secretary of State in order to obtain the benefit of their mature judgment and ripened experience of its members. He would not necessarily have to follow their advice, but he would at least profit by their suggestions. If he is then unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution with the differing government, then why should there not be a joint session of the advisory boards of foreign affairs of the two countries for the purpose of discussing and arriving at a friendly solution of the matter in dispute? If the joint board should be unable to solve the difficulty, then provision could further be made whereby the two boards could, if they thought best, refer the matter for definite decision to the board of a third country.

Surely no harm would result from the plan I have suggested, and it would seem that by the American republics adopting it, they would go a long way toward the creation of conciliatory machinery for the adjudication of their international differences. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next thing in the order of business is the presentation of the platform of the Conference by JUDGE ROSE, Chairman of the Executive Committee.

REMARKS BY HON. JOHN C. ROSE

Complicated problems approached from any other way than one are usually insoluble, but if the problem is anything but a catch one, there is always a solution. When you find it you are surprised at its simplicity. Now the key to our problem was forged here twenty-two years ago. This is not a conference to regulate the world: it is not a conference to establish prohibition, woman suffrage, a world-wide state, the League to Enforce Peace, or pacifist doctrines of any kind. We bring men and women here from all parts of the world. Their views as we have seen, on every subject but one, are as far apart as pole from pole. Whatever remedies may be necessary in addition to arbitration, however ineffective arbitration sometimes proves, however necessary some of you may think it is to compel people either to submit to arbitration or to the results of arbitration or judicial decision, still we will all agree that if two people or two nations have a dispute, the simplest, easiest and cheapest way, if they cannot agree among themselves, is to submit the question to arbitration, conciliation or the determination of some disinterested and impartial people, experts if you can get them. The arbitration cause is flourishing even now. My attention has just been called to an item in the morning newspaper concerning the Navy Appropriation Bill. On motion of Representative Hensley, there has been added to it a rider to the effect that upon the conclusion of the war in Europe, or as soon thereafter as may be done, the President of the United States is authorized to invite all the great governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of suggesting the organization of a court of arbitration or other body, to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for adjudication and peaceful settlement, and to consider the question of disarmament, and to submit their recommendations to their respective governments for approval.

In addition to advocating arbitration again, we renew our many time recommendation that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States be extended to all cases involving the construction

of treaty provisions, or in which the rights of aliens are concerned, in order that such questions shall be determined by the broadest and most impartial tribunals that we have available for the purpose. (Applause.)

Judge Rose then read the Platform, which may be found on page 8.

RETURNING TO ORIGINAL MOHONK IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

REMARKS BY MR. ANDREW B. HUMPHREY

On behalf of the Platform Committee, I wish to second the adoption of this platform and also to add some of the reasons which have especially influenced the Committee at this time.

The fundamental idea of Mohonk is world peace through arbitration. The Mohonk Conference is not a "Peace Society," neither is it a "War Council," although sometimes the discussions wander in these directions. The Conference was established here twenty-one years ago for the distinct purpose of promoting international arbitration as a means of settling international disputes.

Years ago, President Andrew D. White, whom we all love, stood in this presence fresh from the first Hague Conference, where he was one of the delegates from the United States, and said that he gave Mohonk credit for the initial movement which had been one of the causes precedent to the creation of The Hague Conference. (Applause.)

Your Platform Committee, therefore, took the ground that, in view of the history and the central idea of Mohonk as a pioneer in the new internationalism, and remembering the grand and honored men and women who have gathered here from year to year, many of whom have passed on, and that those who have gone forth to the two Hague Conferences have carried the idea of arbitration, it was wise at this time to return to the ark of the covenant and reaffirm our faith in the broad principle of international arbitration.

Our distinguished Chairman a few years ago made a profound impression when he stated publicly as President of the United States that so far as we have discovered, "arbitration is the best substitute for war suggested." If anybody has a better plan, I am sure we would most gratefully welcome it, but until we get a better substitute, a more practical plan that will work out judicially, diplomatically, and politically, by nations and between nations, we should stand by the arbitration fathered at Mohonk, approved by The Hague Conference, and already in practice between most of the "Signatory Powers."

The second part of the platform sets forth the concrete proof of the first proposition, that the arbitration idea, fostered here, is a profound fact, and we cite in that platform certain definite and conclusive disputes that have been settled by arbitration in all parts of the world. These being indisputable facts, why not emphasize them at this time as a safe and sane method of settling international disputes by means other than war? In the present world crisis, we have all been saddened. No man or woman can think of "a world on fire" without being profoundly moved. But that is no reason why we should not prepare ourselves for real world service after this war is over. (Applause.) This is the central thought voiced by this conference. We have different points of view on the detail of armament for the national defense. I came up this hill years ago "armed with a spear that knew no brother," ready to defend peace with a big stick. Some of us have not changed our views on these points, but we have all caught the spirit of conciliation and we have learned the wisdom of reasoning together for a common cause and agreeing that some ideals are supreme, and that we are here to forget the non-essentials and concentrate our thoughts upon the essentials. That is the object of the platform we present: to emphasize the central idea and point out the one star of hope that has been left in the dark skies of the world—the constellation of arbitration. Other plans and dreams have been wrecked in the war cyclone. International law has been swept aside ignominiously and hope in this direction and that direction has vanished, but the principle of arbitration still stands as the world's anchor to windward for the future.

The third point in the platform is one which has been brought to the attention of the world year after year through these conferences, but most prominently by our Chairman, when he was President of the United States. It relates to one of the causes of war arising from the inability of the United States to keep her own treaties with other nations. We have criticized foreign nations for breaking treaties in Europe recently. We do not need to name them and talk about "scraps of paper." In the United States, we have thirty treaties of one kind with other nations; we have other treaties made in good faith with different nations, pledging ourselves to protect their citizens while in the United States, and yet, as Mr. Taft pointed out, the United States had no jurisdiction to protect the citizens of Italy murdered by a mob in Louisiana, notwithstanding that the Italians were guaranteed protection by a treaty between Italy and the United States. The State of Louisiana claimed jurisdiction and the United States had to acknowledge that it could not enforce its own treaty with a foreign power. Here was a distinct cause or excuse for

war, but war in this case was avoided by the application of conciliation, wisdom, and patience. It is now proposed in our platform to extend the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to meet cases of this character. I submit that this is a far-reaching proposal for constructive work that is well worth the support of this conference. (Applause.)

After discussion by MR. JOSEPH ELKINTON, of Moylan, Pennsylvania, and MR. J. HARRIS JONES, of New York, the platform was adopted unanimously, after which the session was adjourned.

Sixth Session

Friday, May 19, 1916, 8 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN: The first speaker for this evening is HON. GEORGE E. ROBERTS, of the National City Bank of New York, formerly Director of the United States Mint. (Applause.)

THE ECONOMIC MOTIVE AS A FACTOR IN WAR

ADDRESS BY HON. GEORGE E. ROBERTS

The outbreak of the great war was a sad disappointment to many people the world over, who had cherished with confidence the hope that the ties of friendly and mutually advantageous relations, which had developed rapidly since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, would prevent another war between countries of the first rank.

The improvements in facilities for transportation and communication since that time have brought the countries nearer together, the rise of incomes has promoted travel and the growth of a common literature, have made the various peoples better informed about each other, and developed among them a common stock of ideas, all of which we believe must tend to promote good understanding and friendly relations.

While this closer acquaintance and better knowledge of each other might be expected to remove prejudice and make the countries more receptive toward each other, the growth of business relationships and of mutually profitable interests has been counted a positive bond and influence for peace. In recent years Germany has been Great Britain's best customer upon the continent of Europe, and Great Britain has been the best of all Germany's markets. Approximately one-fifth of all the foreign trade of Germany was with the British Empire. If ever there were two countries that in their economic needs and resources were natural complements of each other, those countries were Germany and Russia. They face and touch each other, Russia an Empire to be developed, 170,000,000 people to be equipped and directed in industry; and Germany with the shops and machinery, the skilled workmen and scientific leadership to do the task, and wanting raw materials and food. What blind fatuity made these countries enemies?

Germany has led in the foreign trade of Italy, been second only to Great Britain in France and second only to France in

Belgium. The industrial development of France has not kept pace with that of Germany, but France has been a country of surplus capital and, notwithstanding the antagonism born of the conflict of 1870, French capital has been largely employed in Germany and been an important factor in the expansion of German industry.

The bare figures for the volume of international trade give but a faint idea of the importance of that trade, and of the injury that may be inflicted by its interruption. Given stable conditions, and the industries of the trading countries will tend to grow together, to integrate and become more or less interdependent, and they cannot be torn apart without serious shock and loss.

Along with this development of industrial relationship has been a development, even more intimate, of financial relationship. There are no tariff laws to hinder the movement of securities from one country to another, or to interfere with the negotiations between borrowers and lenders. With the establishment of the gold standard, a common language of values was created, and through the media of the stock exchanges and international bankers a great body of permanent international investments has been distributed, and a further large amount of liquid capital made available for the support of current industry and trade in all countries. This international employment of capital creates vast interests in common which are dependent upon mutual confidence and goodwill, and can only be maintained in a state of peace and amity.

These growing international relationships were noted long ago, by leaders of the world's thought and made the basis of repeated predictions that wars would eventually cease. Herbert Spencer delineated the militaristic and the industrial types of society, and held with seemingly convincing logic, that the latter, as "favoring the growth of altruistic sentiments and the resulting virtues," must in the course of evolution become the permanent type of society.

On the other hand, the view is frequently advanced that the economic development of the last generation, and the resulting expansion of world trade, has intensified the rivalries between aggressive nations, that the struggles for markets and for areas of territory for colonization have brought national interests into conflict, and that the points of contact and opportunities for friction and for the development of antagonisms are greater than ever.

I do not believe that the ordinary rivalries of trade are dangerous to the world's peace. Trade and finance flourish under stable conditions. Business is conservative and usually in favor

of maintaining the status quo. The popular fiction that American capitalists have endeavored to bring about intervention in Mexico is without foundation, at least so far as it refers to the large American corporations which have been conducting industrial operations in Mexico. It may be presumed that they would be glad to have their property permanently under the flag of the United States, but their chief interest has been to live on good terms with the Mexican people.

Wars have become too costly, both in direct expense and in economic losses, to be entered upon with old-time readiness. Outside of the Balkan States the peace of Europe was maintained for forty-three years, sometimes under great strain, and in the Morocco controversy by the direct influence of business interests. The fact that the Balkan wars did not immediately involve the powers that are now engaged must be credited to the restraining influence of the great commercial and financial interests.

Primitive society was of the militaristic type, and modern habits of thought have their roots deep in the past. Our economic activities are dominated in a degree by militaristic ideas—that is, by thoughts of attack and defense, of rivalry and antagonism. The language of competitive trade is unfortunately the language of warfare, as when we talk of driving a rival out of a market, and not infrequently the practices have justified the language. The truth is that the public is inclined to be suspicious of rivals who are not always fingering for each other's throats. But those ideas are not a necessary or permanent characteristic of an economic society; they are an inheritance from a more combative and militaristic society. The influence of the higher business type is not to cultivate and strengthen these ideas but to eliminate and throw them off.

Legitimate trade is essentially cooperative, rather than destructive, and it is becoming more and more appreciated that the prosperity of every country is best promoted by the prosperity of every other country. One of the grievances urged against the labor organizations is that they deliberately restrict the output, acting upon the theory that there is only a limited amount of work to be done and that they are interested in making it go as far and pay as much in wages as possible. The theory is a mistaken one, but the idea that one country will do better in world trade with other countries out of it, is based upon the same error. It assumes that there is only a limited amount of work to be done in the world, whereas there is no limit to the amount of work to be done, or the amount of trade to be had, or the amount of wealth that may be created from the resources of nature.

But it is true, as Mr. Norman Angell has effectively pointed

out, that so long as men think their interests are in conflict, they will act precisely as though the conflict existed. This theory of an essential harmony of all interests is the one upon which Spencer based his prediction, but the trouble is that all men are not sufficiently enlightened to accept this view, or they have misgivings about what will happen to them if they act upon it and others do not.

I am convinced that while we give undue importance to the incidental cases of friction arising from ordinary trade relations, we fail to give sufficient consideration to the larger influences which fundamentally affect international relations. Men have always fought for the means of subsistence and for territory to provide for the national life and development in the future, and it is safe to say that they always will when they think it necessary to do so. The world is a long way yet from that community of ideas and that sense of universal brotherhood which would make men indifferent to national ties and without choice as to what flag or government they would live under. The instinct of race solidarity, the impulse to national growth, the desire that children shall live under the same flag and institutions, and that national ideals shall be perpetuated rather than merged or submerged in those of other nationalities, the desire in short to preserve and safeguard the national life for the future in full independence and with opportunity for natural expansion, these ideas, these hopes and aspirations are not mere abstractions; they are facts as real in the social organization of the world as the rivers and mountain ranges. In this large sense, as involving national security and aspirations rather than individual gains, the economic motive must be reckoned with as the most important factor in international relations. When great nations like Germany and Great Britain reach the stage where they are dependent upon the importation of food and necessary supplies, the situation becomes critical unless the old idea of national self-sufficiency and economic independence is abandoned, and it never will be abandoned unless adequate international guarantees are created. It has been generally recognized in the past that Great Britain was justified in insisting upon command of the sea because her population would starve if outside supplies were cut off. But, in recent years, Germany, by the growth of her population, has reached the point where she also has been a regular importer of food. The only sufficient source of supply by land is Russia, a traditional enemy, and under the circumstance it has been natural that Germany should look overseas for supplies, and natural also that she should want a navy to defend her overseas trade. I think we are bound to admit that if the United States has need of a great navy, Germany, with

her dependence upon foreign supplies of food, was justified in wanting one. But there cannot be two nations in command of the sea, and it was natural again that Great Britain should view the rapid up-building of the German navy as involving possible danger to her. It is not a true conception of this situation to regard it as a mere clash of private commercial interests, and it is superficial to charge the antagonisms that arise from such a situation to the ambitions of rulers and governing classes. It is the duty of rulers and leaders to safeguard the vital interests of their people. The Monroe Doctrine, which warns foreign governments to keep away from the Americas, is an example of prevision and solicitude on the part of our own statesmen.

Russia has a great area of territory, sufficient to care for the growth of her population far into the future. Great Britain has in her colonies like areas where her people may find homes under the British flag and contribute to the strength of the Empire. We have in the United States, territory that will comfortably support many times its present population. It requires no particular virtue in these countries to renounce the hope of acquiring more territory. The German nation, however, occupies an area smaller than the state of Texas, with a population of now approximately seventy millions and growing more rapidly by natural increase than the population of either the United States, Great Britain, or the British colonies. Germany has seen that with her limited territory and resources, her people are likely to go out to make their homes in other lands, and that their children will grow up loyal to other lands, and that instead of going on with the great career which has been hers since 1871, she may become a power of relatively diminishing importance. This situation, of course, would give Germany no right to dispossess or absorb her neighbors. They occupy even smaller areas and have denser population than herself; they have as much right to their own national integrity as Germany, and as much right to aspire to be as great as Germany, as Germany has to aspire to be in the first rank of nations.

And that brings up the question as to what advantages the citizen of a large country has over the citizen of a small country. The large country will probably have a greater variety of natural resources and be less dependent upon other countries for necessary supplies for its people, raw materials for its industries and markets for its goods. We have seen that one of the effects of this war is to cause all nations to seek to make themselves economically independent. Evidently, there may be advantages in the present state of the world in having citizenship in a strong, self-contained country, either commanding the sea or independent of sea control, and it is these considerations, these

advantages, this independence and security, which the governments of the various countries have had in view striving for more territory. These are the "vital interests" concerning which governments hesitate to arbitrate, and for the protection of which they arm themselves and form alliances. And they are vital interests. They affect the comfort, the opportunities, the development, the future of their people. A good many of our people regard the proposal for "preparedness" in the United States with indifference; I wonder how many of them would so regard it if we, like Great Britain and Germany, were dependent upon other parts of the world for food?

Even Russia, vast as her resources are, is hampered in one respect. Her national policy has been long directed to obtaining a warm water ocean port through which her commerce might pass at all seasons of the year. And that is not only a matter of vital interest to the Russian people but of beneficial interest to the whole world. All of Russia's recent wars have been fought to accomplish this purpose, but other nations have opposed her because they feared to allow her the additional advantages that would be involved. Japan regarded it as a matter of vital interest to her, an Island Empire as she is, that Russia should not hold possession of the adjacent mainland.

Now these are the fundamental conditions affecting international relations. They go beyond any question over immediate profits or private interests. The chief danger of war in our time is not in the impulse to wanton aggression, or in greed for trade, but in the unorganized state of the world and the feeling of insecurity arising from it. So long as each country believes that protection for its vital necessities is dependent upon its resources and the uncertain treaties which it can make, this rivalry for supremacy will continue, these costly preparations for war will go on, and there will be constant danger of war itself. For my own part, I am unable to see any escape from this state of anxiety, suspicion and antagonism except by establishing a supreme authority in which all countries will have representation, and strong enough to guarantee that protection to vital interests and inherent rights which is the end everywhere sought. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is DR. PHILIP S. MOXOM, of Springfield, Massachusetts, who will make a statement on behalf of the representatives of business organizations.

REMARKS BY PHILIP S. MOXOM, D. D.

In the first place the concern of the business men while it is for the financial and commercial interests of the world, is by no means limited to them. These are not, in the minds of the

business men themselves, interests which are pre-eminent. They speak as business men, wishing to conserve the business interests of society, for they realize that the world is a co-partnership, and it is more distinctly true to-day than ever before that any nation which precipitates a war damages every other nation as well as the one which it attacks. Every question, financial or commercial, is at bottom a moral question; that is one of the things we have been slowly and painfully learning, and therefore it is not a mere question of self-interest, but fundamentally it is a question concerning the moral life of peoples, and business men are by no means unmindful of the supreme moral interests involved even in financial and commercial operations. Some have slightly objected to the phrase "recognizing the need of adequate equipment," and would have us define what constitutes adequate equipment. The business men do not feel that it is their province to make that definition. We are not disposed to release those who represent us in Congress from the responsibility of determining, by the use of their minds, in a proper way, what is adequate equipment for the country.

Two points are of vital importance in this report; one is the demand that there shall be recognized the truth that there is one standard of morals for the individual and for states. If an individual may not encroach upon the rights of his neighbor, neither may a state encroach upon the rights of its neighbor. If an individual may not kill and rob his neighbor, neither may a state assault, with murderous intent, its neighbor. The second point is the truth that the interests of humanity take precedence of the interests of any one nation, however great it may be; that human is a bigger word than American or Englishman or German or Frenchman, and that only as the world comes to recognize the truth, that there is one law for human conduct and that that law is applicable to the actions of states as well as to the actions of individuals, shall we have laid permanent foundations for world amity and peace. (Applause.)

The program of the League to Enforce Peace is approved, for one reason, because the members of the association believe it ought to be approved; and in the second place, because the business organizations of the country have unanimously approved it as a means toward the final settlement of international difficulties. They do not believe that this involves any entangling alliance; they believe rather that it is an emancipating alliance, that it is an integrating alliance, that it is an alliance which works equally for good for all. There is a spirit in our own country which is very evident at times and which adopts as its motto or catch-word the saying of Washington when he counselled the young Republic to avoid entangling alliances with the old world

powers. But an alliance which brings us into unity of action with other peoples for the main great end of keeping them all out of trouble, instead of being an entangling alliance, is, as I said, a liberating alliance. (Applause.) Besides that, it is impossible for this nation to follow any policy of self-isolation and to shirk, in any way, its responsibility for the well-being of humanity. (Applause.) The time is past when this nation, struggling for life and integrity, must guard itself against being drawn into the whirlpool of old world conflicts and problems. To say that America will have nothing to do with the rest of the world save only that which is for its own interest; namely, its commerce and its interchange of intellectual as well as material values, is to be untrue to the fundamental idea of the American people; so that to obstruct the progress of this practical movement for peace on the plea that we are going into entangling alliances, is not only untrue and really contradictory to the essential truth of the case, but it is to stamp ourselves as unwilling to bear our responsibilities and to take our share in the great work of unfolding and developing this human family which covers the whole earth. (Applause.) The declaration of the business men is as follows:

DECLARATION OF DELEGATES* PRESENT FROM BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

We, representatives of the business organizations of the United States assembled at Mohonk Lake, view with solicitude the present condition of the world in which commercial and financial relations are so seriously injured by the war.

Believing with profound conviction that the adjustment of international disputes by war is at once wasteful and wicked, we strongly condemn the perpetuation of militaristic aim and methods, and earnestly advocate the substitution of conciliation, arbitration, or adjudication as the rational way of settling those disputes.

Recognizing the need of adequate equipment for national defense, we deprecate any measures looking toward excessive military and naval increase, and urge upon the Government of this nation the use of all means for the promotion of peace between the nations of the world, and of that spirit which recognizes one standard of morals for individuals and for states. We ask for a development of international law which shall conserve the interests of humanity as superior to the apparent interests, commercial or political, of any one or more nations and to this end, call for a resumption of the Hague Conferences as soon as possible.

* See list immediately following.—ED.

We commend the constructive efforts toward world organization as exemplified in the program of The League to Enforce Peace, for a concert of powers by which the signatories agree to have recourse to a Judicial Arbitral Court for the submission of justiciable issues, and a Council of Conciliation for non-justiciable questions before resorting to hostile measures and the joint use primarily of economic pressure through non-intercourse, and secondarily, by military force to compel submission to this procedure. (Applause.)

DELEGATES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE OF 1916

NATIONAL

Chamber of Commerce of the United States.....	A. B. Farquhar, York, Pa.
National Association of Manufacturers.....	A. B. Farquhar, York, Pa.
National League of Commission Merchants.....	A. W. Patch, Boston, Mass.
National Wholesale Dry Goods Association.....	Calvin M. Smyth, Philadelphia, Pa.

CANADA

Toronto Board of Trade.....	Arthur Hewitt, Pres.
-----------------------------	----------------------

COLORADO

Denver Chamber of Commerce.....	Henry Van Kleeck
Denver Real Estate Exchange.....	Henry Van Kleeck

CONNECTICUT

New Britain Chamber of Commerce.....	F. G. Platt
New Haven Chamber of Commerce.....	Frank J. Linsley

DELAWARE

Wilmington Chamber of Commerce.....	George A. Rhoads
-------------------------------------	------------------

MAINE

Maine State Board of Trade.....	George L. Crosman, Portland
Portland Chamber of Commerce.....	J. Henry Rines

MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts State Board of Trade.....	J. H. Corcoran, Pres., Cambridge
Lynn Chamber of Commerce.....	Ralph S. Bauer, Pres.
Springfield Board of Trade.....	L. L. Doggett

MICHIGAN

Lansing Chamber of Commerce.....	J. H. Moores
----------------------------------	--------------

NEW JERSEY

Camden Board of Trade.....	Alexander C. Wood
Jersey City Chamber of Commerce.....	C. Howard Slater
Newark Board of Trade.....	Carl J. Bannwart

NEW YORK

Amsterdam Board of Trade.....	Francis E. Crane
Auburn Chamber of Commerce.....	Henry D. Hervey
Binghamton Chamber of Commerce.....	L. M. Wilson, Ex-Pres.
Kingston Chamber of Commerce.....	R. E. Leighton, Pres.
Bronx Board of Trade (New York).....	J. Harris Jones, Ex-Pres.
Peekskill Chamber of Commerce.....	W. F. Hoehn
Poughkeepsie Chamber of Commerce.....	E. D. Gildersleeve
Rochester Chamber of Commerce.....	Daniel B. Murphy
Syracuse Chamber of Commerce.....	Edward P. Bates

OHIO

Cincinnati Business Men's Club.....	E. P. Marshall
Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce.....	E. P. Marshall

PENNSYLVANIA

Erie Board of Commerce.....	E. L. Whittelsey
Harrisburg Chamber of Commerce.....	A. C. Stamm
Philadelphia Board of Trade.....	W. R. Tucker
Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce.....	H. B. French
Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce.....	S. B. McCormick

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is MR. CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, Reporter of Decisions, United States Supreme Court. (Applause.)

THE LIMITATIONS OF ARBITRATION TREATIES AND THE "PREPAREDNESS" CRISIS

ADDRESS BY CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, ESQ.

Well, here we are again at Mohonk, that delightful place which has so many memories and so many sentiments; and it is indeed a pleasure for us all to be here. I never can stand on this platform and speak at or of Mohonk without thinking and speaking of dear Mr. Smiley who instituted these conferences which have done so much good—not only for Mohonk and those who come here but for the whole world. (Applause.)

I also remember how as I was standing on the platform looking at this beautiful lake, Mr. Smiley came up and said "What is your platform on arbitration, anyhow, Mr. Butler?" to which I answered, "Well, Mr. Smiley, if I should go out fishing on the lake and should bring up a gold watch and chain instead of a perch or a sunfish, and as I exhibited it in the office you should step forward and say, 'That watch belonged to Mr. Jones who was here last year and he lost it and I gave him \$5 for it and he gave it to me,' I could say 'There's a subject we can arbitrate;' but, Mr. Smiley, if I should seize *your* watch and chain and start running up the hill with it, and when I got one or two hundred yards away, I should shout out 'We will arbitrate about this watch'—'You'd never have got that far,' he said. 'I would have knocked you down first.' 'Well, Mr. Smiley,' I said, 'that's my platform on arbitration.'"

Now, I firmly believe that arbitration is the best substitute for war; I believe that arbitration has fended off many wars and I also believe that no nation will now deliberately go to war over questions that can be arbitrated. I do not believe, however, in any nation making an absolute promise in advance that, as to any question that may ever arise, it will be willing to arbitrate it. I believe we should go very slowly about making any promises that we either cannot fulfill, or that would mean national suicide if we should fulfill it.

No pact would be held legal and binding in law if it required or amounted to the suicide of either one of the parties or both. If we made absolute treaties to arbitrate any and every question, possibly the time might come when a question would arise which we could not submit to arbitration. Therefore I believe in caution in that respect.

Sometimes it is difficult to conceive what the things are which

cannot be arbitrated. But take one instance. After the greatest arbitration tribunal between states called sovereign—although in my opinion they are not entirely sovereign—the Supreme Court of the United States—had decided the Dred Scott case, the question of settling slavery by the Supreme Court, that is by arbitration, was ended. Certainly it could not be settled anyway except by the power that had the force to wipe slavery out and was willing to exercise that force and to make the enormous sacrifice required by exercising it.

Now suppose in this very thing which has been worked into the Mohonk platform—that is, federal jurisdiction over cases involving violations of treaties—suppose instead of some definite case being a civil matter between individuals it were a matter against the United States and the great question should come up—which some day must come up and will have to be settled—as to the extent of the liability of our Federal Government for a claim against one of the States. Are we willing—and mind you, when we say anything, we must follow it logically to the end—are we willing to say now, and shall we be willing to say then, that no matter how that question comes up with a foreign nation, that a court of arbitration, a majority of the members of which will be citizens of countries other than the United States, and which will not be a court of the United States, shall determine that question? It might work the greatest change that ever could be wrought in our Government. If the Federal Government is to become liable for the acts of the States, it must also have a corresponding power to prevent violations of treaties within the boundaries of the States. Are we willing to have these questions settled in courts of arbitration? All I say is that we must go slow. I repeat what I have said already about arbitration; I believe now it is the best substitute for war ever devised, but let us not go too far. I would like to know about these treaties that have been negotiated, and which provide for a year's delay for investigation—what is the effect and construction of that provision to be in regard to a continuing wrong which is not an act of war? What action can this Government take pending that year's delay? The question has been raised—and raised seriously—whether that does not bind the United States, if the act committed is not an actual act of war, to wait a year and investigate it before this Government can do anything, no matter whether the act is repeated or not. There is just one of the dangers that we must look out for. We must do nothing which might ever call on us to say that we cannot carry out a treaty because it might result in national suicide or great national disaster. The way to prevent that is not to make any promise that we do not intend to fulfill or which we could not fulfill without danger to our national life.

There is only one other question I shall speak of tonight, and that is preparedness. I think at this time this country is facing a great crisis. The question is between preparedness, ultra-preparedness—militarism—and ultra-pacifism, going so far the other way that this country may be in a condition where it will be unable to cope with an aggressive enemy. These questions confront us and I believe we ought to get together. I think perhaps I go too far in my ideas of preparedness, perhaps you go too far in your League for Peace—perhaps the ex-Secretary of State goes too far with his Dove of Peace—but in reaching final conclusions we have a great example in this country which Americans can always have before them and always should have.

At the re-interment of the bones of Justice James Wilson, at Philadelphia Mr. Justice White made an address in which he said that the greatest act of patriotism and unselfishness ever exhibited in this country was when, in 1787, the men who were all for states' rights and the men who were all for nationalism compromised their radically opposing views and got together and framed the instrument which is today our Constitution, and which Mr. Gladstone said was the greatest work of man ever struck off at a given time. Right there I believe that every one of us has got before his eyes how to best serve the best interests of this country. I believe that we should be prepared, as has been said at this meeting by many, spiritually as well as materially. I believe, however, that materially we should stop short of militarism, and yet should be equal to a first line of defense, that we should go far enough to prevent any enemy who might, for reasons of his own, unknown to us, and not the result of any aggression on our part, make an effort to attack us. I believe it is the duty of this generation to prepare for the safety of the next generation, as well as it is the duty of this generation to prevent the overburdening of debt for the next generation to pay. Now this means that each and all of us may have to give up something of our own opinions and modify our views in order to reach a platform on which we can all stand together. I believe that if every one who is leading a fight on this question today will take the example of the men of 1787, and give up some of his extreme views and pet ideas, he will be as patriotic as though he were killed in battle. To have to give up your principles, and to say, "Perhaps I am wrong, and must concede something in order that the great result can be achieved"—that may be the highest act of patriotism which we all may be called upon to perform. It is my earnest hope that out of all this great discussion that is going on, which is being so ably led by so many able men, we may be able, with God's help, in whose hands the whole thing must rest at last,

to reach the proper point where we will save this country on the one hand from the despotism of militarism, and on the other hand from the danger of anything in the way of foreign aggression. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is President WILLIAM F. SLOCUM, of Colorado College. (Applause.)

TRUE PREPAREDNESS

ADDRESS BY WILLIAM FREDERICK SLOCUM, LL. D.

This conference has been not only the most interesting, but in many ways it has been fraught with more far-reaching issues for the nation and the world, than any it has been my privilege to attend at Mohonk. This is largely because it is realized that the right solution of the question which we are considering, involves not only the philosophy of international life and its relations, but it is also the most important problem in the future of civilization of any that has been considered by serious and right-minded men and women.

Much is said and written in these days, of "preparedness." It is in the headlines of the newspapers, periodicals are discussing it in almost every issue, one hears it on the street, and in the halls of Congress.

There is, however, very little said about the true preparedness which is essential to the life and greatness of a nation.

Personally I know little or nothing about how many dreadnaughts, armored cruisers, torpedo-boats and infernal devices it would take to defend our thousands of miles of coast line from the attacks of war ships of the rest of the world. Nor do I know how many millions of our young men it would require to ward off the armies of the nations of Europe and the Orient. If inquiries like these can be answered satisfactorily, it will necessitate the wisdom and training of men educated at Annapolis and West Point, and the experience which comes from long years at sea, in camp, and on the battle fields of the world. Very few in this Conference, with all the tedious and baffling statistics which are given in articles and public addresses, can inform the nation what will be essential to defend it from the encroachments of foreign powers. Does anyone know enough to answer the question, "How can this country ward off the armies and navies of the world by means of physical force?"

This brings the question, Is there any other preparedness than that which is material to which the nation can turn and which may be the only solution of the problem as to what constitutes its true and lasting defences?

May it not be that we need to turn our thoughts to strength

and resources that have nothing to do with armies and navies in order that the protection of the real life of the nation may be discovered?

With this thought in mind, one finds that there are three kinds of true preparedness that are worthy of careful consideration. The first of these is intellectual preparation. The author of "The Ideal Republic" maintains that true knowledge and virtue are one and the same thing, and that one who knows what is right will do what is right. Whether we fully accept this doctrine of Plato or supplement it by that of Aristotle that it is the practice of virtue that makes people moral, it is largely true that if men and nations comprehended what justice, righteousness and brotherhood really mean in human life they would never engage in that which violates and destroys these fundamental and noble qualities of individual and national life.

If the statesmen and rulers of Europe could have seen what this present war would surely bring to their nations in loss of life, destruction of homes, reversion to barbarism, breaking down of international relations they would have found it morally impossible to have urged the steps that led to the beginning of hostilities.

It is not inconceivable that even the Crown Prince of Germany and the Prussian War party, if they had been better thinkers, would have hesitated to demand that the Emperor should force the conflict upon the peoples of Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria and the German and Austrian men, women and children of their Empires. It is ignorance even in experts of what is involved in war that makes them drive into it peoples who would never engage in it if they saw the end from the beginning.

Comprehension of the burdens, the sorrows, the national limitations that a century or two will reveal, would make the bravest and most reckless militarist refuse to force through to its logical conclusion the outcome of his profession, which must ever eventually be war, and war is moral idiocy when critically and justly considered.

On its constructive side, it is knowledge of the blessings of peace and its creation of those conditions which produce the true glory of a nation that will make arbitration rather than armed conflict the principle by which international disputes are to be settled.

With all its mistakes of diplomacy, its inadequate and un-statesmanlike treaties of the past, Europe never did a more stupid thing than plunge needlessly and recklessly into the present war which is turning its civilization back a century or more.

It was poor thinking and a narrow conception of state-craft

that led the framer of the "Treaty of Paris," after the "Crimean War," to limit Nature's highway into the oceans of the world. Every able historian has recognized that the closing of the Dardanelles and the restriction of the use of the Danube in that treaty was a blunder. These are God's paths for free passage of his peoples into his seas.

The "Peace Preliminaries of Versailles" and the "Treaty of Frankfort," after the "Franco-Prussian War," contained the causes of future trouble by which Germany foolishly robbed the French of Alsace-Lorraine, which brought them no advantage, but only hatred and sense of injustice from a people that in their humiliation, cannot forget. Wise as was Germany's great Chancellor, he blundered then, as he did again and with him the great men of Europe, in making the "Treaty of Berlin" in 1878, at the "Congress of Berlin," when he and Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, Prince Gortchakoff and Count Andrasse with the others, attempted to settle the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, making the inexcusable mistakes of turning Macedonia over to the cruelty of Turkey, forced Bulgaria to pay tribute to her old enemy, and provided for Austria to commit the political crime of the confiscation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their Serb populations. It was ignorance of the fundamental facts of human nature and the blindness of greed that made these leaders of European states commit these political blunders which are the subtle, but radical causes of the present war in Europe. It is poor thinking and minds blinded by the untruthfulness of political selfishness that are the cause of international strife.

True preparation for the peace and liberty of the world is the knowledge and wisdom that make men and women everywhere see things as they are and enable them to understand the deeper meaning of historic movements in a higher comprehension of human nature and of those principles of statesmanship which were in the mind of Him who too was a Prince; but "*The Prince of Peace.*"

Closely connected with what has been already said is a second fundamental or spiritual force in true preparedness; that is the moral element or principle. This is the very highest kind of preparation in the evolution of those forces which constitute the glory and strength of a people. (Applause.)

No one, Mr. Chairman, will recall more clearly than yourself the circumstances and the anxieties connected with the Boxer incident in China. Roused by the fanaticism of those who were obsessed by prejudices against foreigners, there came a movement to destroy them. The German Ambassador, Baron von Ketteler, was assassinated and soldiers of various nations marched to Peking and relieved those who were in danger.

In the settlement of this affair an excessive indemnity was

exacted from the Chinese government. With a large sense of justice and righteousness the United States returned their share of this money which is now wisely used by China to educate, largely in this country, a number of their choice young men for public service. This act on the part of our nation through its officials, will command for our country, the respect and affection of this Oriental people for long years to come. (Applause.) This is the best kind of preparedness. It has established a relation between the United States and China founded upon justice and high sense of honor. It is safer and stronger than armies and navies. It might just as well exist between all people upon the face of the earth.

Whatever may seem to be the justification of war, it violates in its action, every moral principle that stands at the basis of our modern civilization. It seeks to make murder, arson, deception, hatred, violence, destruction of property not only right, but rewards people for committing these crimes. It turns the whole system of ethics topsy-turvy. It relegates to the rear everything for which Christian civilization has contended and upon which it is founded. Morally, war makes it impossible to see straight.

The strength of a people is moral character and a reputation for justice in the eyes of the nations of the world. The pretext upon which all wars are declared is that "we are right and you are wrong." If one nation had such a character that all other nations could not gainsay it, every dispute could be just so much more easily arbitrated. The hope of the great Hague Tribunal for International Disputes will be the faith that it will act justly and wisely and also that nations will respect one another enough to submit their differences to it.

This moral preparedness will come as each nation in calmness, with high and broad purpose and a wise conception of education, seeks above all material prosperity and physical force, to remember that it is righteousness which exalts a nation.

The third essential in true preparedness is a clear and definite recognition and moral conscientiousness of the brotherhood of all peoples that dwell on the face of the earth.

If Christian civilization, about which we talk very easily and too often vaguely, is what the expression itself signifies, then it is politically, socially and economically true that no nation can live unto itself. This is not a mere commercial proposition; but much more is it true from a literary, scientific, ethical and above all else from a religious point of view. All truth belongs to each country and the enrichment of all may be and should be the spiritual possessions of each.

In a profound sense all the peoples of all the nations are brethren and one nation cannot live unto itself, especially in

this day when everything that is good and true is making for the unification of all the world with its multiplicity of interests. The evolution of a mighty purpose from an infinite mind is revealing more and more clearly in history the fatherhood of God and the wondrous destiny of humanity. When this truth is recognized, it will be understood that the Frenchman, the German, the Englishman, the Japanese and the Chinaman together with all other peoples that dwell on the earth are bound by ties of kinship that center in God. This is the foundation of international relations and of civilization. When the nations comprehend this mighty truth it will become impossible for man to kill his brother because then the curse of heaven will be upon him who does the killing.

This idea is of itself a preparedness that is so powerful it must banish war which is a survival of paganism and barbarism. Do we really believe in the ideals of Christianity or are they the vague theories of an impracticable dreamer? Must we turn to paganism as possessing the only correct view of civilization and international relations?

The issue of war and peace confronts the world as never before in its history. It is an issue between the "Prince of Peace" and the prince of darkness. Who is right? Under whose banner are we as disciples of the Christ to enroll ourselves? Is there any truth in those words: "It is not by might nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord."

To everyone a call has come to prepare himself by serious thought, by a clear and vigorous conception of righteousness and of the brotherhood and essential oneness of humanity for the eternal peace of God. In this warfare there can then be no turning back. Here the bugle never sounds retreat. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is DR. NEHEMIAH BOYNTON, Pastor, Clinton Avenue Congregational Church of Brooklyn. (Applause.)

THE AMERICAN SPIRIT IN INTERNATIONALISM

REMARKS BY REV. NEHEMIAH BOYNTON, D. D.

Out of all the impressions which have been received by me, for which I am indeed grateful, from this conference, I have been trying to think of one or two, which possibly I might revive again in your minds and possibly replant there with a view of the helpful services of time in bringing them to flower and to their fruitage as well.

Time is one of the greatest blessings we have. "The trouble is, said a great reformer, "that God is not in a hurry and I

am;" it was Carroll D. Wright, I think, who made the remark with relation to the labor situation, that when anybody proposed an absolute solution, he always moved to adjourn. You may remember how Mr. William Henry Schlammerhead had his affair with time.

"Mr. Henry Schlammerhead, the bravest of his race,
Stole up against the Zeitgeist to accelerate its pace,
Stole up against the Zeitgeist to accelerate its flight.
He pushed against the Zeitgeist's back and he lunged with all his might.
The Zeitgeist traveled on its way wrapped in eternal peace
And no one saw his rate of speed perceptibly increase."

I rejoice with you in the winnowing influences of the passing weeks and months and years, these ideals of ours which are worthy, are given first their perpetuity and after a while their power, whether three score years and ten or three score and ten centuries shall have taken their way into the shadowed past.

That we live in a new era is a commonplace today. Professor Lake said the other day, in the introduction to one of his books, "A new era is certainly dawning upon the world, but whether it shall come in light or darkness depends upon the clearness of vision and the singleness of purpose of the stewards of the faith." We are jostled in our own easy-going lives by this fact, that we are in a new era.

In the midst of this new age into which we have come stands our own country, and the one contribution which I wish to make to the thought of this convention is this, that heartily as we believe in internationalism, and must if we believe in humanity, cordially as we accept the doctrine that we are all brethren and sisters the world over, still we never will have a strong internationalism which is builded upon a weak nationalism; we never will have a universalism of brotherhood which is abiding and true, which fails of a real appreciation of the place and power and the influence of nationalism. I accept the doctrine of development which has been expounded upon this platform, which shows us that, from the individual to the clan and from the clan to the tribe and from the tribe to the nation has been the development of life and that now the development is to be from the national to the international. It is all strictly and absolutely true, but it is to be remembered that each step in progress has not been lost in the advancing progress, that each step has been, in a way, a transmitter of an idea which has enlarged itself to the borders of that particular state, and then because of its very growth, has leaped out into larger and into more comprehensive relationships. Goethe said that the greatest compliment ever given to him was by someone who said that he was a circumambient man. It is a compliment for

any man of whom it can be said that he is accustomed to look in the north and in the east and in the south and in the west and draw his comprehensive conclusion from his adequate premise. Nationalism cannot be abandoned in the interest of internationalism; it can only be appropriated in that great, fine interest, and therefore it is that I have a word or two to say tonight upon the importance to those of us who are dealing with the high ideals and who are standing in the prophetic relationships, while we look forward with hope and expectancy, with ardor and adventure, to be sure that we also look around in order that we may bring all the tithes into the storehouse in the great and noble destined day when we shall stand together, actually, as now we stand together ideally as brethren and sisters of the universe. Let us remind ourselves of this simple fact, that at the close of the Civil War, when our nation was saved, there were just thirty million people in the United States; we were at that time practically a homogeneous nation. To-day we have multiplied our population more than three fold and have a heterogeneous company of people beneath the stars and stripes with which the citizens of no other nation of the world can be compared. Remember the fact that there has never been, in the history of the world, such a migration of humanity as has occurred upon these shores in this exceedingly brief space of time; that there is nothing in the history of Europe or in the history of ages to compare with this wonderful fact in population which has transpired beneath our very eyes, and that the first great business of the American to-day is this, to infuse the noble ideals of his own country into the lives of those who have come to share his country with him, and that the spirit of yesterday, which was strong and loyal and comprehensive and generous and sacrificial, may be done over again in the life of the nation of to-day as it transmits its goodwill and its love and its brotherhood to those international and universal relationships toward which we look with such interest and with longing tonight. The characteristic of stewardship of the national spirit for the affairs and interests of his own nation must neither be lost, on the one hand, nor put into eclipse upon the other as he moves out in the nobility of his ideals and in the splendor of his aspirations to minister to the world. The need of a refined American spirit throughout the length and breadth of our country is paramount. The meagerness of certain types of American loyalty which are exhibited in our country today—who does not feel the poverty of them? The possibility of the noble, the faithful and the unselfish exercise of our national spirit in being a great minister plenipotentiary to God's great wealth—who is not fascinated by the ideal and comforted by the dream? But must there not be put into the contents of our American citi-

zenship today a spirit of stewardship which shall give us in the modern day at least the range which the expression of that spirit had a century—two centuries—ago? I am not here to mention any particular class of people in our country who may need to be reminded of the fact that the principle of stewardship today in our national life is one of the neglected principles, for I do not believe that there is any one department in life in America which is more blind to that than any other. There is no calling in America which does not need to be reminded today of the implications of national stewardship. There is no great company of men in America who will not be profited by taking to their own souls the proofs which are necessary on the one hand and the encouragements which ensue for those who heed the reproofs upon the other.

Side by side with the spirit of stewardship, there is need of the spirit of sympathy in our country. Are we being reminded of the absolute need that our country should arise just now if she believes these things in her fine ideals, and give a practical demonstration of her sympathy to the need of the world as she has never given it before? I heard a gentleman not very long ago at a lunch at the Banker's Club in New York when around me were the men who hold in their hands the financial destiny of New York, as splendid, earnest, eager looking a company of men as you ever saw, and after the dinner was over, the guest of honor rose to address them, and said: "Men, what is the use of fussing about money in these days when there is such an unparalleled opportunity to do good?" Then he made a man's plea for men to put in his hands the sum of \$5,000,000 in order that he might send it over the sea to the relief of the needy and the ill-used Armenians. It was an American citizen who gloried in the fact that he was a Jew, standing before a great company of New York bankers and pleading for the relief of down-trodden and oppressed Christian Armenians in that ill-fated land over the sea. (Applause.) We must confess that if you subtract a few very large gifts from very wealthy men for the European need which is so pressing just now the rest of our country has been dealing in general in nickels and dimes and the imagination of America has not yet been touched with relation to what brotherhood really means, with relation to the Armenian people and those other tremendous sufferers over the sea. My point is this, that before we find ourselves in possession of the ideals of universal brotherhood, we will have to revise on the one hand and appropriate on the other, that same spirit of brotherhood in our national relationships as it flows out through our national fellowships and desires to those beyond the sea. The thing which leaps from the spirit of stewardship and from the spirit of sympathy is always a bright-

winged angel of service. I am not specially concerned with relation to the services of the elect spirits in our country, with relation to those who have had the opportunity to see the vision, who march, breast forward, and who always look the sun straight in the face, but I am concerned, tremendously concerned, for a new affirmation of the principle of service to our country on the part of the people at large that something of sacredness may again attach itself to that idea, that something of self-forgetting loyalty may become the possession of our people, and that the question, "what shall we eat and what shall we drink and wherewithal shall we be clothed?" need not longer be almost first in the thought and in the endeavor of the average citizen of the land of the free and the home of the brave. Emerson is right when he sings

"United States, the ages plead,
Present and past, in common tongue;
Go put your creed into your deed,
Nor speak with double tongue;
Be just at home; then write your scroll
Of empire o'er the sea
And bid the broad Atlantic roll
The ferry of the free."

(Applause.)

DR. PHILIP S. MOXOM, after speaking feelingly of the work of Mr. Albert K. Smiley and giving a reminiscent sketch of the growth of the conferences, then expressed for the conference heartfelt thanks to Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Smiley for their genuine and rich hospitality and for the opportunity of the conference as "a council where great thoughts, noble aspirations and lofty ideals engage the minds and possess the hearts of the participants, and put them in tune with the great divine movement in the world and in the universe."

Mr. Smiley responded gracefully, accepting the expression of thanks on behalf of Mrs. Smiley and himself and others interested in the preparation of the conference, and concluded by saying, "To our distinguished presiding officer, to our Treasurer and to the committees I feel that thanks are due. There are present with us people from other countries, from the north of us and from the south of us. I have visited in some of their countries; I have experienced their hospitality, their generosity, their unparalleled kindness. I feel that anything I can do is poor beside the royal courtesy that I have received from some of our neighbors on both sides of us, and I want to thank them especially for being present with us. I feel greatly encouraged by what has been done and accomplished in this Conference.

I feel that it will be an inspiration to me and I hope it may be to you in the months to come. And now, as we have arrived at the close of the conference, I feel like expressing the hope that, God willing, we may all meet a year from now. I thank you."

The CHAIRMAN then announced, and the Conference sang, the hymn, "God be with you 'til we meet again," after which the Twenty-second Conference was declared adjourned *sine die*.

MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE

The asterisk (*) following the name of a gentleman indicates that he was accompanied by his wife.

The obelisk (†) following the address of a gentleman indicates that he represented some business organization (see complete list of delegates, page 215).

- ABBOTT, REV. LYMAN, D.D., Cornwall-on-Hudson, N. Y.
ADAMSON, CHARLES,* 4227 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa.
ALVAREZ, HON. ALEJANDRO, 256 Morande a Santiago, Chile.
AMES, ALLAN F.,* *Associated Press*, New York.
ANDREWS, MRS. FANNIE FERN, Secretary American School Peace League, 405 Marlborough St., Boston, Mass.
ARMSTRONG, ROBERT A., L. H. D., Professor English Language and Literature, West Virginia University, Morgantown, Va.
ARNETT, TREVOR,* Auditor University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
ASAKAWA, K., PH.D., Professor Japanese Civilization, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
- BANNWART, CARL J., City Hall, Newark, N. J.†
BARTHOLDT, HON. RICHARD, St. Louis, Mo.
BATTS, E. P.,* 228 West Water St., Syracuse, N. Y.†
BAUER, RALPH S.,* Lynn, Mass.†
BEER, GEORGE LOUIS,* Editor *The New Republic*, 329 W. 71st St., New York.
BLAKESLEE, GEORGE H., PH.D.,* Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.
BORCHARD, EDWIN M., PH.D., Law Librarian of Congress, Washington, D. C.
BORLAND, HON. WILLIAM P., Kansas City, Mo., Member of Congress.
BOYNTON, REV. NEHEMIAH, D.D.,* Clinton Avenue Church, Brooklyn.
BROWN, ELMER ELLSWORTH, LL.D.,* Chancellor New York University, New York.
BROWN, JOSEPH G., President Citizens National Bank, Raleigh, N. C.
BRYAN, HON. WILLIAM J.,* Lincoln, Nebr.
BUTLER, CHARLES HENRY,* Reporter of Decisions, United States Supreme Court, Washington, D. C.
- CALDERON, HIS EXCELLENCY, SENOR DON IGNACIO,* Bolivian Minister, Washington, D. C.
CALL, ARTHUR DEERIN,* Secretary American Peace Society, Washington, D. C.
CARPENTER, HON. WILLIAM L.,* 109 Seward Ave., Detroit, Mich.
CHADWICK, REAR ADMIRAL F. E.,* U. S. N., Newport, R. I.
CHESTER, HON. ALDEN,* 139 S. Lake Ave., Albany, N. Y.
CHISHOLM, HON. JUSTICE JOSEPH A., Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Halifax, N. S.
CLARK, JOHN B., LL.D.,* Professor Political Economy, Columbia University, New York.

- CORCORAN, JOHN H.,* 50 Lexington Ave., Cambridge, Mass.†
 COXE, MACGRANE,* Woolworth Building, New York.
 CRANE, FRANCIS E.,* Amsterdam, N. Y.†
 CROSMAN, GEORGE L.,* Deering Junction (Portland), Me.†
 CURRELL, W. S. PH.D., President University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C.
- DEALEY, JAMES Q., PH.D.,* Professor Social and Political Science, Brown University, Providence, R. I.
 DOGGETT, L. L., LL.D., President International Y. M. C. A. Training School, Springfield, Mass.†
 DOUGLAS, HON. W. W.,* 107 Prospect St., Providence, R. I.
 DUNNING, REV. A. E., D.D.,* 812 Tremont Bldg., Boston, Mass.
 DUTTON, SAMUEL T., LL.D.,* Director Department New York and New Jersey, American Peace Society, 70 Fifth Ave., New York.
- ELKINTON, JOSEPH,* Minister Society of Friends, Moylan, Pa.
- FAIRLAMB, GEORGE R., JR., Midshipman, U. S. N., Annapolis, Md.
 FARNAM, HENRY W., R. P. D.,* Professor Political Economy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 FARNSWORTH, FREDERICK E.,* General Secretary, American Bankers Association, 5 Nassau St., New York.
 FARQUHAR, A. B., LL.D., York, Pa.†
 FRANKS, ROBERT A.,* Treasurer Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching, 576 Fifth Ave., New York.
 FRENCH, HOWARD B.,* 2021 Spruce St., Philadelphia, Pa.†
- GILDERSLEEVE, E. D., Poughkeepsie, N. Y.†
 GREGORY, CHARLES NOBLE, LL.D., 2139 Wyoming Ave., Washington, D. C.
- HALL, REV. J. J., D.D., Director Department South Atlantic States, American Peace Society, 321 North Boulevard, Atlanta, Ga.
 HAMILTON, W. P., Editor *The Wall Street Journal*, 44 Broad St., New York.
 HASKELL, HENRY S.,* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 407 West 117th St., New York.
 HASKINS, HENRY S.,* Secretary Massachusetts Peace Society, 31 Beacon St., Boston, Mass.
 HERVEY, HENRY D.,* Superintendent of Schools, Auburn, N. Y.†
 HEWITT, ARTHUR,* General Manager, The Consumers' Gas Company, Toronto.†
- HOEHN, WILLIAM FREDERIC,* 500 Nelson Ave., Peekskill, N. Y.†
 HOLT, HAMILTON, Editor *The Independent*, New York.
 HOUSTON, HERBERT S., Advertising Manager, Doubleday Page & Company, 11 West 32d St., New York.
 HOWLAND, HAROLD J.,* Associate Editor, *The Independent*, New York.
 HOYT, ALBERT E.,* 410 Western Ave., Albany, N. Y.
 HULL, WILLIAM I., PH.D., Professor History and International Relations, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 HUMPHREY, ANDREW B., Executive Director American Peace and Arbitration League, 120 Broadway, New York.
- JEFFERSON, REV. CHARLES E., D.D.,* Pastor Broadway Tabernacle Church, New York.
 JOHNSON, EMORY R., PH.D.,* Professor Transportation and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
 JOHNSON, ROBERT UNDERWOOD, PH.D.,* 327 Lexington Ave., New York.
 JONES, J. HARRIS, 1455 Undercliff Ave., New York.†

- KING, GEN. HORATIO C., LL.D.,* 46 Willow St., Brooklyn, N. Y.
- KIRCHWEY, GEORGE W., LL.D.,* President American Peace Society, 54 Morningside Drive, New York.
- KISHIMOTO, K., Assistant Freight Traffic Manager of the Imperial Government Railways of Japan and Korea.
- KNAPP, CAPT. HARRY S., U. S. N., The Marlborough, Washington, D. C.
- KNIGHT, REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M., U. S. N., President Naval War College, Newport, R. I.
- KREHBIEL, EDWARD B., PH.D.,* Professor European History, Leland Stanford Jr. University, Stanford University, Cal.
- KUHN, ARTHUR K., PH.D., 308 West 92d St., New York.
- KUHN, HON. FRANZ C., Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Detroit, Mich.
- LA FONTAINE, SENATOR HENRI,* Square Vergote 9, Brussels, Belgium, President International Peace Bureau.
- LAPRADELLE, A. G., DE, LL.D., Professor International Law, University of Paris, Paris, France.
- LE FEVRE, HON. A. P.,* New Paltz, N. Y.
- LE FEVRE, HON. FRANK J.,* New Paltz, N. Y.
- LEIGHTON, R. E.,* Kingston, N. Y.†
- LINSLEY, FRANK J.,* 35 West Park Ave., New Haven, Conn.†
- LYNCH, FREDERICK, D.D., Secretary Church Peace Union, 70 Fifth Ave., New York.
- MCCARROLL, HON. WILLIAM,* President National Bond & Mortgage Insurance Company, 150 Broadway, N. Y.
- MCCORMICK, S. B., LL.D.,* Chancellor University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- MACCRACKEN, HENRY NOBLE, PH.D.,* President Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
- MACFARLAND, CHARLES S., PH.D.,* General Secretary Federal Council of Churches in America, 105 East 22d St., New York.
- MARBURG, HON. THEODORE, LL.D.,* 14 W. Mt. Vernon Place, Baltimore, Md.
- MARSHALL, HON. ELBERT P.,* Vice-President Union Central Life Insurance Company, Cincinnati, O.†
- MEAD, MRS. EDWIN D., National Secretary of the Woman's Peace Party, 39 Newbury St., Boston, Mass.
- MITCHELL, S. C., LL.D.,* President Delaware College, Newark, Del.
- MOORE, HON. JOSEPH B., Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Lansing, Mich.
- MOORES, J. HENRY,* Lansing, Mich.†
- MORRIS, HON. HENRY C., 924 Marquette Building, Chicago, Ill.
- MOXOM, PHILIP S., D.D., 183 Dartmouth Terrace, Springfield, Mass.
- MURDOCK, REAR ADMIRAL J. B., U. S. N., Danbury, N. H.
- MURPHY, DANIEL B., The Burke, FitzSimons, Hone Co., Inc., Rochester, N. Y.†
- MYERS, DENYS P., Publicist, World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass.
- NASMYTH, GEORGE W., Director International Bureau of Students, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass.
- NELSON, DR. ERNESTO,* 1696 Medrano St., Buenos Aires, Argentine Republic.
- OLIVER, CAPT. JAMES H.,* U. S. N., Director Naval Intelligence Office, Washington, D. C.

- PARTRIDGE, HON. FRANK C.,* Proctor, Vt.
 PATCH, A. WARREN, 17 N. Market St., Boston, Mass.†
 PENFIELD, WALTER S., The Wyoming, Washington, D. C.
 PEZET, FREDERICO A., LL.D.,* 2223 R St., Washington, D. C.
 PHILLIPS, H. C.,* Mohonk Lake, N. Y.
 PILLSBURY, ROSECRANS W.,* Londonderry, N. H.
 PLATT, HON. EDMUND, Poughkeepsie, N. Y., Member of Congress.
 PLATT, F. G.,* New Britain, Conn.†
 PUGSLEY, HON. C. A., Peekskill, N. Y.
 PUGSLEY, CHESTER DE WITT, 25 Broad St., New York.
 PUTNAM, GEORGE HAVEN, Litt. D., 2 West 45th St., New York.
- REMICK, REV. N. B., D.D.,* Pine Hill, N. Y.
 RHOADS, GEORGE A.,* Wilmington, Del.†
 RICE, HON. WILLIAM GORHAM,* New York State Civil Service Commission, 135 Washington Ave., Albany, N. Y.
 RINES, J. HENRY,* 529 Congress St., Portland, Me.†
 ROBERTS, HON. GEORGE E.,* The National City Bank, New York.
 ROBINSON, CHARLES MULFORD,* 65 S. Washington St., Rochester, N. Y.
 ROGERS, ELIAS,* Glen House, Deer Park, Toronto.
 ROSE, HON. JOHN C.,* United States District Judge, Baltimore, Md.
- SCHAEFFER, NATHAN C., LL.D.,* State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Harrisburg, Pa.
 SCHMIDLAPP, J. G., Union Savings Bank & Trust Co., Cincinnati, Ohio.
 SCOTT, JAMES BROWN, LL.D.,* Secretary Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.
 SEELYE, L. CLARK, LL.D., Northampton, Mass.
 SHEFFIELD, HON. WILLIAM PAINE,* Newport, R. I.
 SISSON, CHARLES,* 458 Hope St., Providence, R. I.
 SLATER, C. HOWARD,* 2595 Boulevard, Jersey City, N. J.†
 SLOCUM, W. F., LL.D.,* President Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
- SMILEY, A. K.,* Mohonk Lake, N. Y.
 SMILEY, DANIEL,* Mohonk Lake, N. Y.
 SMYTH, CALVIN M.,* 1216 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.†
 SNOW, ALPHEUS H., 2013 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C.
 STAMM, A. C., 409 Kunkel Bldg., Harrisburg, Pa.†
 STEINER, EDWARD A.,* Professor Applied Christianity, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.
- TAFT, HON. WILLIAM H.,* Kent Professor of Law, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
 THWING, CHARLES F., LL.D.,* President Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
 TOWNSEND, HAROLD G., Director Central West Department, American Peace Society, 116 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 TRYON, JAMES L., PH.D., Director New England Department American Peace Society, 6 Beacon St., Boston, Mass.
 TUCKER, WILLIAM R.,* 258 Bourse Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa.†
- VAN ARSDALE, REV. N. H., D.D., Editor *The Christian Intelligencer*, New York.
 VAN KLEECK, HENRY,* 1269 Logan Ave., Denver, Colo.†
- WADHAMS, HON. FREDERICK E.,* Tweddle Bldg., Albany, N. Y.
 WAMBAUGH, EUGENE, LL.D., Professor Law, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

- WATSON, REAR ADMIRAL JOHN C.,* 2236 Q St., N. W., Washington, D. C.
WHITTLESEY, HON. E. L.,* Judge Sixth Judicial District of Pennsylvania,
Erie, Pa.†
WICKWARE, FRANCIS G.,* Editor *The American Year Book*, 35 West 32d
St., New York.
WILLIAMS, FRANK F.,* 54 Irving Place, Buffalo.
WILSON, GEORGE GRAFTON, LL.D.,* Professor International Law, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass. †
WOOD, ALEXANDER C.,* President Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Cam-
den, N. J.†
WOODRUFF, CLINTON ROGERS,* North American Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa.

APPENDIX A

SPECIAL MEETINGS HELD AT MOHONK IN CONNECTION WITH
OR DURING THE TWENTY-SECOND CONFERENCE

BUSINESS MEN'S MEETINGS

The official delegates* from business organizations, and other business men present, held a number of special meetings on May 17th, 18th, and 19th, as a result of which they prepared and adopted the declarations* presented to the Conference at the sixth session.

INTERCOLLEGIATE PEACE ASSOCIATION ORATORICAL CONTEST

The Eleventh National Oratorical Contest of the Intercollegiate Peace Association was held May 18th, at 4 P. M., and, by invitation of the Association, most of the members of the Conference listened to the orations. The five contestants represented 130 colleges and universities and each had been successively the winner in a local, a state and an interstate group contest. They received prizes in the following order: Francis Case, Dakota Wesleyan University (Western Group); Lester H. Jayne, Cornell University (North Atlantic Group); Harry D. Hubbard, Michigan State Normal College (Central Group); Roy L. Aterbury, Vanderbilt University (Southwestern Group); J. J. McBrayar, University of Kentucky (South Atlantic Group).

Particulars of the contest and information concerning the valuable work of the Intercollegiate Peace Association may be obtained from its secretary, Professor S. F. Weston, Yellow Springs, Ohio.—ED.

* See remarks of Dr. Moxom in sixth session; also list following his remarks, and data in Appendix D.

APPENDIX B

A FEW EVENTS OF 1915-1916

The following chronological* lists have been compiled pursuant to the plan inaugurated in 1914 in response to numerous requests for such a reference. They do not purport to cover all the events affecting international peace, and are prepared with special reference to American readers.—ED.

Abbreviations: A., *American Journal of International Law*, Washington; C. H., *Current History*, New York; R., *American Review of Reviews*, New York.

I. THE WILSON-BRYAN TREATIES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE

The following list is a complete record of Wilson-Bryan Treaties for the Advancement of Peace, showing their status up to July, 1916. Such treaties provide that all controversies be submitted to investigation by a standing International Commission before war shall be declared.

Salvador, signed August 7, 1913.

Panama, signed September 20, 1913.

Guatemala, signed at Washington, September 30, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Washington, October 13, 1914; text, Treaty Series, No. 598.

Honduras, signed November 3, 1913.

Nicaragua, signed December 17, 1913.

Netherlands, signed December 18, 1913.

Bolivia, signed at Washington, January 22, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 8, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 606.

Persia, signed February 4, 1914.

Portugal, signed at Lisbon, February 4, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, October 24, 1914; text, Treaty Series, No. 600.

Denmark, signed at Washington, February 5, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 19, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 608.

Costa Rica, signed at Washington, February 13, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, November 12, 1914; text, Treaty Series, No. 603.

Switzerland, signed February 13, 1914.

Dominican Republic, signed February 17, 1914.

Venezuela, signed March 21, 1914.

Italy, signed at Washington, May 5, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, March 19, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 615.

Norway, signed at Washington, June 24, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, October 21, 1914; text, Treaty Series, No. 599.

Peru, signed at Lima, July 14, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Lima, March 4, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 613.

Uruguay, signed at Washington, July 20, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, February 24, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 611.

Argentine Republic, signed July 24, 1914.

Brazil, signed July 24, 1914.

Chile, signed at Washington, July 24, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 19, 1916; text, Treaty Series, No. 621.

* For verification of much of the data of the chronology credit is due Mr. Denys P. Myers of the World Peace Foundation.

Paraguay, signed at Asuncion, August 29, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Asuncion, March 9, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 614.

China, signed at Washington, September 15, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, October 22, 1915; text, Treaty Series, No. 619.

France, signed at Washington, September 15, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 22, 1915. The Commission of Inquiry consists of the following members: J. Loudon, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs; M. Carton de Wiart, Belgian Minister of Justice; M. Louis Renault, French Minister Plenipotentiary and Member of the Institute; R. Olney, former Secretary of State; R. S. Naon, Argentine Ambassador in Washington. Text, Treaty Series, No. 609.

Great Britain, signed at Washington, September 15, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, November 10, 1914. Viscount Bryce has been appointed to represent Great Britain on the Commission of Inquiry. Text, Treaty Series, No. 602.

Spain, signed at Washington, September 15, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, December 21, 1914; text, Treaty Series, No. 605.

Russia, signed at Washington, October 1 (September 18), 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, March 22, 1915. Charles R. Crane, of Chicago, has been appointed to represent the United States on the Commission of Inquiry. Text, Treaty Series, No. 616.

Ecuador, signed at Washington, October 13, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 22, 1916; text, Treaty Series, No. 622.

Greece, signed October 13 1914.

Sweden signed at Washington, October 13, 1914; ratifications exchanged at Washington, January 11, 1915. The Commission of Inquiry consists of the following members: M. Loeff, sometime minister of justice of the Netherlands; F. F. Hagerup, Norwegian Minister at Copenhagen; Baron d'Estournelles de Constant; Dr. Hellner, sometime Swedish minister of justice; Samuel Avery, chancellor of the University of Nebraska. Text, Treaty Series, No. 611.

2. OTHER TREATIES

1914

Sept. 9. France-Peru. Agreement signed providing for the postponement of date fixed in the protocol, signed February 2, 1914, for the settlement of outstanding claims. (A. 10:140)

Sept. 10. France-Turkey. Agreement signed postponing for six months the sessions of the mixed commission appointed under Art. 4 of the compromis of December 18, 1913, for the settlement of claims. (A. 10:140)

Oct. 14. France-Guatemala. French decree issued putting into effect the convention signed February 28, 1914, for the reciprocal protection of patents and trade-marks, ratifications of which were exchanged, June 28, 1914; text, Journal Officiel, November 1, 1914. (A. 10:140)

Nov. 15. Great Britain-Switzerland. By an exchange of notes it was agreed that the arbitration convention of November 16, 1904, and November 19, 1909, should remain in force until the exchange of ratifications of the convention concluded June 10, 1914. (A. 10:141)

Dec. 21. France-Great Britain. Ratifications exchanged of the convention, signed at London, November 9, 1914, relating to prizes captured during the present European war; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 2.

1915

Feb. 3. Great-Britain-Switzerland. Ratifications exchanged at London of the convention of June 10, 1914, providing for the settlement by arbitration of certain classes of questions which may arise between the two governments; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 3.

- Mar. 13. Belgium-France. Convention signed suspending, during the war, the treaty of July 30, 1891, relating to the nationality of minors. (A. 10:141)
- Mar. 25. Great Britain-Netherlands. Convention renewing for a further period of five years the arbitration convention of February 15, 1905; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 5.
- May 25. Argentina-Brazil-Chile. Treaty to facilitate the pacific settlement of international disputes, signed at Buenos Aires; ratified by Brazil November 10, 1915.
- June 6. Russia-Sweden. Ratification of treaty acknowledging the financial, commercial and industrial interests of the respective countries. (C. H. II:815)
- June 21. Great Britain-Honduras. Ratifications exchanged of a treaty of commerce and navigation, signed May 5, 1910; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 7. (A. 10:381)
- July 3. Great Britain-Russia. Agreement signed at Petrograd, providing for the reciprocal waiver of consular fees on certificates of origin relating to exports; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 8.
- July 12. Great Britain-Switzerland. Ratifications exchanged of the treaty of friendship, commerce and reciprocal establishment, signed March 30, 1914; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 6.
- Sept. 22. Great Britain-France. Convention signed at London concerning the exchange of money orders between the British and French Possessions and Protectorates in West Africa; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 11.
- Sept. 28. Great Britain-Netherlands. Convention signed at London relating to the boundary between the State of North Borneo and the Netherland Possessions in Borneo. G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 12.
- Sept. 30. Great Britain-Siam. Accession of the Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Semklan and Pahang to the extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam, signed March 4, 1911; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 13. (A. 10:381)
- Nov. 16. Portugal-United States. Agreement effected by exchange of notes extending the time for the appointment of the commission under Article III of the treaty of February 4, 1914; text, U. S. Treaty Series, No. 600-A. (A. 10:382)
- Nov. 16. Spain-United States. Agreement effected by exchange of notes extending the time for the appointment of the commission under Article II of the treaty of September 15, 1914; text, Treaty Series, No. 605-A. (A. 10:381)
- Nov. 27. Panama-United States. Protocol signed for the determination of amount of damages caused by the riot at Panama City July 4, 1912; text, U. S. Treaty Series, No. 620. (A. 10:149)
- Nov. 30. Great Britain-France-Italy-Japan-Russia. Convention signed at London, engaging not to conclude peace separately during the present war; text, G. B. Treaty Series, 1915, No. 14.
- Dec. 7. France-United States. French decree putting into effect the parcel post convention between French Guiana and the United States, signed August 21, 1914. (A. 10:382)
- 1916
- Feb. 18. United States-Nicaragua. The United States Senate consented to and advised the ratification of the Nicaraguan canal treaty, signed August 21, 1914. The Senate amended the treaty to cover American supervision of the expenditure of the \$3,000,000.
- Feb. 28. United States-Haiti. Treaty ratified establishing a financial and police protectorate over Haiti, designed to stabilize the government and discourage insurrections. (R. 53:410)

3. MEXICO

1915

- Aug. 11. Diplomatic representatives of the United States and the Central and South American countries transmitted an offer of good offices to the leaders of Mexican factions. (R. 52:288)
- Aug. 16. General Francisco Villa accepted the proposals of the American governments. (R. 52:288)
- Sept. 10. Carranza rejected the peace proposals of the American diplomats. (R. 52:417)
- Sept. 18. Secretary of State again conferred with the diplomatic representatives of the Central and South American countries. As a result it was agreed to recognize the faction which at the end of three weeks had best demonstrated its ability to maintain order. (R. 52:416)
- Oct. 19. The United States government recognized the Carranza government as the de facto government of Mexico.
- Oct. 19. President Wilson issued a proclamation placing an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions of war consigned to the Carranza government.

1916

- Jan. 11. Mexican bandits killed 16 Americans taken from a train about 50 miles west of Chihuahua City, Mexico. (A. 10:382)
- Mar. 9. 1,500 Mexican bandits, under General Villa, crossed the border and attacked Columbus, N. M., killing 9 civilians and 8 troopers. (R. 53:409)
- Mar. 10. Military expedition to punish Villa enters Mexico, with Brigadier General John J. Pershing and Colonel Dodd in command. (R. 53:409)
- Mar. 29. American cavalymen, under Colonel Dodd, met Villa's troops at San Geronimo. After a ten-mile running fight the Villa forces retreated to the mountains. (R. 53:546)
- Apr. 7. Carranza inquired of the United States as to the extent of the punitive expedition into Mexico. (R. 53:546)
- Apr. 12. United States forces entered Parral, Chihuahua, and for the first time met with resistance upon the part of the Mexican people. (R. 53:546)
- Apr. 12. Carranza informed the United States that it would be unwise for American troops to remain long on Mexican soil, as serious difficulties might develop. (R. 53:546)
- May 6. Mexican bandits make a second raid across the border, entering several small towns in Texas. (R. 53:673)
- May 9. President Wilson issued a call for the militia of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to mobilize at the border. (R. 53:673)
- May 10. State Department, through the consular officers, warned all Americans to leave Mexico. (R. 53:673)
- May 22. Carranza government presented a note to the United States, protesting against violation of the sovereignty of Mexico, urging definite outline of policy and demanding the withdrawal of American troops. (R. 54:31)
- June 16. Commander of the Carranza forces in Chihuahua informs General Pershing that any extension of the American lines would be a hostile act. (R. 54:31)
- June 18. President Wilson issued a call for the National Guard, for the protection of the frontier against further Mexican aggression. (R. 54:31)
- June 20. United States in strong note, in reply to the Mexican one of May 22, demands improvement in Mexico. (R. 54:31)

- June 22. American troops engage Mexicans at Carrizal and some Americans were captured.
- June 22. United States sent note to Mexican government to the Pan-American governments, with declaration that United States intends only to end conditions menacing American order.
- June 24. American government demanded the return of the prisoners taken by Mexican troops at Carrizal.
- June 25. Mexican government assented to American demand for release of captured troops.
- July 12. Mexican government proposes joint international commission for settlement of difficulties with the United States.
- July 28. The United States government notified Carranza that his proposal for a joint international commission was accepted, with the suggestion that the powers of the commissioners be enlarged beyond the limits proposed in the Mexican note of July 12.

4. EUROPEAN WAR

1915

- May 23. Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. (C. H. II:814)
- May 24. Italians invaded Austria.
- May 25. Italy declared a blockade of Austria. (C. H. II:808)
- May 25. Great Britain formed a coalition cabinet. (C. H. II:813)
- May 25. The United States issued a proclamation of neutrality, covering the entry of Italy into the war. At the request of Italy, the United States took over Italian diplomatic affairs at Vienna. (C. H. II:815)
- May 28. Germany's reply to American note on Lusitania seeks delay by asking for information about the status of the ship, alleging it was armed and carried ammunition. (C. H. II:487)
- May 29. The German Foreign Office issued statement urging that American shipping circles be warned against traversing waters around the British Isles. (C. H. II:808)
- June 1. Great Britain declared a blockade of the coast of Asia Minor. (A. 10:381)
- June 3. San Marino aligns herself with the Allies. (C. H. II:814)
- June 7. German note to United States states that Frye case must be submitted first to German prize court procedure.
- June 8. William Jennings Bryan resigned as Secretary of State, stating that he could not join in the note to Germany without violating what he deems his duty to his country. (C. H. II:807)
- June 9. President Wilson sent note to Germany demanding reparation for Lusitania victims and a pledge not to repeat attacks on merchantmen without observing international rules. (C. H. II:807)
- June 16. The United States government received a report on the injuries to the Nebraskan, struck by a torpedo or a mine, tending to show she was torpedoed by a German submarine. (C. H. II:1020)
- June 22. Austro-German forces captured Lemberg held by the Russians since September 3, 1914. (C. H. II:1014)
- June 24. The American government, in reply to the German note on the Frye case, renews its efforts to settle the claim by diplomatic negotiations, as it cannot recognize the propriety of submitting it to the German prize court.
- July 6. Italy closed the Adriatic Sea to navigation by merchant vessels of all countries. (C. H. II:1018)
- July 7. The United States government seized the wireless plant at Sayville, N. Y., which was German owned, in the interests of neutrality. (C. H. II:1020)

- July 10. Germany. In reply to the third Wilson note, Germany reiterates her assurances that American ships in legitimate trade will not be interfered with. (C. H. II:1020)
- July 13. Italy. Austrian attempts to penetrate Italian territory are repulsed. (C. H. II:1017)
- July 15. The United States protested the seizure of the cargo of the *Neches* by the British government.
- July 15. Germany expressed formal regrets for the torpedoing of the American SS. *Nebraskan*, stating it was due to a mistake, and offered to pay damages. (C. H. II:1020)
- July 21. United States. The fourth note sent to Germany declared that further attacks on ships carrying Americans would be regarded as deliberately unfriendly and that this government will contend for the freedom of the seas without compromise and at whatever cost. (C. H. II:1224)
- July 26. Great Britain replied to American note of March 30, protesting against the British Orders in Council aiming to cut off overseas trade with Germany. (C. H. II:1224)
- July 30. Germany's note to the United States upheld her contentions in the *Frye* case. (C. H. II:1224)
- Aug. 4. Great Britain's reply to American note protesting against the blockade upholds the blockade as strictly within international law, but is willing to submit disputed cases of seizure to arbitration.
- Aug. 5. Germans occupy Warsaw. (C. H. II:1222)
- Aug. 10. The United States accepted the plan set forth in the German note for fixing damages for the *William P. Frye*. (C. H. III:204)
- Aug. 12. The United States sent a reply to the Austrian note of June 20, stating that this government will not stop the shipment of munitions to Europe. (C. H. III:204)
- Aug. 17. Italy demands that Turkey immediately release reservists and other Italian subjects at Turkish ports. (C. H. III:204)
- Aug. 19. The *White Star* liner *Arabic* was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine.
- Aug. 20. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in the United States sent to his government a memorandum concerning activities in America to interfere with trade with the Allies.
- Aug. 21. Italy declared war on Turkey. (C. H. III:204)
- Sept. 1. Germany notified the State Department that she will sink no more liners without warning. (C. H. III:204)
- Sept. 9. President Wilson, in a note to Austria, demanded the recall of Ambassador *Dumba* for attempting to cripple American industries. (C. H. III:203)
- Sept. 9. Germany began new offensive on western approaches to Verdun. (C. H. III:203)
- Sept. 19. Germany accepted proposal relative to the arbitration of the *Frye* case.
- Sept. 22. Bulgaria ordered the mobilization of her army for the preservation of armed neutrality, stating that Greece and Roumania would also remain neutral.
- Sept. 24. Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs replied to the American note of August 16, concerning trade and munitions of war.
- Sept. 24. Greece ordered the mobilization of her land and sea forces as a reply to Bulgaria's war movements.
- Oct. 5. Germany disavows the sinking of the SS. *Arabic*, and offers to pay indemnity.
- Oct. 6. French and British troops were landed at Salonika, Greece. The Greek king dismissed Premier *Venizelos* and a coalition cabinet was formed.

- Oct. 7. Austro-Germans invaded Serbia.
- Oct. 10, 14. Fifth American Peace Congress, San Francisco.
- Oct. 13. Greece refused to aid Serbia and notified her that their alliance did not hold.
- Oct. 14. Bulgaria officially declared war on Serbia.
- Oct. 15. Great Britain declared war on Bulgaria.
- Oct. 16. France declared war on Bulgaria.
- Oct. 19. Italy declared war on Bulgaria. The Italian fleet sailed for the Aegean Sea.
- Oct. 20. Great Britain offers Cyprus to Greece on condition the Greeks join the Allies.
- Oct. 20. Great Britain. Instructions to armed merchant ships issued by the British admiralty. A copy of these instructions presented by Germany to the United States. (A. 10:381)
- Oct. 21. The United States Secretary of State replied to British notes concerning interference with neutral trade, dated January 7, February 10, June 22, July 23 and 31, and August 13.
- Nov. 8. Secretary of State Lansing sent note to Great Britain declaring the blockade illegal.
- Nov. 10. Italian SS. Ancona torpedoed and sunk by an Austrian submarine.
- Nov. 29. Germany advances agreement on arrangements for arbitrating the case of the William P. Frye and submits to the United States project of an arbitration compromise.
- Dec. 1. American Ambassador Penfield demanded an explanation of the sinking of the Italian SS. Ancona.
- Dec. 8. United States. Secretary of State Lansing, in a note to Austria, demanded a disavowal of the sinking of the Ancona and assurances that such acts would not be repeated. (C. H. III:816)
- Dec. 10. Germany, in response to the request of the United States government, recalled Capt. Karl Boy-Ed, naval attaché, and Capt. Franz von Papen, military attaché, for improper activities in naval and military matters. Germany's request for an explanation was refused. (C. H. III:816)
- Dec. 10. The Austrian reply to the American note on the Ancona case disputed facts presented by the United States and offered "to enter into an exchange of views."
- Dec. 15. The Greek Army evacuated the territory from Dorrán to Salonika, leaving it in the hands of the Allies. (C. H. III:1019)
- Dec. 23. United States. The second Ancona note demanded full disavowal, but in a milder tone than the first one.
- Dec. 23. Japanese passenger SS. Yasaki Maru sunk by a submarine in the Mediterranean without warning.
- Dec. 23. British House of Commons passed drastic measure to regulate trade with enemy belligerents.
- Dec. 30. Austria. The Austrian note on the Ancona case yields in part, admitting the principle of the safety of passengers.
- 1916
- Jan. 1. The British passenger SS. Persia was sunk without warning in the Mediterranean, American Consul R. M. McNeely being drowned with more than 200 others.
- Jan. 4. The United States sent a note to Great Britain relative to the removal of mail from steamships.
- Jan. 17. Montenegro obtained separate peace on terms of unconditional surrender, according to report.
- Jan. 19. Paris reported peace negotiations between Montenegro and Austria broken off.
- Jan. 20. Montenegro resumed hostilities against Austria, the peace negotiations having fallen through.

- Jan. 26. The United States protested the provisions of December 23 by the British House of Commons to regulate trade with enemy belligerents.
- Feb. 1. The British passenger liner Appam was brought into Hampton Roads by a German prize crew, having been captured by a German raider. Both England and Germany filed claims to the Appam. (C. H. III:1226)
- Feb. 8. United States-Germany. A final agreement on the Lusitania case reported informally reached by Lansing and Von Bernstorff.
- Feb. 12. Italy, by a royal proclamation, broke off all trade relations with Germany. The Italian government requisitioned 34 German ships interned in Italian ports. (C. H. IV:206)
- Feb. 14. Lusitania settlement held up pending the consideration of the effect of Germany's declared intention to sink armed merchantmen without warning.
- Feb. 25. Kermanshah is captured by Russians. (R. 53:407)
- Mar. 2. Germany's army resumed the attack on Verdun. (C. H. IV:205)
- Mar. 2. United States. The American Department of State replied to German contentions relative to rights of captured British SS. Appam interned in American port.
- Mar. 3. The United States Senate, in response to the request of President Wilson, tabled a resolution forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchant vessels.
- Mar. 8. The United States House of Representatives, in response to the request of the President, tabled a resolution forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchant vessels.
- Mar. 8. Germany sent a note to the United States government, charging England with forcing her into submarine warfare and offering to observe international law prevailing before the war if England would do likewise. (C. H. IV:206)
- Mar. 8. Germany declared war on Portugal.
- Mar. 24. French SS. Sussex torpedoed with Americans on board.
- Mar. 25. The American Department of State issued a memorandum on the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas.
- Mar. 25. Verdun set afire by German shells. (C. H. IV:397)
- Mar. 27. President Wilson addressed a note to Germany, asking an explanation of the attack on the SS. Sussex.
- Mar. 30. The governments of the Entente Allies presented to Secretary Lansing a joint reply to the protest made by the United States against the seizure of neutral mails. The note asserted the intention of the Allies to continue searching parcel post packages for contraband. (C. H. IV:398)
- April 8. Germany denies the sinking of the Sussex.
- April 9. German forces united for a general attack on Verdun. (R. 53:544)
- April 18. United States. Secretary Lansing addressed a note to Germany declaring that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." (C. H. IV:590)
- April 18. President Wilson summoned Congress to explain his ultimatum to Germany. (C. H. IV:590)
- April 20. Russia landed a large force of men at Marseilles, France. (C. H. IV:589)

- April 24. Great Britain. The British ambassador at Washington delivered a memorandum replying to the American note of October 21, 1915, relating to interference with neutral trade. (R. 53:669)
- April 25. Second Russian force arrived in France. (C. H. IV:589)
- April 27. The Entente Allies held an economic conference at Paris, to discuss conditions resulting from the war. (R. 53:669)
- May 4. Germany. The German reply made a new concession limiting the scope of submarine warfare, but made the permanency of the concession contingent upon future action by the United States in forcing Great Britain to "observe the rules of international law," stating that should the United States fail in this, Germany "reserves complete liberty of decision to meet" the new situation. (C. H. IV:590)
- May 7. Germans gained footing in the first French line west of the Meuse near Fort Douaumont. (C. H. IV:589)
- May 7. The United States accepted the declaration of abandonment of submarine warfare by Germany, but declared that the new policy could not be made contingent upon the result of the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and England. (R. 53:671)
- May 8. The White Star liner *Cymric* torpedoed without warning. There were no Americans on board. (C. H. IV:590)
- May 13. Germany. The food situation became so serious that Clemens Delbrueck, minister of the interior, resigned and Tortlowitz von Batocki was appointed food dictator by the Kaiser. (C. H. IV:782)
- May 15. The British Foreign Office announced that the differences between Greece and the Entente Allies had been settled amicably and that there would be no violation of Greek neutrality. (R. 53:317:670)
- May 19. Austrian offensive forces further evacuate positions held by Italians. (R. 53:671)
- May 21. The third month of the battle of Verdun opens; the Germans renew their assaults. (R. 54:29)
- May 22. The French forces regain the offensive at Verdun and recapture Fort Douaumont. (R. 54:29)
- May 23. Germany. A War Food Department is created to deal with all matters relating to the supply and distribution of food. (R. 54:29)
- May 24. The United States protests to Great Britain concerning belligerent examination of parcels and letter mails. (R. 54:29)
- May 26. Bulgarian troops invade Greece. (R. 54:29)
- May 31. The British fleet engaged the German fleet, just emerging from Kiel into the North Sea, in the greatest naval battle of the world, off the coast of Jutland. (C. H. IV:782)
- June 5. The British cruiser *Hampshire* was sunk off Orkney Island. Earl Kitchener and his staff and the entire crew were lost. (R. 54:29)
- June 8. The Entente Powers adopt "precautionary restrictive measures against Greece, creating a commercial blockade." The Greek cabinet decided upon partial demobilization. (R. 54:30)
- June 11. Italy. The Italian cabinet resigned, following the failure of a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies. (R. 54:30)
- June 14. Economic Conference of the Allies opened at Paris; ministers of commerce and finance in attendance. (R. 54:30)
- June 19. Italy. A coalition ministry is constituted. (R. 54:30)
- June 20. Results of the Economic Conference were issued by the British Board of Trade, stating that trade restrictions against Germany will continue after the war is ended. (R. 54:30)
- June 21. The United States makes additional charges to Austria-Hungary, relative to the sinking of the American SS. *Petrolite*.

5. INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN CONFERENCES

1915

- May 24-29. First Pan-American Financial Conference, Washington, D. C.
 Oct. 10-13. Fifth American Peace Congress, San Francisco.
 Dec. 6-8. International Trade Conference, under the auspices of the National Association of Manufacturers, New York City.
 Dec. 27-Jan. 8, 1916. Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, Washington.
 Dec. 28-30. Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington.
 Dec. 29. American Institute of International Law inaugurated, Washington.

1916

- May 13. Eighty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Peace Society, Washington.
 May 17-19. Twenty-second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, Mohonk Lake, New York.
 June 21-July 1. Conference on International Relations for University Students, under the auspices of the Federation of International Polity Clubs, Cleveland, Ohio.

6. OTHER EVENTS

1915

- Jan. 7. Venezuela submitted a proposition to the Special Neutrality Committee, concerning the rights of neutrals.
 Mar. 8. Senor Alberto Membreno, Minister of Honduras and later President, submitted to the Pan-American Union a project of treaty for the advancement of peace.
 July 27. New revolutionary movement in Haiti begun. (R. 52:287)
 July 28. Haitian revolutionists kill President Sam; American cruiser Washington arrives and lands marines and sailors to prevent further rioting. (R. 52:287)
 July 29. Rear Admiral Caperton, with a force of American marines and sailors from the cruiser Washington, assumes control at Port-au-Prince. (R. 52:287)
 Sept. 4. Rear Admiral Caperton proclaimed martial law in Haitian territory occupied by United States forces, declaring that the new government was unable to control conditions although endeavoring to do so.
 Sept. 16. Treaty between the United States and Haiti signed at Port-au-Prince, providing for American supervision of Haitian finances and constabulary. (R. 52:417)

1916

- Jan. 21. American Institute of International Law. The Institute, composed of delegates from 21 American republics, made public a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations. (A. 10:124)
 Feb. 28. Death of Henri Harburger, President of the Institut de Droit International. (A. 10:385)
 May 1. President Jiminez of Santo Domingo was impeached for alleged violation of the constitution in connection with the budget. (R. 52:672)
 May 15. American marines entered the city of San Domingo to guarantee the free election of a Provisional President, to succeed General Jiminez, who resigned after a revolutionary outbreak. (R. 52:673)

APPENDIX C

CORRESPONDENTS OF THE PERMANENT OFFICE OF THE CONFERENCE

Because of limited hotel accommodations, it is impossible for Mr. and Mrs. Smiley to entertain as their guests at one annual conference more than approximately three hundred persons. While, therefore, comparatively few of the many hundreds of interested individuals who desire to cooperate in the work of the conferences can be invited in any given year, in 1907 the permanent office of the conference devised a plan to provide for such individuals an opportunity to cooperate as "Correspondents" of that office. Enrollment as a "Correspondent" in no way precludes invitation to any annual conference. "Correspondents" receive without charge all publications of the conference and occasional circulars of information from the office, which also gladly answers their inquiries. In return, they agree to use their influence to bring about in their respective communities a more general knowledge of the possibilities and accomplishments of arbitration and other agencies for the avoidance of war, to cooperate when practicable with the conference office in furthering special movements, and to keep the office informed of local activity.

About six hundred "Correspondents," residing in forty-five states and territories in the United States and in eighteen nations of Europe, Asia and South and Central America, have been enrolled. Further information may be obtained from the Secretary of the Conference.—ED.

APPENDIX D

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATING WITH THE CONFERENCE OFFICE

Upon the authorization of the Conference of 1902, a committee of three business men was named to enlist, through the aid of the permanent conference office, the cooperation of business organizations of some of the more important cities in the United States. There was a gratifying response to the first attempt, twenty-one organizations out of twenty-four endorsing a circular embodying the ideas of the committee on "Why Business Men Should Promote International Arbitration" and "How Business Men can Promote International Arbitration." (See Conference Report, 1903, pages 74-79.)

The interest has grown until 1916 records show a list of 191 Cooperating and Corresponding Business Organizations, including 7 from Canada and 8 from other countries, having 38 Committees on International Arbitration, and sending an average representation of 40 to each annual conference. Stated numbers of bulletins, published for the purpose by the conference committee, are distributed by 48 of the bodies. Most of the 15 bulletins already published have been printed as parts of the conference reports of the respective years.

The participation of business men has become a feature of each conference, and their practical views have long given a strong backing to the sentiment produced through the annual proceedings.*

A complete list of that date can be found in the conference report of 1914, pages 176-178. Further information may be obtained from the Secretary of the Conference.—ED.

* A list of delegates to the 1916 conference and copy of their Declaration may be found on pages 215 and 214, respectively, of this report.—ED.

INDEX

(Names of speakers in small capitals; titles of speeches in italics.)

- ABBOTT, LYMAN, 31, 52, 89, 229;
address by, 32.
- A. B. C. Mediation, 197, 201.
(See also "Mexico," "United States.")
- Act, The, of 1793, 31.
- Alabama claims dispute, 18, 52-53, 196. (See also "Great Britain," "United States.")
- Algeciras Conference, part of United States in, 73-74.
- Aliens, federal protection of, in the United States, 8, 38, 203-204.
- Alvarez, Alejandro, 2, 229.
- Alliances. (See "Holy Alliance," "League to Enforce Peace," "Triple Alliance," "Triple Entente.")
- Alliances, entangling, 47, 145; described, 103. (See also "United States Constitution.")
- Alsace-Lorraine, 27-28, 67, 163, 221. (See also "European war.")
- American Association for International Conciliation, 50.
- American conferences in 1915-16, 244.
- American Congresses, 198-200. (See also "Pan-America.")
- American Expansion, arguments against, 47, 62. (See also "Columbia," "Mexico," "Spain and United States.")
- American Institute of International Law, 117, 244.
- American Journal of International Law, 235.
- American Peace Congress, Fifth, 244.
- American Peace Society, 108-109, 139, 244.
- American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 139.
- American Spirit, the, in Internationalism*, 223.
- Ames, Allan P., 3, 229.
- Amsterdam Board of Trade, 215.
- Angell, Norman, 46, 47, 50, 138-139, 209.
- Antelope case, 15.
- Arbitral Justice, Court of (see "International Court of Arbitral Justice").
- Arbitration (see "International Arbitration").
- Arbitration, the Permanent Court of (see "Hague Court").
- Arbitration Treaties, the Limitation of, and the "Preparedness" Crisis*, 216.
- Arbitrations (see "International Arbitration, cases of").
- Argentine Republic, 115, 202; attitude of, toward Pan-Americanism, 187-188; part of, in A. B. C. mediation (see "Mexico," "United States"); relations of, with England, 196, with France, 196, with United States, 187-188. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Armaments, 60-61, 65-88; arguments against 77-86; as police (see "International Police"); cost of, 78-79; discussed, 44-53; hinder mediation, 80; influence of, on arbitration, 85-86; limitation of, 47, 79-80; not the

- main issue, 33-35, 44-46, 65-68; United States, 69-70 (see also "Preparedness"); value of, 65-76.
- Armaments and Economics*, 86.
- Armaments, Large, Provocative of War?* 65.
- Army and Navy, the United States, 152. (See also "Armaments," "Preparedness.")
- Arnold, John J., 97.
- Asquith, Premier, 120.
- Asser, M. T. M. C., 80.
- Associated Advertising Clubs of America, 96.
- Auburn Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Austria, 68, 86, 148, 163; relations of, with Servia, 68, 116. (See also "European War.")
- "Balance of Power," 45, 48-49, 117, 121, 134, 178; and the Monroe Doctrine, 185. (See also "Alliances" "Monroe Doctrine.")
- Balkans, wars in the, 178, 209.
- Bannwart, Carl J., 215, 229.
- BARTHOLDT, RICHARD, 174, 229; address by, 169.
- Bates, E. P., 215, 229.
- Bauer, Ralph S., 215, 229.
- Beer, George Louis, 3, 229.
- Beernaert, M. Auguste, 80.
- Belgium 25, 87, 135, 148; part of, in European War, 24, 135. (See also "European War.")
- Berger, Victor, 132.
- Bieberstein, Marschall von, 84.
- Binghamton Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- BLAKESLEE, GEORGE H., 2, 229; remarks by, 89.
- BORCHARD, EDWIN M., 229; address by, 37.
- BORLAND, WILLIAM P., 229; address by, 181.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, 85-86, 221. (See also "European War.")
- BOYNTON, NEHEMIAH, 229; remarks by, 223.
- Brazil, 115, 197; in A. B. C. mediation (see "Mexico," "United States"); relations of, with Great Britain, 196, with Portugal, 196. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Briand, Monsieur, 59-60.
- Bronx Board of Trade, 215.
- Brown, Elmer Ellsworth, 2, 229.
- BRYAN, WILLIAM JENNINGS, 130, 140, 175, 218; address by, 143.
- "Bryan Peace Treaties" (see "Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties").
- Bryce, James, 111.
- Business Men: declaration made by, 214-215; part taken by, in conference, 212-215; share of, toward peace, 4, 95-96, 99, 212-215, 234, 246. (See also "Business Organizations," "Commerce.")
- Business Organizations: committee on 3, 246; cooperation of, with Lake Mohonk Conference, 4, 212-215, 234, 246; delegates from, present at 22d conference, list of, 215, meetings of, 234, resolutions of, 214-215. (See also "Commerce.")
- BUTLER, CHARLES HENRY, 229; remarks by, 216.
- Butler, Nicholas Murray, 135.
- CALDERON, IGNACIO, 2, 181, 229; address by, 177.
- Camden Board of Trade, 215.
- Canada: business organizations of, cooperating with Lake Mohonk Conference, 4; relations of, with United States, 112, 161 (see also "Great Britain," "United States").

- Canevaro claim, 200.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 192, 194.
- Central American Court of Justice, 201. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Central Powers (see "Triple Alliance").
- CHADWICK, FRENCH E., 2, 44, 229; presents Pugsley prize to winner, 50.
- Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 95-96, 215; peace referendum of, 99.
- Chile, part of, in A. B. C. Mediation (see "Mexico," "United States"). (See also "Pan-America.")
- Chinese Exclusion case, 14.
- Chronological list of events, 235-244.
- Cincinnati Business Men's Club, 215.
- Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- CLARK, JOHN B., 2, 229; remarks by, 86.
- Colleges and Universities, prizes for essays by students of, 44.
- Colombia: relations of, with Central America, 197, with Chile, 197, with Ecuador, 197, with Mexico, 197, with Peru, 197, with United States, 21-22, 26, 62, 197, with Venezuela, 197. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Commerce: effect of war on, 161-162; internationalization of, 119; "open door" policy, 107, 127-128, 164. (See also "Business Men," "Business Organizations.")
- Commission of Conciliation (see "League to Enforce Peace").
- Commissions of Inquiry, 80. (See also "Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties.")
- Committees: general, 2; on business organizations, 3, 246; on press, 3.
- Conciliation in settlement of international disputes (see "League to Enforce Peace, program of").
- Conferences, American, in 1915-16, 244.
- Conferences, International, in 1915-16, 244.
- Congress, The United States, 152, 213.
- Contents, 5-7.
- Corcoran, J. H. 215, 230.
- Correspondents of the permanent office of the Lake Mohonk Conference, 4; status of, 245.
- Court of Arbitral Justice (see "International Court of Arbitral Justice").
- Court of Arbitration, the permanent (see "Hague Court").
- Crane, Francis E., 215, 230.
- Crimean War, 221.
- Crosman, George L., 215, 230.
- Cuba, independence of, 46, 62, 64-65.
- Current History, 235.
- Declaration of London, 154.
- Defense, National (see "Armaments," "Preparedness").
- Delegates of business organizations, present at conference, 215, meetings of, 234. (See also "Business Organizations.")
- Denver Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Denver Real Estate Exchange, 215.
- Descamps, Chevalier, 80.
- Disarmament, fallacy of, 35-36, 48. (See also "Armaments," "Preparedness.")
- Dogger Bank Incident, 80.
- Doggett, L. L., 215, 230.
- Drago, M. Luis M., 80, 109.

- Dumba, Baron, 130, 143, 144.
 Dunning, Albert E., 3, 230.
- East Florida claims, 41. (See also "Spain," "United States.")
- Economic Pressure, the Sanction of (see "Sanctions").
- Economics and Armaments*, 86.
- ELKINTON, JOSEPH, 230; remarks by, 50, 206.
- Enforcement, The, of Unselfishness: An Analogy*, 90.
- England, 130; at the First Hague Conference, 85; attitude of, toward arbitration, 85, toward the Monroe Doctrine, 185; relations of, with Argentina, 196, with Ireland, 163, with Germany, 67-68. (See also "European War," "Great Britain.")
- Erie Board of Commerce, 215.
- Europe and Latin America, and United States and Latin America international understanding between, compared, 187-195.
- European War, 9, 23, 24, 67, 119, 124, 177-179, 207, 239-243; Belgium, 24, 135; causes of, 67-68, 150, 160, 178-179; chronological list of events in, 239-243; extent of, 24; Germany 24; influence of, on United States, 129, 133-134, 147, 148-149, 153-154; lessons from, 67, 124, 147, 177-179. (See also "Alliances," "League to Enforce Peace," "Neutrals.")
- Eyschen, M., 80.
- Fabian Society of London, 100, 110.
- FAIRLAMB, GEORGE R., JR., 50, 230; remarks by, 44.
- Farnsworth, Frederick E., 2, 230.
- Farquhar, A. B., 2, 215, 230.
- Filene, Edward A., 99, 112.
- Fisher, Sir John A., 85.
- Force, right use of, in international affairs, 34-35, 63, 74. (See also "Armaments," "Preparedness.")
- Force, the Substitution of Law for, to Eliminate Race Issues*, 169.
- France, 25, 27-28, 40, 48, 130; attitude of, toward Monroe Doctrine, 185, toward world federation, 120; relations of, with Argentina, 196, with Germany, 67, 68, 160-161, 172, with Great Britain, 64, with Italy, 80, with Mexico, 196, with United States, 48, 63-64, 147. (See also "European War.")
- Franco-Prussian War, 27, 207, 221.
- Franks, Robert A., 2, 230.
- French, Howard B., 2, 215, 230.
- Germany, 25, 27-28, 87, 118, 134, 148; as a nation, 166; at First Hague Conference, 80-81, 85; attitude of, toward arbitration, 85, toward Monroe Doctrine, 185, toward world federation, 119; in the European War, 24 (see also "European War"); need of territorial expansion, 67, 211; relations of, with Austria, 68, with England, 67-68, with France, 67, 68, 160-161, 172, with Great Britain, 48, 84-85, 210-211, with Russia, 68, with United States, 46-47, 65, 84, 144.
- Gildersleeve, E. D., 215, 230.
- Good Offices (see "Mediation").
- Great Britain, 40, 48, 104, 118, 134, 142, 161; at First Hague Conference, 81; attitude of, toward world federation, 119; relations of, with Brazil, 196, with France, 64, with Germany, 48, 84-85, 210-211, with Russia,

- 80 (see also "Dogger Bank Incident"), with United States, 18, 37, 48, 52-53, 65, 77-78, 130, 144, 147, 156, 196, 200. (See also "European War," "Great Britain," "United States").
- Greece, 134.
- Grey, Sir Edward, 59-60, 95.
- Hagerup, M. Francis, 80.
- Hague Conferences, 16, 17, 41, 47, 107, 115, 121, 124, 135, 141, 199, 204, 214; a step toward an International Court, 16-17; commissions of inquiry, 80 (see also "Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties"); Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers, 109 (see also "Neutrals, rights and duties of"); Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 107, 108, 114, 117, 200; court of arbitral justice (see "International Court of Justice;"); international prize court, 47, 109, 157; Pan-America at the, 200; part of England in, 85, Germany, 80-81, 85, Great Britain, 81, United States 17, 200; permanent court of arbitration (see "Hague Court").
- Hague Conference, Third, Preparatory Committee, 111.
- Hague Court, 42, 48, 80-81, 109, 110, 112, 114, 121, 139, 200, 222; cases tried by, 8, 37, 47-48; weaknesses of, 48.
- HAMILTON, W. P., 3, 230; remarks by, 136.
- Harrisburg Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Hensley, Walter L., 203.
- Hervey, Henry D., 215, 230.
- Herzegovina and Bosnia, 85-86, 221. (See also "European War.")
- Hewitt, Arthur, 215, 230.
- History, the Trend of*, 89.
- Hoehn, W. F., 215, 230.
- Holy Alliance, 108, 115, 117, 121.
- HOUSTON, HERBERT S., 112, 139, 230; address by, 94.
- HOWLAND, HAROLD J., 3, 230; remarks by, 90.
- Hoyt, Albert E., 3, 230.
- HULL, WILLIAM I., 44, 50, 76; address by, 77; remarks by, 51.
- HUMPHREY, ANDREW B., 2, 230; remarks by, 204.
- "Hyphenated Americans," 170-171; attitude of the press toward, 173.
- "*Hyphenated American, The: A Plea for Fair Play*," 174.
- Individual Morality, Rules of, Difficulties in the Way of Applying to the Relations of Independent States*, 20.
- Industry (see "Commerce").
- Institute of International Law, 194.
- Intercollegiate Peace Association, 234.
- International Agreement, An, for Emergencies Arising in War*, 153.
- International and American Conferences List of, 244.
- International Arbitration, 80-81, 137; attitude of England toward, 85, Germany, 85; cases of, 47-48, 52-53, 61, 80-81, 196; dependent on world federation, 123; growth of, 17; influence of armaments on, 85-86; in program of League to Enforce Peace, 141; permanent court of (see "Hague Court"); practicability of, 39, 47-48, 52-53, 99; prize for essays on, 44; relations of business to (see

- "Commerce"); treaties of (see "Treaties").
- International Arbitration and Conciliation*, 122.
- International Arbitration: An Estimate of the Situation Showing the Necessity for a Revision of Pacifist Methods*, 44.
- International Arbitration, Returning to Original Mohonk Idea of*, 204.
- International conferences in 1915-16, 244.
- International Court of Justice, 10-20, 35, 42, 47, 55, 109, 115, 121, 124-125, 135, 215; Hague Conferences a step toward, 16-17; necessity of, 10; United States Supreme Court a basis for, 14-17; Universal Postal Union, an example as international organ, 18.
- International Court of Justice for the Decision of International Disputes, an, the Form of the Agreement and the Cooperation Necessary for the Creation of*, 10.
- International Court of Claims, 199. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Internationalism and Nationalism compared, 168-169; dependent on true nationalism, 224-227; enemies of, 166.
- International Law: American Institute of, 117, 244; differences in growth of and national law, 12-13; essential essence of, 10-20; in the European War, 153-159; present limitations of, 20-31, 153-155.
- International Peace: Carnegie Endowment for, 192, 194; Pan-American Cooperation toward, 177-203; plans for (see "League to Enforce Peace," "Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties," "World State"); relation of business to (see "Commerce").
- International Peace Congress, Fifth, 96, 244.
- International Peace, The Monroe Doctrine as a Factor in*, 181.
- International Pecuniary Claims, The Adjustment of: Their Removal from Political to Legal Channels*, 37.
- International Police, 49, 61, 100, 108-122; in history, 108-109. (See also "Armaments," "League to Enforce Peace," "Sanctions.")
- International Police*, 108.
- International Prize Court, 47, 109, 157.
- Interparliamentary Union, 109, 141.
- Italy: attitude of, toward a world federation, 120; relations of, with France, 80, with Peru, 200, with Turkey, 42, with United States, 147, with Uruguay, 197.
- Japan, 134; attitude of, toward world federation, 120; relations of, with Russia, 212, with United States, 64, 84.
- Jay's Treaty, 17, 61, 196.
- JEFFERSON, CHARLES E., 230; address by, 82.
- Jersey City Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Johnson, Robert Underwood, 3, 230.
- JONES, J. HARRIS, 215, 230; remarks by, 206.
- Judicial Arbitral Court (see "International Court of Justice").
- Justiciable, defined, 56-57.
- KING, HORATIO C., 231; remarks by, 51.
- Kingston Chamber of Commerce, 215.

- KIRCHWEY, GEORGE W., 2, 139, 141, 231; address by, 131.
- KNIGHT, AUSTIN M., 77, 231; address by, 65.
- KREHBIEL, EDWARD B., 231; address by, 159.
- Ladd's "Essay on a Congress of Nations," 108-109.
- LaFontaine, Henri, 2, 231.
- Lake Mohonk Conference, 17, 50, 54, 79, 94, 102, 137, 173, 203, 204, 216, 227, 244; annual reports of, how obtainable, 4; committees of, 2-3; cooperation of business organizations with, 212-215, 234, 246; correspondents of permanent office of, 245; delegates present at, from business organizations 215, meetings of, 234; members of 1916 conference, 229; nature, origin and purposes of, 4, 100; officers of, 2-3; permanent office of, 2, 4, 20, 245, 246; prizes offered by, 44; report of treasurer of, 20; resolutions of 1916 conference, 8.
- Lansing Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Latin America, and United States, international understanding between, and Europe compared, 187-195. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Latin American center, a, the United States as, 194-195.
- Law, the Substitution of, for Force, to Eliminate Race Issues*, 169.
- League to Enforce Peace, 48-49, 90-93, 94-99, 125, 137-139, 218; arguments against, 55-56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 100-122, 131-136, 144-147; arguments for, 54-65, 139-142; in relation to German Constitution, 118, to Monroe Doctrine, 115, 116, 146, to United States Constitution, 61-63, 113, 117, 146; in the light of history, 89-90; origin of, 54-55; part of United States in, 60, 111, 116, 118-119, 127, 137-138; program of, 54-55. 99, 101, 111, 135, endorsed by business men, 99, 213-214. (See also "Alliances.")
- League to Enforce Peace, The Program of the*, 54.
- Leighton, R. E., 215, 231.
- Lichnowsky, Prince, 84.
- Limitation of Armaments (see "Armaments").
- Linsley, Frank J., 215, 231.
- Lynch, Frederick, 2, 231.
- Lynn Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- McCarroll, William, 3, 231.
- McCormick, S. B., 215, 231.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 46, 48, 50.
- Maine State Board of Trade, 215.
- MARBURG, THEODORE, 95, 231; remarks by, 139.
- Marshall, E. P., 2, 215, 231.
- Marshall, John, 14-15, 31, 124.
- Massachusetts State Board of Trade, 215.
- MEAD, MRS. EDWIN D., 231; remarks by, 137.
- Mediation (and "Good Offices"), 73; between Mexico and United States (see "Mexico," "United States"); offer of, by United States in European War, 80.
- Meetings, special, held during 1916 conference, 234.
- Members of 1916 conference, list of, 229.
- Mexico, 9, 179, 202; at the Hague, 200; mediation by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 197, 201; relations of, with Central America, 197, with Colombia, 197, with France, 196, with Peru,

- 197, with United States, 22, 36, 42, 65, 196, 197, 200, 201, 209, 238-239.
- Militarism, dangers of, 75, 82-86; defined, 75; false philosophy of, 150-153. (See also "Armaments," "Preparedness.")
- Monroe Doctrine, 26, 53, 68, 108, 115, 116, 120, 130, 141, 142, 164, 179, 211; as argument against League to Enforce Peace, 146; attitude of England, France and Germany toward, 185; good results from, 181-187; in relation to Pan-Americanism, 180, to the balance of power, 185; may be out of date, 182-183; part of text of, 182. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Monroe Doctrine, The, as a Factor in International Peace*, 181.
- Moore, John Bassett, 44, 102.
- Moore, Joseph B., 2, 231.
- Moores, J. H., 2, 215, 231.
- Morality, Individual Difficulties in the Way of Applying Rules of, to the Relations of Independent States*, 20.
- Moroccan controversy, 73-74, 209.
- MOXOM, PHILIP S., 231; remarks by, 212, 227.
- Munster, Count de, 85.
- Murphy, Daniel B., 215, 231.
- Nation, a, defined, 159-169.
- National Association of Manufacturers, 215.
- National Defense (see "Armaments," "Preparedness").
- National honor, 46, 48, 53, 165, 199, 201-202.
- Nationalism: and Internationalism compared, 168-169; true internationalism dependent on, 224-227.
- Nationalism—An Anachronism*, 159.
- National League of Commission Merchants, 215.
- National Wholesale Dry Goods Association, 215.
- Navies (see "Armaments," "Preparedness").
- Navy and Army, the United States, 152. (See also "Armaments," "Preparedness.")
- Navy League, 96.
- NELSON, ERNESTO, 231; address by, 187.
- Neutrals, rights and duties of, 47, 65, 94, 135-136, 153-159.
- Newark Board of Trade, 215.
- New Britain Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Newfoundland Fisheries arbitration (see "North Atlantic Fisheries").
- New Haven Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Non-intercourse, the sanction of (see "Sanctions").
- North Atlantic Fisheries, 37, 200.
- Ocean commerce, immunity during war (see "Commerce," "European War," "Neutrals.")
- Officers and Committees, 2, 20.
- "Open door" policy, 127-128, 164; should exist in seized territories, 107.
- Orinoco Steamship Company case, 200.
- Panama (see "Colombia," "United States").
- Panama Canal, 64.
- Pan-America: at the Hague Conferences, 200; attitude of, toward proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, 115; Congresses of, 199-200; cooperation of, toward peace, 177-203 (see also "American Institute of International Law"); court of arbitration of,

- 202-203; Financial Conference, 244; United States as a part of, 194-195. (See also "Latin America," "Pan-Americanism," "Pan American Union.")
- Pan-American Cooperation, Possibilities of, in the Settlement of International Differences*, 195.
- Pan-American Doctrine, The*, 177.
- Pan-American Financial Conference, 244.
- Pan-Americanism, development of, desirable, 187-195; United States a leader in, 181, 194-195. (See also "Pan-America.")
- Pan-Americanism, Efficient*, 187.
- Pan-American Union, 90, 100, 116, 123, 124, 130, 194.
- Paris, Treaty of, 27.
- Patch, A. W., 215, 232.
- Peabody, George Foster, 3.
- Peace (see "International Peace").
- Peace on a War Footing*, 94.
- Peace Problems, Present, and the Preparedness Program*, 143.
- Peace, The Inconsistency of Trying to Enforce*, 131.
- Peace, the Pathway to*, 32.
- Pecuniary claims, International, 37-44, 196; in relation to politics, 37-44; international court needed for adjudication of, 40, 41.
- Pecuniary Claims, International, The Adjustment of: Their Removal from Political to Legal Channels*, 37.
- Peekskill Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- PENFIELD, WALTER S., 232; address by, 195.
- Permanent Court of Arbitration (see "Hague Court").
- Peru, 179; at the Hague Conferences, 200; relations of, with Colombia, 197, with Italy, 200.
- Philadelphia Board of Trade, 215.
- Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Phillips, H. C., 2, 3, 4, 232.
- Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Platform of the 1916 Conference, 4, 8; committee, 2, 204; discussion, 203-206.
- Platt, F. G., 215, 232.
- Poland, 68.
- Poortugael, J. C. C. DenBeer, 80.
- Porter, Horace, 41, 109.
- Porter-Drago Convention, 109.
- Portland Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Portugal and Brazil, 196.
- Poughkeepsie Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- Preface, 4.
- "Preparedness," 60-61, 78-79, 94, 213; arguments against United States program of, 150-153; attitude of United States Congress toward, 152; conservative program of, needed, 218-219; Europe as an example of, 150; historical illustrations of the lack of, 35-36, 70-71; influence of the press, 83-84. (See also "Armaments.")
- Preparedness Crisis, The, and the Limitations of Arbitration Treaties*, 216.
- Preparedness Program, The, and Present Peace Problems*, 143.
- Preparedness, True*, 219.
- Press, the, harmful influence of, 83-84.
- Preston, Elwin G., 3.
- Prize Court, The International, 43.
- PUGSLEY, CHESTER DEWITT, 2, 50, 232; presents treasurer's report, 20.
- Pugsley, Cornelius A., 2, 232.

- Pugsley prizes, for essays on international arbitration, 44.
- PUTNAM, GEORGE HAVEN, 133, 143, 232; address by, 122.
- Race prejudice, the evils of, 169-176.
- Resolutions: general (platform), 4, 8; presented by business men, 214-215.
- Review of Reviews, American, 235.
- Rhoads, George A., 215, 232.
- Richardson, Charles, 3.
- Rines, J. Henry, 215, 232.
- ROBERTS, GEORGE E., 2, 232; address by, 207.
- Rochester Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- ROSE, JOHN C., 2, 31, 89; address by, 20; presents platform, 203.
- Rush-Bagot Agreement, 77. (See also "Great Britain," "United States.")
- Russia, 27, 48, 67, 134; attitude of, toward world federation, 120; relations of, with Finland, 163, with Germany, 68, with Great Britain, 80 (see "Dogger Bank Incident"), with Japan, 212, with United States, 147.
- Ruy Barbosa, M., 80.
- Sanctions, 35; economic pressure, 94-99, 100, 104, 112, 136, 215; non-intercourse, 35, 49, 94-99, 215. (See also "International Police.")
- Schooner *Exchange* case, 15.
- SCOTT, JAMES BROWN, 2, 37, 52, 54, 61, 232; address by, 10.
- Security League, 96.
- Seelye, L. Clark, 2, 232.
- Selden, John, 12.
- Senate, The United States, 41.
- Servia, 68; relations of, with Austria, 116. (See also "European War.")
- Slater, C. Howard, 215, 232.
- SLOCUM, WILLIAM F., 232; address by, 219.
- Smiley, A. K., 4, 137, 216, 227.
- Smiley, A. K. (Junior), 2.
- SMILEY, DANIEL, 2, 4, 9, 10, 20, 54, 100, 177, 187, 227, 245; remarks by 9, 54, 227.
- Smiley, Mrs. Daniel, 4, 9, 10, 177, 187, 227, 245.
- Smyth, Calvin M., 215, 232.
- SNOW, ALPHEUS H., 139, 140, 142, 232; address by, 100.
- Society of Nations, Cooperation versus Compulsion in the Organization of the*, 100.
- Soveral, Marquis de, 80.
- Spain and United States, 41, 46, 47, 73, 109, 196.
- Springfield Board of Trade, 215.
- Stamm, A. C., 215, 232.
- States, Independent, Difficulties in the Way of Applying Rules of Individual Morality to the Relations of*, 20.
- STEINER, EDWARD A., 2, 232; remarks by, 174.
- Supreme Court of United States (see "United States Supreme Court").
- Switzerland, 87.
- Syracuse Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- TAFT, WILLIAM HOWARD, 2, 50, 90, 91, 111, 131, 132, 144, 187, 204, 205, 221; address by, 54; remarks by, 143, 150.
- Taft Arbitration Treaties, 131.
- Taney, Roger Brooke, 31.
- Tolstoy, Count, 32.
- Toronto Board of Trade, 215.
- Trade: dangers of rivalries of, 119, 208-209; effect of war on, 207-212. (See also "Commerce.")

- Treaties: arbitration, 197-198, chronological list of recent, 236; dangers of, 27, 216-217; embodying "Wilson-Bryan Peace Plan," chronological list of, 235; obligations in re aliens, 8, 38, 203-204; of Berlin, 221, of Frankfort, 221, of Friendship, Union, League and Confederation (see "Colombia," "Mexico"), of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 197, of Paris, 27; Rush-Bagot Agreement, 77 (see also "Great Britain," "United States"); should be enforced (see "League to Enforce Peace").
- Triple Alliance, 90, 133. (See also "European War," "League to Enforce Peace.")
- Triple Entente, 48, 90, 120, 133; as a basis for a League to Enforce Peace, 48. (See also "European War," "League to Enforce Peace.")
- TRYON, JAMES L., 139, 232; address by, 108.
- Tucker, W. R., 215, 232.
- Turkey, and Italy, 42.
- Turko-Russian War, 178.
- United States, The, 40, 81, 117, 130, 182; a leader in Pan-Americanism, 181 (see also "Pan-America"); an Asiatic power, 64-65, 185-186; an example of federation, 124, 128, 142; as a Latin American center, 194-195; as a part of League to Enforce Peace, 60, 111, 116, 118-119, 127, 137-138; at the Hague Conferences, 17, 200; attitude of, toward armaments (see "Preparedness"), toward world federation, 120; a world power, 73-75, 122-123; influence of European War on, 129, 133-134, 147, 148-149, 153-154; "open door" policy, 127-128; part of, in Algeciras Conference, 73-74; plan of, for international peace (see "League to Enforce Peace," "Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties"); protection of aliens, 203-204; relations of, with Argentina, 187-188, with Canada, 112, 161, with China, 64, with Colombia, 21-22, 26, 62, 197, with France, 48, 63-64, 147, with Germany 46-47, 65, 84, 144, with Great Britain, 18, 37, 48, 52-53, 65, 77-78, 130, 144, 147, 156, 196, 200, with Italy, 147, with Japan, 64, 84, with Mexico, 22, 36, 42, 65, 196, 197, 200, 201, 209, 238-239, with Russia, 147, with Spain, 41, 46, 47, 73, 109, 196, with Venezuela, 200; responsibility of, toward peace, 99.
- United States, and Latin America, and Europe and Latin America, international understanding between, compared, 187-195. (See also "Pan-America.")
- United States Bureau of Education, 192.
- United States Chamber of Commerce, 95-96, 215; peace referendum of, 99.
- United States Congress, 213; attitude of, toward "Preparedness" program, 152. (See also "United States Senate."),
- United States Constitution, 81, 154, 170, 218; as opposed to the League to Enforce Peace, 61-63, 113, 117, 146.
- United States Declaration of Independence, 11-12, 13, 15.
- United States of Europe, 132.
- United States Senate, 41. (See also "United States Congress.")
- United States Supreme Court, 57, 114, 173, 217; fundamental pro-

- visions in establishment of, a basis for international court, 14-17, 19, 114-115.
- Universal Postal Union, example of an international organ, 18.
- Uruguay, and Italy, 197.
- Van Arsdale, N. H., 3, 232.
- Van Kleeck, Henry, 215, 232.
- Van Vollenhoven, Prof. C., 110-111, 113, 114, 117; plan of, 110-111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120. (See also "League to Enforce Peace.")
- Venezuela: at the Hague Conferences, 200; Boundary Dispute, 53; Preferential Treatment Case, 200; relations of, with United States, 200.
- "Vital interests," 211-212. (See also "National honor.")
- Von Jagow, Herr, 59-60, 84.
- Waite, Morrison Remich, 15.
- WAMBAUGH, EUGENE, 232; address by, 153.
- War: effect of, on economics, 207-212; influence of, on commerce, 161-162. (See also "European War.")
- War, an International Agreement for Emergencies Arising in,* 153.
- War, the Economic Motive as a Factor in,* 207.
- Weston, S. F., 234.
- Westphalia, Treaty of, 47.
- White, A. D., 73-74, 204.
- White, Edward D., 218.
- Whittelsey, E. L., 215, 233.
- Wickware, Francis G., 3, 233.
- William II, Kaiser, 84, 85.
- Wilmington Chamber of Commerce, 215.
- "Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties," 112, 140, 141, 145, 147-148, 197-198, 217; chronological list of, 235-236.
- Wilson, George Grafton, 2, 233.
- Wilson, Woodrow, 24, 25, 80, 94, 95, 130, 144, 172.
- Wood, Alexander C., 2, 3, 215, 233.
- Wood, James, 3.
- Woodruff, Clinton Rogers, 3, 233.
- World Court (see "International Court of Justice").
- World Peace Foundation, 50.
- World State, a, 48-49, 89, 92, 100, 110, 116, 173; and international arbitration, 123.

